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Abstract
The central question of this thesis is how the internationalisation of corporate activity 
has changed the commercial policy preferences of Japanese corporations. Using case 
studies of the automobile, electronics and textile industries, and of Keidanren — the 
peak federation of big business —, this thesis tests the hypothesis that as firms 
strengthen international linkages in the form of multinational operations and 
international corporate alliances, they become more committed to trade liberalisation of 
the global market, including the market at home. Testing this hypothesis helps to enrich 
the study of corporate preferences on trade policy issues. The study in the Japanese 
context is particularly important because it is often presumed that Japan has different 
institutional settings from these of other industrial countries, and maintains close 
business-government relationships. Evidence of a link between change in corporate 
policy preferences and internationalisation of industry provides a strong test of the 
hypothesis.
Japanese corporations have intensified their stance on opening the domestic 
market as their international operations have expanded. Growing multinational 
operations appear to be the major reason why internationally oriented automotive and 
electronics producers have committed themselves to promoting the opening up of 
keiretsu groups as well as market access for foreign products from the late 1980s. In the 
textile industry, apparel makers opposed import restrictions because of their overseas 
operations and intra-firm trade. Towel manufacturers also opposed restrictions on 
imports of cotton yarn because they were users of imported yam. As Japanese 
corporations expanded their international corporate activity, Keidanren strengthened its 
anti-protectionst stance over agricultural trade. Its activities for creating a more open 
Japanese market also extended from border measures such as the improvement in 
standards and certification systems in the 1980s to deregulation, as well as to inward 
investment policies in the 1990s.
The study reveals the complexity of the relationship between the 
internationalisation of corporate activity and firms’ policy preferences in Japan. Large 
textile producers did not oppose import restrictions in spite of their international links. 
Their preferences stemmed from their desire to maintain their strong linkages with 
subcontracting weaving houses. In contrast to other industrialised countries, intra­
industry divisions resulting from differences in the degree of internationalisation 
appeared less apparent in Japanese industry. This is partly because Japanese 
corporations entered international operations at the same time as a result of a sharp 
appreciation of the yen and intensifying trade friction, and partly because industrial 
associations played a significant role in coordinating interests among their member 
corporations.
The Japanese government is often seen as a strong force leading the private sector 
to its policy objectives. However, in respect of the trade policy issues examined in this 
thesis, the preferences of the private sector have also influenced changes in trade policy. 
The effectiveness of government initiatives has often depended on the explicit or tacit 
preferences of the private sector.
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1 Japanese Multinational Corporations and Trade 
Policy
Japan has become the second biggest economic power in the world. Its economic 
activities have an enormous influence on its major economic partners as well as on the 
world economy. In spite of Japan’s huge economic power, the internationalisation of 
Japanese corporations does not have a long history.1 Although Japanese corporations 
penetrated overseas markets through exports in the 1970s, multinational production on a 
large scale in manufacturing is a relatively recent development. Some sectors such as 
textiles and electronics commenced overseas production before the 1980s, but full scale 
multinational production started in the mid 1980s triggered by rapid appreciation of the 
yen, a desire to avoid trade friction with developed countries, and promotion of 
globalisation strategies. Between 1983 and 1989, outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by Japanese manufacturing firms expanded sharply from US$2.6 billion to 
US$16.3 billion (Table 1.1). Expanding multinational operations created a network of 
trade flows within firms. The share of exports shipped to foreign affiliates in total 
exports by Japanese manufacturing parent companies grew from 29.9 per cent in 1983 
to 49.5 per cent in 1992, while the share of imports shipped by overseas affiliates in 
total imports to Japanese manufacturing parent companies rose from 20.9 per cent to 
37.4 per cent in the same period. Japanese manufacturing firms have also deepened 
their ties with foreign companies through the creation of various webs of international 
corporate alliances.
International economic interdependence may not necessarily lead to the 
strengthening of support for open trade. It often increases the incentives for some firms 
to demand protectionist measures by exposing them to further competition with foreign 
rivals. But heightened interdependence may make some internationally oriented firms 
represented by multinational corporations (MNCs) more interested in open trade and
The term ‘internationalisation’ is broadly defined as a process of international exchange and 
interdependence. International exchange means the movement across national boundaries of 
goods, capital, information, people, and so on. Inderdependence refers to the development of 
interlocking relationships brought about by increased international exchange (Ogata 1992, p.63). 
The concern in this thesis is the internationalisation of corporate activity such as foreign direct 
investment, overseas production, and international corporate alliances.
less tolerant of closed markets at home.2 A closed home market may disadvantage 
these firms because it provokes retaliation against their overseas operations (Milner 
1988, p.23). Closure of the home market may also disrupt trade flows between MNCs 
and their overseas subsidiaries. Hence, it is probable that internationally oriented firms 
have a preference for policies which promote the opening of their home markets. This 
generalisation might be applied to the experience of Japanese industries and 
corporations.
Table 1.1 Internationalisation of Japanese Manufacturing Firms, 1980-93
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1993
FDI (US$ billion) 1.7 2.6 3.8 16.3 10.1 11.1
Intra-firm exports (%) 16.4 29.9 39.2 41.1 49.5 50.1
Intra-firm imports (%) 32.5 20.9 23.4 30.9 37.4 30.3
Overseas production (%) 2.9 3.9 3.2 5.7 6.2 7.4
Note: The figures in intra-firm exports and intra-firm imports are a percentage proportion of exports
to and imports by overseas affiliates in total exports to and imports by Japanese 
manufacturing parent companies.
Sources: Ministry of Finance. Kokusai kinyukyoku nenpo [Annual Report of International Finance 
Bureau] 1994, pp.420-21; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Kaigai toshi tokei 
soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], No.l-No.5; Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry, Dai 24 kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo [The 24th Survey on 
Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms] 1995.
This study hypothesises that as Japanese corporations intensify international 
linkages in the form of multinational operations and international corporate alliances, 
they have more interest in the openness of the Japanese market. This hypothesis is 
tested through examination of Japanese corporations’ preferences for liberalisation of 
the Japanese market. This study seeks to answer several questions on the relationship 
between the internationalisation of Japanese corporations’ activity and their preferences 
on trade policy. How have Japanese corporations changed their trade policy preferences 
as a result of their international activity? Have they strengthened their preference for 
open trade abroad and at home? What effects have changes in Japanese corporations’ 
preferences had on Japan’s trade policy and trade relations with foreign countries?
A MNC is defined as a corporation that ‘controls and manages production establishments —  
plants —  located in at least two countries’ (Caves 1982, p .l).
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A study of the policy preferences of Japanese corporations and their effects on 
trade policy has theoretical implications. The formation of a nation’s trade policy is an 
outcome of a struggle among domestic interest groups, the national government and the 
national conception of public interest, and foreign actors (Milner 1988, p.l). A study of 
trade policy formation thus needs to examine the activities of these actors and 
interactions between them in the policy-making process. Although the role and 
activities of bureaucrats and politicians in trade policy formation in Japan have been 
explored extensively, those of the private sector have not been thoroughly examined in 
previous studies.3 So far, much of the research on corporate policy preferences has 
focused on American firms and their corporate demands on government.4 Little 
attention has been paid to the case of Japan. The interest in Japanese corporations has 
been largely confined to study of their corporate strategy and management skills. While 
many studies have been undertaken of the interaction between business and government 
in Japan, most of them have tended to discuss the issue of how the government controls 
and administers the private sector. There are fewer studies that deal with the influence 
of corporate preferences on government policy or which examine the formation and 
evolution of the trade policy preferences of Japanese corporations. This study seeks to 
shed more light on these issues and fill the gap.
CAUSES OF MARKET OPENING IN JAPAN
The Japanese government has become more eager to promote market access for foreign 
firms and goods since the early 1980s, implementing various measures towards this 
end. In addition to successive market opening packages in the 1980s, several 
deregulation programs have been announced in the 1990s.5 New tax systems and loans 
programs have sought to promote inward investment as well as imports.6 The Japanese
3 For the depiction of the trade policy formation in Japan, see Higashi (1983). For an examination
of interactions among actors on trade policy in Japan, see Ötake (1979, chap.3), Kusano (1983) 
and NIRA (1989).
4 For instance, see Aggarwal, Keohane and Yoffie (1987), Milner (1987, 1988), and Milner and 
Yoffie (1989).
5 Seven major market opening programs were implemented between 1982 and 1985. The Japanese 
government announced four deregulation programs between 1993 and 1995.
6 The import promotion tax system for manufactured products introduced in 1990 allows 
manufacturers to deduct 5 per cent tax of increase in import amount, and wholesalers and retailers 
are allowed to deduct 20 per cent tax. In 1984, the Japan Development Bank began low rate loans
3
government has also adopted a relatively liberal stance, without taking protectionist 
measures in import competing industries such as textiles, steel and petro-chemicals. In 
the textile industry, for instance, the government has resisted the demand by textile 
circles to protect the industry under the umbrella of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA).
What factors have driven these open market policies? Sometimes these policy 
approaches are explained in terms of foreign pressure and strong government initiatives. 
Some scholars refer to Japan as a ‘reactive state’ or a nation lacking a political power 
centre (Calder 1988b; van Wolferen 1989).7 This interpretation sees Japan as unlikely 
to formulate independent economic policies without external pressure.
Other scholars of the Japanese political economy presume that the bureaucracy 
has played a dominant role in shaping and implementing economic policy in Japan.8 
According to this view, the central bureaucracy is capable of formulating economic 
policy through its own initiative, and the private sector follows suit. In this conception, 
market liberalisation is a result of bureaucratic leadership.
Quite a few policies designed to open up the Japanese market have been adopted 
as a consequence of pressure from foreign countries, especially the United States.9 The 
Japanese government adopted various schemes to open up the Japanese market by 
accepting US demands.10 But foreign pressure alone hardly seems sufficient to explain 
the whole picture of the trend towards market opening in Japan. As Tanaka (1989, 
pp.28-31) argues, the United States and China may have successfully exerted pressure 
on Japan, but other countries have rarely attained their objectives by such pressure. 
Japan has often successfully transformed the agenda of those external forces advocating
for companies establishing distribution institutions and other equipment for imports. The Export- 
Import Bank of Japan also commenced special loans for Japanese importers, users of imported 
goods and foreign exporters in 1984.
A reactive state means a nation where ‘the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by 
outside pressure’ (Calder 1988b, p.518).
8 For this view, see Vogel (1978), Pempel (1982) and Johnson (1982,1989). Their assertions will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
9 The US demand for market opening has escalated since the early 1980s both because US trade 
deficits with Japan grew and because the Japanese market has become a profitable large market as 
a consequence of the sharp yen appreciation.
10 The major examples are the Market Oriented Sector Specific (MOSS) negotiations in 1986 and 
the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in 1989 and 1990.
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change into more acceptable directions to the Japanese government. This result has 
been one of a blended response of concession and non-compliance (George 1991, p.16). 
For example, the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks yielded mixed results in 
the various issue-areas.11 In some areas, there were significant concessions (the 
savings-investment balances and the distribution system); in others, there was little or 
no concession (exclusionary business practices and keiretsu relationships), although the 
US interest was strong in the latter issues (Schoppa 1993).
Certainly, bureaucratic initiatives have been vital in promoting market 
liberalisation and overcoming domestic resistance. Yet bureaucratic leadership alone is 
insufficient to explain the recent tide towards market opening. As argued in Chapter 3, 
recent studies of the Japanese political economy challenge the view that the bureaucracy 
dominates economic policy making. Bureaucratic power is believed to have gradually 
declined because of the diversity of public policy objectives, a relative shift in power 
from bureaucrats to politicians, and rising foreign criticism of the government’s 
interventionist policy. The opponents of the bureaucracy-dominant view assert that the 
private sector has played a critical role in shaping government policy.12
In addition, the main target of criticism of the closed Japanese market has shifted 
from official barriers to trade to non-official practices and institutions such as the 
Japanese economic structure and business organisations which limit access to the 
market. Control over these factors is significantly in the possession of the private sector. 
Even if the government urges the private sector to promote market access, the success 
of government initiatives is ultimately dependent on private actors able to provide 
foreign firms with opportunities for entering the market (ACCJ 1993, p.2). Hence, 
consideration of the stance and actions of private actors is necessary for adequate 
analyses of market access issues.
This study tries to explain the contribution of ‘corporate policy preference’ in the 
policy shift towards market liberalisation. Among American scholars of trade politics
11 In the SII talks, the Japanese and US governments identified several issue areas for reform. Six 
areas were raised on the Japanese side: the price mechanism, the distribution system, the savings- 
investment balances, land policy reform, exclusionary business practices, and keiretsu 
relationships.
12 For example, see Kitayama (1985), Rosenbluth (1989), and Mason (1992).
5
who have examined the effects of corporate preferences on trade policy, Milner (1987; 
1988) is the most prominent. In her case studies of US and French industries, Milner 
(1987, p.664) concludes that:
[A]spects of increased international interdependence have wrought changes in the trade 
policy preferences of industries. Strengthened international economic ties in the form of 
exports, multinationality, and global intra-firm trade have raised the costs of protection 
for internationally oriented firms. These firms have thus resisted seeking protection even 
in times of serious import competition.
A crucial aspect of Milner’s findings is that international economic 
interdependence has changed corporate policy preferences in advanced industrial 
economies in a similar way to that which she showed to be the case in the United States 
and France. Rising interdependence should have similar effects on Japanese 
corporations, if this is indeed the case. Rising international ties of Japanese corporations 
in the form of multinational operations, intra-firm trade, and various forms of 
international corporate alliances are likely to enhance the interest in the openness of the 
Japanese market. These altered corporate policy preferences are expected to facilitate 
the market access of foreign products and promote market liberalisation in Japan.
This is somewhat at odds with the common perception of policy making in Japan. 
Some scholars doubt the influence of Japanese corporations in policy making. Lincoln 
(1986 p.166) contends that ‘[n]ot being truly international in outlook, Japanese 
multinationals do not seem to have put much pressure on the government to reduce 
investment barriers as a quid pro quo for their own advance overseas’, in his argument 
objecting to the view that Japanese multinationals take a pragmatic stance in desiring 
fewer barriers. In the same vein, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) suggests 
that although many multinational enterprises are increasingly ‘multi’ and less ‘national’ 
than in the past, this is less true of Japanese corporations because ‘formal government 
policies and informal administrative guidance — as well as the signals effectively 
embedded in the structure of business networks — have encouraged companies to 
consider and act in the national interest’ (OTA 1993, p.14).
These views are based on the conception that Japanese industries have developed 
in close collaboration with the home government and that Japanese firms maintain tight 
inter-corporate relationships among domestic firms. While there may be some truth in 
these assumptions, it is also true that Japanese corporations have only relatively recently
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embarked on overseas operations, and their overseas activities are expanding very 
rapidly. A new free-trade coalition consisting of general trading companies, large retail 
chains, business federations represented by Keidanren (a peak business federation), and 
internationally oriented bureaucracies like the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) has emerged and has an increasing influence on the policy-making 
process and policy outcomes on trade policy (Calder 1982; Okimoto 1988). These 
actors are committed to opposing protectionist trade policies and facilitating the access 
of foreign goods and firms to the Japanese market.13 It is likely, therefore, that 
Japanese MNCs with intensive links to the world economy, have strengthened the 
orientation towards open trade, and represent this preference to the government through 
the activities of industrial associations and Keidanren.
RESEARCH APPROACH
This study argues that increased internationalisation has modified Japanese firms’ 
preferences in favour of open trade in world markets and liberalisation of the domestic 
market. This argument will be tested through case studies at the national as well as 
sectoral levels. The degree and character of internationalisation differ in each industry. 
The market structure and relationship to government agencies, which constitute 
important factors shaping firms’ policy preferences, are also different across industries. 
There are also different corporate preferences within industries. These differences need 
to be examined carefully in case studies. There need to be sufficient case studies to 
allow cross-sectoral comparison and robust generalisations. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, the peak business federations, especially Keidanren, play an important role 
in representing business interests to government and the community in Japan. The 
preferences of internationally oriented firms on overall trade policy are delivered to the 
government primarily through the activities of Keidanren. Accordingly, the 
representation of corporate preferences through Keidanren is examined.
13 As will be shown in Chapter 7, since the early 1980s, Keidanren has submitted a host of 
recommendations designed to improve administrative procedures regarding imports, and to open 
Japan’s agricultural trade. MITI has changed its stance from restraining to promoting market 
access of foreign goods and firms, shown in the acceptance of a number of foreign firms to its 
research institutes or a pledge of programs designed to expand imports (Ozawa 1986).
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The thesis does not aim to provide a complete account of the development of 
firms’ trade policy preferences. It primarily focuses on the influence of 
internationalisation on firms’ preferences, although it considers other factors such as 
those deriving from the character of each industry. The study seeks to demonstrate that 
corporate preferences have effects on policy formulation and policy implementation. 
But this does not mean that other factors such as government initiatives are 
insignificant, or that corporate policy preferences dominate.
It is hoped that this research will contribute to the study of international political 
economy in several ways. The research aims to unpack the black box of domestic 
politics influencing Japan’s commercial policy. Detailed analysis of these issues will 
help to explain how domestic politics affect a state’s international relations. In addition, 
the study makes a contribution to the broader debate on business-government relations 
in Japan. Examination of the influence of corporate preferences in trade policy 
formation involves exploring the relations between government agencies and major 
business actors. By focusing on this relationship in the formulation of market 
liberalisation in an era when the Japanese economy has integrated more tightly into the 
global economy, the study should add new insights to the understanding of business- 
government relations in Japan.
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The aim of this study is to investigate the evolution of trade policy preferences of 
Japanese corporations and their effects on trade policy. Chapter 2 introduces a 
hypothesis about corporate trade policy preferences. It reviews the relevant literature on 
trade policy determinants in general and anti-protectionist corporate preferences in 
particular. It provides a rationale for anti-protectionist corporate preferences. Based on 
the literature review, it sets out the hypothesis that as Japanese corporations have 
intensified international activity in the form of multinational operations and 
international corporate alliances, they have had more interest in an open domestic 
market. The chapter also explains the research method — a case study method at the 
sectoral and national levels.
8
Chapter 3 explains the influence of business on Japanese policy making. As long 
as firms’ trade policy preferences are embedded in policy making through the political 
process, it is necessary, before undertaking detailed case studies, to examine institutions 
through which business wields influence on the government. This chapter identifies two 
institutions, zaikai and gyokai, and explains their interface with bureaucrats and 
politicians. The chapter also reviews the literature on the role that business plays in 
formulating and implementing economic policy in Japan.
Chapter 4 presents an initial sectoral case study — on the automobile industry. 
Two aspects are highlighted for testing the hypothesis linking internationalisation of 
corporate activity to changing firms’ trade policy preferences. One is the effect of 
internationalisation on inter-corporate institutions, keiretsu groups. Supplier and 
distribution keiretsu have been criticised for impeding the market access of foreign 
products. This chapter considers how automakers, which have expanded their 
international operations, have shifted their stance on keiretsu groups and what actions 
they have undertaken to transform them. The other aspect this chapter looks at is the 
changes in trade policy stance of the automakers by examining their reactions to the 
government’s market opening policies.
In Chapter 5, the electronics industry is taken up. This industry, like the 
automobile industry, has undergone a thoroughgoing internationalisation with 
complicated webs of corporate alliances in high technology fields as well as extensive 
foreign investment. It examines what influence internationalisation has had on the 
electronics firms’ stance on import restrictions as well as market opening policies. 
Special attention is paid to the US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement, revealing how 
firms’ stance on market access has evolved and what effect this has had on the 
implementation of the arrangement.
Unlike the previous two chapters, Chapter 6 tests the hypothesis by using the case 
of an import competing industry. The Japanese textile industry has suffered from a 
surge of imports since the mid 1980s, leading major industrial associations to call on 
the government to introduce import restriction measures. By investigating how various 
industrial associations with different international ties react to such a move, it explores 
the relations between the internationalisation of corporate activities and its effect on
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firms’ trade policy preferences. This chapter pays attention to the large textile 
producers’ stance on import restrictions, analysing the complex motivations of these 
firms on import restrictions.
Keidanren, the peak federation of big business, is the focus of Chapter 7. 
Keidanren is the most influential business lobby. The influence of internationally 
oriented firms is most likely to be integrated into government policy through the 
activities of Keidanren. This chapter examines the development of Keidanren’s views 
and activities on several trade policy issues. This analysis reveals how Keidanren’s 
posture and commitment have evolved as Japanese industry has become interlinked 
with the international economy.
Chapter 8 evaluates the evidence on firms’ policy preferences in the case studies, 
and asks whether Japanese corporations have strengthened their open trade stance as 
their international linkages have deepened. It also takes a look at the character of trade 
policy preferences specific to the Japanese case. The case of Japan is placed within the 
context of broader debate on international and comparative political economy in order 
to demonstrate its wider theoretical implications. The limitations of the study are 
discussed and suggestions are made regarding areas for further research.
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2 The Rise of Multinational Corporations and Policy 
Preferences
What effect does international economic interdependence have on firms’ trade policy 
preferences? Heightened interdependence has exposed firms to more competition with 
foreign rivals, and has often led domestically oriented firms to demand that the 
government introduce protectionist measures. At the same time, rising interdependence 
has produced firms whose global operations are deeply integrated into the world 
economy. Such internationally oriented firms, represented by multinational corporations 
(MNCs), have brought about quantitative and qualitative changes in international trade 
through foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI has promoted the industrialisation of 
recipient countries through a transfer of capital and technology, creating additional 
trade. A large portion of this trade occurs in the manufacturing sector, and raises levels 
of intra-industry trade. FDI by MNCs has also promoted intra-firm trade.
Because of their tight linkages with the international economy, MNCs are said to 
have more interest in resisting the demand for protection and maintaining the stability 
and openness of the international trading system. They fear that protection at home will 
kindle retaliatory measures towards their operations abroad (Milner 1988, p.23). In 
addition, closure of the home market puts internationally oriented firms in a 
disadvantageous position compared to domestically oriented firms. While 
internationally oriented firms may incur new costs of trade barriers, domestically 
oriented firms experience little or no effect. Furthermore, the increase in intra-firm 
trade means that closure of the home market is likely to hamper MNCs’ trade 
ambitions.
This research seeks to examine whether interdependence of corporate activities 
has changed the trade policy stance of Japanese corporations towards a preference for 
an open domestic market. As a prelude, this chapter reviews the literature on firms’ 
trade policy preferences and their effect on trade policy. This provides the foundation 
for the analysis of detailed case studies in later chapters. This chapter also sets out the 
approach adopted in the study.
In the first section, the literature on trade policy determinants and corporate 
preferences favouring open trade policy is reviewed. The next two sections provide 
support for the argument that firms with intensive international ties have less
protectionist preferences than do more domestically oriented firms. The second section 
explores the nature of MNCs and their global intra-firm trade, while the third section 
focuses on the rise in corporate alliances as supporting evidence. The fourth section lays 
out the model that in later applies to Japanese industry. The final section explains the 
research method adopted in the study.
CORPORATE PREFERENCES ON TRADE POLICY 
The determinants of trade policy
There is a voluminous literature on the determinants of trade policy. It is broadly 
divided into two approaches: the state-centric and societal-centric approaches. These 
approaches are not mutually exclusive, but provide conflicting explanations of the 
relative importance of the determinants of trade policy. The state-centric approach 
allows priority to policymakers’ decisions and national political institutions in 
determining trade policy. Some political scientists highlight the role of policymakers in 
explaining trade policy formation (Krasner 1978a; Nordlinger 1981). This view 
postulates that public officials are not mere intermediaries for societal interest groups. 
They can, by withstanding societal pressure, maintain autonomy to pursue their own 
policy goals.1 Others emphasise the role of domestic institutions in trade policy 
formation (Katzenstein 1978b; Goldstein 1988; Mares 1990). According to this view, 
not only do political institutions create the particular social order but also constitute the 
filter through which the demands from societal actors are transformed into policies. The 
political behaviour of societal actors responds to the constraints and opportunities 
offered by these institutions (Odell 1990, p.153). Hence, political institutions and 
institutional changes are the key variables in determining the patterns and shifts of trade 
policy.
The societal-centric approach links general economic conditions and pressure 
group demands to trade policy formation. This approach regards trade policy as the 
product of competition among societal interest groups which react to changes in market 
conditions. Macroeconomic factors are often cited as important variables. Employment
For example, Nordlinger (1981, p.203) argues that ‘the democratic state is frequently autonomous 
in translating its own preferences into authoritative actions, and markedly autonomous in doing so 
even when they diverge from those held by the politically weightiest groups in civil society’.
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is the most important macroeconomic factor in accounting for the demand for 
protection (Takacs 1981; Bergstem and Cline 1983, pp.77-82). When unemployment is 
high, workers face difficulties in finding alternative jobs and experience downward 
pressure on their wages. Widespread unemployment imposes severe adjustment costs on 
domestic workers resulting from rising imports, and an increase in imports tends to lead 
to demands for protection. Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) raise variations in the 
exchange rate as the most important macroeconomic determinant of protection. They 
argue that appreciation of the dollar leads to demand for protection because the 
overvalued currency undermines the competitiveness of exports and import competing 
sectors by raising the price of domestically produced goods. The overvalued dollar in 
the early 1980s, they conclude, was a major cause of the US trade imbalance and the 
rise in protectionist pressure.2
Other studies have focused on firms’ preferences in shaping trade policy. 
Theoretical and empirical research explores why industries and firms demand 
protection. It is generally held that demand for protection arises out of the rent-seeking 
behaviour of firms. Firms ask for protection if they believe that they can obtain excess 
rents from the imposition of quantitative restrictions and tariffs (Krueger 1974; 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980; Bhagwati 1982). Other scholars argue that industries 
facing a comparative disadvantage — normally the labour-intensive industries in 
developed countries — seek to exert political pressure on government to adopt 
protectionist measures against foreign imports (Caves 1976; Ray 1981).
Other research on firms’ preferences demonstrates the influence of industries’ 
characteristics on firms’ policy preferences and policy outcomes. It is generally 
accepted that the smaller the number of firms in an industry, the greater the industry 
gains in favourable policy outcomes. This is because the small groups are more likely to 
overcome the free rider problem and to raise the benefits per firm from policy influence 
(Olson 1965). Other studies suggest that an industry’s geographic concentration is 
positively related to its success in lobbying for protection (Pincus 1975). This is
In addition to the state-centric and societal-centric approaches, there are structural approaches to 
trade policy. These approaches view trade policy as a product of the international structure of 
which state is a unit. The hegemonic stability thesis, the representative theory of the structural 
approaches, posits that an openness of the international trading system arises when a hegemon 
with a strong free trade preference dominates the world economy (Krasner 1976).
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because greater geographic concentration improves the ability of an industry to 
communicate and coordinate the benefits of actions (Pincus 1975, p.774).3
Aggarwal, Keohane and Yoffie (1987) explore why different patterns of 
protectionism — what they call institutionalised, temporary, and sporadic — have 
evolved in the negotiation of trade barriers. They explain these different patterns by the 
characteristics of industries: institutionalised protectionism results when large scale 
industries face low barriers to entry and have few exit options; temporary protectionism 
appears in industries that are small and where exist is easy; and sporadic protectionism 
emerges when barriers to entry are high. Milner and Yoffie (1989) also focus on 
industrial characteristics that affect types of policy demand. While industries where the 
majority of firms have similar competitive strategies tend to demand strategic trade 
policy, highly segmented industries which face rapid erosion of market position 
generally favour unconditional protection.4
Anti-protectionist policy preferences
Previous studies of firms’ trade policy preferences tended to focus on the subject of 
why and how domestic societal actors demand protection. In recent years, some 
scholars have focused on domestic political forces that oppose protection and that 
favour pro-liberal trade policy initiatives. These scholars posit that rising economic 
interdependence has strengthened the international ties of some firms in the form of 
exports, multinational operations, and intra-firm trade, and thereby motivated 
internationally oriented firms to shift their preferences against protectionist measures in 
favour of more liberalised trade policies.
Milner (1987; 1988) is representative of this perspective. She explores the 
relationship between firms’ pro-liberal policy preferences and domestic trade politics. 
Milner’s analysis starts with an historical puzzle: why did major industrial sectors of
There are other industry characteristics which influence policy outcomes such as the industry’s 
size, the degree of industry concentration, the number of workers, the average wage level, and so 
on.
Unlike the literature cited above, which regards firms and sectors as the unit of analysis, 
Rogowski (1989) focuses on factors as the explanatory unit of a country’s trade policy. He argues 
that changes in countries’ trade policy can be explained by the patterns of political cleavages 
produced by the different factor endowments of those countries.
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advanced economies stay open in the 1970s in spite of economic and political 
turbulence similar to that of the 1920s when disastrous trade war occurred? In order to 
resolve this puzzle, Milner compares an industry’s trade policy preferences derived 
from the degree of international linkages, and their effects on the domestic policy 
process among eighteen industries in the United States during the 1920s and 1970s and 
in France during the 1970s. Her research selects two aspects of industry as independent 
variables: one is the extent of export dependence deriving from an industry’s net trade 
position and its percentage of exports to production, and the other is the nature and 
degree of multinationality resulting from a proportion of foreign relative to domestic 
assets and the degree and direction of intra-firm trade. She selects firms’ trade policy 
preferences as dependent variables, and these are examined through the industries’ 
lobbying of Congress and executive agencies.
She finds differences in trade policy preferences among industries: industries with 
limited export dependence and few multinational operations (type I) tended to seek 
protection when facing serious import pressure; those that depended more on exports 
but with less overseas production (type II) were less protectionist than those in type I; 
industries with significant export dependence and extensive multinational operations 
(type III) were likely to be least protectionist and showed durable interest in continued 
openness even at a time of strong import penetration at home; and those with little 
export dependence but substantial multinational operations (type IV) were less 
protectionist than type I and favoured selective protection against particular countries 
and/or products (Milner 1988, pp.222-36). Based on these differences in corporate 
preferences, Milner concludes that rising international economic interdependence in the 
post World War II period made protectionism a less viable option for certain firms that 
had extensive linkages with the world economy.
Milner also suggests that trade policy preferences of industries exerted a crucial 
influence on trade policy outcomes, noting that ‘in none of the eighteen cases were 
industries accorded protection when they, or substantial parts of them, did not desire it’, 
and ‘in many cases when industries demanded changes in trade barriers, they were able 
to obtain them’ (Milner 1988, p.258). The crucial point here is that all the industries 
Milner examined were facing serious import competition. Even in such industries, 
internationally oriented firms favoured an open domestic market. As Odell (1990,
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p. 146) asserts, a liberal trade policy preference is more likely for globalised industries 
with an internationally competitive edge.
The politics of international trade with respect to anti-protectionism have also 
been examined by other scholars. Destler and Odell (1987) analyse the anti­
protectionist political activities of various interest groups in the United States. By using 
empirical evidence from 14 product-specific trade cases, they conclude that actors who 
carried out anti-protectionist political activities and sometimes obtained effective results 
were economic groups with specific interests in open trade: exporting companies, 
manufacturing companies dependent on imported input, retailers selling imported goods 
in the United States, and foreign governments and firms. These groups bore the most 
immediate costs of import barriers.
Ferguson (1984) links the development of firms’ multinational operations and a 
rise in the free trade trend in the pre-World War II period. His research finds that the 
political force which provided a basis for promoting free trade in Roosevelt’s Second 
New Deal was the political coalition between capital-intensive industries and 
multinationally oriented firms, not the traditional supporters of the Democratic party, 
the workers, blacks and poor. Bhagwati (1988, chap.4) also explains the emergence of 
pro-liberal and anti-protectionist interests in terms of the recent phenomenon of rising 
interdependence. He argues that production webs created by intra-industry criss­
crossing investments have encouraged MNCs to oppose protectionism at home in order 
to avoid a possible outbreak of protection elsewhere. He also contends that the potential 
of FDI has created pro-trade interests because it has undermined protection by 
providing an alternative to this as a form of adjustment to import competition.5
Milner and Yoffie (1989) seek to explain MNCs’ strategic demand for trade 
barriers in the home market. They argue that US high-technology industries have 
moved away from supporting unconditional free trade to favouring free trade at home 
only if they can obtain free trade abroad. This shift stems from the fact that under 
conditions of large economies of scale or significant learning effects, access to foreign 
markets and the behaviour of foreign firms and governments have a crucial impact on
Vernon (1982), Lipson (1982), and Strange (1985) also argue that MNCs have interests in reduced 
trade barriers and oppose protectionist measures.
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the profitability of the domestic industry. Milner and Yoffie develop the study of 
MNCs’ trade policy preferences, suggesting that MNCs will favour trade barriers for 
their home markets under certain conditions. They do not deny that MNCs are 
fundamentally in favour of an open trade policy. This argument is confirmed by Nollen 
and Quinn (1994) who examine the voting patterns in the US Congress. They find that 
the legislators who receive contributions from the political action committee of 
international corporations tend to oppose protectionist trade policy, although they are 
also in favour of fair trade.
Along somewhat different lines, Frieden (1991) suggests a similar relationship 
between capital mobility and national economic policies. He argues that increased 
financial integration has a differential impact on domestic actors: while the owners of 
financial assets and MNCs derive benefits from integration, some producers in specific 
sectors suffer disadvantage from integration. As a consequence, the former tend to 
encourage international market integration, whereas the latter show an ambivalent or 
hostile attitude towards it.
Some economists, employing regression analysis, have examined the correlation 
between multinational operations, resultant intra-firm trade, on the one hand, and trade 
policy outcomes, on the other. Pugel and Walter (1985) conduct a micro-political test of 
a company’s position on trade policy issues, examining the relationship between US 
firms’ positions on trade liberalisation and three factors: the intensity of import 
competition, the benefits deriving from foreign markets, and the capabilities for 
adjustment during the 1970s. They conclude that a firm that gains more benefits from 
access to foreign markets or that has more product diversification is more likely to 
favour trade liberalising legislation, while a firm facing stronger import pressure tends 
to oppose liberalising legislation. Other studies at the aggregate industry level differ 
subtly in their results regarding the effects of multinationality or intra-firm trade on 
policy outcomes. While Baldwin (1985, pp. 150-72) finds that policy outcomes were 
little influenced by the level of FDI, Lavergne (1983, pp. 153-54) suggests that intra­
firm trade had little effect on tariff levels.
Several scholars have examined the influence of firms’ trade policy preferences in 
multilateral negotiations and regional integration schemes. Ostry (1990, chap.2) argues
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that US private-sector advisory committees played a critical role in setting up the new 
agenda for multilateral negotiations on services and trade-related intellectual property 
rights as well as pressing for lower trade barriers in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). Rugman and Verbeke (1990) suggest that MNCs supported these 
negotiations and the implementation of free trade argument because trade liberalisation 
and regulatory standardisation attained in free trade agreements enable them to compete 
with their foreign rivals on a more equal footing.
MNCS AND TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES
MNCs are the major actors with an interest in reduced trade barriers at home as well as 
in foreign markets, and in preventing recourse to protectionism. This preference is 
explained by both the characteristics of MNCs in operating across national borders and 
the global intra-firm trade they conduct
MNCs and pro-liberal preferences
MNCs with operations in several nations are likely to resist appeals for protectionism 
and to favour open trade policies. This preference can be accounted for by several 
factors deriving from their characteristics as globally operating firms. In the first place, 
MNCs generally gain more benefits from policies which reduce barriers to trade and 
investment flows. MNCs are basically trade-oriented both because foreign production is 
impossible without some trade in intermediate products and because MNCs’ value- 
added activities are directed to create or divert trade in goods and resources (Dunning 
1993, p.402). Accordingly, lower trade barriers allow them to achieve higher profits 
resulting from more economic activities based on multinational corporate ties. In 
addition, not only do MNCs account for a large portion of exports but their imports tend 
to be concentrated on primary and intermediate products (Lavergne 1983, p.105).6 As 
some studies suggest, firms that depend on extensive exports or imports of intermediate 
inputs are more likely to be in favour of free trade.7
In 1993, MNC-associated trade accounted for 58 per cent of US merchandise exports (Survey of 
Current Business, Vol 75, No.6 June 1995, p.39).
For the argument that demands for protection are less pervasive among export dependent firms, 
see Baldwin (1985, pp. 150-72), Destler and Odell (1987), and Milner (1988). For the argument
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In the second place, MNCs incur high costs from protection at home. MNCs fear 
that protection at home will promote retaliatory protection abroad or new restrictions on 
their operations and trade flows (Milner 1988, p.23). Retaliation may take the form of 
closing markets for their exports, causing disruption to MNCs’ integrated world trade 
flows. Retaliatory measures may also take the form of disturbance to investment or 
strict application of performance requirements. MNCs are vulnerable to foreign 
governments’ measures against their operations. In addition, costs and benefits derived 
from closure of the home market are distributed unequally between internationally 
oriented and domestically centred firms (Milner 1987, p.645). Domestically oriented 
firms gain substantial benefits from closing home markets because they experience little 
or no effect from trade barriers which impose new costs on internationally oriented 
firms. The closure of the home market strengthens MNCs’ domestic rivals in relative 
terms by enhancing their profitability and market position.
In the third place, structural adjustment, a process whereby factors of production 
shift from declining sectors to those with future prospects, is relatively easy for MNCs 
(Grimwade 1989, pp.384-88). MNCs have more information about market trends and 
changes in international comparative advantage than uni-national firms. They are able 
to anticipate the need for adjustment and the emergence of new sources of supply for a 
particular product. In addition, they can maintain industrial competitiveness by 
relocating production bases to overseas countries because they possess mobile capital 
(Milner and Yoffie 1989, p.242). Furthermore, MNCs can move away relatively easily 
from declining sectors. They usually operate in multi-product areas, including sectors 
with better prospects. They can also easily develop new products because they possess 
the necessary funds as well as appropriate technology and marketing skills. Lower 
adjustment costs mean that MNCs are less worried about an upsurge of imports and 
therefore require less protection.8
with respect to the preferences of firms that import a substantial portion of their intermediate 
input, see Destler and Odell (1987).
Piore and Sabel (1984, chap.2, 8) take a contrasting view, arguing that small firms with flexible 
production techniques may be the most adaptable to the uncertain, competitive economic 
environment. However, empirical evidence supports the view that MNCs have low adjustment 
costs. MNCs managed more successfully the adverse effects of volatility and market failure 
during the economic recession in the 1970s (Dunning 1993, p.428). Milner’s case studies also 
support this view. She holds that ‘[i]n general, these firms [large firms with international ties]
19
In addition to these reasons that explain MNCs’ resistance to the temptation of 
protectionism, MNCs are in an advantageous position in mitigating the movement 
towards protectionism in foreign countries, thereby sustaining the liberal trade system. 
Some foreign subsidiaries of MNCs play a significant role in developing local 
industries. For instance, the promotion of the computer industry in Europe would have 
been impossible without the cooperation of IBM Europe, which surpassed the parent 
company in annual sales in 1990 (Okumura 1991, p.142). When the subsidiaries 
become major players in industries in host countries, they may play a role in dampening 
protectionist movements in host countries (Milner 1988, p.235). They also attempt to 
circumvent trade restraints against their parent companies.
Multinational operations also limit the effectiveness of interventionist government 
policies. Rising economic interdependence has encouraged governments to intervene in 
economic activities in new ways as shown by the fact that a growing portion of imports 
is subject to non-tariff barriers. Some scholars stress the role of governments in creating 
and changing countries’ competitive advantage (Tyson and Zysman 1983; Cohen and 
Zysman 1987; Yoffie ed. 1993). Tyson and Zysman (1983, p.24) argue, for instance, 
that government intervention does not simply distort the workings of otherwise efficient 
markets, but alters permanently the pattem of comparative advantage of nations through 
a change of market structure.
The increase in foreign subsidiaries operating in home markets makes it difficult 
to decide which firms governments should bolster in order to augment national welfare. 
The broad objective of a government’s industrial and trade policy is to reduce 
unemployment and to increase national welfare. Foreign subsidiaries offer job 
opportunities and raise the work force skills of the host countries. They also tend to 
commit themselves seriously to good corporate citizenship by returning an increasing 
portion of profits to public institutions, and supporting local community events. They 
are sometimes more keen on such activities than domestic firms are, as otherwise they 
would lose the support of local workers, the local community and consumers. Insofar as 
firms contribute to boosting national welfare, the nationality of firms is of secondary 
importance (Reich 1990). Thus, the dynamic activities of MNCs are reducing the
were more willing and easily able to adapt their operations to new conditions of international 
competition’ (Milner 1988, p.244).
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importance of the nationality, national boundaries, and the preservation of national 
companies.
Intra-firm trade and pro-liberal preferences
The other factor that has induced MNCs to resist the temptation for protectionist 
measures and to favour a more open trading system is the increase in intra-firm trade, 
defined as imports and exports involving firms related by ownership and operating in 
different countries.9 The rise in intra-firm trade strengthens the advocacy of free trade 
in goods and services. For a firm which exports to its home market, trade barriers at 
home may lead to the curtailment of its own exports and act as an additional cost on 
internal transfers (Anderson and Baldwin 1987, p.24; Milner 1988, p.23). In addition, 
manufacturing MNCs often set up cross-national production networks in order to 
exploit profit opportunities by optimum location of the network bases. Each production 
base is given a particular specialisation in the production chain. Closing a specific 
market including the home market and resultant disruptions to the flows of intra-firm 
transactions reduce the benefits that the production chain yields.
Some empirical analyses support the tendency of firms involved in intra-firm 
trade to show a positive attitude to trade liberalisation. Helleiner (1981, p.82) points out 
that import duties on primary and intermediate products were lower than average duties 
of final products, and these products were likely to be traded between MNCs and their 
foreign affiliates. Helleiner (1981, p.83) also argues that the importance of intra-firm 
imports by American MNCs was negatively correlated with the height of the US trade 
barriers and positively with the tariff reduction attained in the Kennedy Round.
The significance of intra-firm trade in the formation of corporate policy 
preferences is increasing as intra-firm trade accounts for a large proportion of current 
international trade. In 1989, for example, 39.0 per cent of US merchandise exports and 
43.5 per cent of imports were undertaken between US parent firms and their foreign 
affiliates (OECD 1993, pp.38-39). In 1992, 49.5 per cent of exports of Japanese firms
The concept of intra-firm trade is not necessarily unambiguous. Helleiner (1981, pp.9-10) 
interprets it rather broadly, including trade based on minority ownership, management, technology 
or marketing contracts and longstanding customer relationships, in addition to trade between 
parent companies and wholly-owned or majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.
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were directed to their overseas affiliates, while 37.4 per cent of the exports of the 
affiliates went to their parent companies.10 The incentive towards intra-firm trade has 
been enhanced by technology competition. Transactions costs tend to be high in the 
exchange of technology-intensive products. Several studies point out a positive 
correlation between intra-firm trade and research and development (R & D) expenditure 
(Lall 1978; Helleiner and Lavergne 1979). A recent study by Siddharthan and Kumar 
(1990) also found that R & D intensity was one of the most important determinants of 
intra-firm trade. Intra-firm trade is expected to increase in the high technology field.* 11
CORPORATE ALLIANCES AND TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES
As noted, earlier studies have focused on the structure of industries, import penetration 
as well as export dependence and multinational operations, as important variables in 
forming firms’ trade policy preferences. Export dependence and multinational 
operations are vital factors that encourage firms to favour open trade. In the 1980s, 
international corporate alliances became more prominent.12 Alliances themselves are 
not necessarily new, and were widely used as a major corporate strategy in the past. 
But, recent alliances, unlike those before, are characterised by a strategic character. This
10 MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], No.5 (1994), p.8.
11 In addition to the increase in intra-firm trade, another feature of the current trade structure is an 
increase in intra-industry trade, the simultaneous export and import of products belonging to the 
same industry. Estimates indicate that intra-industry trade accounts for more than 60 percent of 
trade among industrialised countries. Intra-industry trade also reinforces a tendency to support the 
liberal trade system in several ways. Firstly, trade liberalisation in sectors where intra-industry 
trade prevails necessitates less adjustment assistance compared with sectors where inter-industry 
trade dominates (Grimwade 1989, pp.388-91). Intra-industry specialisation necessitates a shift of 
resources within industries while inter-industry specialisation requires a shift from import 
competing to export expanding industries. In the case of intra-industry specialisation, the export­
expanding and import competing sectors are merely two sectors in the same industry. It is unlikely 
that workers will be forced to leave a particular industry or region, and hence the risk of structural 
unemployment is reduced. Secondly, the industries where intra-industry trade prevails 
successfully fmd profitable new areas of specialisation in related production lines (Lipson 1982, 
p.444). Such firms can maintain a pro-liberal stance when faced with growing imports. Thirdly, it 
is easier to negotiate trade concessions on intra-industry trade, for the same industry that would 
suffer a loss through trade concessions might be compensated by gains from such concessions. 
This explains why GATT negotiations have promoted intra-industry trade, and the increase in 
intra-industry trade has, in turn, facilitated the negotiations (Hufbauer and Chilas 1974, p.6). 
Fourthly, the rise in intra-industry trade generates allies who export to a partner’s country and will 
oppose protectionist measures in domestic markets against the partner’s imports.
12 Corporate alliances refer to cooperative arrangements made between firms for mutual advantages, 
including joint ventures, cooperative R & D, marketing and distributorship agreements, and other 
business link-ups (Starr 1991, p. 138).
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is a crucial factor shaping corporate preferences. An examination of why strategic 
alliances have become popular in current business is a prerequisite for investigating 
what effects alliances have on firms’ policy preferences.
Why corporate alliances are so important
FDI still constitutes a crucial pillar in international corporate strategy. However, 
corporate alliances have emerged as an alternative corporate strategy for international 
business. Corporate alliances existed in the past, but a salient feature of the alliances 
after the 1980s is their strategic character (Takeda 1992, p.10). Doz, Hamel and 
Prahalad (1986, cited in Young et al. 1989, pp.273-74) identify four features of current 
strategic alliances: (1) they are composed of two or more partners from industrialised 
countries with comparable global strength and resources; (2) the partners of strategic 
alliances are often direct competitors in the same product/geographical market; (3) in 
strategic alliances, the contribution of partners regarding the production, marketing and 
technology is more balanced than in conventional alliances; and (4) the motivations 
underlying the formation of strategic alliances are strategic and competitive in scope 
rather than such simple ones as the need for market access, economies of scales, or 
pooling of resources. Alliances with a strategic character are common in high 
technology sectors like semiconductors and computers, although they can also be found 
in conventional industries such as steel, automobile, and machine tools.
Several fundamental changes in the business environment over the past decade or 
so have made corporate alliances an indispensable strategy for firms operating 
internationally. First of all, corporate alliances facilitate access to a wide range of new 
technology and technological know-how. Technological changes have eroded sectoral 
boundaries. For instance, the transmission and reception of information in digital form 
contribute to binding the information technology industries, including consumer 
electronics and telecommunications with other electronic hardware and the software 
(computer and entertainment) sectors (Cawson et al. 1990, p.350). Given the 
complexities and diversities of technology, it has become almost impossible for a 
company to operate alone. In addition, under conditions of rapid technological 
development, technological advantages last for less and less time before superior or 
cheaper technologies take the place of the original one (Collins and Doorley 1991, p.6).
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Firms are increasingly looking towards cooperative solutions in acquiring the 
technology skills and expertise needed to search for next-generation products and new 
sectors. Strict application of intellectual property rights has also encouraged firms to 
enter into licensing and partnership agreements.
In addition to technological development, global market integration plays a 
crucial role in enhancing the significance of corporate alliances. It is often the case that 
the domestic market is too small for individual producers, especially when firms need to 
pay for increasing costs for R & D, production, and marketing. Corporate alliances are 
an effective way of gaining access to local markets, borrowing from local banks, 
securing government procurement, supply of crucial intermediate goods, local labour, 
and so on. Because of equalisation of income level and a harmonisation of consumer 
needs and tastes in the world, global scale activities in R & D, manufacturing and 
distribution are justified (Ohmae 1989, p.144; Lewis 1990, p.12). It is difficult as well 
as disadvantageous for firms to manage the entire process themselves since this incurs 
huge costs. Hence, firms seek to specialise where they have a competitive advantage 
and complement their weak points by external resources.
Corporate alliances and pro-liberal preferences
Increased internationalisation through corporate alliances has contributed to 
transforming corporate preferences towards resisting protectionist measures and 
promoting open trade policy. This change in preferences has sprung from several 
factors. First of all, corporate alliances contribute to making private firms less 
dependent on protectionist measures. Risk sharing through corporate linkages dissuades 
firms from demanding protection (Cowhey and Aronson 1993, p.225). As noted above, 
private firms incur huge costs in developing new products and establishing market 
bases. In the past, the need to pay these high costs motivated firms to call on 
governments to shut out foreign competitors. By sharing the costs of market 
development and R & D, corporate alliances undermine incentives to protect home 
markets. In addition, international alliances promote a division of labour enabling 
alliance parties to concentrate their management resources on their strengths while 
depending on their partners to cover weaknesses (Imai 1990, p. 186).
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Secondly, corporate alliances often encourage partners involved to resist 
protectionist claims against their partners. Alliance partners are expected to exert 
political pressure for the benefits of foreign counterparts. Even in a case when a partner 
firm does not take action but shows a passive attitude to protectionist measures against 
its foreign partner, this might be likely to divide the industry in the home country, 
weakening the industry’s capability for protection. When the United Automobile 
Workers (UAW) pushed for quotas and domestic content legislation in the 1980s, GM 
opposed the move due to its arrangements for small car imports with Isuzu, Suzuki and 
Daewoo, and the joint venture of the New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI) 
with Toyota. Because of GM’s disagreement, the industry’s trade group, the Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association (MVMA) declined to support quotas and domestic 
content legislation (Kline 1985, p.64). Corporate alliances also promote mutual 
understanding of partners’ institutions and customs, and thereby reduce the risk that 
disputes will become serious. Trade friction can spring from differences in institutions 
and social or economic customs between states.13 In order to maintain alliances 
successfully, the parties seek to deepen their understanding of market conditions, and 
production and procurement methods prevailing in the countries of their partners.
Thirdly, corporate alliances motivate firms to oppose protectionist measures by 
undermining the base for nationalistic trade and industrial policy. High technology 
fields such as computers, information electronics, and pharmaceuticals are viewed as 
critical for industrial competitiveness because of their spillover effects on other 
industries. Governments are increasingly trying to cooperate with private companies in 
these sectors and to sustain their activities through special tax treatment and the 
formation of research consortia which limit participation to national firms.14 In the
13 Ostry and Nelson (1995, p.78) refer to this kind of friction as ‘system friction’. Exclusionary 
business practices and firms’ keiretsu groupings, which became the major issues at the Japan-US 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, are examples.
14 For instance, all ‘triad’ countries have special programs for the high technology sector: the 
European Community has joint R & D programs such as the European Strategic Program for 
Research and Development in Information Technologies (ESPRIT), the Research on Advanced 
Communication for Europe (RACE), and Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI) ; 
The United States started the SEMATECH consortium in May 1987 for developing semiconductor 
technology for the next generation; in Japan, the joint research association for very-large-scale 
integrated circuits (VLSI), operating from 1976 to 1979, laid the foundation for later success in 
the semiconductor and computer industries.
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high technology sector, firms are so profoundly linked with foreign partners that it is 
almost impossible to find firms which are completely independent in their industrial 
activities. Even if a government seeks to support particular domestic firms, the benefits 
of such policies leak to foreign firms and countries through international alliances 
(Soete 1991, p.61; Stevens 1991, p.100). This is because firms which have cooperative 
R & D contracts with foreign partners often exchange new technological knowledge 
including that acquired from government sponsored programs. Hence, firms with 
international corporate alliances are generally less inclined to support nationalistic 
industrial and trade policies which lead to protection.
A MODEL OF CORPORATE POLICY PREFERENCE FOR JAPAN
The literature suggests the hypothesis that as firms deepen international linkages in the 
form of multinational operations and international corporate alliances, they have less 
interest in protection and more interest in preserving the openness of the global market, 
including their home market. This corporate policy preference is one vital factor 
shaping trade policy. This study applies this hypothesis to Japan, seeking to examine 
how trade policy preferences of Japanese corporations have evolved with the expansion 
of their multinational operations and corporate alliances, and what effects such changes 
in policy preferences have had on Japan’s trade policy.
In applying the hypothesis to Japanese industry, it is necessary to examine the 
degree of internationalisation in Japanese industry. The hypothesis presupposes that 
intensive internationalisation of corporate activity will change corporate preferences in 
favour of open trade. The most common indicator used to show the extent of 
internationalisation of corporate activity is FDI. Since the mid 1980s, Japanese FDI has 
not only grown sharply but has also expanded its scope in terms of industries and 
recipient countries.15 Japanese outward FDI increased from US$12 billion in 1985 to
15 There are numerous studies concerning Japanese MNCs and their FDI. For the early stage of FDI, 
see Tsurumi (1976) and Yoshihara (1978); for FDI in the United States, see Graham and Krugman 
(1991); for FDI in ASEAN countries, see Phongpaichit (1990); and for FDI in Europe, see 
Thomsen and Nicolaides (1991). For a recent trend of Japanese FDI, see Chen and Drysdale eds 
(1995).
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US$57 billion in 1990 (Table 2.1).16 The share of overseas to domestic sales doubled 
from 3 per cent in 1985 to 6.2 per cent in 1992, still below the share of the United 
States (27.5 per cent in 1991) and Germany (19.6 per cent in 1989).17 In the late 1960s 
and 1970s, Japanese FDI was concentrated in resource extraction and import- 
substituting manufacturing sectors in East Asia. Since the mid 1980s, FDI has flowed 
into manufacturing parts and finished products, finance, insurance and real estate, and 
diversified geographically to North America and Western Europe.
Intra-firm trade, another vital indicator of the degree of firms’
internationalisation, is increasing in the major Japanese industrial sectors as well.18 
While the share of exports by Japanese manufacturing companies to their overseas 
affiliates grew from 29.9 per cent in 1983 to 49.5 per cent in 1992, the share of imports 
by their overseas affiliates rose from 20.9 per cent to 37.4 per cent in the same 
period.19 Intra-firm trade is expected to rise more because some Japanese firms regard 
so-called reverse imports —  imports from overseas affiliates to Japan —  as a pillar of 
corporate strategy. This propensity has been strengthened by two kinds of international 
division of labour (Ozawa 1991, pp.55-56). One is vertical division of labour. While 
Japanese firms export sophisticated components to Asian countries, they import final
16 Japanese FDI has been accelerated by several factors. Firstly, sharp appreciation of the yen has 
encouraged Japanese firms to invest in foreign markets. After the Plaza Agreement of 1985, the 
value of the yen against the US dollar almost doubled within two years. Japanese firms were 
obliged to relocate their operations overseas so as to restore competitiveness by reducing 
production costs. Secondly, FDI has been promoted as a means of mitigating the trade surplus 
with the United States and Western Europe and circumventing increased protectionism. In 
addition to these external factors, changes in corporate strategy have stimulated overseas 
activities. Japanese firms have to meet two contradictory demands in global corporate 
competition: to supply differentiated products which respond to differences in local needs and 
tastes; and to reduce production costs. Growing interdependence in a ‘borderless’ world does not 
result in one amorphous mass of universal taste. On the contrary, the provision of goods which are 
exactly suited to local preferences is indispensable to survival in fierce corporate competition. 
Internationally oriented firms have, therefore, increasingly shifted R & D institutions and 
marketing bases to local subsidiaries and have made efforts to become insiders in each market. 
Japanese firms are pursuing this corporate strategy.
17 MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], No.5 (1994), p. 18.
18 Owing to the dominant role of general trading companies (sogo shosha) in Japanese trade, intra- 
firm trade has been high in Japanese firms. In 1988, for example, trade between MNCs and their 
affiliates accounted for 79.4 per cent of US imports from Japan and 57.2 per cent of US exports to 
Japan, while such trade accounted for 40.0 per cent of US exports to Europe and 48.5 per cent of 
US imports from Europe (Lawrence 1991a, p.39). The difference in the trade between US - Japan 
and US - Europe lay in the role of Japanese sogo shosha.
19 MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment] No.2 (1985), pp.74-77; 
No.5 (1994), p.8.
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products from affiliates which use these components or under original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) contracts. This is the case for calculators, standard colour 
televisions (TVs), and video tape recorders (VTRs). The other is horizontal 
specialisation. Japanese firms are transferring production bases of low value-added 
products and models to overseas plants, and sending the products back to Japan. For 
example, Honda Motor is transferring the production of Civic and Accord models to the 
United States and Europe, while it concentrates at home on the production of luxury 
models such as Integra and Prelude. This leads to the import of the Accord model from 
the United States.20 The increase in intra-firm trade and reverse imports is expected to 
be an important factor changing firms’ trade policy preferences.
Table 2.1 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment by Destination, 1981-93 (US$ 
million and per cent)
Year Asia N. America Europe World
1981 3,338 37.4 2,522 28.2 768 8.9 8,931
1982 1,384 18.0 2,905 37.7 876 11.4 7,703
1983 1,847 22.7 2,701 33.2 990 12.2 8,145
1984 1,628 16.0 3,544 34.9 1,937 19.1 10,155
1985 1,435 11.7 5,495 45.0 1,930 15.8 12,217
1986 2,327 10.4 10,441 46.8 3,469 15.5 22,320
1987 4,868 14.6 15,357 46.0 6,576 19.7 33,364
1988 5,569 11.8 22,328 47.5 9,116 19.4 47,022
1989 8,238 12.2 33,902 50.2 14,808 21.9 67,540
1990 7,054 12.4 27,192 47.8 14,294 25.1 56,911
1991 5,936 14.3 18,823 45.3 9,371 22.5 41,584
1992 6,425 18.8 14,572 42.7 7,061 20.7 34,138
1993 6,637 18.4 15,287 42.4 7,940 22.0 36,025
Total 66,517 15.7 184,868 43.8 83,637 19.8 422,555
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kokusai kinyukyoku nenpo [Annual Report of International Finance 
Bureau] 1994, p. 155.
Corporate alliances between Japanese and foreign companies have also become 
conspicuous. According to Nomura Research Institute data, the number of reports in 
Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun [Japan Industrial Newspaper] on corporate alliances increased 
from 4,700 between 1981 and 1983 to 8,417 between 1984 and 1986, and to 11,215
20 The number of reverse imports of Accord increased from 5,395 in 1988 to 47,296 in 1994.
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between 1987 to 1989 (Higashi and Ökawa 1993, p.79). In the 1990s, quite a few 
alliances are transformed into those with strategic objectives. Table 2.2 shows the 
number of alliances between Japanese and US firms. While the number of alliances in 
equity relationships decreased from 497 in 1990 to 246 in 1994, that in manufacturing 
and technical alliances increased from 230 to 418 in the same period. This propensity is 
seen at the firm level. For instance, the original aim of the alliance between Ford Motor 
and Mazda Motor was equity participation. However, this alliance now involves joint 
development of new models, mutual supply of vehicles and supply of Mazda’s 
distribution channels.
Table 2.2 Number of Alliances between Japanese and US Firms, 1990-94
Year Equity
relationships
Manufacturing 
technical alliance
Joint
development
Technology
grant
Total
1990 497 230 43 25 795
1991 370 215 50 59 694
1992 277 396 27 40 740
1993 183 469 9 42 703
1994 246 418 20 40 724
Source: Soken chosa, March 1995, p.73.
What implications, then, does the application of the corporate preference model to 
Japanese industry have? The implications are twofold. The first is that study of the 
Japanese case enables an important research gap to be filled. Corporate preferences on 
trade policy have been studied intensively in the United States, but there has been little 
research on this issue outside the United States. Moreover, most of the literature focuses 
on protectionist pressures, and literature on anti-protectionist and pro-liberal domestic 
forces is an exception in the study of the political economy of international trade. Work 
on the anti-protectionist movement is very limited. As Milner (1988) suggests, the 
effects of international interdependence of corporate activity should be seen similarly in 
all industrial countries. The trend towards internationalisation of Japanese industry 
might be expected to have made Japanese corporations more sensitive to the reactions 
of foreign governments and firms on trade policy, raising the likelihood that they would 
move to support an open market in Japan. Thus, undertaking research on Japan 
contributes to enriching the study of the anti-protectionist political pressure and to
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generalising the influence of the pro-liberal corporate preference in policy formation in 
industrial countries.
Secondly, the application of the model to Japanese industry deepens our 
understanding of Japanese political economy. There has been a long and intensive 
debate over the cause of Japan’s economic success. Some observers with a neo-classical 
perspective posit that Japan’s economic success came from the vigorous activities of 
private firms in the market, and that the role of the government at best creates a 
supportive environment.21 Others with a statist perspective argue that the critical and 
particular role of the government and effective industrial policy are the keys to Japan’s 
economic success.22 In recent years, some scholars, the so-called revisionists, have 
argued that Japan operates in a different political and economic system.23 Although the 
revisionist thesis tends to exaggerate the different characteristics of Japanese political 
economy, it is a fact that some economic conditions in which Japanese industry operates 
are different from those in other industrial countries.
As examined in the next chapter, the relationship between business and 
government is closer in Japan than in the United States where business-government 
relations are frequently adversarial and at arms length. The Japanese business 
community has distinctive features such as its powerful peak business federations and 
industrial associations, the dominance of long-term relational dealings, and the 
prevalence of financial keiretsu links. There is the possibility that even if conditions are
21 Patrick and Rosovsky (1976), Trezise (1983), and Adams and Ichikawa (1983) stand in line with 
this view. Patrick and Rosovsky (1976, p.47), for example, argue that ‘while the government has 
certainly provided a favorable environment, the main impetus to growth has been private —  
business investment demand, private saving, and industrious and skilled labor operating in a 
market-oriented environment of relative prices. Government intervention generally has tended 
(and intended) to accelerate trends already put in motion by private market forces —  the 
development of infant industries, the structural adjustment of declining industries, and the like’.
22 Kaplan (1972), Pempel (1982), and Johnson (1982) adopt this view. Kaplan (1972, p.10) contends 
that ‘[ijt is the special and unique way in which the Japanese government has guided the 
economy’s development and the interaction of government and enterprise which is the peculiar 
hall-mark of the Japanese economy. Japan’s economic destiny has not been left to the free play of 
market forces. The government has undertaken from the beginning of Japan’s modernization and 
industrialization to identify objectives and priorities for the Japanese economy’.
23 The revisionists contend that since the Japanese system is organised on fundamentally different 
economic principles from those in other Western countries, different rules and treatments should 
be applied to Japan. For the argument of the revisionists, see Fallows (1989), Prestowitz (1988) 
and van Wolferen (1989).
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developing in which internationally oriented Japanese corporations support an open 
domestic market, the characteristics which are peculiar to Japan may produce outcomes 
different from those in other countries. That is, long-term dealings based on keiretsu 
relations may affect Japanese firms’ stance on liberalisation of the domestic market, and 
the different institutional settings in Japanese business may provide different channels 
of influence on trade policy and different policy outcomes.
Given that Japan is presumed to have different institutional settings and business- 
government relations from other industrial countries, an investigation of the hypothesis 
developed on the basis of American experience is all the more interesting and will 
provide robust support for the assumption that the international interdependence of 
corporate activity has a similar influence on industrial countries. In order to test the 
hypothesis in the Japanese context carefully and sufficiently, detailed examination of 
how business interests affect the policy-making process in Japan, and the adoption of a 
methodology taking into account the particular institutional settings in Japan are required.
METHODOLOGY
Case studies at the sectoral and national levels
This study analyses whether rising economic interdependence has transformed Japanese 
firms’ preferences on trade policy into promoting liberalisation of the market, and what 
effects changing policy preferences have had on Japan’s trade policy and trade 
relations. In order to accomplish this research objective, a case study approach is 
adopted. Case studies are a valuable method for testing candidate theories (Eckstein 
1975, p.80). The case study method is suitable for a study which seeks to test the 
hypothesis that as firms deepen international linkages, they have more interest in open 
trade policy. Case study analysis clarifies case-specific differences that are omitted in 
quantitative studies. These differences are crucial for this study because it seeks to 
examine changes in the international environment and domestic responses to these 
changes which differ in each case. Case studies are particularly adept at revealing the 
complexity of the policy-making process in which many actors exert influence in order 
to achieve their own objectives. It focuses on the interaction of such actors as 
politicians, bureaucrats, peak business and industrial associations, and individual firms
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in forming trade policy. In so doing, it clarifies the motivations and interests of the 
actors involved, and the political leverage they use as well as the outcomes they 
generate. The case study approach enables more ready analysis of these factors.
The case study approach also has its inherent limitations — ‘the problem of 
uniqueness’ (Lowi 1964, p.686). Since each case is unique, it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions from a few cases. However, comparative analysis of even a few 
cases can contribute to the development of theory, if the class of events and phenomena 
is adequately defined, and aspects of each case carefully selected (George 1974, pp.49- 
51). In order to draw empirically supported generalisations, case studies not only have 
to be assessed in a broader framework but should be compatible with analyses at 
different levels.
This study focuses on two sorts of case: one at the sectoral level and the other 
national representation of Japanese industries’ policy preferences. A particular interest 
is how firms and industrial associations in different sectors have responded, as well as 
how the peak business association has performed. Such factors as industrial structure, 
international operations, and relations with the government, which form the foundation 
of firms’ policy preferences, differ across industry. Examination of industrial level 
variables provides a clearer picture of the factors influencing firms’ policy preferences. 
Policy preferences are frequently expressed by associations at the industrial level. Each 
industry has one or more industrial associations. These associations, as the 
representatives of firms in different industries, express their stance on public policy and 
conduct political activities such as lobbying, political donations, and submission of 
policy proposals. The activities of industrial associations provide clearer insights into 
the policy preferences of the different industrial sectors.
In the sectoral studies, firm level variables are also examined. The real actors 
undertaking international operations, experiencing the costs and benefits of particular 
policies, and developing specific policy preferences are individual firms. Individual 
firms may have strong trade policy preferences even when the preferences of the 
industry are ambiguous. As Milner (1988, pp.36-37) points out, an industry’s aggregate 
preferences may hide deep divisions among the firms within an industry. Individual 
firms, which have a different involvement in international operations or a different
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position in an industry, are affected in different ways by trade policies. These 
differences naturally create diverse preferences on trade policies. Heterogeneous policy 
preferences may have a crucial effect on the formation of an industry’s policy position 
and the purposefulness with which it represents that position, a factor which needs to be 
taken into account in industry level analysis.
In addition to case studies at the sectoral level, this study highlights the views and 
activities of Keidanren, a peak business federation, on trade policy at the national level. 
International linkages are formed by individual firms, and the characteristics of 
internationalisation differ industry by industry, but the representation of firms’ and 
industries’ interests at the national level is important in some institutional settings. Two 
factors make it particularly useful to highlight the expression of corporate preferences at 
the national level.
Firstly, Japanese peak business organisations have played a more politically 
influential role in the policy making in Japan than their counterparts in some other 
industrial countries. US business has peak associations such as the National Association 
of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.24 But, because 
of their huge and heterogeneous membership and their history of development, these 
two associations cannot effectively coordinate the interests of their members, and their 
role in shaping policy is often overshadowed by issue-specific coalitions (Lynn and 
McKeown 1988, pp.81-83). The US business community also has more narrowly 
representative associations. The Business Roundtable, founded in 1973, comprises 175- 
200 chief business leaders. The Business Council, originally established in 1933 as a 
hybrid private-public organisation, consists of some 150 business elites (Lynn and 
McKeown 1988, p.82). In spite of their small and homogeneous membership, these 
organisations have no strong common goals. Firms attempt to pursue their interests, 
acting individually instead of trying to coordinate their differences (Ouchi 1984, p. 158).
24 The Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1912, comprises 180,000 member companies and several 
thousand state and local chamber and trade association members. The National Association of 
Manufacturers, established in 1895, consists of 13,000 companies, 150 state and local associations 
of manufactures and 110 manufacturing trade associations (Lynn and McKeown 1988, p.81).
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Japanese business leadership — zaikai — organises at the national and local 
levels.25 The national level zaikai operates through four business federations: the Japan 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nissho); the Japan Federation of Employers’ 
Associations (Nikkeiren); the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai 
Doyukai); and the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren). Although 
there is considerable overlap in the membership, the four business federations have 
different functions: Nissho is a forum for small and medium scale business; Nikkeiren 
is a labour relations-focused organisation; Keizai Doyukai is a forum for individual 
business leaders; and Keidanren is a representative of big business. Japanese zaikai 
takes positions that transcend narrow company- or industry-specific interests through 
those national level associations. Although inter-industry disputes are also prevalent in 
the Japanese business community, their influence is less apparent than its US 
counterpart.
Zaikai is involved in the formation of government policy, as well. Zaikai is 
commonly consulted on important public policies.26 Zaikai is also involved in policy 
formation through membership on advisory councils.27 The mass media publish and 
represent the views and activities of zaikai as the collective opinion of business circles. 
Zaikai influences politicians directly through financial donations which were collected 
by Keidanren. Although Keidanren ceased channelling donations to political parties in 
1994, it still maintains close relationships with politicians through unofficial gatherings 
between senior members of zaikai and leading politicians, and through the exchange of 
opinions between the secretariats of business federations and the deliberative organs of 
the political parties.
A second interest in Keidanren’s national level representation of business views 
derives from the division of policy concern between peak business federations and
25 The role of zaikai will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
26 For instance, the Ministry of Finance holds a meeting with zaikai leaders in the budget 
compilation process (Yamakawa 1984, p. 114).
27 Senior zaikai members have chaired most of the advisory councils on economic policy such as the 
Economic Council, the Industrial Structure Council, the Financial System Council, and the 
Foreign Exchange Council. In 1995, for instance, the Industrial Structure Council and the 
Financial System Council were chaired by Shoichiro Toyoda, Chairman of Keidanren, and the 
Economic Council and the Foreign Exchange Council were chaired by Gaishi Hiraiwa, the former 
chairman of Keidanren (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 July 1995).
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industrial associations. Unlike the peak associations in Europe, which often represent 
the interests of specific industries to governments, the activities of Japanese business 
federations have been directed to ‘the issues on which there is consensus in the business 
community like the decrease in corporate tax and administrative reform, or issues which 
attracted meagre attention from individual firms like education, law and order, and
defence’ (Ötake 1979, pp.96-100). In respect of trade issues, Keidanren deals with 
overall trade policy issues, non-tariff quotas and agricultural trade policy issues 
affecting the Japanese economy as a whole. Keidanren publishes position papers on 
specific industries, but these are often relevant to Japanese industry as a whole or 
economic relations with foreign countries. Industrial associations are more concerned 
with micro-level, industry-specific policy issues, and transmit their opinions directly to 
the government through relevant bureaus and sections. Examining Keidanren’s posture 
and activities enriches our understanding of firms’ trade policy preferences in an 
institutional setting which is ostensibly very different from that of the United States, 
where most of the previous research has been carried out.
Selection of industrial sectors
Insofar as the internationalisation of corporate activities is an independent variable, the 
industries selected for study need to reflect high degrees of integration into the 
international market or the large extent to which firms are tightly integrated into the 
world economy through FDI, global intra-firm trade and corporate alliances. At the 
same time, the selection of an industry which is facing high and rising level of imports 
and probably favours protectionist measures broadens the range of observation in a way 
that strengthens examination of the cental hypothesis.
In order to select industries in the first category, the study highlights both firm- 
level and industry-level data. As long as the internationalisation of corporate activity is 
a result of firms’ strategies, the primary focus should be directed to data at the firm 
level. However, data at the firm level are meagre, while data at the industry level 
provide evidence about the degree and character of internationalisation in the industry 
to which firms belong. Therefore, this study first highlights industry-level data in order
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to identify particular industries with advanced internationalisation, prior cO exploring 
firm-level data.
The study uses several measures of internationalisation at the industry level: (1) 
the level of FDI; (2) the ratio of overseas production; (3) the extent of intra-firm trade; 
and (4) the number of corporate alliances. The first three provide an indication of the 
extent of multinational operations in each industry. The higher the relevant measures, 
the more the industry is involved in multinational activities. The last element provides a 
broader measure of internationalisation.
All the manufacturing sectors increased FDI after 1985 (Table 2.3). Chemicals, 
electrical machinery and transport machinery are the leading sectors in FDI. Electrical 
machinery ranked first between 1986 and 1991, while chemicals and transport 
machinery ranked second or third.
Table 2.3 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing by Sector, 1980- 
93 (US$ million)
Sector 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1951-93
Food 54 90 821 632 517 888 6,123
Textiles 91 28 796 616 428 498 5,540
Wood and pulp 78 15 314 312 431 346 4,057
Chemicals 314 133 2,292 1,602 2,015 1,742 16,300
Metals 493 385 1,047 907 824 754 12,794
General mach. 102 352 1,454 1,284 1,104 1,171 11,491
Electrical mach. 309 513 5,684 2,296 1,817 2,762 27,235
Transport mach. 176 627 1,872 1,996 1,188 942 15,007
Other manuf. 89 208 1,207 2,666 1,732 2,029 16,565
Manuf. total 1,706 2,352 15,486 12,311 10,057 11,132 115,112
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kokusai kinyukyoku nenpo [Annual Report of International Finance 
Bureau] 1994, pp.420-21.
The degree of internationalisation of corporate activities is also usefully measured 
by the ratio of overseas to home production in each industry (Table 2.4). The more 
overseas operations grow, the higher the overseas production ratio. Although the overall 
overseas production ratio was almost unchanged between 1980 and 1985, it rose 
gradually after 1985, climbing from 3.0 per cent in 1985 to 7.4 per cent in 1993. The 
rise in electrical and transport machinery was the most remarkable. The ratio for
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electrical machinery exceeded 10 per cent in 1988 and the ratio for transport machinery 
jumped sharply above 10 per cent in the following year.
Global operations through FDI have also intensified international trade flows 
within firms. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 reveal trends in intra-firm trade for Japanese industry 
between 1980 and 1992.28 The machinery sectors have a high level of both intra-firm 
exports and imports. Three machinery sectors — electrical, transport, and precision 
machinery — exceeded 55 per cent in intra-firm exports in 1992. The three sectors also 
maintained a high level of intra-firm imports through the 1980s.
Table 2.4 Overseas Production Ratios in Japanese Manufacturing Sectors, 1980- 
93 (per cent)
Sector 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Food 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.4
Textiles 4.0 2.7 3.1 4.2 1.3 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.2
Wood and pulp 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.9
Chemicals 1.4 2.0 3.2 3.9 3.8 5.1 5.5 4.8 7.0
Iron and steel 3.4 5.3 5.9 6.6 5.3 5.6 4.9 5.0 6.3
Non-ferrous metals 4.1 2.7 2.6 4.0 6.4 5.2 5.2 7.8 6.5
General machinery 1.8 3.4 4.0 4.5 3.8 10.6 7.6 4.1 5.8
Electrical machinery 6.3 7.4 9.4 10.6 11.0 11.4 11.0 10.8 12.6
Transport machinery 2.2 5.6 9.3 9.4 14.3 12.6 13.7 17.5 17.3
Precision machinery 2.5 3.4 2.8 13.9 5.4 4.7 4.4 3.6 5.6
Oil and coal - 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.2 5.2 7.1
Other manufacturing 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.4 3.1 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.8
Manufacturing total 2.9 3.0 4.0 4.9 5.7 6.4 6.0 6.2 7.4
Note: The figures are a percentage proportion of the sales of overseas affiliates to the domestic sales
in Japan.
Sources: MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], No.3 (1988), p.10; 
No.5 (1994), p.17; MITI, Dai 24 kai wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo [The 24th 
Survey on Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms] 1995, p.13.
28 These data, collected by MITI, are not necessarily suitable for comparisons between years and 
industries because the number of companies surveyed is different from year to year. Nonetheless, 
it is useful to know the general trend in intra-firm trade in Japan.
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Table 2.5 Shares of Intra-Firm Exports in Japanese Manufacturing Sectors, 
1980-92 (per cent)
Sector 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
Food 16.9 18.3 7.8 18.6 12.8
Textiles 3.2 2.7 7.2 3.3 11.0
Wood and pulp 0.2 0.4 0.0 5.2 5.7
Chemicals 17.5 19.5 9.4 21.9 25.9
Iron and steel 2.7 2.2 8.3 1.4 9.3
Non-ferrous metals 14.5 2.9 8.3 19.2 23.3
General machinery 19.5 12.8 32.2 43.8 43.3
Electrical machinery 23.8 24.8 43.3 50.9 57.1
Transport machinery 10.8 45.3 43.7 41.1 56.5
Precision machinery 39.4 38.7 59.6 52.8 55.5
Oil and coal - 42.4 73.6 36.5 2.4
Other manufacturers 38.6 40.7 35.0 43.8 53.8
Manufacturing total 16.4 29.9 39.2 41.1 49.5
Note: The figures are a percentage proportion of exports shipped to foreign affiliates in total exports
by Japanese parent companies.
Sources: MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], N o .l- No.5.
Table 2.6 Shares of Intra-Firm Imports in Japanese Manufacturing Sectors, 
1980-92 (per cent)
Sector 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
Food 4.6 2.3 11.4 14.8 14.8
Textiles 5.2 5.2 27.9 14.8 27.2
Wood and pulp 14.4 22.0 25.7 22.9 32.1
Chemicals 6.8 8.0 17.1 9.9 17.4
Iron and steel 9.7 1.8 11.0 0.5 8.6
Non-ferrous metals 12.6 21.0 2.9 5.7 12.2
General machinery 7.7 20.0 12.0 34.2 52.4
Electrical machinery 46.1 41.9 49.2 35.8 33.3
Transport machinery 4.5 34.3 21.9 36.0 39.2
Precision machinery 49.2 32.1 36.4 38.1 57.7
Oil and coal - 28.8 25.9 51.8 49.4
Other manufacturers 44.7 11.3 35.9 25.1 34.8
Manufacturing total 32.5 20.9 23.4 30.9 37.4
Note: The figures are a percentage proportion of imports shipped by Foreign affiliates in total
imports to Japanese parent companies.
Source: MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], N o.l-No.5.
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It is not easy to determine the exact number of corporate alliances because the 
form of corporate alliances is nominal and they are often treated as confidential. 
However, those relating to large firms are announced publicly. One way to explore 
trends in corporate alliance formation is to examine newspaper reports of these 
activities. Table 2.7 shows the trend of corporate alliances in reports in Nikkei Sangyo 
Shimbun. In the manufacturing sector, the leading industry is electrical machinery, 
followed by metals and transport machinery. Though the number of corporate alliances 
in the metal sector has been increasing since the mid 1980s, alliances in the sector are 
mainly in high technology fields such as semiconductors.
Table 2.7 Number of Newspaper Reports on Corporate Alliances
Sector 1981-83 1984-86 1987-89 1990-92 Total
Food 172 338 588 537 1,635
Textiles, wood, pulp 272 358 454 421 1,505
Chemicals 349 745 1,085 899 3,078
Pharmaceuticals 98 153 284 321 856
Metals 488 893 1,253 1,172 3,806
Machinery 505 623 755 661 2,544
Electrical machinery 826 1,586 1,946 1,877 6,235
Transport machinery 706 992 1,159 824 3,681
Other manufacturing 208 383 488 398 1,477
Construction 194 340 511 499 1,544
Distribution 585 1,099 1,410 1,202 4,296
Finance 38 145 251 194 628
Transportation 43 126 193 173 535
Energy 139 358 441 337 1,275
Communications 15 116 184 103 418
Other services 62 162 213 274 711
Total 4,700 8,417 11,215 9,892 34,224
Note: The figures are the number of articles that appeared in Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun. They were
identified from the Nikkei Telecom database using the following key words; technical 
alliances, joint developments, production alliances, sales alliances, joint ventures, equity 
participation, and mergers.
Source: Higashi and Ökawa (1993, p.79).
These industry-level data suggest that the transport and electrical machinery 
sectors are the most internationalised sectors within Japanese industry. Which industries 
appear the most internationalised from firm-level data? There are four kinds of firm-
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level data that can be used to address this question. The first is the Fortune Global 500 
firm ranking. This ranking, confined to the manufacturing sector, is based on sales in 
world markets. Twenty Japanese MNCs were listed in the top 100 in 1992 (Table 2.8). 
These firms belonged to six sectors: eight in electronics, five in automobiles, three in 
iron and steel, two in oil and coal, one in transport equipment, and one in rubber and 
plastics. The second set of data is the world’s largest 100 MNCs identified in the United
Table 2.8 Ranking of Japanese Multinational Corporations (1)
Company Industrial
Sector
Fortune
Ranking
U.N.
Ranking
Toyota Motor Automobile 5 16
Hitachi Electronics 10 5
Matsushita Electric Ind. Electronics 12 6
Nissan Motor Automobile 16 52
Toshiba Electronics 25 38
Honda Motor Automobile 30 45
Sony Electronics 32 22
NEC Electronics 40 67
Fujitsu Electronics 42 -
Mitsubishi Electric Electronics 44 -
Mitsubishi Motors Automobile 47 -
Nippon Steel Iron and steel 48 -
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Transport equipment 49 -
Mazda Motor Automobile 59 -
Nippon Oil Oil and coal 62 -
Idemitsu Kosan Oil and coal 83 -
Canon Electronics 84 82
NKK Iron and steel 88 -
Bridgestone Rubber and plastics 96 47
Sumitomo Metal Ind. Iron and steel 98 -
(Total) 
Nissho Iwai Trading
(20) (10)
28
Itochu Corporation Trading - 54
Sharp Electronics (116) 55
Marubeni Trading - 57
Mitsui & Co. Trading - 75
Mitsubishi Corp. Trading - 90
(Total) - (20) (16)
Sources: Fortune, 26 July 1993; United Nations, World Investment Report 1994, pp.6, 7.
40
Nations’ World Investment Report. This ranking, excluding firms in banking and 
finance, is based on foreign assets. Sixteen Japanese MNCs are ranked in this group 
(Table 2.8). Most of these firms belong to three sectors: five in trading, seven in 
electronics, and three in automobiles.
The third and fourth data sets are based on questionnaire surveys of firms’ 
international operations (Table 2.9). The third set of data is a ranking of companies 
based on overseas sales. This ranking is dominated by the electronics and automobile 
sectors to which 14 out of the 15 top companies belong. The fourth data set is overseas 
sales ratios. Companies that have developed large overseas markets rank high in this 
list. Although this ranking incorporates companies in various sectors, the two major 
sectors are the automobile and electronics sectors. These data confirm the conclusion
Table 2.9 Ranking of Japanese Multinational Corporations (2)
Company Industrial
Sector
Overseas sales 
(billion yen)
Overseas 
Sales ratio
Toyota Motor Automobile 4,558 44.6 (9)
Matsushita Electric Ind. Electronics 3,478 49.3 (6)
Sony Electronics 2,965 74.2 (1)
Honda Motor Automobile 2,753 66.6 (3)
Nissan Motor Automobile 2,301 37.1 (12)
Hitachi Electronics 1,800 23.9 (20)
Mitsubishi Motors Automobile 1,515 47.6 (7)
Toshiba Electronics 1,379 29.8 (15)
Canon Electronics 1,342 70.1 (2)
Fujitsu Electronics 1,149 33.2 (12)
NEC Electronics 801 22.8 (21)
Sharp Electronics 764 51.7 (5)
Mitsubishi Electric Electronics 710 21.8 (23)
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Transport equipment 639 22.6 (22)
Sanyo Electric Electronics 630 41.0 (10)
Kyocera Electronics - 54.3 (4)
Dainippon Ink & Chemicals Chemicals - 46.9 (8)
Fuji Photo Film Chemicals - 39.3 (11)
Komatsu Machinery - 30.6 (14)
Note: Ranking is based on questionnaire survey on major 42 manufacturing companies.
Source: Global Business (15 January/ 1 February, 1994, p.74).
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from industry-level data that the firms in the electronics and automobile sectors are the 
most internationalised of Japanese corporations.
The automobile and electronics industries are the ‘soft’ cases which are selected 
in terms of their high degree of internationalisation. They have maintained relatively 
strong competitiveness and do not suffer significant import competition in the domestic 
market. Because a broader coverage is required in this study, a ‘hard’ case has also been 
selected, one facing rising imports and likely to favour protectionist measures.
The Japanese economy has sharply increased its imports since the second half of 
the 1980s. The increase in imports of manufacturing products is particularly salient, 
with the share of imports of manufacturing products in total imports rising from 27.2 
per cent in 1983 to 50.2 per cent in 1992. The ratio of imports to domestic demand has 
gradually increased for a number of manufacturing products (Table 2.10).
Table 2.10 Import Shares in Major Manufactured Products, 1988-93 (per cent)
Product 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Watches 14.6 12.9 9.0 7.6 8.6 11.0
Bicycles 11.1 10.1 7.9 11.5 14.0 18.8
Woven outer garments 38.9 45.1 45.5 48.5 55.0 61.1
Knitted outer garments 27.8 30.3 30.1 33.4 41.3 45.8
Copy machines 0.4 2.2 2.1 0.5 3.6 9.6
Electric calculators 38.2 38.8 36.2 37.7 39.3 52.9
Colour TVs 7.2 14.9 10.1 16.3 22.2 33.0
VTRs 5.5 8.5 11.3 6.5 20.2 39.9
Air-conditioners 3.0 3.6 2.6 8.8 10.1 13.0
Washing machines 1.3 1.5 1.2 2.7 3.2 3.7
Refrigerators 3.3 6.2 6.9 8.4 7.9 9.2
Microwave ovens 4.9 12.2 5.6 2.5 2.6 6.3
Fans 48.9 53.8 43.1 42.3 49.1 54.6
Note: The figures are a proportion of imports in total domestic demand.
Sources: JETRO, Nihon no seihin yunyu doko [Imports of Manufactured Products in Japan] 1993; 
Electronic Industries Association of Japan, Facts & Figures, 1995; Japan Electrical 
Manufacturers’ Association, Electrical Industries in Japan, 1995.
Among these products, the increase in imports in woven outer garments and 
knitted outer garments is remarkable. In 1993, the share of imported products in total 
domestic demand was 61.1 per cent of woven outer garments and 45.8 per cent of
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knitted outer garments. In all textile products, the share of imports in total domestic 
demand rose from 26.1 per cent in 1985 to 50.8 per cent in 1993, as Japan became a net 
importer of textile products in 1987. This rise in imports has resulted in declining 
numbers of establishments, as well as stagnant employment and production in the 
industry. The number of employees fell from 1.39 million in 1980 to 1.22 million 1992, 
and the number of establishments declined from 147,500 to 121,400 in the same period. 
Production also declined from 2.05 million tonnes in 1980 to 1.66 million tonnes in 
1992.29 in order to restrain a sharp rise in imports, some textile producer associations 
filed anti-dumping and countervailing suits. The major textile producer associations 
also intensified their demands on the government to activate the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement. An examination of firms’ preferences on trade policy in the textile 
industry provides a valuable case to examine the central hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
This is a study of the relationship between rising economic interdependence and 
domestic trade politics. This chapter has reviewed the literature on interdependence in 
international corporate activity and corporate trade policy preferences. Milner (1987; 
1988) has advanced the argument that as firms have become increasingly interlinked 
with the world economy, they are more inclined to oppose protectionist measures in the 
home market. This chapter examined the theoretical underpinning of this argument. 
MNCs appear to have open trade preferences because they fear retaliation by foreign 
governments against protection in home markets, and are disadvantaged by the closure 
of home markets in relation to their domestically oriented rivals. The closure of home 
markets also disrupts the flow of the intra-firm trade that MNCs conduct. International 
corporate alliances are also a factor making firms’ trade policy preferences more pro­
liberal. Corporate alliances not only qualify interest in nationalistic trade policy but also 
make firms less dependent on protectionist measures.
From the literature review, the hypothesis that firms with intensive links to the 
international economy in the form of multinational operations and corporate alliances 
have more interest in maintaining open markets including their home markets is
29 Seni Nenkan, 1981, p.105; 1995, p.65.
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derived. This thesis examines this hypothesis and its application to the behaviour of 
Japanese industry. The links between Japanese industry and the world economy through 
multinational operations, intra-firm trade, and corporate alliances have clearly 
intensified remarkably. Examination of experience in Japan is of interest in 
understanding Japanese political economy, as well as enriching research on trade 
politics.
The particular institutional framework of the representation of corporate policy 
interest in Japan requires a review of the influence of business on Japanese policy 
making. This is undertaken in the next chapter. The discussion there is directed to the 
issues of whether and how business interests influence the policy-making process and 
policy outcomes, as a prelude to examination of the hypothesis in detail in a case study 
through Keidanren, a peak business federation, as well as through sectoral case studies 
of the automobile, electronics, and textile industries.
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3 The Influence of Business on Japanese Policy 
Making
As firms have become more interlinked with the world economy, it is hypothesised, 
they have increased their interest in open trade and liberal economic policies. This 
hypothesis, it is suggested, has a broad validity in the sense that economic 
interdependence has affected advanced market industrial economies similarly. This 
study tests the hypothesis in the Japanese context. In the study, corporate preferences 
are argued to be a central factor affecting trade policy. These preferences translate into 
policy through a political process in which various actors compete to achieve their 
policy objectives. It is necessary to understand the policy-making structures in which 
corporate preferences are transformed into policy outcomes. Close business-government 
relations in policy making and the existence of powerful peak business federations and 
industrial associations constitute distinctive features of the Japanese political economy. 
These features affect the formation of corporate preferences and their influence on trade 
policy, and need to be spelt out.
This chapter discusses the influence of business on policy making in Japan by 
looking at two broadly related questions. The first question is whether business interests 
are a crucial factor in determining economic policy and affecting policy outcomes in 
Japan. Previous studies of this issue referred to Japan as a strong state, and emphasised 
the dominant role of the bureaucracy in shaping and implementing economic policy. In 
recent years, however, quite a few scholars have accumulated empirical research which 
challenges the strong state thesis and the bureaucracy-dominant model. These studies 
suggest that the influence of bureaucracy vis-a-vis politicians has been waning since the 
early 1970s, and that the private sector has played a significant role in shaping 
economic policy in some cases.
The second question is how business preferences are integrated into the policy­
making process. This issue has been elaborated less extensively partly because previous 
studies of business-government relations in Japan have tended to focus on the issue of 
how the government has guided and directed private business. The answer to the second 
question will show how the interests of business are aggregated and through what 
channels they are conveyed to government. An understanding of the aggregation of
business preferences and their channels of influence on government offers u foundation 
on which detailed case studies in the thesis are developed.
ROLE OF BUSINESS IN DETERMINING ECONOMIC POLICY 
The statist view and bureaucracy-dominant model
There has been much debate over what role government and business have played in 
determining and implementing economic policy in Japan. Early studies of Japanese 
political economy considered the state as the primary determinant of economic policy in 
Japan. This statist perspective posits that the state has its own interests and policy 
preferences as well as the ability to devise public policy independently of societal 
actors, leading societal agents to the goal that it has fixed. Katzenstein (1978b) 
characterises the Japanese political economy as statist because Japan enjoys a high 
degree of centralisation of both state and society’, symbiotic relations between business 
and the state, and a wide range of administrative tools. Krasner (1978b) explains the 
characteristics of relations between state and society by the terminology of weak and 
strong: while a weak state is completely permeated by pressure groups, a strong state 
has the capability to remake society. He argues that ‘Japan comes closest to the pole of 
strength’ (Krasner 1978b, p.60) because Japanese leaders have been able to pursue a 
coherent set of objectives on the basis of a one-party system, a wide range of policy 
instruments, and the acceptance by interest groups of the legitimacy of state 
intervention. Zysman (1983) identifies three models of industrial change in 
industrialised countries based on the three types of financial system: state-led, 
company-led, and tripartite-bargained among labour, capital and government.1 He 
holds that in Japan, a conservative coalition achieved ‘state-led’ growth by promoting 
the shift from an agricultural to an industrial society and from a labour-intensive 
industrial structure to a knowledge-intensive structure within a system where state 
bureaucrats manipulated credit, tax and trade policies (Zysman 1983, pp.234-35). The 
statist thesis posits that the Japanese state can utilise a wide range of effective policy
In the ‘state-led’ model, a credit-based, price-administered financial system allows bureaucrats to 
intervene intensively in industrial adjustment. In the ‘company-led’ model, extensive and efficient 
capital markets limit the channels and influence of bureaucrats on industrial activities. In the third 
‘tripartite-bargained’ model, an institution-led or bank-dominated capital market offers the 
conditions for negotiated adjustment (Zysman 1983, pp.91-95).
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instruments. For example, Katzenstein (1978a, p.20) argues that Japanese policy makers 
are provided ‘with a formidable set of policy instruments which impinge on particular 
sectors of the economy and individual firms’.
The statist paradigm is consonant with the view that stresses the critical role of the 
bureaucracy in Japan’s economic policy making.2 One of the most celebrated scholars 
of this persuasion is Chalmers Johnson. Although Johnson admits that the bureaucracy 
is influenced by pressure groups and political circles, he argues that ‘the elite 
bureaucracy of Japan makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, 
controls the national budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the 
system’ (Johnson 1982, pp.20-21).3 Johnson (1989, p.206) considers the same issue in 
an analysis of the ‘telecom war’, and admits that ‘Japanese policymaking during the 
first half of the 1980s became more political and probably more democratic than it had 
been in the past’. Yet, he still insists that ‘most important policies still originate within a 
ministry or agency, not within the political or private sectors’ and that ‘the Japanese 
system remained one of bureaucratic initiative and near monopolization of expertise’ 
(Johnson 1989, pp.182, 206). Scholars like Vogel and Pempel take a similar position. 
Vogel (1978) refers to the Japanese system as ‘guided free enterprise’ in which 
powerful bureaucrats provide continuity as well as expertise in making difficult 
decisions to guide the Japanese economy. Pempel (1982, chap.2) also stresses the 
initiative of key bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Bank of Japan in 
formulating economic policy in ‘state-led capitalism’. According to the bureaucracy- 
dominant thesis, the central bureaucracy has the capability to determine economic 
policy goals autonomously from political parties and interest groups. The bureaucrats 
pursue these goals with a wide range of policy tools, by varying the formal industrial,
This bureaucracy-dominant model can, in a broader sense, be seen as a variant of the elitist 
interpretation which posits that the Japanese political scene is dominated by three elite actors; 
politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders. As Ishida (1987) argues, the bureaucracy-dominant 
model is the Japanese version of the elitist model that bureaucrats have relatively more influential 
power in policy making compared with politicians and business leaders.
Johnson (1982) refers to Japan as a ‘developmental state’ whose economic orientation is plan- 
rational to pursue social and economic goals, in contrast to a ‘regulatory state’ like the United 
States, whose economic orientation is regulatory and market-rational.
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monetary and fiscal policy, and informal administrative guidance. The private sector is 
dependent on the bureaucrats and follows their policies and guidance.
Criticism of the statist view and bureaucracy-dominant model
The statist thesis and the bureaucracy-dominant model of Japan are challenged from 
several directions. The first challenge focuses on the weakening power of the 
bureaucracy. Since the Second World War and especially since the first oil shock of 
1973, the power of the bureaucracy has gradually waned, as a result of several changes 
in domestic and international environments. Firstly, national priority shifted away from 
maximisation of economic growth to improvement of broader social and economic 
performance (Uekusa and Ide 1986, p.154). Japan’s gross national product (GNP) had 
overtaken those of Western nations by the early 1970s. The Japanese people, by this 
stage, earning higher incomes, began to give credence to values other than economic 
development, such as better living conditions, and environmental preservation.4 In 
addition, rapid industrialisation provoked serious social problems such as pollution and 
urbanisation that occurred very quickly and without proper planning. The government 
was obliged to pay more attention to these issues. This change had profound 
implications because the predominant influence of the bureaucracy stemmed partly 
from a national consensus giving overriding priority to economic growth as a state goal 
(Haley 1986, p.118).
Secondly, with the rising effects of the Japanese economy on the world scene, 
criticism of the interventionist nature of government policy became strong. MITI had 
undertaken a strong and exclusive industrial policy in order to nurture targeted 
industries.5 On the one hand, MITI granted favourable tax treatment and facilitated the 
introduction of advanced foreign technology. On the other hand, MITI restricted the 
access of foreign firms to targeted sectors. As Japanese industry had increased its
This new trend was a result of the emergence of a ‘new middle mass’ society in the 1960s 
(Murakami 1984).
There are many studies on the Japanese industrial policy such as Uekusa and Ide (1986), 
Yamamura (1986), Eads and Yamamura (1987), and Suzumura and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987). The 
most comprehensive exposition of Japan’s industrial policy is Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura eds 
(1988).
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industrial competitiveness and expanded its exports, the foreign governments called on 
the Japanese to liberalise restrictive policies.
Thirdly, the Japanese government lost leverage in influencing corporate decisions 
because of sharply increased budgetary rigidity (Inoguchi 1983, pp. 180-81; Eads and 
Yamamura 1987, p.449). The oil crises and the resultant worldwide economic 
turbulence ended the era of high economic growth, and the government began to suffer 
from financial deficits and therefore cut subsidies to firms. The liberalisation of the 
Japanese economy also deprived the bureaucrats of substantial leverage over the private 
sector. While MITI lost control of foreign exchange rationing owing to the amendment 
of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in December 1980, MOF lost 
administrative power over financial institutions because of successive financial 
deregulation in the 1980s. Furthermore, the implementation of administrative guidance 
was criticised in both domestic and international legal actions.6
Fourthly, the rising complexity of economic and social issues has made it difficult 
for bureaucrats to formulate public policy. New developments such as computer 
software, biotechnology and telecommunications are beyond the jurisdiction of one 
ministry, thus promoting inter-ministry jurisdictional conflict.7 With the increase in
In the petroleum production cartel case, the Tokyo High Court made decisions in September 1980 
as follows: ‘If the Ministry of International Trade and Industry issues administrative guidance to 
an industrial organization in order to have each enterprise follow the restrictive guideline on oil 
refining, the industry will, more often than not, implement joint action. Therefore, such 
administrative guidance should be prohibited’ (Shiono 1984, p.211). A 1988 GATT panel, held by 
the petition from the European Community regarding the US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement, 
also concluded that the time-honoured administrative guidance has the same effect as statutory 
regulations and contravenes the GATT provisions.
The most well-known example of inter-ministry battle in these new fields concerned the 
telecommunications industry. Because of the convergence of computer and communication 
technology, MITI, which has a jurisdiction over computers, and the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), which administers the telecommunications field, had repeated 
serious conflict over administrative jurisdiction. While MPT sought to expand its jurisdiction 
through control over value-added networks and specification of technical standards for 
telecommunications, MITI tried to dwarf the power of MPT by promoting deregulation in the 
telecommunications industry. For a detailed description of the conflict between MITI and MPT 
over telecommunications, see Calder (1989a), Johnson (1989), and Muramatsu (1991). A more 
complex battle is emerging over biotechnology among MITI, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Education, and the Science and 
Technology Agency, which claim legitimate jurisdiction through their responsibility for chemical 
industries, medicines, food, university research, and science promotion, respectively. Each 
ministry has set up its own policy program and required budget for implementing it. For the 
depiction of the conflict among ministries and agencies over biotechnology, see Tanaka (1991).
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inter-ministry conflicts, policy process is more likely to be politicised, leading senior 
LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) politicians to intervene and mediate in policy 
making.8
The second challenge is that the statist view and the bureaucracy-dominant model 
ignore the pluralistic nature of the Japanese political system. In recent years, several 
scholars have articulated pluralistic models of the Japanese political system.9 The 
power shift from bureaucrats to politicians is a critical factor demonstrating that the 
Japanese political system has become pluralistic. More than thirty years in power 
enabled the LDP to foster politicians with special expertise as well as to use the Policy 
Affairs Research Council (PARC), the LDP’s deliberation organ, to formulate 
government policy. PARC consists of 17 divisions (bukai) attached to each ministry and 
to standing committees in the Diet, and it includes a number of investigative 
committees and special committees.10 The power of PARC derives from article 43 of 
the LDP Constitution, which requires that any bills or policy plans be examined and 
approved by PARC before being submitted to the Diet. After deliberation in PARC, a 
bill is sent to the Executive Council, then to the Diet Policy Committee (kokkai taisaku 
iinkai), and finally to the Diet.11 The function of PARC has gradually increased in 
terms of quality and quantity. The number of committees increased from 78 in 1965 to 
92 in 1975 and to 109 in 1985. The LDP sought to cope swiftly with new policy issues 
by establishing PARC committees. For example, the public nuisance special committee 
was established in 1964, preceding the establishment of the Environment Agency by six 
and half years (Satö and Matsuzaki 1986, p.98).
Quite a few sectoral disputes and important trade issues have been resolved by the involvement of 
politicians. For instance, the disputes between MITI and MPT over telecommunications were 
mediated by senior politicians belonging to yusei zoku. The serious deadlock over US firms’ 
access to the Japanese construction market was resolved in March 1988 by the involvement of a 
senior LDP leader, Ichiro Ozawa (new head o f the New Frontier Party).
Opponents of the bureaucracy-dominant model emphasise the pluralistic nature of the Japanese 
political system. However, advocates of pluralism do not regard the Japanese political system as a 
normal pluralist model, and impose some conditions. For a pluralist model, see Inoguchi (1983, 
bureaucratic mass-inclusionary pluralism), Nakamura (1984, fragmented pluralism), Satö and 
Matsuzaki (1986, compartmentalised pluralism), and Muramatsu and Krauss (1987, patterned 
pluralism).
10 For details of the role of PARC, see Fukui (1987a).
11 Gekkan jiyu minshu, August 1986, pp.56-63.
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The power of the LDP strengthened as the LDP politicians called on zoku to play 
a critical role in the policy-making process.12 Its long-term reign since 1955 enabled 
the LDP to produce such politicians. Furthermore, the end of the high economic growth 
era marked by the first oil shock had much to do with the emergence of zoku. Low 
budgetary income resulting from stalled economic growth acted as a constraint on the 
discretion of bureaucrats to promote new public policies. Bureaucrats, who are limited 
to coordinating inter-ministry interests, cannot avoid asking the LDP, the upper level 
institution, to coordinate sectoral interests in order to realise their own interests (Kusano 
1989, pp.78-79). Zoku field requests from local governments and interest groups and 
lobby the central government to incorporate their requests into public policy. In the 
budget compilation process, zoku wield lobbying power towards MOF in order to 
satisfy demands from the spending ministries with which they have close relations 
(Sakakibara 1991, p.73). Thus, the active role of zoku increases the influence of the 
spending ministries against MOF, especially in the compilation of the national budget, 
while it leads to a weakening of the power of the party bosses (Sakakibara 1991, p.74).
The shift of importance in decision making from the bureaucracy to the LDP 
could be considered merely a sideways shift within a still-strong state (McKean 1993, 
p.80). However, this has much to do with the rising influence of the private sector in 
policy making. As Campbell (1977, chap.5) and Calder (1988a) find, the policy stance 
of the LDP has been strongly influenced by the interests of its supporting clientele and 
interest groups. Insofar as the LDP’s power derives from the support of various interest 
groups, its strength vis-a-vis the bureaucracy implies that private interests permeate the 
policy process more strongly by restraining the influence of bureaucratic power 
(McKean 1993, pp.80-81).13
12 Zoku (tribe, clan) are ‘LDP Diet members who exert, formally or informally, a strong influence on 
specific policy areas mainly at the LDP’s PARC’ (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, p.20). The LDP 
politicians, who have had positions such as political vice-minister (seimujikan), chairman and 
vice-chairman of the PARC divisions, and chairman of the Diet standing committees, have 
accommodated special expertise and influence concerned with policy implementation as well as 
formulation.
13 Political changes in 1993 have also affected power relations between politicians and bureaucrats. 
The end of the LDP’s single party reign lessened the influence of politicians on bureaucrats. 
PARC is no longer the main deliberation organ even after the LDP returned to the coalition 
government. One example of diminished influence is the abolition of ‘the list of demands for tax 
reform’ for the fiscal year of 1994 and 1995 (Foresight, September 1993, p.127; October 1994,
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The third challenge to the statist thesis and the bureaucracy-dominant model is 
that the bureaucracy has failed to realise its objectives due to objections from the 
private sector. Many scholars who have undertaken detailed empirical research on the 
Japanese political economy show that there are quite a few incidences where the 
government failed to realise its policy objectives against private business. The most 
well-known example is the automobile industry. Although MITI sought to limit new 
entrants and create dominant enterprises in the industry towards the end of the 1960s, 
this intention was not realised because it failed to elicit compliance from related firms. 
This was also the case in the steel industry. In 1965, the Japan Iron and Steel Federation 
and MITI sought to limit the capacity expansion in new steel-making facilities, and 
decided on production quotas. Sumitomo Metals, the fifth largest firm in the industry, 
was not satisfied with the assigned quota and MITI’s favouring Yawata Steel and Fuji 
Steel, and did not comply with production quotas. MITI sought to retaliate against 
Sumitomo by curtailing its coking coal import quota, yet before this action had any 
effect, Sumitomo accepted MITI’s guidance in exchange for a sharp rise in its export 
quota (Kaplan 1972, pp. 146-48; Kitayama 1985, pp.92-94). Friedman (1988, p.33) 
similarly describes the failure of MITI’s policy towards the machine tool industry:
[T]he machinery industry grew in a pattern the reverse of what the bureaucracy sought. 
MITI’s longstanding desire was to build up economies of scale through cartels, 
restrictions on market entry, and consolidation. Instead, Japanese machinery makers 
fragmented the market: new entrants flooded high-tech equipment sectors, existing firms 
flatly refused to coordinate or consolidate production.
In a similar vein, Noble (1989) shows that in the cases of consumer video and 
steel minimills, MITI, industrial associations, and dominant firms were unable to force 
maverick firms with superior products to abide by format standardisation of video-tape, 
video disc and camcorder or capacity reduction in steel.
Growing business influence on policy making
Given that the bureaucracy is not necessarily autonomous from politicians and interest 
groups, and its power is gradually declining, a number of scholars have undertaken 
empirical studies to examine the role of government and business in policy making.
p.107). The LDP made the list every year in order to coordinate budget allocations, and zoku 
pressured MOF to realise the interests of their related industries on the basis of the list.
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Some scholars highlight the role of private business in shaping industrial policy. 
Samuels (1987), who takes Japanese energy policy as a case study in investigating 
interaction between state and society, asserts that industrial development in Japan was 
not attained by strong government leadership but by negotiations between bureaucrats 
and firms based on ‘reciprocal consent’. According to his explanation, firms were 
willing to give the state jurisdiction over markets but they retained control of those 
markets. Kitayama (1985), in his case studies of the textile and steel industries in the 
1960s, emphasises the role of the private sector in policy implementation as well as the 
policy formation process. He argues that industrial policy was not formed by unilateral 
intervention from MITT, but by a process of reciprocal interaction between societal 
actors (industrial associations) who exerted pressure for realising their interests, on the 
one hand, and MITI which had its own policy preferences, on the other. This process 
was often mediated by relevant Diet members. He also points out that even in the 
implementation process, individual firms retained the autonomy to react freely to 
policy, leading to unexpected results such as non-implementation, unsuccessful 
implementation, and over-implementation of policy. Tilton (1990) argues that in the 
Japanese basic materials industries, the bureaucrats delegate policy design and policy 
implementation to relevant industrial associations, under what he calls ‘decentralised 
corporatism’. MITI helped industrial associations to develop internal consensus and 
exert market controls in respect of prices, production capacity, and cartel formation.
Recent research has extended the analysis of the range of policy issues on which 
business and government interacts, and extracted a similar conclusion. Several scholars 
give credence to the role of the private sector in Japan’s investment policy. Mason 
(1992) contends that not only did domestic business initiate foreign investment policies 
but it also had a great influence on the timing of introduction and substance. This 
critical role played by business was seen even before the 1960s when the power of the 
government was more influential. Encamation (1992, p.41) also argues that Japanese 
oligopolists acted as aggressive intermediators between American multinationals and 
the Japanese government, and eventually took charge of Japan’s strategic investment 
policy. Rosenbluth (1989) arrives at a similar conclusion in her case study of financial 
reform in Japan. She puts emphasis on the role of private institutions in propelling the 
transformation of the regulatory structure in the financial system, arguing that
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‘[financial regulation is changing in Japan not because the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
now deems Japanese financial institutions ready to compete globally but because the 
institutions themselves find much of the protective regulation no longer useful’ 
(Rosenbluth 1989, p .l). Calder (1993) focuses on the role of industrial credit allocation, 
and explains the economic growth of Japan in terms of ‘corporate-led strategic 
capitalism’. He argues that the government has served as a stabiliser rather than as a 
proactive strategist, while private initiative has led the way in industrial development. 
That is, the long-term credit banks, and banks and general trading companies in keiretsu 
groups identified emergent industries and fostered them by providing substantial 
financial inputs for a long period of time.
The critical influence of business is seen in high-technology sectors. Although the 
government took the initiative in nurturing these sectors, decisions were often 
accompanied by strong support from the private sector. For example, Brock (1989, 
p.130) indicates that:
Despite the identification of biotechnology by MITI as early as 1979 as an important area 
of future economic growth, and the subsequent publication in March 1980 of MITI’s 
Vision of the 1980s, it was not until the autumn of that year that MITI really began a 
feverish campaign to boost this technology in Japan. This was a direct result of 
provocation from the domestic private sector after the explosive sale of biotechnology 
equity in the US. Large Japanese private enterprises, communicating mainly as a 
collective through the business federation, Keidanren, pressed MITI to develop fully its 
half-baked policy initiatives towards biotechnology or witness Japanese industry fall 
technologically years behind the Americans.
These empirical studies reveal subtle relations between state and business in 
which the latter’s interests often impinge on the policy-making process. They indicate 
the limitation of an over-generalised typology of weak and strong states or an over­
simplified interpretation of bureaucratic dominance. In addition, they caution against 
overplaying the effectiveness of policy instruments available to the state that the statist 
thesis presupposes. The failure of bureaucrats to attain policy objectives in important 
areas suggests that the policy instruments available to the Japanese state were not 
necessarily powerful enough to direct the private sector towards the state’s policy 
objectives.
These studies also offer several useful insights relevant to the argument here. 
Firstly, some studies stress the importance of examining informal relationships between
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the government and business (Tilton 1990; Brock 1989). Although the examination of 
informal relationships is one of the most difficult research tasks, it is important to 
understanding the process of policy development. It is of particular relevance in areas 
where informal administrative guidance is pervasive.14 Secondly, these studies reveal 
certain limitations in the scope of earlier research. Most of them focused on how the 
government administers and controls the private sector. There are few studies of what 
influence the preferences of private actors have on the formation of government policy 
or how such preferences are formed. Thirdly, earlier studies suggest that in order to 
understand the influence of business on policy making in Japan it is necessary to pay 
attention to changes over time. The major criticisms of the bureaucracy-dominant 
model stem from the changes in bureaucratic power and the influence of politicians 
over time, especially after the 1970s. Some scholars, who have considered the changes 
over time, argue that the bureaucracy-dominant model captures the characteristics of a 
specific period.15 If the changes do matter, research on the influence of business on 
policy making after the 1980s when Japanese industry entered into full scale 
internationalisation may present an opportunity to explore these developments in the 
Japanese political economy.
HOW BUSINESS PREFERENCES ARE INTEGRATED INTO POLICY 
MAKING
Institutions in the Japanese business community
The business community is vertically organised in Japan. The top level is zaikai. Zaikai 
is often described in English as ‘business world’ or ‘financial circles’, but it could better 
be defined as a ‘group of people who, apart from their identification with specific 
companies or industries, speak from the capitalist position and exert a strong influence 
on politics’ (Tanaka 1979, p.64). Zaikai functions through four functionally 
differentiated peak federations. The oldest and broadest is the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (Nissho). Nissho, originating from the Tokyo Shoko Kaigisho
14 The definition and role of administrative guidance will be provided later.
15 For example, Kosai (1987, p.557) contends that the bureaucracy-led model captures the essential 
characteristics of the polity of the prewar and the immediate postwar period, while the ruling-triad 
model applied to policy making in the 1950s, and patterned pluralism after 1960.
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(Tokyo Chamber of Commerce) founded in 1878, consolidates some 500 local 
chambers of commerce and industry, covering 1.55 million small and medium-sized 
firms. It has served as a forum for small and medium-sized firms and represented their 
interests. In 1974 and 1983, for instance, Nissho played a central role in forcing 
legislation to arrest the expansion of supermarkets, thereby confronting big business 
(Calder 1988a, p.199). The Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren) is 
an organisation of employers and deals with labour-management relations. Nikkeiren 
coordinates wage negotiations with labour organisations at the annual shunto (spring 
struggle). The Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) is a 
business forum where leading businessmen participate as individuals. The association, 
comprising approximately 1,500 senior corporate executives from some 900 firms, 
plays a unique role in submitting progressive recommendations on business, social and 
other issues beyond the interests of individual firms. The Japan Federation of Economic 
Organisations (Keidanren) is the most influential peak business association.16 This 
association, inaugurated in August 1946, is the principal power centre of zaikai. Its 
chairman has been labelled ‘the prime minister of zaikai'. It is a federation of 123 major 
industrial associations, such as the Japan Iron and Steel Federation, the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), the Electronic Industries Association 
of Japan (ELAJ), and so on. Membership also covers some 970 leading enterprises, 
encompassing trading companies, retailers, and banks as well as a complete range of 
manufacturers.17 The chief role of Keidanren is to collect opinions from the business 
community about domestic and external economic issues and to represent business 
interests to the Diet, the government, and the community.
The other institution through which private business exerts influence on the policy 
process is gyokai. Gyokai normally means a formal association (industrial association) 
which represents the interests of a specific industrial sector. Sone (1993, p.300) uses the 
term of gyokai in a broader sense, referring to ‘all of the entities (firms, enterprises, and 
trade associations) that fall under the legal jurisdiction of a particular ministry’. In
16 For a comprehensive depiction of Keidanren, see Honjo (1993). For a historical survey of 
Keidanren through the appointments of chairmen and vice-chairmen, see Allinson (1987).
17 The figures are from 1994. Keidanren also has 46 special members composed of public 
corporations and 50 recommended individual members.
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evaluating the substantial function of gyokai, Sone’s definition is appropriate. Gyokai 
comprises ‘sub-governments’ along with the LDP’ PARC or zoku with a special interest 
in a specific sector, and the bureaus or sections of ministries.18 This sub-governmental 
triangle is an exclusive policy-making institution, which is insulated in large measure
from other actors (Ötake 1979, p. 188). It has played a crucial role in formulating and 
implementing detailed sector-specific policies (Kitayama 1985).
The substantial organisation of gyokai is in industrial associations.19 Industrial 
associations are organisations of firms with the purpose of furthering the firms’ 
collective interests.20 In 1993, there were 15,128 industrial associations in Japan, of 
which 4,402 were from manufacturing industries.21 Japanese firms are broadly covered 
by industrial associations. According to a survey on industrial associations conducted 
by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in 1993, 32.5 per cent of the industrial 
associations surveyed accounted for 90 per cent of total sales, and 21.8 per cent 
accounted for 75 per cent to 90 per cent (FTCc 1993, p.5).22
The functions of industrial associations are divided into two categories. The first 
set of functions is related to administrative agencies. According to the FTC survey, 83.5 
per cent of major industrial associations undertook the delivery of administrative 
information to its members, and 41.0 per cent implemented other cooperative functions 
relating to administrative agencies (FTCc 1993, p.10). The second set of functions is 
directed towards promoting the collective interests of their members such as market 
surveys, setting of industry standards, and the organisation of seminars, symposia and 
study groups. The FTC survey shows that 67.5 per cent of major industrial associations 
conducted market surveys, and 43.5 per cent organised technical training seminars for
18 Sub-governments are defined as ‘small groups of political actors, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, that specialize in specific issue areas’ (Ripley and Franklin 1984, p.8).
19 Industrial associations are normally rendered in Japanese as gyokai dantai. The term jigyosha 
dantai used in the Antimonopoly Law indicates the same meaning.
20 Although some industrial associations were established before World War II, the majority of 
manufacturers’ associations were organised as toseikai (control associations) during the war. 
Toseikai aimed to cooperate with war plan execution by deploying technical and manufacturing 
expertise of the private sector for the government’s material procurement plans. Toseikai was 
reorganised as industrial associations after the war.
21 Fair Trade Commission, Kosei torihiki iinkai nenji hokoku [FTC Annual Report] 1994, p.197.
22 This questionnaire survey was conducted in September 1993, targeting 844 industrial associations 
including 432 in the manufacturing sectors.
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their members (FTCc 1993, p.10). These functions include the promotion cf long-term 
ties between firms, and the coordination of the interests of member firms involved in 
ferocious intra-industry competition. One source of Japanese economic success lies in 
the fierce competition among major firms in an oligopolistic market structure. Fierce 
competition may lead to excessive competition undermining the interests of the whole 
industry. Coordination through industrial associations has encouraged member firms to 
cooperate on matters perceived to be in their common interest (Okimoto 1989, p.166). 
The function of coordinating interests among firms is originally an internal one, but this 
is also helpful for MITI’s bureaus and sections that want the industry under their 
jurisdiction to be organised in an orderly manner (Komiya 1988, p.ll).
Japanese industrial associations bring together the broad interests of firms in 
particular industries. All major firms join the primary industrial associations and play a 
role in the associations. It is usual in Japan for there to be several associations within an 
industry whose objectives or sub-sector interests are different from each other. For 
example, EIAJ has 14 associations as its relevant organisations in the electronics 
industry, while JAMA has as many as 22. But, these associations play a supplementary 
role in realising the broader interests of the industries. In addition, Japanese industrial 
associations enjoy a stable legal status because there are quite a few exempt cases in 
which the Antimonopoly Law provides exemption for actions of associations under its 
auspices (Lynn and Mckeown 1988, chap.3).23
Political influence of business through zaikai
How does zaikai exert influence on the policy-making process? This question can be 
examined by focusing mainly on the case of Keidanren. Keidanren is not only the most 
influential association representing the interests of private business to the government 
but three other business federations use similar methods to influence the policy process. 
Zaikai uses three common methods to influence the policy process. The first method is 
the submission of formal recommendations to relevant ministries and agencies. For this 
purpose, each business federation undertakes research on domestic and international
23 For example, the amendment to the Antimonopoly Law in 1953 allowed industrial associations to 
organise depression and rationalisation cartels.
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issues. For example, Keidanren has 42 policy committees and 4 special committees 
chaired by leading businessmen. These committees conduct detailed research on a wide 
range of issues from small business and taxation to industrial policy and international 
trade.
Keidanren publishes some 30 policy recommendations every year. These 
recommendations identify problems in specific areas in the Japanese economy and 
industry, and suggest solutions to the problems. In quite a few cases, they have become 
the catalyst in creating and changing government policy. The most prominent instance 
is the promotion of administrative and financial reform. The low budgetary income 
after the first oil shock and the spending policies of the 1970s caused a large blowout in 
budgetary deficits. The government attempted to cope with the deficits by introducing 
tax increases. Zaikai orchestrated a chorus for ‘fiscal reconstruction without tax 
increases’, and Keidanren took the initiative in realising this slogan through a set of 
recommendations for policy and administrative reform. In September 1979, Keidanren 
made public a recommendation entitled Opinions on the Future Tax System, which 
urged the government to embrace reform and detailed policies for financial 
reconstruction including simplification and rationalisation of administration and 
finance, and extensive reform of budgetary expenditure. Then, Keidanren released a 
more detailed recommendation entitled Hope for Decisive Implementation of 
Administrative and Financial Reform in November. This was supplemented by another 
document the following month, Proposals for the Urgent Issues of the Japanese 
Economy and the Tax Reform. These recommendations led to the establishment of the 
Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (.Daini Rincho) in March 
1981. Most issues discussed at Rincho were covered by Keidanren’s recommendations 
(Heiwa Keizai Kenkyu Kaigi 1982, pp.85-86).
A more recent example of Keidanren’s initiative in policy development is a 
comprehensive package of economic measures proposed in 1992 (Honjo 1993, pp.96- 
99). The Japanese economy plunged into a severe recession in 1992, and the average 
market share price index fell below 15,000 yen. After intensive discussions with MOF 
and the three top-ranking officials of the LDP, Keidanren submitted a recommendation 
on 15 August which urged the government to introduce a massive public investment
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program and decrease anxiety about the financial system by introducing public funding. 
On 28 August, the government announced the first round of comprehensive economic 
measures which incorporated the requests from Keidanren. With exquisite timing, the 
share market recovered sharply to 18,000 yen.
The second channel of influence is through dispatching executive officials to 
advisory councils (shingikai). The advisory councils are attached to and appointed by 
ministries, and staffed by representatives from peak business, relevant industrial sectors, 
journalism and academia.24 These councils function as intermediate vehicles reflecting 
the interests and opinions of various societal groups in the formulation of public 
policy.25 Owing to the priority of economic growth in public policy and close ties with 
the bureaucracy, the business community has sent more representatives to the councils, 
and their interests and opinions have tended to be adopted in the agenda and 
discussions. According to the 1992 data on advisory councils, 34 per cent of the 
members were from academia and journalism, and 25 per cent belonged to the business 
community. The ratio of business circle representation is higher in the advisory councils 
attached to economic ministries. In the councils attached to the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications and MITI, 40 per cent and 38 per cent of the members came from 
the business community, respectively (Ryü 1995, pp. 104-105). It is common for 
ministries and agencies to ask for Keidanren’s recommendation about the membership 
of a council, where deliberations are relevant to the whole of the Japanese economy and 
industry (Heiwa Keizai Kenkyü Kaigi 1982, p.38).
The third method is policy coordination between the secretariats of business 
federations and relevant ministries through informal contacts. In the case of Keidanren, 
each division maintains constant communication and exchange of opinion with various
24 In 1992, there were 212 advisory councils under Article 8 of the National Administrative 
Organisation Act, 33 of which were attached to MITI. In addition to these official councils, there 
are a number of unofficial private advisory bodies in Japan. Since these bodies are not 
organisations with legal authorisation, it is difficult to know the exact number. One survey 
estimates that there were 284 bodies in 1985 and 1986, some 140 bodies established per year (Ryü 
1995, p.109).
25 For instance, Okimoto (1989, p.160) raises advisory councils as one of intermediate institutions 
bridging public and private spheres. However, there is a controversy over the assessment of 
advisory councils. Although they are often criticised as kakuremino (an invisible fairy’s cloak), 
Schwartz (1993) assesses their functions positively as mediating conflicting interests and shielding 
decision-making bodies from disputes over conflicting interests.
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bureaus and sections of ministries. When bureaus and sections formulate a new policy 
or bill, the officials responsible for this have prior consultations with the Secretariat of 
Keidanren, or ask for its opinion. Once the policy or bill is drafted, chiefs of relevant 
bureaus explain the draft at the policy committee of Keidanren and collect the opinions 
and preferences of the business community (Heiwa Keizai Kenkyü Kaigi 1982, p.64). 
For example, in the process of the drafting of the Special Measures Law for the 
Promotion of Designated Industries (Tokutei sangyo shinko rinji sochi ho), Keidanren 
saw intensive interaction with MITI.26 Between April 1962 and February 1963, 
consultation meetings between Keidanren and chiefs of the Enterprises Bureau of MITI 
were organised five times.27
The influence of zaikai has extended to the political world. Zaikai contributed 
massive financial donations to the LDP’s running costs and huge election campaign 
costs. A large amount of money was collected by the National Political Association 
{Kokumin Seiji Kyokai), Keidanren’s fund raising institute.28 In 1992, for instance, the 
LDP had an income of 25.5 billion yen, 12.7 billion yen of which were contributions 
from Kokumin Seiji Kyokai.29 The financial contributions through Kokumin Seiji 
Kyokai were not necessarily designed to influence specific public policy, but rather to 
ensure that a party with a pro-business orientation stayed in power (Iwai 1990, pp.116- 
118). The contributions from big business were delivered through other channels: from 
individual business leaders, individual companies, and industrial associations to 
individual LDP representatives, faction leaders, and zoku. In addition, zaikai often 
supports the LDP in elections. For example, at the Upper House election of July 1989, 
the LDP’s Secretary-General Ryutaro Hashimoto called on a managing director of
26 Through 1962 to 1963, MITI drafted the bill of the Special Measures Law, which aimed to 
provide certain industries with tax and monetary incentives for rationalisation and consolidation in 
an effort to prepare for the coming liberalisation. Although the draft of the bill was submitted to 
the Diet three times, it was eventually discarded owing to an anxiety about the strong 
administrative control, especially the administrative restriction on capital supply. For the Special
Measures Law, see Johnson (1982, pp.255-60) and Öyama (1988).
27 Keizai dantai rengokai 30 nenshi [The 30-year history of Keidanren], 1978, pp.363-76.
28 Keidanren set up the Economic Reconstruction Association (Keizai Saiken Kondankai), a fund 
raising institute in 1955, after a big political funding scandal occurred in the shipbuilding industry. 
The institute was transformed into Kokumin Seiji Kyokai in March 1975 (Hanamura 1994, pp.88- 
89).
29 Jichi no ugoki, No.262, November 1993, p .l 1.
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Keidanren to list branches and factories in prefectures of major companies belonging to 
Keidanren, and asked them directly to support the party.30 Furthermore, it is reported 
that Keidanren’s Secretary-General was asked to wield influence in the companies in 
the districts where the LDP was weak, and directors of Keidanren were engaged for 
days calling on heads of companies to support the LDP.31
Zaikai is also linked with the LDP through consultation meetings. The top four 
officials of the LDP — the Secretary-General, the chairman of the PARC, the chairman 
of the Executive Council and the chairman of the Upper House Diet members — and 
representatives of the four business federations have held a breakfast meeting once a 
month. Moreover, major zaikai members often organise unofficial gatherings which 
support senior LDP leaders who are prime ministers and candidates for prime minister. 
When Yasuhiro Nakasone was Prime Minister, he had at least six gatherings with zaikai 
members (Yamakawa 1984, p. 114).
Political influence of business through gyokai
Industrial associations wield influence on the policy process by sending members to 
advisory councils and submitting position papers with sectoral policy issues to the 
government. However, industrial associations exert a substantial influence through 
continuous give-and-take relationships with relevant bureaus and sections of ministries 
and agencies. Intimate relationships are formed through various channels and actions. 
Industrial associations and relevant sections and bureaus maintain close daily 
communication, through which industrial associations provide government officials 
with the latest and most precise information, and opportunities for simpler and more 
regular contacts with relevant firms. Industrial associations and relevant bureaus and 
sections are linked by personnel as well. Most executive directors of major industrial 
associations are retired bureaucrats from relevant ministries. The executive directors 
coordinate relations with relevant ministries by making use of the close communication 
ties with current bureaucrats.
30
31
Mainichi Daily News, 22 November 1989. 
Mainichi Daily News, 22 November 1989.
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Although MITI has expanded the mandate for Japanese industry, the increases in 
its budget and personnel have not been commensurate with the growth in Japanese 
industry. For instance, the total personnel of M m  decreased slightly between 1980 and 
1992 from 10,670 to 9,131.32 This is also the case with MITI’s bureaus. For example, 
the number of personnel in the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau was 
almost unchanged from 193 in 1980 to 199 in 1992, although the Bureau’s jurisdiction 
covers fast-growing sectors such as computers, semiconductors and automobiles.33 
M m  has sought to reduce the burden of its task by encouraging the private sector to 
organise industrial associations and by making use of their resources. Samuels (1983, 
p.499) describes this situation as follows:
While it is frequently acknowledged that committees in Diet and the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), having limited expertise and staff, are dependent upon the 
bureaucracy for data and analysis, it is not as often recognized that the well-fabled 
Japanese bureaucracy is itself often dependent in the same way upon the industry 
associations and firms with which it works so closely.
Career bureaucrats experience frequent job rotation. When, after two or three 
years, they know something about their jurisdictional sectors, they are transferred to 
another division which has nothing to do with the previous division. ‘As a consequence, 
staff in MITI bureaus frequently do not have personal expertise on any given industry, 
nor do they have a comprehensive memory of the history of policies applied to a 
specific case’ (Friedman 1988, pp.84-85). Their inadequate expertise and specialised 
knowledge is supplemented by instruction and cooperation from staff of industrial 
associations and companies.
Based on close links to the bureaucracy, industrial associations are involved in the 
formation and implementation of government policy in various ways. Firstly, industrial 
associations provide information on the basis of which bureaucrats identify policy 
issues for the industry. For example, industrial associations conduct surveys on 
statistical data, supply and demand perspectives, and international markets. The results 
of these surveys become basic data for administrative operations. In addition, bureaus
32 The Administrative Management Agency, Gyosei kikozu, [Organisational chart] 1980, p.143; The 
Management and Coordination Agency, Gyosei kikozu, [Organisational chart] 1992, p.163.
33 The Administrative Management Agency, Gyosei kikozu, [Organisational chart] 1980, p.144; The 
Management and Coordination Agency, Gyosei kikozu, [Organisational chart] 1992, p.164.
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and sections seek to collect opinions of industrial associations before formulating 
policies, especially administrative guidance.34 Since administrative guidance is not 
based on law, there is no guarantee that it will be accepted by private actors and will 
attain its objective. As a result, before deciding on administrative guidance, ministries 
and agencies have to conduct ample nemawashi or informal negotiations with industries 
as well as to collect opinions at the formal advisory councils.35 They talk extensively 
with relevant industries and firms about their requirements in order to prevent non- 
compliance after the guidance has been taken (Muramatsu 1993, pp. 14-15).
Secondly, some industrial associations engage in policy formation activities. 
Although MITI issues various reports for industry, some reports are substantially 
drafted by industrial associations. For example, the General Affairs Committee of the 
Industrial Policy Deliberation Council drew up Vision of Trade and Industry Policy for 
the 1980s in 1980. The Japan Industrial Robotics Association, at a request from MITI, 
drafted a vision for the industrial robotics industry (Lynn and McKeown 1988, p.77). 
Another example is Vision for the 1990s in the Electronics Industry. Although MITI 
finalised the report, the basic data were supplied and arranged by EIAJ.36
Thirdly, industrial associations play a role in implementing government policies, 
administrative guidance in particular. As explained before, the delivery of 
administrative information is one of the key functions of industrial associations. The 
role of industrial associations is not merely to deliver administrative information to its 
members. Administrative guidance, formulated after adequate prior consultation with 
industrial associations, often reflects the consensus interests of the whole industry. 
Therefore, once administrative guidance is introduced, industrial associations play an 
intermediary role in supervising its implementation by member firms. More
34 Administrative guidance is defined as an administrative action that, without any coercive legal 
effect, ‘encourages regulated parties to act in a specific way in order to realize some 
administrative aim’ (Young 1984, p.923). For the discussion of the role of administrative
guidance, see Haley (1986), Wakiyama (1987), Öyama (1989) and Shindö (1992).
35 Öyama (1989, pp.34-35) regards the advisory council system in policy making and the 
administrative guidance system in policy implementation as playing complementary roles in 
coordinating industrial interests.
36 Interview, Users Committee of Foreign Semiconductors, Tokyo, September 1995 (For a list of 
interviewees, see appendix). There are cases when sections of MITI and EIAJ jointly draft reports 
regarding industries, and the publisher of the reports is decided according to the conditions of the 
budget.
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importantly, industrial associations, in some cases, call on the government to introduce 
administrative guidance in order to ensure coordination in the industry (Wada 1990, 
p.60). The conventional example is that when the private sector faces a problem in 
forming a recession cartel, a majority of the industry asks the government to use 
administrative guidance encouraging the formation of the cartel, and thereby restrains
the opposition (Öyama 1989, p.21).37 In such circumstances, administrative guidance is 
a ‘joint masterpiece’ created both by administrative agencies and by industrial 
associations which serve as the ‘confederate organisation’ of administrative agencies 
(Shindö 1992, p.112).
Industrial associations and bureaus and sections of ministries thus maintain 
intense communication networks and undertake intensive interactions. In general, 
government policies are formed and implemented with the cooperation of industrial 
associations. In some cases, industrial associations are deeply involved in the policy 
making and policy-implementation process as joint organisers of government policies.
In the past, unlike industries in the United States which have cultivated various 
channels with Congress, Japanese industries tended to have close relationships with the 
bureaucracy which drafts laws (Ueno and Atsuya 1977, p.24). Japanese industries had 
little incentive or necessity to lobby politicians because of their tight relationships with 
bureaucrats. The interests of industries were easily delivered to bureaucrats who 
willingly sought to realise them. However, the commitment of gyokai to politicians is 
gradually increasing. While donations through Kokumin Seiji Kyokai have been limited 
owing to the Political Donation Regulation Law, individual industrial associations and 
firms have gradually raised their donations to individual politicians. This is shown by 
the fact that the donations to individual politicians increased sharply against those to the 
party in the second half of the 1980s (Iwai 1990, p. 119).
In addition, gyokai has been more likely to cooperate with LDP’s zoku in realising 
its policy objectives. A case in point is the revision of the Banking Law. In February
37 There are quite a few instances of this kind of behaviour. In 1966, the Petroleum Association of 
Japan asked MITI to use administrative guidance to force Idemitsu Kosan to comply with the 
association’s efforts to curtail crude petroleum production. In the same year, major spinning firms 
resorted to similar requests for help in order to make Nissin Spinning continue a recession cartel 
(Lynn and McKeown 1988, p.93).
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1981, MOF sent a proposal to the Joint Committee of the Committee on Financial 
Issues and the Budget Division of PARC to revise the Banking Law. MOF was facing 
the future liberalisation of banking in Japan, and desired to strengthen its authority 
through the proposed revision which sought to put constraints on bank lending and to 
make disclosures obligatory. The Federation of Bankers Association of Japan, which 
made contributions to the LDP but not to individual politicians, pressured politicians by 
suggesting that it temporarily change the target of contributions from the party to 
individual politicians (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, p.235). The discussions at the Joint 
Committee were delayed owing to detailed deliberation and numerous questions by the 
members supporting the bankers’ position. In the LDP’s redrafted law passed in the 
Diet in May 1981, the section regarding enforcement of the MOF’s control over the 
banks was deleted, and the section regarding disclosure was made advisory only.
Interaction between industries and the LDP also occurs through the Diet 
Members’ Leagues (giin renmei), private groups of Diet members sharing specific 
policy objectives and interests in particular industrial sectors. While PARC committees 
and divisions function as supporting groups of bureaucrats, giin renmei tend to wield 
power by reflecting the interests of industrial sectors to government (Fukushima 1991, 
P-94).
On the firm level, major firms regularly send staff to the relevant divisions of 
ministries in order to obtain information from and consult with officials. The 
bureaucrats, on the other hand, receive visitors from companies in order to collect the 
latest information about their sectors. In addition, firms also accept amakudari, whereby 
bureaucrats ‘descend’ into high positions in companies. According to a survey by Toyo 
Keizai Shimposha, 629 out of 2,220 firms surveyed accepted 1,404 former bureaucrats 
as the executive members in July 1994.38 Amakudari has been regarded as a means by 
which bureaucrats exert influence on industries as well as secure beneficial positions in 
retirement. Calder (1989b) asserts, however, that firms hire retired bureaucrats in order 
to increase their influence on the policy process. Furthermore, quite a few business 
leaders have cultivated a web of personal connections with politicians and bureaucrats. 
A number of senior bureaucrats, companies’ top executives and politicians have
38 Shukan Toyo Keizai, 15 October 1994, pp.80-81.
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graduated from the small number of elite universities and have kept close contacts after 
graduation. This ‘old-boy’ network contributes to the facilitation of communication 
among them. Close relationships are also formed through participation in informal 
study groups and breakfast meetings. Government bureaucrats, politicians, and business 
leaders exchange valuable information in these informal networks, including 
information about sensitive issues which are not necessarily discussed in formal 
settings.
Changes in the influence of business on policy making
There are zaikai and gyokai routes through which the business world represents its 
interests in policy making. These two business institutions have a different level of 
counterpart in the bureaucracy and among politicians. While zaikai interacts with high 
level bureaucrats and LDP senior leaders, gyokai communicates with bureaus and 
sections of the ministries and zoku (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Two-Level Relations among Business, Bureaucracy, and Politicians
Business Bureaucracy Politicians
Zaikai -------  MOF, senior bureaucrats -------  LDP senior leaders
Gyokai -------  Bureaus and sections -------  LDP’s zoku
There have been two changes to the relationship among business circles, the 
bureaucracy and politicians. The first change is the gradual decline in the influence of 
zaikai on political parties. Curtis (1975), in the 1970s, points to the declining role of 
Keidanren as a pressure group because of the pluralism within the business community, 
the internationalisation of the Japanese economy, and the emergence of a new less 
cohesive generation in the business world. This decline has become evident in relations 
with the LDP. In the mid 1970s, Keidanren was the predominant pressure group whose 
financial contributions provided for some 80 per cent of officially disclosed political 
donations to the LDP. In 1977, for example, 7.6 billion yen of the donations from 
Keidanren accounted for 75 per cent of 10.1 billion yen of LDP’s total income.39 As
39 Jichi no ugoki, No. 132, September 1978, pp.14-15.
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many interest groups have been organised since the 1970s, the status of Keidanren as 
the foremost interest group has gradually waned.40 Although Keidanren’s financial 
contributions constituted vital financial resources to the LDP, the relative importance of 
Keidanren’s donations declined in the late 1980s, accounting for some 50 per cent of 
the LDP’s total income. Furthermore, as the financial contributions from Keidanren to 
the LDP became routine, the LDP took them for granted, while Keidanren considered 
them as a kind of necessary cost. This led to reverse power positions between a money 
provider and a receiver (Iwai 1990, p. 118). This phenomenon escalated in 1990. Ichiro 
Ozawa, Secretary-General of the LDP, collected 16 billion yen directly from gyokai in 
the general election in February 1990, ignoring the route for donations through 
Keidanren. It was reported that the LDP gained 5 billion yen each from the automobile 
and electronics industries and 3 billion yen each from the finance and construction 
industries.41
Zaikai did not approve of the escalation of the LDP’s money politics. Some zaikai 
leaders openly advocated financial and organisational reform in the LDP, and expressed 
their expectation of the emergence of a two-party system in Japan from the late 1980s. 
For example, Tokio Nagayama, a managing director of Nikkeiren as well as vice- 
chairman of Keidanren, irked LDP politicians, by announcing that ‘the historical 
mission of the conservative coalition is over. Two parties involving middle-of-the-road 
parties should compete on policies. It is desirable to return to the “two party system”, a 
natural form of democracy’ (Mainichi Shimbun 1991, p.32). Takuji Matsuzawa, a vice- 
chairman of Keidanren, also bowed towards the Japan Socialist Party, observing that 
‘the socialists join the government in ten out of 24 advanced nations joining the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). If the Japan 
Socialist Party pursues a Western-style social democracy, we do not have to be hostile 
towards it’. It was reported that the LDP was shocked that the vice-chairmen of 
Keidanren endorsed restructuring the political world in this way (Mainichi Shimbun 
1991, p.33).
40 The number of interest groups in Japan increased from 17,413 in 1966 to 20,614 in 1975 and to 
33,668 in 1986 (Tsujinaka 1988, p. 19). The emergence of new interest groups is prominent in 
policy areas such as welfare, education and consumer affairs.
41 Mainichi Daily News, 14 April 1990.
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The change in relations between zaikai and the LDP came to a head in September 
1993 when Keidanren decided to cease funnelling donations from business circles to the 
LDP. This decision derived from the judgement that the rationale that donations should 
be given to support the capitalist system was less valid after the waning of the Cold 
War. It was also felt the need to take action to redress turbid relations between zaikai 
and politicians (Matsumoto 1993, p.78). After the collapse of the LDP’s single-party 
dominance in August 1993, it became difficult for zaikai to support any one party. 
More than one conservative coalition had emerged as a potential government. The 
relations between zaikai and politicians began to fragment inexorably.
The second change is that the internationalisation of the Japanese economy has 
transformed the role of gyokai. As explained before, gyokai has a strong influence on 
policy making, and this influence stems largely from the cohesion of member firms. 
However, dynamic internationalisation of the Japanese economy and industry after the 
mid 1980s has undermined this cohesion. Many foreign firms have joined industrial 
associations in Japan.42 For instance, the Trust Companies Association of Japan, which 
had long been composed of eight Japanese bankers, accepted nine foreign-affiliated 
firms in 1986.43 The increase in foreign firms as members makes it difficult for 
industrial associations to conduct their activities on the basis of implicit practice among 
members with homogeneous interests, and this weakens the cohesion of the 
associations. In addition, dependence on overseas markets by some Japanese firms has 
undermined the role of gyokai. Firms have become less interested in preserving order in 
the industries, and industrial associations have difficulty in coordinating members’ 
activities and interests outside Japan. The declining cohesion of gyokai and the 
diminished role of the industrial association has contributed to the weakening influence 
of administrative agencies whose operations were facilitated by industrial associations.
On the firm level, global corporate activities have made Japanese firms less 
dependent on the government. Firms operating in international markets gain ready 
access to foreign sources of capital, making them less dependent on MOF and the Bank
42 According to the FTC survey, 67.6 per cent of the respondent foreign-affiliated firms operating in 
Japan joined some industrial associations in 1993 (FTCc 1993, p.20).
43 Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 June 1994.
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of Japan, which controls bank loans (Fukui 1987b, p.163). Large firms with widespread 
international corporate networks have more information regarding their industries and 
rival firms in the world than do bureaucrats. As the internationalisation of corporate 
activities has proceeded, it has become extremely difficult for government officials to 
project a clear vision of future trends in the macro-economy and industries. As far as R 
& D are concerned, big firms rely less on government laboratories. Even now they 
acknowledge the advantage of government-financed high-risk research programs, but 
they spend an increasingly large portion of their profits on R & D as they recognise the 
importance of basic research. Besides, Japanese firms that operate in overseas markets 
cannot depend on the home government with respect to the risks involved in their 
overseas operations. They no longer live in a risk-free society where private citizens 
and enterprises are supposed to be protected from damage or failure by a paternalistic 
and benevolent government (Fukui 1987b, p.163). Japanese firms are more sensitive to 
reactions from foreign governments and firms, and have less interest in maintaining a 
close relationship with the home government.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the policy-making structure in Japan, and how it has allowed 
business interests to influence the policy-making process and policy outcomes. Previous 
studies tended to regard Japan as a strong state, and emphasised the dominant role of 
the bureaucracy in the policy-making process. In the 1980s, these views were 
challenged from three directions. The first suggested that the power of the bureaucracy 
has gradually waned owing to changes in the environment in which the Japanese 
bureaucracy works. These changes included a shift in national priority from maximum 
economic growth to comprehensive improvement in social economic performance, 
increased budgetary rigidity, and foreign accusations of interventionist government 
policy. The second challenge concerned the rising role of politicians in policy making. 
The LDP has strengthened its capability in policy making through the enhanced role of 
PARC as the policy deliberation organ and through the influential role of zoku. 
Although the shift of influence in decision making from the bureaucracy to the LDP 
could be seen as occurring within the state itself, the increased power of politicians 
raised the possibility that societal actors including business actors exerted more
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influence on the policy-making process. Thirdly, some studies challenge the view of a 
strong state and the bureaucracy-dominant thesis with evidence of the government’s 
failure to attain certain policy objectives. Even in the 1960s when government power 
was potent, some studies assert, the guidance of the government was not always 
accepted and at times even rejected by some industries and firms.
Other empirical studies give more credence to the role of private business in 
policy making and policy implementation. They have shown that private actors retained 
control of the market or initiated government policy in various industrial areas. The 
implication of these studies is that an understanding of business influence on policy 
making needs more detailed work on formal and informal interactions between business 
and government, taking into account changes over time and the direction of influence.
The Japanese business community retains well organised vertical institutions. 
Zaikai, at the top, influences policy making through the submission of policy 
recommendations, dispatch of members to advisory councils and informal policy 
coordination between the secretariats of business federations and the bureaucrats. Zaikai 
has also been linked to the ruling LDP through financial donations, active cooperation 
at the national elections, and participation in the gatherings which support the senior 
leaders of the LDP.
While zaikai exerts influence on macro-economic policy and national issues, 
gyokai is influential in sector-specific policies. Although industrial associations are 
linked with government policy in a similar way to zaikai, their influence on the relevant 
bureaus and sections is exerted in more informal forms. In addition to an exchange of 
information and opinions, major industrial associations accept former bureaucrats as 
executive directors. Furthermore, in some cases, industrial associations initiate the 
formation and implementation of government policies. This can be seen when industrial 
associations take the initiative in forming recession cartels by calling on the government 
to exert administrative guidance. As the LDP’s zoku enhanced their influence in policy 
making, gyokai became more dependent on them to achieve their policy objectives. In 
Japan, individual business leaders also have some influence on the policy-making 
process using various communication channels with bureaucrats and politicians.
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Relations among business, bureaucrats and politicians have changed significantly 
in recent years. Zaikai and the LDP no longer have such close relations owing to the 
cessation of financial contributions through Keidanren to the LDP and the end of the 
single party dominance of the LDP. The internationalisation of the Japanese economy 
has also undermined the influence of gyokai. While the participation of foreign- 
affiliated firms in industrial associations has weakened the cohesion of industry, more 
dependence on foreign markets makes some firms less interested in seeking cohesion. 
The declining influence of gyokai has been associated with the decreasing influence of 
the bureaucracy.
The review of the literature on the role of business in Japanese policy making and 
the exploration of business channels of influence on the government set the context in 
which detailed case studies are explored. This is particularly significant for 
investigating Keidanren’s stance and activities on commercial policy. Corporate 
preferences and their effects on trade policy in specific sectors are examined through 
Chapter 4 to 6. In Chapter 7, the representation of Japanese firms’ attitudes to trade 
policy is examined through an analysis of the stance and actions of Keidanren.
72
4 The Japanese Automobile Industry and Trade Policy
The automobile industry has developed the most fully-fledged international operations 
of all Japanese manufacturing sectors. Japanese automakers have actively strengthened 
local production in North America and Europe since the early 1980s. Corporate 
alliances with foreign auto producers have also evolved from equity participation to 
joint ventures and joint vehicle development. This chapter examines whether major 
Japanese auto producers have supported market opening policies in Japan as they have 
deepened multinational operations and corporate tie-ups. This question is addressed 
from two directions. One examines the transformation of keiretsu groupings in the 
automobile industry, and the other looks at the reactions of automakers to market 
opening policies.
Keiretsu groupings impinge on Japan’s trade relations in the sense that they are 
regarded as an initial barrier to the Japanese market. In the automobile sector, supplier 
and distribution keiretsu are widely prevalent. More commitment to multinational 
production is likely to have induced Japanese automakers to open up these keiretsu 
groupings.
The Japanese government has become more inclined to promote the access of 
foreign goods to the Japanese market since the mid 1980s. In addition, the US 
government has requested that the Japanese government and auto industry purchase 
more US-made auto parts and vehicles. This study explores how the Japanese 
automobile industry has reacted to such policies and demands, with the hypothesis that 
as multinational production and international corporate alliances expanded, the industry 
assisted the government’s market opening policies and its attempts at resolving the auto 
issue with the United States.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section examines the 
internationalisation of corporate activity in the Japanese automobile industry. The 
second section investigates the effects of internationalisation on the transformation of 
supplier and distribution keiretsu groups. In the third and fourth sections, automakers’ 
reactions to government policies for import promotion and their stance on market 
opening are examined. The third section highlights international cooperation programs 
that major automakers announced in 1989. The fourth section examines the interaction
between the government and industry over the Action Plan in January 1992, and the 
automakers’ stance on market access as revealed by this event.
CHARACTER OF INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONALISATION
The automobile industry is one of the major manufacturing sectors in Japan. In 1993, 
the value of domestic output of motor vehicles was estimated at 41.7 trillion yen, 
representing 13.4 per cent of Japan’s total manufacturing output. Automobile related 
industries accounted for roughly 10 per cent of the total work force in Japan.1 The 
industry is highly concentrated, reflecting its highly capital-intensive character. There 
are 11 auto assemblers, including two makers producing only trucks and buses. This 
number is large compared with other auto manufacturing countries. For example, there 
are three makers in the United States and eight in Germany. In 1993, Toyota, the 
leading company, accounted for 31.7 per cent of total domestic output. The second 
maker, Nissan, accounted for 16.1 per cent in the same year, falling from 23.9 per cent 
in 1980.2 Under the assemblers, there is a great number of parts suppliers, most of 
which are small and medium-sized firms. The auto assemblers make up the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), one of the most representative 
industrial associations in Japan. The chairmanship of JAMA has been assumed by 
Toyota and Nissan alternatively. Parts suppliers form the Japan Auto Parts Industries 
Association, while auto dealers are represented by the Japan Automobile Dealers 
Association.
How, then, have Japanese automakers developed the internationalisation of their 
corporate activities? The multinational operations of the Japanese automobile industry 
commenced in the early 1980s, mainly in order to circumvent trade friction with 
western countries. This movement started in the United States. Honda, which had begun 
business as a manufacturer of motor cycles, developed the automobile business mainly 
through targeting the US market. It decided to make inroads into the United States in 
1978, before a voluntary export restraint (VER) on Japanese car exports was 
announced. Honda led the Japanese automakers in production and sales in the United
1 The Motor Industry of Japan, 1995, pp.2-4.
2 Jidosha sangyo hando bukku, 1995, pp.368-71.
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States, developing local production to exceed exports from Japan. In 1990, Honda’s 
export volume from Japan to the United States was 391,000, whereas local production 
was 435,000. Owing to steady growth in local production and success in sales of the 
Accord model, Honda’s sales surpassed those of Chrysler, the third US passenger car 
producer, in 1991, obtaining a 9.8 per cent share in the US market.
Honda was followed by Nissan, which opened assembly plants for pickup trucks 
in June 1983 and for passenger cars in 1985. Although Nissan’s local production in the 
United States has not experienced steady growth because of limited production capacity 
and failure to introduce competitive compact car models, Nissan did expand production 
capacity to nearly 400,000 in 1993 after the introduction of compact cars in 1992. 
Toyota was behind Honda and Nissan in local production in the United States. Toyota, 
in spite of its dominant status in the domestic market, was extremely cautious about 
local production because it doubted whether its efficient Japan-based production system 
would work outside Japan. However, the sharp growth of Honda in the US market 
compelled Toyota to decide on local production in the United States. Unlike its 
forerunners, Toyota selected a joint venture with General Motors (GM), establishing the 
New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI) in California. NUMMI, which started 
production in December 1984, was regarded as an experiment aimed at examining 
whether Toyota’s production and management styles were applicable in the United 
States (Fourin 1991, p. 19). NUMMI took over the Fremont plant of GM, which had 
been closed owing to unsuccessful management. Toyota revitalised the plant by creating 
cooperative management-labour relations and developing close relations with selected 
parts suppliers. Confidence built on the success of this joint venture led Toyota to set up 
a wholly-owned plant in Kentucky in 1988. Five other Japanese automakers launched 
locally based production in North America in quick succession.3 Total production in 11
Most late starters opted for joint ventures with their US partners. Mazda established AutoAlliance 
International Inc. (AAI), a fifty-fifty joint venture with Ford in 1985, starting production in 
September 1987. The joint venture provides half of its output to Ford. Mitsubishi Motors built up 
Diamond-Star Motors (DSM) with Chrysler in October 1985. DSM started production in 
September 1988 with a capacity of 240,000 a year. Although Chrysler retreated from DSM in 
October 1991, DSM continues to supply vehicles to Chrysler. While Fuji and Isuzu established 
Subaru-Isuzu Automotive Inc. (SIA) in 1987, Suzuki established CAM! Automotive Inc. with GM 
in Canada.
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plants owned by Japanese automakers amounted to 2.15 million in the United States 
and to 2.52 million in North America in 1994 (Table 4.1).
Multinational production by Japanese automakers also grew in other regions. In 
Europe, production was initiated by Nissan in July 1986, and mainly limited in the 
United Kingdom. Isuzu followed Nissan, establishing a joint venture with GM in 
September 1987. In order to prepare for the integration of the European Community in 
1992, Honda, then Toyota began local production in the United Kingdom in 1992. The 
feature of local production in Europe is that Nissan led the move. By 1993, Toyota, 
Nissan and Honda respectively had 28, 13, and 26 plants outside Japan manufacturing 
auto vehicles and parts.4 The proportion of overseas production relative to total 
production was 24.9 per cent for Toyota (in 1993), 29.0 per cent for Nissan (in 1992), 
and 35.8 per cent for Honda (in 1993).5
Table 4.1 Local Production by Japanese Automakers in the United States, 1985- 
94 (unit)
Company 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Honda 145,337 435,437 451,199 458,254 403,775 498,710
Nissan 151,232 235,248 265,024 300,328 385,973 444,608
NUMMI 64,601 205,604 208,601 256,136 321,445 363,040
Toyota - 218,215 187,708 240,382 234,060 275,678
AAI - 184,428 165,314 168,859 219,096 247,004
DSM - 148,379 153,936 139,783 136,035 169,829
SLA - 66,960 116,297 124,491 126,558 153,883
Total 361,170 1,494,271 1,548,079 1,688,233 1,826,942 2,152,752
Source: JAMA, The Motor Industry in Japan 1995, p.25.
As a consequence of extended multinational production, intra-firm trade has 
increased rapidly in the automobile industry. Intra-firm trade mainly takes the form of 
reverse imports of finished cars from overseas plants to Japan. Reverse imports climbed 
from almost zero in 1986 to more than 70,000 cars in 1994 (Table 4.2). The share of 
reverse import cars in total imported vehicles rose to 23.3 per cent in 1994. In
Jidosha sangyo hando bukku, 1994, pp. 140-151.
Jidosha sangyo hando bukku, 1995, pp.310-19; Toyota, Kaisha gaiyo 1995, p .ll;  Nissan, Nissan 
jidosha no gurobarizeishon, 1993, p.5; Honda, Annual Report 1993, p.6.
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particular, Honda has boosted the export sales of the Accord coupe made at its Ohio 
plant since 1991. The sales volume of Honda has been larger than that of the total sales 
of the Big Three US auto producers since 1991, and Honda became the primary 
importer of cars into Japan in 1994, surpassing the Volkswagen-Audi group and 
Mercedes-Benz.
Table 4.2 Reverse Import of Passenger Cars, 1988-94 (unit)
Company 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Toyota 10 146 2,109 862 2,363 7,955 9,918
Nissan 4 31 69 1,062 2,264 944 11,587
Honda 5,395 4,697 7,534 14,302 19,835 26,880 47,296
Mitsubishi 84 279 3,095 1,183 586 1,214 1,304
Total 5,493 5,153 12,807 17,409 25,048 36,993 70,105
Source: Japan Automobile Importers’ Association, Imported Car Market of Japan 1993, pp.22-23; 1995, 
pp.24-25.
The other pillar of the internationalisation of Japanese automakers is corporate 
alliances. These alliances commenced in the 1970s as equity participation by US 
automakers in Japanese auto manufacturers: Chrysler and Mitsubishi in June 1971, GM 
and Isuzu in September 1971, and Ford and Mazda in November 1979. Ford has a 24.5 
per cent stake in Mazda; GM holds 37.5 per cent of Isuzu and 3.5 per cent of Suzuki. 
Chrysler also owned 6 per cent of Mitsubishi Motors until July 1993. Corporate 
alliances deepened in the 1980s through the undertaking of joint ventures. As explained 
before, Toyota and GM started production at a joint venture NUMMI in December 
1984, while Mazda and Ford did the same at Auto Alliance International (AAI) in 
September 1987. In Canada, Suzuki and GM established a joint venture called CAMI 
Automotive and began production in April 1989. Corporate tie-ups are also seen in the 
supply of vehicles. The Big Three sell vehicles manufactured by the joint ventures 
(Table 4.3). Captive imports from Japanese makers to the Big Three are continuing 
although their scale is decreasing in the 1990s.6 In addition to the supply of finished 
cars, the provision of engines and transmissions is also undertaken. While Mitsubishi 
Motors provides engines for Chrysler, Chrysler offers engines and transmissions to
GM established the Geo brand in the Chevrolet division in 1989, which was solely composed of 
Japanese original equipment manufacturing (OEM) vehicles (Soken Chosa, October 1991, p. 13).
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Diamond-Star Motors (DSM). Mitsubishi also decided to procure transmissions from 
Chrysler for a high rank model manufactured in the US plant.7
The cooperative relationship between Japanese and US automakers further 
evolved to include joint development of vehicles. Nissan and Ford worked jointly in the 
development of minivans. Mitsubishi also developed models for Chrysler at DSM.8 It 
is often believed that relations between the Japanese and the US auto industry have been 
characterised by constant disputations since the late 1970s, but cooperative relationships 
on the business level have progressed steadily. Some scholars observe that cooperative 
relationships have contributed to mitigating the friction between Japanese and US 
automakers in the US market (Sei 1987). As described later, alliances play a crucial role 
in facilitating access for foreign vehicles to the Japanese market.
Table 4.3 OEM Supply from Japanese to US Automakers, 1986-92 (unit)
Recipient Supplier 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992
GM Toyota (NUMMI) 170,507 96,868 109,631 98,433 74,346
Isuzu (Cl) 101,384 70,690 88,215 79,392 72,251
Suzuki (CAMI) - - 85,995 107,165 115,839
Suzuki (Cl) 60,993 50,233 43,260 13,917 11,822
Ford Mazda (AAI) - 77,763 103,062 76,295 63,659
Chrysler Mitsubishi (DSM) - - 69,441 66,334 61,290
Mitsubishi (Cl) 219,002 174,944 74,896 69,118 67,474
Total Local production 170,507 174,631 368,129 348,227 315,134
ci 381,379 295,867 206,371 162,427 151,547
551,886 470,498 574,500 510,654 466,681
Note: Cl denotes captive imports.
Source: Fourin (1993, p.177).
INTERNATIONALISATION AND OPENING OF KEIRETSU RELATIONS
Japanese automakers have developed multinational production and international 
corporate alliances since the early 1980s. What influence has growing 
internationalisation had on the stance of Japanese automakers on trade policy? Has it
7 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 July 1994.
8 Soken Chosa, October 1991, p. 13.
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changed their preferences for an open domestic market, as our argument predicts? One 
way of answering this question is to examine automakers’ stance on detailed trade 
issues. However, it is also useful to investigate how Japanese automakers have sought to 
transform keiretsu groupings.9 The formation of keiretsu groupings stems from 
business practices, not government policy, but they have been alleged to be one of the 
barriers to the Japanese market.10 This allegation has intensified as the basis of the 
closed Japanese market has shifted from official barriers and non-tariff barriers such as 
customs procedures and testing and certification requirements to non-official business 
practices. The transformation of keiretsu links has had a great impact on Japan’s trade 
relations as well as on the opening of the Japanese market.
The opening of keiretsu supplier groups
Supplier keiretsu in the automobile industry is characterised by a multiple chain of 
suppliers. In the case of Toyota, for example, there are 230 primary, 4,000 secondary 
and more than 30,000 tertiary suppliers.11 The assembly makers and parts suppliers 
maintain tight links through equity participation, personnel, and cooperation in 
technology improvement. In addition, assemblers and keiretsu parts suppliers forge long 
term contracts. Survey data by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) confirm the above 
characteristics (FTC 1993a, pp.23-30). The auto manufacturers have, on average, an 
equity of 58.7 per cent in the leading 30 parts suppliers. In addition, auto manufacturers 
send their employees to 38.7 per cent of the leading 30 parts suppliers where they serve
9 The term keiretsu broadly means various forms of inter-firm relationships, but its real meanings 
are diverse. Sheard (1993, pp.5-6) identifies five common usages: firstly, the six enterprise groups 
composed of firms in different markets which are connected through common financial affiliation, 
interlocking shareholdings and director ties; secondly, sets of firms that have common financial 
links (financial keiretsu); thirdly, a group of firms comprising a large parent company and its 
subsidiaries and affiliates; fourthly, a group of firms composed of a parent firm and its 
subcontracting suppliers (supplier keiretsu); and fifthly, a group of firms comprising a core 
manufacturer and its affiliated wholesalers and distributors (distribution keiretsu). The first and 
second types are referred to as horizontal keiretsu, while the third and fourth are vertical keiretsu. 
The automobile industry has a bearing on all keiretsu groups, yet supplier keiretsu and distribution 
keiretsu have been the primary source of trade disputes. The present discussion is directed to these 
two keiretsu in the automobile industry.
10 See, for instance, Balassa (1986), Laurence (1991b), and Bergsten and Noland (1993). Lawrence 
(1991b), for instance, argues that while vertical kereitsu improves efficiency by reducing imports 
and promoting exports, horizental keiretsu only reduces imports and inhibits new entrants.
11 Asahi Shimbun, 7 January 1992.
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as executives. In terms of the trade period, 82.2 per cent of the deals between 
assemblers and parts suppliers are for more than five years, and in the case of the 
primary 30 parts suppliers, 91.7 per cent of deals are for more than 20 years. Insofar as 
keiretsu groups are formed on the basis of long-term relationships, they tend to be fixed 
and to impede the entry of newcomers. Even the Japanese parts makers admit this 
nature of keiretsu groups. According to a survey by Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha of 101 
auto parts companies, 61.3 per cent of respondents considered that ‘Japanese keiretsu 
deals are rational but not open’ against 19.8 per cent supporting them as ‘rational and 
open’.12
Foreign criticism of supplier keiretsu derives from the small number of deals 
made between Japanese assemblers and foreign parts suppliers. The small number of 
contracts negotiated with foreign suppliers is largely due to differences in production 
and procurement systems between Japanese and foreign automakers. For instance, 
Japanese and US parts manufacturers used different methods of quality control until 
recently. Japanese parts manufacturers seek to attain no defects by building quality 
assurance into each part of the production process. They design equipment and train 
employees so that defects and problems are resolved as soon as they occur. In the US 
automobile industry, many parts manufacturers accepted a minimal level of defects as a 
trade-off for increased efficiencies in mass production. They gave up weeding out 
defective items somewhere down the line in the production sequence (JAMA 1993, 
p.6). In addition, there is a difference in design methods between Japan and the United 
States. There are two methods in auto parts design. One is the design provision method. 
Under this method, automakers mostly design parts in-house, and suppliers manufacture 
the parts by referring to the automakers’ drawings. The other is the design approval 
method, in which suppliers receive approval for the design that they draw themselves 
using their own information and technical ability, and make the parts according to the 
approved design (Asanuma 1989a, p.69). Even though the share of in-house parts 
production is decreasing in the Big Three, the shares are higher than in the Japanese 
companies: 70 per cent in GM, 50 per cent in Ford and 30 per cent in Chrysler. They 
are also dependent on the design provision method in ordering parts and components.
12 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 13 February 1992.
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Therefore, US parts makers have little experience in design. The average share of in- 
house parts production in Japanese producers is 30 per cent. The major method adopted 
in Japan is the design approval method, under which Japanese parts makers have 
sufficient experience in designing. Because of these differences, Japanese automakers 
tended to depend on Japanese parts suppliers, especially their keiretsu members.
Japanese automakers seek to break through these bottlenecks by two means. The 
first method is the promotion of design-in.13 Design-in functions are an effective 
method of exchanging techniques between automakers and parts suppliers as well as 
rationalising design costs and time. At the same time, design-in has been regarded as a 
serious impediment to market access for foreign companies. Foreign companies which 
had little or no experience in design-in, a precondition for deals with Japanese 
automakers, were therefore unable to participate in this method of parts supply.
Japanese automakers and JAMA have implemented activities to accustom foreign 
suppliers to design-in. JAMA has organised conferences for design-in. In addition to the 
conferences in April 1991, a conference held in Detroit in June 1993 drew 145 
participants from Japanese automakers and parts manufacturers and 360 from US parts 
manufactures. At these conferences, they discussed the problems and detailed methods 
of design-in. Toyota established a design-in office within the technical division at its 
headquarters. The company also holds design-in teaching seminars for foreign 
suppliers. Five groups of foreign suppliers were accepted to the seminars between 
October 1992 and March 1993. As of January 1991, nearly 300 US parts suppliers had 
engineers who had been trained in design-in development by Japanese automakers, and 
more than 300 other companies had engineers in training.14 Reflecting these efforts, the 
number of design-in contracts is steadily increasing. In the case of Toyota, the number
13 The design-in for automobiles refers to ‘a process in which engineers from suppliers work 
together with design and development engineers from car manufacturers in the early stages of 
vehicle development’ {JAMA Information Update, July 1991, p .l). In design-in, suppliers are 
required to select appropriate materials, perform self-evaluation and implement most of the 
development work on their own initiative, while assemblers offer guidance and support as 
necessary.
14 JAMA, Important Facts about the Japanese and U.S. Auto Industries, p.8.
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of finished design-in contracts grew from 119 in September 1991 to 697 in February 
1994, and as of February 1994, 404 were under development.15
The other method to eliminate the bottleneck is through direct assistance to 
foreign parts suppliers. The Big Three, which had kept short-term contracts with 
independent parts suppliers, had little incentive to assist them to improve their technical 
skills because they feared that inside information might be leaked to competitors 
through them (Dertouzos et al. 1989, p.177). Japanese automakers seek to support US 
parts manufacturers in order to ensure reliable parts procurement. Toyota established a 
Supplier Support Centre in Kentucky in September 1992. The centre holds seminars 
where the engineers explain Toyota’s quality assurance philosophy. The centre also 
dispatches production engineers to the factories of suppliers, including those which do 
not have any business with Toyota. These engineers provide detailed advice on quality 
improvement and cost reduction. The centre represents ‘a voluntary effort by Toyota to 
support American suppliers, indeed [the] American manufacturing industry in general, 
to become more efficient through rationalization of their operations’ (Shimokawa 1993, 
pp.35-36).
Nissan has also implemented measures to buttress foreign parts suppliers. For 
instance, Nissan organised the Supplier Development Team, which encouraged 
suppliers’ own efforts to improve factory floor operations. The Team advises suppliers 
to use various techniques for improving productivity and abating costs, such as value 
analysis (VA) and value evaluation (VE).16 Nissan also established the Nissan 
Logistics Corporation in the United States in October 1993. Many foreign suppliers 
have little experience in exports and have to * spend time and money becoming 
accustomed to the export business. The Corporation centralises control of parts exports 
from North America to Nissan’s plants in Japan, and removes the burden of 
complicated export business for local suppliers.
Some observers dismiss these efforts as token gestures, directed merely to pacify 
the dissatisfaction of foreign automakers. However, design-in is a core characteristic of
15 Interview, Toyota, Tokyo, April 1994.
16 VA is the effort to reduce costs through proposals on improvements after the start of mass 
production, while VE is such effort prior to mass production (Asanuma 1989b, p.20).
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the keiretsu supplier groups. Supplier companies capable of developing parts from the 
early stage of vehicle development were accepted as members of keiretsu groups. In 
addition, since design-in incorporates the offer of inside information about new models, 
automakers cannot help forging long-term relationships with design-in participants. The 
Japanese automakers’ efforts to expand design-in to foreign suppliers indicate their 
willingness to expand keiretsu groups to foreign suppliers. The assistance to foreign 
suppliers also illustrates willingness of Japanese auto producers to become truly 
international companies in each market.
These efforts contributed to the breakup of keiretsu-based parts procurement. 
Although there are a number of cases in which Japanese automakers selected foreign 
suppliers instead of Japanese suppliers, there are few direct data to indicate the change 
in keiretsu deals.17 It is possible to guess at the change from the trends in trade with 
foreign suppliers. The number of US suppliers doing business with Japanese 
automakers quadrupled from 298 in 1986 to 1,245 in 1993. The number of business 
contracts has also increased substantially from 807 to 2,726 during the same period 
(Table 4.4). As a consequence, the total value of deals between Japanese automakers 
and US parts suppliers has expanded sharply. Japanese automakers’ purchases of US- 
made parts and materials increased eightfold from US$2.49 billion to US$19.86 billion 
between 1986 and 1994 (Table 4.5). The content of purchased parts has gradually 
changed from commodity parts at the start of local production to high quality parts such 
as engines, chassis, and electric/electronics parts.
Table 4.4 Number of US Suppliers and Business Contracts, 1986-93
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Suppliers 298 408 527 657 816 906 1,179 1,245
Contracts 807 1,046 1,225 1,523 1,805 2,087 2,387 2,726
Source: JAMA, internal documents.
17 For example, Toyota decided to purchase air bag sensors and controls from an American maker, 
TRW Technic Inc., instead of from Nippon Denso. TRW surpassed Nippon Denso, an affiliate of 
Toyota, by producing a new design and a finished product from conception to production within 
14 months (Los Angeles Times, 25 February 1992).
83
Table 4.5 Value of US Parts Purchases, 1986-94 (US$ billion)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Imports 0.40 0.65 1.05 1.49 1.95 2.08 2.44 2.61 3.23
Local Use 2.09 2.49 3.86 5.63 7.12 8.45 11.18 12.93 16.63
Total 2.49 3.14 4.91 7.12 9.07 10.53 13.62 15.54 19.86
Source: JAMA, internal documents.
The value of the purchase of foreign parts by individual automakers has also 
steadily increased. The total value of Toyota’s imports and local purchases from foreign 
suppliers grew from US$4.1 billion in 1990 to US$ 6.3 billion in 1992.18 Nissan 
experienced a steady increase in imports, the value expanding from US$374 million in 
1988 to US$976 million in 1992.19 Although domestic vehicle output declined in the 
early 1990s, the value of total imports remained at the level of US$ 900 million. 
Imports therefore have expanded as a proportion of Nissan’s total procurement.
Critics often say that even if Japanese automakers increase their deals with parts 
suppliers in the United States, most are allocated to keiretsu Japanese parts makers. 
Indeed, Japanese parts makers have expanded overseas investment since the mid 1980s 
(Table 4.6). There are no data which show the breakdown in the number of deals with 
local US parts suppliers compared with Japanese local plants because Japanese 
automakers regard all suppliers manufacturing in the United States as US parts 
suppliers. However, if the trend of an automaker’s total deals with parts suppliers in 
compared with the number of Japanese local plants, we can estimate whether Japanese 
automakers are dealing mainly with their keiretsu parts suppliers. In the case of Honda, 
the number of suppliers was small in the early 1980s, but has risen sharply in the late 
1980s from 60 in 1987 to 194 in 1990 (Table 4.7). This resulted partly from the high 
appreciation of the yen and partly from the doubling of production in Honda’s 
manufacturing plant in 1985-86 (Mair 1994, p.100). Japanese parts suppliers also 
expanded from 28 in 1988 to 76 in 1990. This was a boom period in FDI for Japanese 
parts makers. Even after the boom, the number of local suppliers increased from 194 in 
1990 to 250 in 1992. Toyota also experienced a sharp increase in business with local
18
19
Interview, Toyota, Tokyo, April 1994. 
Interview, Nissan, Tokyo, April 1994.
84
suppliers. Toyota’s local suppliers sharply increased from 204 to 296 between 1991 and 
1992 (Table 4.8). These figures suggest that Japanese automakers do not necessarily 
stick to the trade with their keiretsu parts suppliers.
Table 4.6 Number of Overseas Plants Established by Japanese Parts Makers, 
1986-92
Region 1986* 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
North America 44 32 49 27 32 13 4 201
Asia 144 21 40 28 21 13 12 279
Europe 15 5 6 7 8 5 9 55
Other 26 2 2 2 0 3 2 37
Total 229 60 97 64 61 34 27 572
Note: * Up to 1986.
Source: JAPIA (1992, p.20).
Table 4.7 Number of Parts Suppliers Dealing with Honda in the United States,
1985-92
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Total Suppliers 40 - 60 110 180 194 240 250
Of which Japanese - - 28 - 76 - -
Source: Mair (1994, p.100).
Table 4.8 Number of US Parts Suppliers Dealing with Toyota, 1990-93
1990 1991 1992 1993
Imports 83 94 119 131
Local Procurement 194 204 296 301
Total 277 298 415 432
Source: Toyota, internal documents.
The opening of supplier keiretsu groups has impacted on supplier associations, the 
representative bodies of keiretsu groups. Supplier associations are organised by parts
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suppliers which have deals with the Japanese automakers, except for Honda.20 
Associations play a crucial role in organising seminars and cooperative research and 
development (R & D) as well as in coordinating relations between suppliers and the 
assembly maker, and among suppliers. In the past, participation in supplier associations 
was limited by the trade period or transaction amount (Tsuruta 1992, p.8). However, 
these qualifications were excluded, and foreign companies have been invited to become 
members. Toyota’s first tier suppliers organise kyoho-kai, consisting of some 230 
members divided into Tokai (the area around Nagoya), Kanto (the area around 
Tokyo)and Kansai (the area around Osaka and Kyoto). Kanto kyoho-kai admitted the 
participation of three parts divisions of GM in April 1994. Although several foreign 
parts suppliers had joined Toyota’s supplier association, the parts divisions of the US 
Big Three automakers participated in it for the first time.21 Restructuring of the 
supplier associations was also seen in the Nissan group. This group had set up the two 
supplier associations, takara-kai composed of suppliers which started deals at the 
Nissan’s establishment, and shoho-kai composed of suppliers which entered the trade 
afterwards. They were dissolved in June 1991 and a new combined association, nissho- 
kai was established. The new association included 22 new parts makers, including such 
foreign firms as Garrett Turbo and Texas Instruments Japan.22
Why have Japanese automakers extended parts contracts to non-keiretsu foreign 
suppliers? Foreign pressure for raising local content in overseas markets and for 
expanding imports in the Japanese market has been one critical factor explaining this 
change. The appreciation of the yen also forced Japanese automakers to use more 
foreign parts. Yet, as Japanese automakers have expanded their international operations, 
they themselves have a stronger incentive to expand procurement from foreign suppliers 
beyond keiretsu groups.
The key feature of supplier keiretsu lies in the nature of its long-term transactions 
(Yaginuma 1992, p.32). Long-term transactions have considerable economic
20 Although it is often considered that parts suppliers are divided according to keiretsu makers, they 
participate in several associations. According to an FTC survey, parts suppliers join an average of 
3.5 supplier associations (FTC 1993a, P.32).
21 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 April 1994.
22 The Japan Economic Journal, 18 May 1991.
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advantages compared with spot market transactions. Firstly, long-term transactions 
reduce transaction costs. Long-term relationships enable contracting parties to 
accumulate information about product development, product quality, technological 
innovation, and so on. The accumulation of information reduces the cost of maintaining 
contractual relationships (Tsuruta 1992, pp.6-7). Secondly, long-term contracts ensure 
stable supply channels. This provides incentives to make valuable, specific investments 
based on a long-term perspective (Sheard 1993, p.37). Thirdly, long-term contracts 
enable parts suppliers to develop ‘relation-specific skills’.23 On the basis of these skills, 
parts suppliers and assembly makers undertake steady improvement in part quality, 
rationalisation of production methods, and cost reduction. It is reasonable for firms to 
enter into long-term contracts given such economic benefits.24
Why, then, have Japanese automakers sought to transform keiretsu links with 
economic advantages? Division of long-term contracts into the first contracting stage 
and the contract renewal stage helps to address this question (Sheard 1993, pp.33-36). 
Wfiile Japanese automakers have little incentive to transform the practice in the contract 
renewal stage, consideration of foreign parts suppliers at the first contracting stage is 
indispensable for successful multinational operations. For Japanese automakers which, 
on average, outsource 70 per cent of parts and materials, identification of parts suppliers 
that provide products of the highest quality, at the lowest prices, and with the most 
reliable delivery is critical. In the past, Japanese automakers concentrated on domestic 
production, and developed efficient production and procurement systems with domestic 
parts suppliers. They had little incentive to negotiate contracts with foreign suppliers. 
However, as Japanese automakers extended multinational production, they recognised 
that it was not feasible to rely heavily on Japanese parts suppliers. They also sought to 
enhance their international competitiveness by fostering relationships with leading 
supplier companies in specific product sectors on an international scale. Furthermore, as 
Japanese automakers strengthened local production, they had to manufacture
23 Relation-specific skills are defined as skills required of parts suppliers to maintain and develop 
relations with core firms through the supply of intermediate products, responding appropriately 
and efficiently to their specific needs (Asanuma 1989a, p.74).
24 As long as long-term transactions have an economic rationale, —  and ‘exclusionariness’ is almost 
a definition of a long-term contract — , it is misleading to consider them in terms of closure of 
markets (Sheard 1993, p.34; Drysdale 1995, p.278).
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differentiated models that took into account local preferences and tastes. The 
participation of local parts suppliers contributes to the development of locally oriented 
vehicles. Japanese automakers seek to expand parts transactions at the first contracting 
stage to foreign suppliers, and to make use of the advantages deriving from long-term 
contracts.
The cultivation of trustworthy relationships with local suppliers led to an increase 
in imports of foreign parts to Japan. Previously Japanese producers had little 
information about excellent foreign parts suppliers, and it was difficult to increase 
imports. Import from the parts suppliers with which overseas subsidiaries have already 
dealt is reliable and efficient.25
Reflecting the changes in firms’ stance on parts procurement, Japanese 
automakers are inclined to pursue an open procurement policy, targeting overseas 
suppliers. For instance, Tatsuro Toyoda, President of Toyota, shocked the keiretsu parts 
suppliers by announcing that Toyota would make efforts to attain the most appropriate 
procurement anywhere in the world at the new year conference of its supplier 
association in 1994.26 Toyota started to accumulate an international data base on parts 
suppliers in 1994 in order to realise a worldwide parts procurement system.27 Nissan 
announced that any firm having dealings worth more than 1 billion yen annually could 
automatically join its supplier association.28 This indicates Nissan’s intention to 
establish cooperative relations with any parts makers, irrespective of nationality.
25 There are at least two factors other than those explained above that promoted the breakup of 
supplier keiretsu groups. The first is technological innovation. As parts production puts weight on 
high function, electronically-controlled auto parts and systematisation, and assembly makers seek 
to differentiate their products from their rivals through high quality auto parts, they are forced to 
deal with parts producers with high technology and high development ability regardless of 
keiretsu links. A symbol of this was the commencement of deals between Toyota and Hitachi in 
January 1992. Toyota decided to purchase electronically-controlled fuel injection sensors from 
Hitachi, which had previously dealt mainly with Nissan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 20 January 1992). 
The second is the severe recession of the 1990s. On the one hand, assembly makers cut back on 
model variations and used more common auto parts in order to curtail production costs. On the 
other hand, major suppliers sought new customers irrespective of keiretsu links in order to 
improve scale economies further. According to an FTC survey, 71 per cent of parts suppliers 
conduct activities to expand their deals to new companies (FTC, 1993a, p.26).
26 Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 4 February 1994.
27 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 22 April 1994.
28 The Japan Economic Journal, 18 May 1991.
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The opening of keiretsu distribution groups
Japan’s car distribution system, based on keiretsu dealer networks, has also been a 
source of trade friction in the automobile industry.29 For example, several agenda items 
at the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks such as the distribution system, 
exclusionary business practices, and keiretsu relations were relevant to the car 
distribution system (Shioji 1991, pp. 189-90). A collaborative survey by MITI and the 
US Department of Commerce announced in February 1994 also concluded that tight 
linkages between makers and dealers through finance and personnel created 
environments where foreign automakers found it difficult to penetrate the Japanese 
market.30 The criticism of Japan’s car distribution system by foreign car makers has 
also been severe. For instance, Robert A. Lutz, President and chief executive officer of 
Chrysler, in October 1993, criticised the entry barriers to the Japanese market such as 
manufacturer-mandated ‘exclusivity clauses’ for dealers, high distributor margins, and 
extremely high costs associated with meeting safety and other regulatory 
requirements.31
The major Japanese automakers have several sales channels (Table 4.9). Sales 
channels are generally determined by the terms of franchise agreements. Under these 
agreements, dealers are allocated specific car models, so it is difficult for them to 
handle models that have been allocated to other sales channels in the same company, as 
well as models from other automakers, including imported models. In addition, the 
prefecture-based territory system is adopted as the basis for sales in Japan. Automakers 
seek to contract at least one dealership for each of the sales channels in 47 prefectures, 
and the prefectures where a dealership is located constitute the dealers’ areas of prime 
responsibility for sales (JAMA 1990, p.2). This broad territory system has led dealers to 
compete for outlets, and has strengthened their dependence on the automakers.32 
Furthermore, Japanese auto producers intervene in the management of car dealers. They
29 For an analysis of the Japan’s car distribution system, see Shimokawa (1987), Ishibashi (1991), 
and Shioji (1992).
30 The survey suggests that the US car sales would increase by 37,000 annually, if the impediments 
of keiretsu links between automakers and dealers were removed (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 
February 1994).
31 The JAMA Forum, Vol. 12, No.2, December 1993, p.4.
32 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 23 March 1994.
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not only hold equity in dealer companies and dispatch their employees to them, but they 
also support them by offering loans and rebates.33
Table 4.9 Distribution Channels of Major Japanese Automakers
Company Channel Dealer Outlet Model Imported Car
Toyota Toyota 50 1,264 12 GM
Toyopet 52 1,081 10
Corolla 76 1,497 11
Auto 66 1,065 10
Vista 66 693 10
Nissan Nissan 57 1,140 20
Motor 37 683 15
Sunny 57 993 14
Cherry 4 50 10
Prince 51 1,037 16
Honda Clio 94 479 9 Chrysler
Primo 986 1,426 10 Chrysler
Vemo 94 399 8 Chrysler
Mitsubishi Galant 129 729 24 Mercedes-Benz
Car Plaza 129 360 16
Fuso 47 297 8
Mazda Mazda 54 662 21
Infini 55 605 16
Ford 115 300 15 Ford
Autozam 807 876 8 Fiat
Euros 143 250 11 Citroen
Source: Nikkan Jidosha Shimbunsha, Jidosha Nenkan 1995, pp.71-85.
Japanese automakers have taken measures to open dealership networks in recent 
years. The opening of the distribution system has been implemented from two 
directions: one is to revise the dealer contracts, and the other is to handle foreign 
vehicles in automakers’ dealer channels. The most problematic custom between 
automakers and dealers was the prior consultation requirement clause in franchise
33 Several research reports point to tight relationships between Japanese automakers and dealers. For 
instance, the final report for the MOSS Motor Vehicle Study issued in February 1994 points out 
that 33 per cent of domestic car dealers accept equity participation from automakers, while 25 per 
cent borrow short-term operating funds from automakers, and 40 per cent have long-term debts. 
FTC survey data on the distribution also show that 12.9 per cent of dealers accept executives from 
automakers (FTC 1993b, p.23).
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agreements. Under this clause, dealers were required to consult with automakers about 
any plans to sell cars distributed to other sales channels or to sell other makers’ cars. 
However, according to the managers of the automakers, what was required was that 
they should be informed when dealers made decisions which had a ‘serious’ effect on 
management. To handle foreign cars was not necessarily ‘serious’. Therefore, dealers 
were free to deal in foreign cars on their own initiative.34 Yet, because the clause was 
apt to generate misunderstanding, Japanese automakers eliminated the prior 
consultation requirement clause in dealership contracts, and made it clear that dealers 
could freely sell cars from other manufacturers. Toyota sent its dealers a document in 
November 1991 which explained that dealers could handle any kind of car they 
wished.35 Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Mazda also revised dealership contracts in order to 
clarify that dealer companies could deal in other makers’ vehicles.36 However, some 
dealers did not understand that they could handle any kind of car including imported 
vehicles. Japanese automakers therefore undertook further measures to provide a better 
environment for dealers to trade in foreign cars. In May 1994, for instance, Toyota, 
Nissan, and Mitsubishi rectified the payment method of rebates and the limitation of 
sales territory.37
As Japanese automakers have strengthened corporate alliances with foreign 
partners, they have forged tie-ups for distribution and sales of imported cars, especially 
in the late 1980s. Mazda formed the Autorama channel as single-franchise outlets for 
Ford brand cars in 1982.38 Mazda has also handled Fiat of Italy since June 1989, and 
Citroen of France since September 1989. Isuzu has handled GM since 1973 and Adam 
Opel of Germany since December 1988, while Suzuki has traded in GM and Peugeot- 
SA of France since April 1988. These moves have expanded to leading producers in the 
1990s. Honda started to sell Chrysler’s Cherokee in September 1990 based on a sales 
agreement with Chrysler. Toyota also commenced the sales of foreign cars. The
34 Interview, Nissan, Tokyo, April 1994. In reality, according to an FTC survey, all dealers who 
undertook prior consultation with their producers in handling imported cars could attain the 
objective (FTC 1993b, p.41).
35 Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 1991.
36 Asahi Shimbun, 20 November 1991.
37 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 7 May 1994.
38 Ford Japan became an equity partner in the Autorama channel in 1989.
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company started to sell Volkswagen and Audi in its Duo dealer channel in April 1992. 
Toyota agreed with GM in November 1993 to sell 20,000 right-hand drive Chevrolet 
Cavaliers annually through its sales channels in 1996.
The deals regarding foreign car sales mentioned above were determined by auto 
manufacturers, and dealers continued to handle foreign cars according to 
manufacturers’ policies. However, US automakers demanded the right to negotiate 
dealership contracts directly with individual Japanese dealers. It is generally believed 
that there are few cases where dealers themselves negotiated contracts with foreign 
manufacturers or their Japanese subsidiaries. However, there are quite a few cases.39 
But these dealers sell German, not American vehicles.
This trend has expanded to US cars in the 1990s. Four Nissan dealers decided to 
establish sales outlets for Ford cars. This resulted from Ford’s asking Nissan to 
introduce dealers who had an interest in handling Ford’s cars. Toyota dealers are also 
embarking on direct sales contracts with the Big Three. Chiba Toyopet, one of the 
major Toyota dealers, decided independently to begin the sales of Ford cars in 
November 1994.40 This decision had significant implications. Toyota dealers were 
regarded as the least likely to deal in foreign cars because they were the most profitable 
dealers in Japan. The Chiba Toyopet case reveals that this is not the case.
The critical factor which led Japanese automakers to trade in more US vehicles 
was their commitment to corporate alliances and their interest in the US market. Honda 
started to handle Chrysler’s Cherokee in 1990. One reason for this action was that 
Honda did not have any Jeep type car such as the Cherokee. The other reason was 
relevant to Honda’s local production in the United States. Honda had steadily expanded 
local production in the United States in the late 1980s, and took the status of the third 
US passenger car producer from Chrysler in 1991. Honda recognised the necessity for 
promoting cooperation with Chrysler, leading to an agreement to sell Chrysler’s Jeep in 
Japan. Reflecting this consideration, Honda has made serious efforts to sell the 
Cherokee. After importation from the United States, the Cherokees had several defects
39 In the case of Nissan’s dealers, Kushiro Nissan handles Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, and Audi, 
Sunny Miyagi sells Mercedes-Benz, and Tochigi Nissan sells Mercedes-Benz, Audi. There are 
many other cases (Interview, Nissan, Tokyo, June 1994).
40 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 October 1994.
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such as hollows and paint spots. Although Chrysler maintained that such trifling defects 
were not problems, Honda spent money and time to correct them through pre-delivery 
inspections.41 Honda also expanded the number of dealers from 430 in 1990 to 694 in 
1993. This led to an exceptional success for US vehicles in Japan with the sales volume 
increasing from 807 in 1992 to 3,747 in 1993.
Toyota’s handling of foreign cars in its dealer network can be explained by its 
commitment to corporate alliances and multinational production. Toyota started the 
sales of Volkswagen and Audi in April 1992. The two giants had already commenced 
joint production of small trucks in Germany in 1989. Toyota aimed to strengthen the 
relations with Volkswagen through the sales agreement. In addition, the sales agreement 
had much to do with Toyota’s plan to begin local production in Europe. Toyota planned 
to start the production of passenger cars in the United Kingdom in 1992. However, 
following a move to restrain the total volume of Japanese cars which included imported 
and locally produced cars, Toyota sought to ensure its sales in Europe by showing its 
commitment to expanding the access of European vehicles to the Japanese market.42
Toyota’s decision to handle GM cars can be understood in this context, as well. 
Before announcing that Toyota would sell GM cars, Toyota examined the possibility of 
selling GM cars in 1989 and 1990. However, the plan was not realised due to Toyota’s 
consideration for GM’s importer Yanase & Co., which had sold GM cars since 1915. 
The relations between Toyota and GM had steadily been strengthened after they started 
a joint venture, NUMMI in 1984. In May 1988, the two companies established a joint 
venture, the United Australian Automotive Industries Ltd. (UAAI) in Australia. This 
company became the parent company of Toyota’s subsidiary, Toyota Motor 
Corporation Australia Ltd. and General Motors-Holden’s Automotive Ltd. in May 
1991 43 Furthermore, NUMMI expanded its business in spring 1991 by starting the 
production of small trucks. Therefore, the handling of GM cars resulted partly from 
Toyota’s intention to strengthen the relations with GM by selling its vehicles in Japan.
41
42
43
Interview, Honda, Tokyo, April 1994. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 April 1991. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 April 1991.
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This intention was reflected on Toyota’s decision to sell GM Cavaliers through the 
Toyota channel, the most powerful and profitable channel.44
What is important is that Toyota has changed its stance on opening its dealer 
network. There were, however, several episodes reflecting Toyota’s managers’ 
opposition to its dealers handling foreign cars. For example, when the president of 
Chiba Toyopet asked a direct sales manager of Toyota to handle Ford, he agreed. But 
the president was not convinced that the agreement was his real intention 45 In summer 
1994, Tatsuro Toyoda proclaimed that Toyota’s dealers would be able to handle other 
makers’ cars if they wished. Within hours of this announcement, Toyota’s managers 
sent dealers faxes advising that if they did so they could expect to lose their connection 
with Toyota.46 These episodes do not necessarily reflect the views of Toyota’s senior 
executives. Sales managers tend to make efforts to ensure stable sales of Toyota’s 
vehicles. However, the senior executive appreciated the necessity of opening the dealer 
network to foreign vehicles in order to tighten relationships with foreign alliance 
partners as well as to promote reciprocal relationships with foreign automakers.
MARKET OPENING POLICIES AND INDUSTRY REACTION IN 1989 
Nissan’s international cooperation program
The Japanese government became more eager after the early 1980s to promote market 
access of foreign goods, and implemented various measures towards this end.47 The 
government has held import expansion meetings since the mid 1980s. At the first 
meeting in April 1985, senior executives of 60 export-oriented companies, and trading 
and retail companies were requested to establish a division for import expansion, to 
submit an import expansion program, and to report periodically on the implementation 
of the program. The next year, the target number increased greatly to 302 companies.
44 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31 August 1994.
45 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 24 March 1994.
46 The Economist, 1 July 1995, p.68.
47 These measures include seven major market opening programs between 1982 and 1985, new tax 
systems and financial loans programs designed to promote inward investment as well as imports, 
and import promotion activities through the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO).
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The response by the automobile industry to government requests for expanding 
imports was similar to other industries until 1989. In 1989, however, automakers 
announced international cooperation programs that included import expansion plans. 
The most challenging program was announced by Nissan. The second largest auto 
producer in Japan outlined its international cooperation program on 20 September 1989. 
This program consisted of three pillars. Firstly, the firm would double the value of its 
imports worth US$370 million in 1988 by 1992, and would double this again by the 
second half of the 1990s. To expand imports, Nissan would sell the Volkswagen Passat 
in its dealer network in 1990, and import cars from its overseas factories in North 
America and Australia. Secondly, Nissan would expand local production and reverse 
the ratio of exported vehicles to locally built vehicles in Nissan’s unit sales overseas. 
The ratio would be changed from 2 to 1 in 1989 to 1 to 1 in 1992 and to 1 to 2 by the 
end of the 1990s. For this purpose, Nissan would increase local content and promote the 
localisation of management through recruiting local persons to senior executive posts of 
each subsidiary. Thirdly, the program included a plan to whittle down exports. The 
peak export volume of Nissan was 1.41 million in 1985. The volume would be reduced 
to 1 million by 1992 and to around half a million by the end of the 1990s. In order to 
promote the program, Nissan established an international procurement division at its 
headquarters in January 1990. The division was set up on the model of the domestic 
procurement division. Procurement divisions were also established in Nissan North 
America and Nissan Europe, the regional headquarters.
Motivation of Nissan’s program
Why did Nissan announce this international cooperation program in 1989? Did this 
program have anything to do with the internationalisation of Nissan’s corporate 
activity? It may be thought that Nissan’s program did not stem from the change in 
corporate preferences but from the encouragement by MITI which was keen to expand 
imports. However, there are at least two factors which suggest otherwise. The first 
factor relates to Nissan’s response to MITI’s guidance on a capital investment plan. In 
October 1989, the Minister of MITI requested automakers to refrain from making large 
capital investments. Nissan ignored this request on the grounds that the capital spending
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would not lead to a further export drive.48 The second factor is that other automakers 
resisted MITI’s guidance to formulate a similar program to Nissan’s. MITI expected 
Toyota, Honda and Mazda to draw up the program. Though all these firms eventually 
announced programs, the contents of these programs did not meet MITI’s expectations. 
Toyota’s program only included an import expansion plan. Honda did not abide by 
MITI’s guidance for some time. After some resistance, Honda announced a program 
which summarised an existing import-export plan.49
Nissan’s program sprang from several factors. First of all, trade relations with the 
United States had entered a serious phase. Japan’s trade surplus with the United States 
remained high in spite of a rapid increase in imports in the second half of the 1980s.50 
The US government launched new measures to rectify trade imbalances. In May 1989, 
the government identified Japan as a country carrying out unfair trade practices under 
Super 301, and listed supercomputers, satellites, and wood products as items subject to 
unfair trade practices.51 At the same time, the US government proposed the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII) talks to discuss measures to reduce structural impediments 
to trade between the two countries. These moves motivated Nissan, which was 
dependent on the US market for exports and local production, to take measures to 
reduce trade friction with the United States.
Secondly, the program was influenced by domestic political factors. The Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) experienced an historical setback in the Upper House election 
of July 1989. The automobile industry was accused of bearing a large responsibility for 
the defeat. The Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions was one of the 
major constituents of the Japanese Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) 
whose remarkable advance was largely responsible for the loss of LDP’s seats. On 25 
July, two days after the Upper House election, Seiroku Kajiyama, the Minister of MITI, 
and top ranking officials of MITI met senior executives of the automobile industry such 
as Shoichiro Toyoda (President of Toyota), Yutaka Kume (President of Nissan), and
48 The Japan Economic Journal, 9 December 1989. Nissan’s response contrasted sharply with that of 
Mazda. Mazda, whose president was a former MITI official, accepted MITI’s guidance to curtail 
planned production capacity at its new plant.
49 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 December 1989.
50 These were US$51.4 billion in 1986, US$52.1 billion in 1987, and US$47.6 billion in 1988.
51 The New York Times, 26 May 1989.
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Satoshi Okubo (Chairman of Honda). Kajiyama argued that although the industry 
enjoyed benefits from the introduction of the consumer tax, it did not contribute support 
to the LDP government (Mainichi Shimbun 1991, pp.19-21).52
Besides, the LDP had a specific quarrel with Nissan. Takashi Ishihara, Chairman 
of Keizai Doyukai as well as Chairman of Nissan had had a great impact on business 
and political circles by pushing for the resignation of the Takeshita administration in 
April 1989 (Mainichi Shimbun 1991, p.20). In June 1989, he also criticised the reaction 
of the government towards the Tiananmen Incident in China as being lukewarm 
compared with other countries which severely criticised the military actions of the 
Chinese government. His remarks irritated LDP politicians. Senior executives of Nissan 
probably felt the need to announce some measures that would appease the anger of the 
LDP government.
Thirdly, the program was set up as a result of changes in the policy stance of 
Nissan on market access. Japanese auto producers became more sensitive to market 
access issues in the late 1980s. This change was seen in the attitude of major 
automakers to the purchase of foreign semiconductors. Automakers had previously 
shown little interest in expanding the purchase of foreign semiconductors on the 
grounds that the semiconductor disputes were caused by electronics firms. The share of 
foreign semiconductors in the total purchases for Toyota, Honda, and Nissan was only 2 
per cent in 1988 when the average share of foreign semiconductors in the Japanese 
market was more than 10 per cent. However, these firms announced plans to increase 
the purchase of foreign semiconductors in 1989. In May 1989, Nissan announced a plan 
to begin imports of memory chips from Intel for use in the electronic-control units of 
engines.53 In the same month, Honda also published an action program, in which the 
value of semiconductor purchases would be expanded tenfold, and the ratio of foreign 
semiconductors in the total purchase would be raised from 1.8 per cent to more than 10
52 In 1989, commodity taxes, which were imposed on standard cars at a rate of 23 per cent and on 
compact cars at 18.5 per cent, were transformed into a 6 per cent consumer tax on all kinds of 
vehicles.
53 The Japan Economic Journal, 6 May 1989.
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per cent by 1992.54 Toyota also decided to purchase micro controllers and memory 
chips from Motorola, a US company.55
Why, then, did Nissan change its stance on market access issues? This question is 
relevant to the issue of why Nissan announced its bold program. The program had a 
great bearing on Nissan’s multinational operations. Nissan’s expansive international 
operations made it possible for Nissan to draw up concrete plans including adjustment 
of the ratio of imported vehicles to locally built vehicles and the reduction of exports 
(Tsuchiya 1989, p.53). Nissan’s international activities date back to 1957 when it 
agreed to offer technical assistance to Yulon Motors of Taiwan. In 1961, Nissan 
established Nissan Mexicana which became Nissan’s first offshore production plant. 
Nissan extended local production to the United States in June 1983 half a year behind 
its forerunner, Honda. Its globalisation was swift in Europe as well. After the equity 
participation in Nissan Motor Iberica in Spain in January 1980, local operations started 
in the United Kingdom in July 1986. Nissan was the first Japanese automaker to 
manufacture vehicles in Europe.
Nissan’s multinational operations were extended in the late 1980s. Nissan had 
proceeded with globalisation in a four step process: first, creation and development of 
local production; second, strengthening of local R & D capabilities; third, localisation in 
management functions; and fourth, localisation of decision-making process.56 Unlike 
other Japanese automakers, Nissan has made efforts to localise management. Not only 
were three out of four overseas manufacturing plants managed by local chief executive 
officers but the ratio of Japanese in employment at overseas plants was extremely 
low.57 With the opening of regional headquarters, Nissan Europe in April 1989 and 
Nissan North America in January 1990, the company has arrived at the final step.
The advanced stage of Nissan’s internationalisation encouraged it to pay attention 
to developments in the international market. In 1989, a corporate planning office was
54 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 26 May 1989.
55 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 19 June 1989.
56 Interview, Nissan, Tokyo, April 1994.
57 The ratio of the Japanese in total employees at the Japanese manufacturing plants operating in the 
United States was 2.5 for Toyota, 5.0 for Honda and 1.9 for Mitsubishi, and only 0.7 for Nissan 
(Ishii 1990, p. 14).
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organised under the direct control of the president. The office drew up the first long­
term plan which envisaged that the automobile industry in Japan and the world would 
promote multinational production and a globalisation strategy. The top executives of 
Nissan considered that since Japanese cars have penetrated the world market and 
Japanese automakers have actively promoted multinational operations, they would have 
to take into account more seriously international cooperation with foreign makers.58 
This consideration led to the plans for a curtailment of exports as well as to the 
doubling of imports in the program. At the same time, by announcing that the company 
would take measures to promote access of foreign products to the Japanese market and 
did not intend to disrupt the world market, Nissan hoped that its local production 
facilities in the United States and Europe would be accepted as insiders.59
What is crucial about Nissan’s program was that it suggested a change in stance 
on free trade. Japanese automakers supported free trade principles in the early 1980s. 
When the Japanese government sought to introduce a VER in 1981, automakers were 
strongly opposed to it, arguing that the VER contradicted free trade principles. The 
primary reason why they adhered to free trade principles was that these provided 
conditions for keeping export markets open. The automakers showed little interest in 
opening up their own home market and in rectifying high export dependence. However, 
they gradually recognised that other methods were necessary to sustain the free trade 
system. For this reason, Nissan’s voluntary program included concrete measures to 
reduce exports for the first time. Nissan’s President Yutaka Kume stressed the 
importance of this point, arguing that ‘we thought the import expansion alone would 
not be effective in correcting Japan-U.S. trade imbalances. Judging from the seriousness 
of Japan-U.S. commercial relations, we concluded it would be best to cut down exports 
instead of just denouncing the U.S.’.60
Although it is a matter of debate as to whether Nissan’s internationalisation has 
been successful, Nissan was the leading company in the Japanese auto industry in terms 
of internationalisation through the 1980s. This enabled Nissan to take a lead in
58
59
60
Interview, Nissan, Tokyo, April 1994.
Mainichi Shimbun, 21 September 1989.
The Japan Economic Journal, 9 December 1989.
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announcing programs designed to expand market access for foreign products and to 
abandon an export-dependent corporate strategy.
Influence of Nissan’s program
The international cooperation program that Nissan announced in September 1989 
impinged not only on the behaviour of other auto companies but also the government’s 
policies for expanding market access. Even when the program was announced, other 
automakers paid scant attention to it, asserting that every auto producer was reducing 
exports as they expanded local production in North America and Europe.61 However, 
after Nissan announced the program, other industries and the overseas press asked why 
other automakers were not announcing similar programs.62 In succession, other firms 
eventually announced similar programs. Mazda announced a program on 20 October 
1989 to quadruple the value of imports in 1988 to 200 billion yen by 1992: to increase 
car imports from 7,200 in 1988 to 60,000 in 1992; and to expand the international 
procurement of semiconductors and electronics equipment.63 Toyota’s program was 
announced on 30 October. The program, which aimed to raise the import value to 300 
billion yen in 1992, included reverse imports of Camry from its Kentucky plant in the 
United States as well as imports of other foreign-made cars.64 Honda followed on 24 
November and Mitsubishi on 17 January 1990.65 Automakers other than Nissan were 
forced to draw up cooperation programs by the unintentionally associated moves by 
MITI and Nissan.66 It is doubtful whether other producers would have made their plans 
so early, if Nissan had not initiated its program.
Nissan’s program also contributed to creating a new impetus in the government’s 
import expansion policy. The program considered import expansion from a rather long-
61
62
63
64
65
66
For instance, Shoichiro Toyoda, President of Toyota, commented on Nissan’s program that ‘it is 
natural that exports will decrease as local production increases. We have referred to this direction 
many times’ (Asahi Shimbun, 23 September 1989).
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 October 1989.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 October 1989.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31 October 1989.
While Honda planned to increase the value of imports in 1988 by 2.5 times to 160 billion yen by 
1992, Mitsubishi’s import figure was 100 billion yen in 1992, up 3.6 times on 1988 (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 25 November 1989; 18 January 1990).
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 October 1989.
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term perspective, three years or more. MITI had previously considered short-term 
plans, within one year, but recognised that import expansion was important in the 
longer term. Around one month after Nissan’s announcement, MITI requested some 50 
export-oriented firms in automobiles, electronics, general machinery, which accounted 
for 60 per cent of Japan’s exports, to double their 1988 import value by 1993, and to 
add the same value of imports as exports if they expand exports by 1993.67 MITI 
expected these firms to draw up a medium-range program like that which Nissan had 
announced. This request was exceptional because MITI had already held regular import 
expansion meetings in June. The import-doubling program launched by Nissan 
motivated MITI to take this additional action. The efforts by private firms indirectly 
affected government policy. MITI sought to introduce an import promotion tax system 
in 1989. Although this idea was resisted by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), MITI 
succeeded in including the import promotion tax arrangements in the 1990 tax reform 
plan. The import expansion efforts by firms provided MITI with the pretext for the 
introduction of this tax reform system.
Nissan’s program was epoch-making in its effect on the relations between MITI 
and the automobile industry. The automobile industry was regarded as less cooperative 
with MITI’s policy compared with other industries such as iron and steel. Relations 
between MITI and the automobile industry were marked by a history of disputes. MITI 
drew up the people’s car concept in 1955, but this concept failed, owing to the 
objections of automakers. MITI also advocated the two-group concept in 1968, 
designed to reinforce the oligopoly position of Toyota and Nissan. This concept again 
failed because of strong opposition from smaller manufacturers. Before a VER was 
introduced in the US market in 1981, MITI encouraged automakers to invest in the US 
market to mitigate trade tension. However, the major automakers turned a deaf ear to 
MITI (Chung 1993, chap.6). When a VER was introduced in 1981, Naohiro Amaya, 
MITI’s negotiator with the United States, implored the top executives of auto producers 
to accept the VER (Amaya 1981; Kotani 1982). The crucial factor in MITI’s voluntarily 
extension of VER in 1985 was that MITI could not draw on cooperation from the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 20 November 1989.
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automobile industry.68 In the case of import promotion in 1989, however, a company 
in the automobile industry offered a sample plan that MITI could use as a pretext to 
persuade other companies and industries. Nissan’s program functioned as a catalyst 
promoting momentum for market access.
THE ACTION PLAN IN 1992 
Background
Market access in the automobile industry became an issue and the stance of Japanese 
automakers on market access was revealed in the Action Plan announced in January 
1992. The automobile sector became the main target when US President George Bush 
visited Japan, and the Japanese government and automobile industry clashed over the 
import expansion of auto parts and vehicles before and during Bush’s visit. On 9 
January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa and US President Bush announced the Tokyo 
Declaration, which confirmed the Japan-US global partnership after the Cold War. In 
the Action Plan attached to the Tokyo Declaration, the Japanese government announced 
assistance with design-in training for engineers of US parts manufacturers, sales 
missions to Japan and other measures to assist the US parts manufacturing industry. The 
government also promulgated further improvements in tax and financial incentives to 
promote imports to and investments in Japan, such as tax incentives for the 
establishment of foreign firms, low interest rate loans, and debt guarantee facilities. 
With respect to imports of finished vehicles, the government proclaimed its intention to 
increase opportunities for the sales of foreign vehicles through budgetary allocations, 
holding foreign automobile shows in Japan, and JETRO activities.
The Japanese auto manufacturers and related industrial associations also 
suggested measures to increase the purchase of US auto parts and vehicles. The 
automakers set purchase goals of US$19 billion for US-made auto parts in 1994, up 
US$10 billion from 1990 (Table 4.10). Parts procurement from US suppliers by 
Japanese affiliates in the United States was expected to more than double from US$6.9
68 MITI expected that the industry would coordinate orderly exports with a volume of less than 2.3 
million after VER was abolished, but the industry failed to coordinate their interests. MITI’s 
hearing revealed that the total export volume amounted to more than 2.7 million (NIRA 1989, 
chap.l).
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billion in 1990 to US$15 billion in 1994. As a consequence, the percentage of local 
procurement in the total purchase of parts was expected to increase from some 50 per 
cent in 1990 to 70 per cent in 1994. By contrast, the percentage of imports from Japan 
would decrease from 50 per cent to 30 per cent. Imports of US-made parts were 
expected to double from US$1.8 billion in 1990 to US$4 billion in 1994. Japanese 
automakers also suggested that they continue further efforts to encourage design-in, 
expand R & D facilities in the United States and assist US parts suppliers to develop 
long-term business relationships.
Table 4.10 Japanese Automakers’ Goals for US-Made Auto Parts Purchases 
(US$ billion)
Company
Target for 1994 Purchases in 1990
(a/b)Local
content
Imports Total
(a)
Local
content
Imports Total
(b)
Toyota 3.82 1.46 5.28 1.90 0.70 2.60 203.1
Nissan 2.90 0.80 3.70 0.90 0.40 1.30 284.6
Honda 4.38 0.56 4.94 2.52 0.28 2.80 176.4
Mitsubishi 1.20 0.40 1.60 0.52 0.16 0.68 235.3
Mazda 1.90 0.40 2.30 0.97 0.22 1.19 193.3
Others 0.80 0.38 1.18 0.12 0.03 0.15 786.7
Total 15.00 4.00 19.00 6.93 1.79 8.72 217.9
Source: JAMA Report, No.45, p.4.
Table 4.11 Japanese Automakers’ Goals for US Vehicles Sales (unit)
Importer Supplier Volume Target year
Toyota GM 5,000 Not specified
Nissan Ford 3,000 Not specified
Honda Chrysler 1,200 1994
Mitsubishi Chrysler 6,000 1995
Mazda
Total
Ford 4,500
19,700
1992
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun (10 January 1992).
In terms of complete cars, the Japan Automobile Dealers Association reconfirmed 
their willingness to undertake dual dealerships to sell US automobiles. This statement
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was a response to US criticism that Japanese dealers avoided dealing with US cars 
under a single dealership contract with manufacturing companies. Major Japanese 
automakers also announced their target figures to support imports of US cars (Table 
4.11). The total number of 19,700 units attained within a few years was roughly 6,000 
units more than in 1990. In line with these objectives, they expressed their willingness 
to cooperate in expanding sales opportunities for US cars in Japan and to provide space 
to exhibit the Big Three’s cars at seven showrooms in the Metropolitan Tokyo area.
Interactions between MITI and the automakers
Before Japanese automakers announced their voluntary plans in the Action Plan in 
January 1992, there was tough bargaining between the government and the automobile 
industry. Bush’s tour included exceptional features for a top US-Japan meeting. The 
schedule of the tour was suddenly changed. Bush was originally expected to visit Japan 
in early December. The tour was postponed because of rising economic problems in the 
United States. The objective of the tour was also altered. The original objective of the 
meeting was to strengthen the friendly ties between the United States and Japan on the 
50-year anniversary of the Pearl Harbour attack. But the objective was transformed into 
a detailed discussion of trade issues affecting automobiles and other areas in order that 
Bush could demonstrate to the American people his serious interest in economic matters 
in an election year. The Bush delegation was accompanied by 21 leading business 
executives including eight business leaders from the auto sector. The tour that Bush 
hailed as ‘a mission to create jobs and restore prosperity for all Americans’ was thus 
changed into Bush’s campaign for presidential re-election in November 1992.
The Japanese government was forced to take urgent measures to promote the 
summit’s success and to cope with the changes in tour’s schedule and objectives. On 11 
December, Vice-Minister of MITI, Yuji Tanahashi, requested the top executives of 
automakers to make maximum efforts to respond to the US request, including providing 
assistance to US car sales.69 Two days later, MITI suddenly called in Shoichiro 
Toyoda, President of Toyota, and requested him to redress the trade imbalance with the
69 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 December 1991.
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United States through expanding the purchase of US auto parts and vehicles.70 The 
government’s focus on the auto industry accelerated after Robert Zoellick, US 
Undersecretary of State, arrived in Japan on 20 December for consultation prior to 
Bush’s visit. He was dissatisfied with the voluntary programs which Japanese 
automakers had announced in November and persuaded the Japanese government to 
make concessions on trade issues so as to arrest the protectionist movement in the US 
Congress. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa requested the automobile industry on 25 
December to consider lifting the purchase of US auto parts.71 MITI invited the top 
executives of major automakers to a breakfast meeting on 26 December, and persuaded 
them to draw up new programs which would boost the purchase of US-made parts and 
targeted goals for US car sales.72 MITI fixed the deadline for the new programs on 6 
January of the next year.
MITI faced strong resistance from the automakers. Toyota, the leading 
automaker, was the main target of MITI’s guidance, shown in the special commitment 
by MITI on 13 December. Toyota rejected successive MITI’s requests, asserting that 
the purchase of parts should not be implemented according to the government’s request. 
Yuji Tanahashi, Vice-Minister of MITI, was impatient with this attitude.73 The top 
executives of Toyota, who maintained a close connection with the kochi-kai (Miyazawa 
faction), hoped that if they asked Prime Minister Miyazawa, they would obtain his 
support for their stance.74 Although they met Miyazawa twice, this commitment was 
not forthcoming. Miyazawa had his own reasons for wanting a successful summit. 
Miyazawa, who had become Prime Minister a few months earlier, did not enjoy 
sufficient support within the LDP. In addition, he had just failed to pass the bill 
allowing the dispatch of Self Defence Forces overseas for United Nations peace 
keeping. There was strong pressure on Miyazawa to make substantial concessions to 
Bush.
70 Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 January 1992.
71 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 December 1991.
72 Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 January 1992.
73 He censured Toyota for considering its own company alone without understanding Japan’s 
situation (Mainichi Shimbun, 8 March 1994).
74 Mainichi Shimbun, 8 March 1994.
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After failing to persuade Miyazawa, Toyota showed a more flexible attitude. The 
figure for purchases of US parts which Toyota announced in November 1991 was 
US$4.6 billion. The procurement division concluded that additional purchases of 
US$0.3-0.4 billion were the best that could be achieved. This figure was boosted to 
US$5.28 billion. This new target was set by the external relations division and the 
decision of top executives (Watanabe 1992, pp.12-13). Toyota had earlier rejected the 
idea of selling GM cars on the grounds that it was nonsense to proceed unless GM 
asked Toyota to sell cars. However, Toyota eventually accepted a target for annual sales 
of 5,000 GM cars on several conditions.
The decision to increase purchases of US-made auto parts and sales of US cars 
was difficult for Nissan as well. Yutaka Kume, Nissan’s President, summoned the 
firm’s executives on 5 January in order to discuss countermeasures to MITI’s request to 
boost the voluntary program in November 1991 and to assist the sales of US vehicles. 
Some executives asserted that it was nonsense to propose that Nissan sell US cars as 
long as US automakers themselves did not put this proposal to Nissan.75 Kume decided 
to accept MITI’s request. Nissan agreed to increase purchases of parts and announced a 
plan to cooperate in sales of US cars. The value of parts purchases was raised from 
US$3.3 billion to US$3.7 billion. The company also decided to provide showrooms for 
US cars and to sell Ford’s minivan, Quest, and Taurus in its dealer networks.
Japanese automakers gathered on 6 January in order to make a final decision on 
the purchase of US-made cars and auto parts. At the meeting, all auto producers except 
Toyota decided to accept targets for purchases of parts and vehicles. Toyota followed 
other companies after the top executives met Miyazawa in the afternoon of 7 January. 
Nissan announced its cooperation program on 7 January and the other four major auto 
firms the next day.
The actions of automakers were characterised by strong resistance to the 
requirements of MITI and the Prime Minister’s Office to increase the purchase of US- 
made parts and to assist the sales of US vehicles. They did not keep the original 
deadline for new programs which MITI had determined, and the negotiations between 
automakers and MITI continued until 8 January, the day before the second Miyazawa-
75 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 9 January 1992.
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Bush meeting. Further, MITI’s goal of boosting purchases of auto parts by 50 per cent 
from November plans was not realised.
The actions of automakers superficially indicated a reluctance to promote market 
access of foreign products. However, there were plausible reasons for their resistance. 
They had already announced voluntary programs for expanding imports twice in late 
1991. The first programs were forged in November. The programs, based on the Market 
Oriented Sector Specific (MOSS) agreement in September 1991, involved a purchase 
plan for US-made auto parts. Although some firms were dissatisfied with the managed 
trade method, the automobile industry by and large cooperated in implementing the 
government agreement.76 Under these programs, the total value of imports and local 
procurement was expected to increase to US$16.4 billion in 1994, 91 per cent up from 
1990.77
One month later, the automakers announced a second voluntary program which 
targeted imports worldwide under the Business Global Partnership (BGP) Project.78 
Under these programs, the five leading auto producers would increase annual imports 
from US$4.4 billion in 1990 to US$7.4 billion in 1994, and expand purchases by 
overseas subsidiaries from US$12.8 billion to US$24.6 billion in the same period.79 
The two programs were announced after consultation with MITI as gifts for Bush’s 
visit. However, MITI forced automakers to revise the November figures after a short 
time. The automakers asserted, quite plausibly, that if they revised the figures that had 
been announced only two months earlier, these figures would seem to have been 
calculated irresponsibly. Furthermore, the industry feared that the figures would be 
regarded as a pledge when they were included in the governmental document, and
76 For instance, Yutaka Kume emphasised the need for the programs as follows: ‘The cooperation 
between Japanese and US firms is important for the solution to trade friction regarding auto parts. 
For this purpose, each firm has to draw up a program for purchases of US-made parts as soon as 
possible’ (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 September 1991).
77 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 20 November 1991.
78 MITI requested the major firms in automobiles, electronics, steel, and machine tools to submit 
plans for purchasing foreign made equipment and materials as well as plans for subsidiaries 
abroad to purchase parts and materials from foreign companies. These firms were also required to 
draw up plans for establishing joint ventures and technical tie-ups with foreign companies.
79 Nissan and Mazda would double the purchase of parts between 1990 and 1994, while Toyota and 
Mitsubishi would increase them by 75 per cent.
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might be used as a pretext for retaliation if the targets were not achieved.80 The 
automakers sought to settle with figures that were attainable.
Japanese automakers did not necessarily wish to promote the purchase of US auto 
parts and vehicles. Their real intention lay in the two programs that they announced in 
1991 in order to promote market access of foreign products. What Japanese automakers 
resisted was MITI’s unreasonable demands to revise the plans within a short time frame 
and MITI’s intervention which might lead to managed trade.
Motivation of the automakers
If automakers regarded MITI’s demands unreasonable, why did they agree to boost the 
purchase of US auto parts and to sell US vehicles? It seemed that the automakers’ 
actions were a result of MITI’s strong pressure. Indeed, at that time, MITI was greatly 
worried about the auto trade issue with the United States. In addition to statistical data 
suggesting that the share of Japanese automakers combining imports and local 
production exceeded 30 per cent in the US market, and that three quarters of the US$40 
billion US trade deficit with Japan in 1990 was attributable to the automobile industry, 
another factor forced MITI to respond positively to the US demand. GM announced on 
18 December that it would close down six assembly plants and 15 parts plants, and 
slash its North American work force by 74,000 by 1995.
Reflecting this concern, MITI’s request to boost the earlier plans was persistent 
and strong. It is reported that at the meeting with automakers’ executives in late 
December, MITI suggested banning the exports of cars and auto parts under the Export 
Trade Control Ordinance.81 MITI asked automakers to announce increased figures for 
the purchase of US auto parts regardless of whether these figures could be achieved. In 
addition, the volume of US car sales allocated to each firm was based on the number of 
dealer shops, not on a feasible calculation of how many cars automakers could sell.82
80
81
82
Ekonomisuto, 28 January 1992, p.29. 
Nildcan Jidosha Shimbun, 6 January 1992. 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 January 1992.
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The fact that MITI asked major companies to purchase US cars in the event that 
Japanese consumers would not purchase them also revealed MITI’s desperation.83
To explain the automakers’ actions in terms of MITI’s pressure alone seems 
implausible because the influence of MITI on the automobile industry was limited. 
MITI had implored the top executives of auto producers to accept a VER in 1981. MITI 
also failed to coordinate views among automakers when the extension of the VER 
became an issue in 1985. It is also said that the manager of the Automobile Division in 
MITI only learned of the plan through a newspaper report of Toyota and GM to 
establish a joint venture.84 Although MITI’s influence had gradually increased as the 
automobile sector had become the source of the Japan-US trade friction, major 
automakers could have rejected M m ’s request, if they had wished to do so.
What, then, were the other factors encouraging automakers to expand the 
purchase of US auto parts and vehicles? One factor was that all major actors supported 
the idea that the Japan-US summit should be successful at any cost. A successful 
summit was important to Prime Minister Miyazawa’s strengthening his stance in the 
LDP. There was consensus within the LDP on the need for a successful summit. 
Originally, LDP members were hostile towards the automobile industry. Party members 
were disappointed that because of continuous trade imbalances with Japan, most of 
which were attributable to the industry, the US government had strengthened its 
demand for market opening measures in agriculture, construction and small retail 
business, which constituted major constituencies for funding and support for the LDP 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha ed. 1990, p.201). Accordingly, the Diet Members’ League 
on Automobiles {Jidosha giin renmei), composed of 212 members of the House of 
Representatives and 52 from the House of Councillors showed little interest in trade 
issues concerning auto and auto parts.85 The LDP not only regarded the summit as a 
crucial turning point in the Japan-US relationship but also hoped that President Bush, a 
free trade advocate, would be re-elected.86 The four business federations also
83 Asahi Shimbun, 9 January 1992.
84 Purejidento, January 1985, p.311.
85 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 December 1991.
86 Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 December 1991.
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advocated the need to promote cooperation with the United States through substantial 
measures in the auto and rice issues.87
More importantly, Japanese automakers had their own incentives to expand 
market access and to promote cooperation with US automakers. These incentives 
stemmed largely from the expansion of international operations. Firstly, Japanese 
automakers feared that the US auto industry would strengthen demands for restraints on 
local operations of Japanese automakers. In 1991, there were several developments 
which indicated moves to restrain the total volume of Japanese cars (both exports and 
local production) distributed to the US market. In January 1991, the United Automobile 
Workers (UAW) sent a letter to the Japanese government, demanding that the 
government restrain the share of Japanese imports and locally produced cars in the US 
market.88 On 6 March, Lee Iacocca, Chairman of Chrysler, sent a letter to US President 
Bush, urging him to regulate the volume of Japanese cars. The Big Three filed an anti­
dumping petition against the Japanese minivan on 31 May 1991.89 Japanese 
automakers feared that the demand for volume controls would gain momentum as a 
result of this suit.90 On 20 December 1991, the House of Representatives majority 
leader, Richard Gephardt proposed legislation which would request Japan to curtail its 
trade surplus with the United States by 20 per cent each year over the next five years, 
otherwise Japanese car sales (including imports and locally produced vehicles) in the 
United States would be reduced by 250,000 each year.91
Local production by Japanese automakers in the US market reached some 1.5 
million units in 1990. Japanese automakers regarded local production as a key strategy 
in reducing exports from Japan, and also as a contribution to the US economy by
87 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 7 January 1992.
88 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 January 1991.
89 The New York Times, 1 June 1991. The Big Three asserted that the import expansion of the 
Japanese minivan at a low price harmed the US auto industry. Although the Department of 
Commerce found that the prices of Japanese minivans were a case of dumping in May 1992, the 
International Trade Commission, which was responsible for determining whether there had been a 
damage to the US industry, decided in June 1992 that this was not the case. However, the market 
share of Japanese minivans in the United States had fallen sharply from 14.2 percent in August 
1991 to 6.7 percent in May 1992 because the Japanese makers refrained from active sales 
advertisement.
90 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 3 June 1991.
91 The Washington Post, 21 December 1991.
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creating job opportunities. Consequently, they were keen to avoid any restrictions on 
local production. The fear that the United States might adopt volume controls partly 
explains why Japanese automakers accepted US demands.92 This fear also motivated 
Japanese automakers to support the re-election of Bush, a free trade supporter, by 
making concessions.93
Secondly, the Action Plan stemmed from Japanese automakers’ intention to 
tighten linkages with foreign suppliers on a global scale (Ishizawa 1992, p.260). In the 
process of negotiations with the government over the Action Plan, Japanese automakers 
announced substantial measures to improve relations with US auto parts suppliers. In 
order to help US parts suppliers improve production efficiency and reduce costs, Toyota 
announced the establishment of a Supplier Support Centre in the United States. Honda 
had maintained a list of priorities in sourcing parts. The first place on the list went to 
local parts suppliers. The second place went to joint ventures or technical licensing 
arrangements between local manufacturers and established Japanese parts makers, and 
the third to established Japanese parts makers that construct local plants or in-house 
production (Mair 1994, p. 101). Other automakers announced that they would adopt 
similar procurement methods.94 These plans were not merely temporary means for 
appeasing US pressure. Japanese automakers had already become more willing to 
sustain the US auto parts industry by their own efforts. These measures were to their 
own benefit as well as a contribution to the US automobile industry because the 
establishment of cooperative relationships with local suppliers was indispensable for 
successful local production.
Thirdly, Japanese automakers changed their stance on market access as they 
intensified international operations. As explained before, Nissan changed its policy 
stance, announcing its international cooperation program in 1989. In the 1990s, Toyota 
also gradually changed its stance. Toyota had made pursuit of market share a 
fundamental corporate strategy until the late 1980s. Toyota’s key strategy in the 1980s
92 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 December 1991; Tokyo Shimbun, 10 January 1992.
93 Interview, JAMA, Tokyo, March 1994.
94 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 January 1992.
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was the ‘Global 10’, which aimed to attain 10 per cent of the global production share.95 
Toyota’s expansionist policy was supported by the maxim: ‘What is wrong with selling 
quality cars at a low price? It makes the consumers happy’. In pursuing market share, 
Toyota paid little attention to the criticism that Japan was a closed market.
Toyota’s stance on the pursuit of market share and the opening of the Japanese 
market changed in the 1990s. This change was incorporated into Toyota’s new guiding 
principles, which were revised for the first time in 57 years. The new principles, set up 
in January 1992, embodied Toyota’s new stance. Article 1 is ‘Be a company of the 
world’. Although the English version is very simple, a literal translation of the Japanese 
version is ‘Be a trustworthy corporate citizen in the international community, based on 
open and fair corporate activity’. The phrase ‘open and fair corporate activity’ was 
excluded in the English version because this is taken as given in foreign business 
custom. Article 7 is ‘Building lasting relationships with business partners around the 
world’ in the English version. The Japanese version literally translated is ‘Realise long­
term and stable growth and co-existence and co-prosperity through mutual 
enlightenment and development based on open trade relationships’. Thus, the new 
guiding principles paid attention to being accepted as a trustworthy company in the 
world.
The changes in stance were also demonstrated in Toyota’s actions on market 
access. Toyota announced in September 1991 that it agreed with six US semiconductor 
producers to undertake joint development of 28 semiconductor devices. The share of 
foreign semiconductors in total use jumped from 5 per cent in 1990 to 20 per cent in 
1993.96 Toyota also reacted swiftly to the guidelines for the Antimonopoly Law that 
the FTC announced in July 1991. One month after the announcement, Toyota drew up a 
manual on observing the Antimonopoly Law. Toyota was the first company to draw up 
this kind of corporate manual.97
95 This strategy was adopted by President Eiji Toyoda in January 1978 when the market share of 
Toyota in the world was 7 per cent. Although the ‘Global 10’ was an abstract slogan at first, it 
became an explicit target in Toyota’s growth process such as the start of overseas production in 
1984 and 2 million domestic sales in 1988. The objective was attained in 1990 when the market 
share grew from 8.6 per cent in the previous year to 10.3 per cent (Fourin 1991, p.9).
96 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 September 1991.
97 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 August 1991.
112
Toyota’s changed strategy saw it accepting a boost of the sales of US auto parts 
and vehicles. Public statements by Toyota’s senior executives showed this change. 
Shoichiro Toyoda, President of Toyota, explains the voluntary plan of January 1992 as 
follows: ‘The United States is the most important country for Japan. The prosperity of 
today’s Japan depends on its guidance. It is quite natural to offer any assistance to the 
US automobile industry in a critical situation. This is the more so because Toyota raises 
“co-existence and co-prosperity” as an ideal corporate policy’.98 He also answered the 
question of whether sales of foreign cars in Toyota’s dealer networks would lead to a 
reduction in home sales, ‘We have to pay such costs in order to maintain “co-existence 
and co-prosperity” in the world. We sell a lot in the overseas markets’.99
One of the critical reasons why Toyota changed its stance on market access lay in 
its growing commitment to overseas markets. As explained before, Toyota was 
reluctant to make inroads into overseas markets. Toyota decided on local production in 
America in 1984, six years after Honda and four years after Nissan. In spite of the late 
start, Toyota caught up with Honda by 1989 in its production volume in the United 
States after it started production in its own plant in May 1988. Toyota also decided in 
January 1989 to start local production in the United Kingdom in 1992. In June 1991, 
Toyota decided to establish two head divisions for administrating operations in North 
America and Europe.100 Thus, Toyota’s multinational operations were fully developed 
in the 1990s. This growing presence in overseas markets made Toyota vulnerable to 
reactions from foreign competitors and governments. Toyota also sought to become a 
true insider in each local market rather than an exporter, and had a strong incentive to 
develop and increase local production for maintaining steady growth. In order to attain 
these objectives, it had to cease its aggressive expansionist strategies as well as to 
promote cooperation with local competitors and parts manufacturers and to re-invest 
profits to the local community.
In particular, the minivan dumping suit by the Big Three in May 1991 motivated 
Toyota to reconsider its expansionist policy. Although the suit was directed at Toyota
98 Nikkei Bijinesu, 27 April 1992, p.67.
99 Keizaikai, 14 April 1994, p.30.
100 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 29 January 1991.
113
and Mazda, the main target was Toyota’s Previa. GM, Toyota’s partner in NUMMI, 
participated in the suit. Toyota was shocked at the fact that GM, which had long 
adhered to free trade principles, took the same stance as Ford and Chrysler because 
Toyota considered NUMMI as making a contribution to GM as well as the US 
automobile industry.101 Through the incident, Toyota was reminded of the need to 
promote cooperation with the Big Three as well as to contribute to the US auto 
industry.
In brief, Japanese automakers became willing to expand market access as they 
intensified their international operations. Not only did they fear retaliatory treatment in 
overseas markets, but they saw more deals with local suppliers and the resultant 
expansion in imports as increasingly necessary and inevitable. These political and 
economic pressures played a crucial role in motivating Japanese automakers to boost 
the purchases of US auto parts and to sell US vehicles in the Action Plan.
CONCLUSION
The Japanese automobile industry has rapidly expanded its multinational operations and 
international corporate alliances since the 1980s. Japanese automakers came to exhibit 
more commitment to opening the Japanese market as they strengthened their 
international linkages. They also sought to open up their keiretsu groups. They 
attempted to increase deals with local parts suppliers both by offering guidance in 
respect of the Japanese procurement and production systems and by accepting local 
parts suppliers as design-in partners. The car distribution keiretsu has also been opened 
up by thorough elimination of exclusive clauses in dealership contracts and by handling 
foreign vehicles in automakers’ distribution channels. These actions were driven largely 
by the internationalisation of corporate activity. As Japanese automakers intensified 
overseas operations, they regarded it as indispensable to successful localisation to 
increase deals with local suppliers. In addition, they considered international 
procurement policies as indispensable to realise the most appropriate procurement in 
each local market, irrespective of the suppliers’ nationality. In distribution keiretsu,
101 Sentaku, February 1992, pp.76-77.
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corporate alliances are critically tied to the handling of foreign vehicles. Japanese 
automakers deal in vehicles that their alliance partners manufacture.
The shift in the automakers’ stance was also evident in their commitment to 
market access expansion. The major automakers displayed a passive attitude towards 
facilitating the market access of foreign products to Japan until the mid 1980s. 
However, they became more eager to expand market access in the late 1980s. When 
market access became a critical policy issue in 1989, automakers responded by 
announcing voluntary international cooperation programs. This response was closely 
linked with the internationalisation of corporate activity. This was clearly shown in 
international cooperation program of Nissan, which took the lead in the move among 
the automakers. This program stemmed from several factors including the need to 
mitigate trade friction with the United States and to appease criticism from the LDP 
government towards the automobile industry. However, internationalisation also 
constituted a critical pillar. Expanding multinational operations induced Nissan to take 
more cooperative action towards market access than other Japanese automakers, and 
enabled it to announce challenging and comprehensive plans.
In 1992, the major automakers announced voluntary plans to increase the 
purchase of US auto parts and vehicles. In the process of drawing up these plans, they 
strongly resisted MITI’s entreaties to purchase more US auto parts and vehicles. 
Superficially, they appeared reluctant to assist in the expansion of access for foreign 
products to the Japanese market. However, what they resisted was MITI’s aggressive 
demand to appease the US government and auto industry as an expedient, rather than a 
genuine opening of the Japanese market. Their desire to cooperate in the expansion of 
market access was shown by the two programs announced in the previous year. In these 
programs, there was a willingness to boost the purchase of auto parts from the United 
States and from all over the world.
Japanese automakers had reason to promote market access of foreign parts and 
vehicles. There was, at that time, a possibility that the US government might adopt 
policies to regulate production in America by Japanese automakers as well as exports 
from Japan. The likelihood that local production would suffer from restrictions induced 
them to promote market access of foreign auto parts more seriously. They also had to
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make more deals with local suppliers in order to deepen their own local production 
operations. The shift in the stance of major automakers on free trade and market access 
also had much to do with the expansion of foreign parts purchases. In the past, they had 
aggressively pursued market share, and considered that free trade was necessary to 
realise this strategy. As operations expanded to the global market, more commitment to 
local markets and to sustaining local auto producers followed inevitably. The expansion 
of market access to Japan was necessary to achieve these objectives. Thus, 
internationalisation of corporate activity played a critical role in changing the stance of 
Japanese automakers in favour of open trade. This led to action to expand the access of 
foreign products to the Japanese automobile market.
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5 The Stance of the Japanese Electronics Industry 
towards Market Liberalisation
The electronics industry is one of the most internationally oriented sectors of Japanese 
industry. The promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) after 1985 and the creation 
of a web of corporate alliances in the high technology sub-sectors of electronics since 
the late 1980s have strengthened the international linkages of Japanese electronics 
firms. The objective of this chapter is to examine what influence growing international 
linkages have had on the stance of Japanese electronics firms towards market 
liberalisation.
This chapter focuses on two aspects of trade policy. The first is the effect of 
internationalisation on the stance of electronics firms over rising imports. Imports of 
electronic products have been rapidly increasing since the mid 1980s. Just how 
internationalisation affects electronics firms’ reaction to this import surge is a subject of 
particular interest in this context.
The second aspect concerns market liberalisation. The Japanese government has 
been willing to promote the market access of foreign products to Japan since the mid 
1980s. How has the Japanese electronics industry responded to this policy, and how has 
its response been influenced by growing international activities? The reaction of 
electronics firms to market opening policies is examined further with respect to the 
semiconductor sector. The US and Japanese governments concluded the US-Japan 
Semiconductor Arrangement in 1986. This arrangement was controversial because both 
governments and the two industries were in serious conflict over its implementation, to 
the point where US sanctions were imposed against Japan’s alleged non-compliance in 
April 1987. The stance of Japanese electronics firms and its influence on the 
implementation of the arrangement are examined. This is a case in which 
internationalisation changed the stance of Japanese electronics firms on market access.
In the next section, the character of the Japanese electronics industry and its 
internationalisation are outlined, followed by an examination of the issue of rising 
imports and the response of electronics firms. The influence of internationalisation of 
corporate activity on the stance on electronics firms’ market opening activities is then 
analysed. The final section sheds light on changes in corporate preferences and 
government policy through an analysis of the US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement. It
sketches how corporate preferences evolved in this process of influencing the 
arrangement.
CHARACTER OF INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONALISATION 
Character of the industry
Although the electronics industry manufactures a wide variety of products, they are 
normally divided into three groups. The first group is consumer electronic equipment 
which covers audio-visual products and electrical appliances. The second is industrial 
electronic equipment which incorporates radio communication systems, broadcasting 
equipment, and applied electronic equipment. The third group, electronic components, 
includes electronic tubes, integrated circuits, and liquid crystal devices. These product 
categories are related to the three classifications of Japanese electronics producers. The 
first group is comprehensive electronics makers which manufacture various products 
ranging from heavy electrical apparatus to semiconductors. Hitachi, Toshiba and 
Mitsubishi Electric are in this category. The second group is computer and 
communications equipment makers. NEC, Fujitsu, and Oki Electric belong to this 
category. The third group is consumer electronics makers. The representatives of this 
category are Matsushita Electric Industrial, Sony, Sharp and Sanyo Electric. Although 
these classifications are still useful in understanding differences in corporate strategies 
among firms, the borders between them are becoming more blurred. Not only do NEC 
and Fujitsu produce consumer electronic products, all the companies mentioned above 
manufacture semiconductors.
The policy preferences of the electronics firms are normally expressed through 
industrial associations, represented by the Electronic Industries Association of Japan 
(EIAJ). The association, with a membership of roughly 600 companies including some 
50 foreign-affiliated firms, covers consumer and industrial electronic equipment and 
electronic components and devices. NEC, Sony, Toshiba, Hitachi, Matsushita, and 
Mitsubishi Electric have played a pivotal role in decision making in EIAJ. All the past 
chairmen of EIAJ have been selected from these companies.1
l Other industrial associations in the electronics industry have been formed according to product 
category. The Japan Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (JEMA) covers heavy electrical
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Several distinctive features of the Japanese electronics industry need to be noted 
because they affect the formation of policy preferences of the electronics firms. The 
first feature is a traditionally high dependence on consumer electronic products. The 
share of consumer electronics in total electronics production decreased significantly 
from 49.0 per cent in 1960 to 13.0 per cent in 1994 (Table 5.1). However, the share in 
Japan at 16.2 per cent in 1992 was still high compared with 4.0 per cent in the United 
States and 8.0 per cent in Europe.2
Table 5.1 Production of the Japanese Electronics Industry, 1960-94 (billion yen; 
per cent)
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994
Consumer 241 1,473 2,932 4,912 4,436 3,563 3,059 2,771
electronics (49.0) (43.4) (32.6) (26.3) (18.4) (16.2) (14.7) (13.0)
Industrial 108 1,030 3,396 7,614 11,342 10,527 9,824 10,070
electronics (21.9) (30.3) (37.7) (40.7) (46.9) (47.7) (47.2) (47.0)
Electronic 143 893 2,677 6,162 8,373 7,966 7,946 8,564
components (29.1) (26.3) (29.7) (33.0) (34.7) (36.1) (38.1) (40.0)
Total 491 3,397 9,005 18,688 24,151 22,057 20,828 21,405
Note: The figures in parentheses are percentage share in total.
Sources: Urata (1993, p.54); EIAJ, Nihon no denshi kogyo [The electronics industry in Japan] 1995/96, 
p.9.
The second feature is that Japanese electronics producers are vertically integrated 
producers engaging in various sub-sector businesses.3 Major Japanese electronics firms 
manufacture various products ranging from electrical appliances such as air- 
conditioners and refrigerators to industrial electronic equipment such as facsimiles and
apparatus such as prime movers and boilers, motors and generators, electrical systems for 
industrial facilities and plants, as well as home electrical appliances including washing machines, 
refrigerators, and air-conditioners. The Japan Electronic Industry Development Association 
(JEIDA) covers computers and related equipment The Communications Industry Association of 
Japan (CIAJ) covers communication equipment such as terminal and network equipment and parts 
and components.
Nihon no denshi kogyo [The electronics industry in Japan] 1993/94, p .l.
This is a common feature of the semiconductor business internationally, with the exception of the 
United States. The major semiconductor producers in Europe such as Philips, SGS-Thomson, and 
Siemens, and Korean makers such as Samsung are vertically integrated producers. In the US case, 
while Motorola and Texas Instruments belong to the above category, National Semiconductor, 
Intel, and Advanced Micro Devices are producers that specialise in semiconductor production.
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computers, and semiconductors. Therefore, a considerable quantity of electronic 
components are used for internal consumption.4 In addition, Japanese electronics 
producers have been able to invest profits from mature sectors in newly emerging 
sectors due to the vertically integrated structure of the industry.
The third feature is that major electronic products have been manufactured by 
only a few companies. Popular products in consumer electronics shifted from black and 
white televisions (TVs) in the early 1960s to colour TVs in the 1970s and to video tape 
recorders (VTRs) in the 1980s. The majority of these products were manufactured by 
five or six makers — Sony, Toshiba, Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi Electric, Sanyo. 
This is also the case in semiconductor production. The five top producers — NEC, 
Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electric — account for roughly 75 per cent of 
the total semiconductor output in Japan (Shimura 1992, p.49). As described later, this 
oligopolistic market structure has often led to excessive competition.
Internationalisation
The electronics industry spearheaded multinational production in Japanese industry. 
The industry has had three surges of FDI: from the end of the 1960s to 1973; from the 
end of the 1970s to 1985; and after 1985 (Table 5.2). FDI in the first phase was directed 
at the East Asian countries, especially the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs). Of 
211 overseas production facilities which Japanese electronics producers set up before 
1974, 140 were in Asia including 109 in NIEs (EIAJ 1993b, p.iii). The original 
objective of local production during this phase was to capture the local market protected 
by import barriers, but this was later superseded by the aim to establish export-oriented 
overseas capacity (Yoshihara 1978, pp. 152-57).
The second phase targeted North America and Europe. Between 1980 and 1984, 
64.1 per cent of FDI was directed at North America and another 14.2 per cent at 
Europe, while the Asia’s share dropped to 15.7 per cent. Of 100 overseas 
manufacturing facilities set up between 1980 and 1984, 25 were in North America and
4 According to a report of the Integrated Circuit Engineering, the share of internal transfers in the 
total Japanese integrated circuit market was roughly 35 per cent (EIAJ 1989, p.8).
26 were in Europe (EIAJ 1993b, p.iii). The aim of the FDI in the second phase was to 
circumvent trade friction over Japanese exports to these areas (Urata 1993, pp. 18-19).
Table 5.2 Foreign Direct Investment by Japanese Electronics Producers by 
Destination, 1970-93 (US$ million)
Year North
America
South
America
Asia Europe Other Total
1970 - 5 15 1 1 22
1971 6 4 19 - 1 30
1972 20 10 36 2 1 69
1973 31 35 83 4 3 156
1974 26 23 30 13 7 99
1975 43 11 36 4 2 96
1976 75 31 44 9 5 164
1977 87 29 32 5 8 161
1978 116 20 93 13 1 243
1979 88 12 55 21 4 180
1980 167 16 71 55 - 309
1981 330 39 57 46 3 475
1982 150 22 43 53 - 267
1983 368 18 45 68 3 502
1984 242’ 8 93 57 9 409
1985 403 7 51 48 4 513
1986 577 17 262 125 6 987
1987 1,719 42 467 179 14 2,421
1988 1,501 125 852 557 6 3,041
1989 2,734 45 934 755 12 4,480
1990 2,413 101 827 2,305 37 5,684
1991 868 46 871 501 10 2,296
1992 740 80 540 434 22 1,817
1993 1,445 11 884 418 4 2,762
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Kokusai kinyukyoku nenpo [Annual Report of International Finance 
Bureau], various issues.
Japanese consumer electronic products had penetrated these markets in quantities 
sufficient to drive local producers out of the market, causing local governments to 
restrain Japanese imports by anti-dumping suits and import quotas. Japanese electronics 
firms then decided to commence local production to maintain their market position. A 
typical example is the beginning of local production of colour TVs in the United States. 
The first formal allegation by the US makers against Japanese TV exporters was the 
anti-dumping suit of March 1968, and the trade dispute over colour TVs led to the
121
orderly marketing agreement (OMA) from 1977 to 1979. The response of Japanese 
manufacturers to these import restrictions was to begin local production of colour TVs.
Compared with these two phases, the third phase, starting in the mid 1980s, was 
more dynamic and comprehensive. The value of FDI increased greatly from US$1,962 
million in 1980-84 to US$11,442 million in 1985-89. The share of electrical machinery 
in total manufacturing FDI accounted for 27.5 per cent and 36.7 per cent in 1989 and 
1990 respectively. The number of production facilities increased from 100 in 1980-84 
to 356 in 1985-89. Although FDI experienced a downward trend in 1991 and 1992, the 
resumption of yen appreciation in February 1993 revitalised FDI.
Growing FDI raised the overseas production ratio. The overall ratio for the 
electronics industry grew modestly from 7.4 per cent in 1985 to 10.6 per cent in 1988 to 
12.6 per cent in 1993. However, the changes in major consumer electronics firms were 
striking. The overseas production ratio of the five major consumer electronics producers 
— Matsushita, Sony, Sanyo, Sharp, and Pioneer — increased from 20.1 per cent in 
1985 to 34.2 per cent in 1988 to 40.9 per cent in 1992 (Teranishi and Yamasaki 1995, 
p.53). The volume of overseas production surpassed that of domestic production in 
colour TVs in 1988 and in VTRs in 1994.
A sharp appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Agreement in September 1985 
encouraged electronics firms to expand foreign investment. At the same time, 
multinational production was undertaken as a corporate strategy. Japanese electronics 
producers developed an integrated production system based on an international division 
of labour, seeking, in their domestic production, to specialise in high value-added 
technology-intensive goods and to transfer manufacturing of low and medium value- 
added products to foreign countries. Items manufactured at plants in East Asia have 
expanded from radio cassette recorders, fans, and colour TVs to medium technology 
products such as VTRs and CD players, whereas the production of technology­
intensive, high value-added goods such as high-quality TVs and camcorders has been 
retained by domestic manufacturing plants.
International division of labour has also been pursued in overseas production 
bases. In order to minimise production costs, Japanese electronics producers divide 
production categories or entire production processes and locate each category or sub-
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process in specific countries or plants (Urata 1993, pp.29-30). In the past, some 
overseas Japanese subsidiaries manufactured a wide range of products. For example, 
Matsushita established the so called ‘mini Matsushita’ in Asian countries, which 
manufactured a wide range of products such as radios, fans, rice cookers, TV sets and 
so on. Now, however, subsidiaries specialise in specific items and specific production 
processes. This is typically shown in Matsushita’s production of audio equipment in 
Asia. Parts and components for audio equipment are manufactured as follows: 
transistors and integrated circuits, switches, and speakers in Singapore; variable 
resistors, capacitors, tuners, electric capacitors in Malaysia; electric capacitors in the 
Philippines; and speakers in Indonesia. These parts and components are assembled in 
plants in Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The first two 
plants aim to export to other regions, while the others sell to local markets (Dobson 
1993, p.42). In this international division of labour, each production base has a 
specialised function according to its technology level, and intermediate and final 
products are exchanged mainly through the inter-corporate network.
In recent years, corporate alliances between Japanese and foreign electronics 
producers have increased mainly in the high technology fields such as semiconductors, 
telecommunications and computers. The semiconductor field, in particular, has become 
a locus of complicated networks through corporate alliances. Although corporate 
alliances in the semiconductor sector were agreed on before the 1980s, their primary 
objective was a transfer of advanced US technology to latecomer Japanese makers. The 
flow of technology was one way, from the United States to Japan. There were almost no 
alliances in production, marketing and servicing, or general purpose cooperation 
(National Research Council 1992, p .ll). After the second half of the 1980s alliances 
became a two way flow of technology and management resources, taking a variety of 
forms and pursuing a range of objectives.
Although the promotion of alliances is a general trend in the current business 
world, the semiconductor field has a greater need for the alliances owing to rising 
research and development (R & D) and production costs. The semiconductor sector has 
required massive R & D expenditure. For instance, the ratio of R & D to total sales is
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more than five times the manufacturing average in Japan.5 Higher integration in 
semiconductor chips and the development of next generation devices have imposed 
enormous costs on firms.6 For one company to assume these spiralling costs and risks 
is not a feasible strategy. Companies with the same objective share the risk through 
alliances. In addition, the combination of specialised technologies and core skills that 
each company possesses is indispensable for acquiring the initiative in developing next 
generation products such as flash memories, which are expected to have a market scale 
of 1 trillion yen in the world.
Japanese semiconductor producers have actively promoted corporate alliances. 
Not only have the alliances increased in number but they have also incorporated various 
types of alliances in the areas of R & D, manufacturing, marketing and service.7 Recent 
alliances also include combined objectives. For instance, Toshiba and National 
Semiconductor reached an agreement in May 1992 regarding complementary metal 
oxide semiconductor (CMOS) standard logic integrated circuits. This alliance included 
joint development of new products, mutual second sourcing, and mutual supply under 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) contracts. Fujitsu and Advanced Micro 
Devices also concluded an agreement in July 1992 to conduct joint development, 
manufacturing and sales of flash memories. Furthermore, alliances have become 
international. Alliances with domestic firms are less attractive not only because these 
firms are direct competitors but also because they have similar kinds of technological 
and managerial skills. Japanese electronics producers looked for foreign partners, but 
most of them were US makers. In the 1990s, however, they formed alliances with
The ratios of R & D in total sales for the semiconductor sector and the manufacturing average 
were 14.9 percent and 1.91 percent in 1981, 17.1 percent and 2.69 percent in 1985, and 15.9 
percent and 3.36 percent in 1990 (EIAJ 1994a, p.23).
For example, capital investment for a plant with a capacity of 20,000 units per month rose from 
USS300-400 million for one megabyte dynamic random access memory (1M DRAM) to US$400- 
600 million for 4M DRAM to US$600-850 million for 16M DRAM, and to US$900-1,200 million 
for 64M DRAM (EIAJ 1994a, p.92). The development and production of next generation 
products such as flash memories and 256M DRAM are expected to cost more than US$1 billion. 
The National Research Council (1992, p.10) mentions the following examples: R & D alliances 
which include licensing and cross-licensing agreements, technology exchange, and joint 
development; manufacturing alliances which contain original equipment manufacturing (OEM) 
agreements, second sourcing agreements whereby a company is given permission to manufacture 
products developed by another company; marketing and service alliances which consist of 
procurement agreements, sales agency agreements and servicing contracts; and general purpose 
tie-ups represented by joint ventures.
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Korean makers. Fujitsu concluded an agreement with the Hyundai group on cooperating 
in 4M and 16M dynamic random access memory (DRAM) production in October 1993, 
and NEC agreed with Samsung Electronics to share the technology for the development 
of 256M DRAM in March 1994.
INDUSTRY REACTION TO INCREASES IN IMPORTS OF ELECTRONIC 
PRODUCTS
What effects have the expansion of multinational production and corporate alliances 
had on firms’ trade policy stance and trade structure? The effects of the 
internationalisation of corporate activity can be seen in the reaction of electronics firms 
to a rise in imports of electronic products. Imports of electronic products have rapidly 
expanded in recent years. Total imports of electronic products grew 2.6 times from
Table 5.3 Foreign Trade of the Japanese Electronics Industry, 1960-94 (billion 
yen; per cent)
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994
Exports
Consumer 57 587 2,047 3,805 2,618 2,258 1,752 1,542
electronics (78.1) (68.1) (44.9) (39.3) (23.8) (20.0) (16.3) (13.9)
Industrial 3 137 1,049 2,919 3,443 3,692 3,430 3,143
electronics (4.1) (15.9) (23.0) (30.1) (31.3) (32.6) (31.9) (28.3)
Electronic 13 138 1,462 2,971 4,933 5,361 5,564 6,419
components (17.8) (16.0) (32.1) (30.6) (44.9) (47.4) (51.8) (57.8)
Total 73 863 4,558 9,695 10,994 11,310 10,746 11,104
Imports
Consumer 0.2 5 38 24 113 156 172 238
electronics (2.2) (2.6) (5.4) (2.3) (5.7) (7.7) (7.9) (8.8)
Industrial 6.1 121 298 398 692 633 698 881
electronics (66.3) (62.0) (42.3) (38.5) (34.6) (30.9) (32.0) (32.5)
Electronic 2.9 69 368 613 1,195 1,256 1,308 1,589
components (31.5) (35.4) (52.3) (59.2) (59.7) (61.4) (60.1) (58.7)
Total 9.2 195 703 1,035 2,001 2,046 2,178 2,709
Note: The figures in parentheses are percentage share in total.
Sources: Urata (1993, p.54); EIA1, Nihon no denshi kogyo [The electronics industry in Japan] 1995/96, 
pp.11,13.
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1,035 billion yen in 1985 to 2,709 billion yen in 1994 (Table 5.3). Imports of consumer 
electronic products in particular are notable. Between 1985 and 1994, imports grew 
tenfold from 24 billion yen to 238 billion yen in value.
The rise in imports is notable in individual products such as air-conditioners, 
washing machines, and colour TVs (Table 5.4). The number of imported colour TVs 
jumped from 1.7 million in 1989 to nearly 6 million in 1994. As a consequence, the 
ratio of imports to total domestic sales exceeded 50 per cent in 1994.
Table 5.4 Import Volume of Major Electronic Products, 1987-94 (1,000 units; per 
cent)
Product 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Air-conditioners 60 156 188 144 738 622 597 497
(1.4) (3.0) (3.6) (2.6) (8.8) (10.1) (13.0) (7.9)
Washing machines 13 55 67 56 131 145 170 230
(0.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.2) (2.7) (3.2) (3.7) (4.9)
Refrigerators 64 143 282 340 436 343 401 471
(1.6) (3.3) (6.2) (6.9) (8.4) (7.9) (9.2) (9.4)
Fans 5,334 5,511 4,989 5,553 7,409 6,950 4,016 3,760
(46.0) (48.9) (53.8) (43.1) (42.3) (49.1) (54.6) (55.7)
Microwave ovens - 3,047 2,594 2,750 2,603 2,550 2,638 2,929
- (4.9) (12.2) (5.6) (2.5) (2.6) (6.3) (16.4)
Colour TVs 349 740 1,714 1,063 1,851 2,267 3,657 5,844
(3.2) (7.2) (14.9) (10.1) (16.3) (22.2) (33.0) (50.4)
VTRs 128 367 473 264 317 487 680 1,340
(2.7) (5.5) (8.5) (11.3) (6.5) (20.2) (39.9) (89.6)
Note: The figures in parentheses are percentage share of imports in total domestic demand calculated
by imports/domestic production-exports+imports. Imports include those under OEM contracts.
Source: JEMA, Electrical Industries in Japan, 1995, pp.34-35; EIAJ, Facts & Figures, 1995, pp.18-19.
In addition to rising imports, the consumer electronics sector is facing several 
other problems. Demand for major consumer electronic products is already saturated in 
Japan, and there are no hit products in the 1990s such as colour TVs in the 1970s and 
VTRs in 1980s. Moreover, diversification in the preferences of consumers in Japan and 
other advanced countries has made it less feasible to rely on mass production techniques 
which were earlier a source of the international competitiveness of Japanese electronics 
producers.
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In spite of this critical situation, there is no move to restrain imports. Instead of 
demanding protectionist measures, major electronics producers have undertaken 
internal adjustment strategies. Toshiba withdrew from the consumer audio business in 
April 1993, and consolidated its consumer electronic and information equipment 
divisions in October 1993 in order to integrate consumer electronic products into multi- 
media products. Hitachi decided to introduce ‘second brand’ consumer electronic 
products in 1995 with prices that were 20 to 30 per cent lower than those of the normal 
brand.8 Hitachi also merged with Hitachi Sales Corporation, the sales company of 
Hitachi’s consumer electronic products, in April 1995. This merger aimed at forming an 
integrated system covering all phases from product planning to development, 
production, sales and services, and to speed up decision making.
The increase in imports has been associated with the growth of intra-industry 
trade, and the industry still enjoys huge trade surpluses despite the recent surge in 
imports.9 Japanese electronics firms have stopped production of uncompetitive goods 
and procured them from other Japanese producers and foreign producers in the NIEs 
under OEM agreements. This has led to increased imports of finished products. 
Moreover, the increase in imports is linked to a rise in exports from Japan. The 
expansion of final product manufacturing in East Asia has stimulated increasing 
demand for Japanese electronic components used in final electronic products, especially 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries where the 
components industry has not been extensively developed. Exports of electronic 
components increased by 116 per cent between 1985 and 1994, raising the share of 
electronic components in total exports of electronic products from 30.6 per cent to 57.8 
per cent (Table 5.3).
Other factors link imports tightly to the multinational operations of Japanese 
electronics firms, so these firms have little incentive to restrain imports. Firstly, a large 
proportion of imports is dominated by Japanese firms. Urata (1992 p.25) points out that 
in 1986, exports of Japanese affiliates in Asia to Japan were concentrated in electrical 
machinery, accounting for 41.7 per cent of total exports in the manufacturing sector. In
8 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 2 June 1994; Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 7 June 1994.
For example, the export value of 11.1 trillion yen in 1994 was four times as large as the import 
value of 2.7 trillion yen, leading to a trade surplus of 8.4 trillion yen.
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addition, the share of exports to Japan by affiliates of Japanese electronics firms in Asia 
in total sales increased steadily from 16.2 per cent in 1980 to 27.4 per cent in 1992 
(Table 5.5). These imports from overseas affiliates, or so-called ‘reverse imports’ have 
been expanding in consumer electronic products such as colour TVs, and cassette tape 
recorders. For example, Matsushita increased reverse imports of colour TVs from
100.000 units in 1991 to 150,000 units in 1992, while Sanyo’s increase was from
360.000 units in 1993 to 620,000 units in 1994.10
Table 5.5 Shares of Exports to Japan by Overseas Affiliates of Japanese 
Electronics Firms, 1980-92 (per cent)
Region 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
North America 0.4 0.1 1.2 1.5 2.5
Asia 16.2 21.0 22.2 26.9 27.2
Europe 0.8 3.4 1.5 0.8 1.2
Total 6.6 8.1 5.4 8.3 9.3
Sources: MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], N o.l - No.5.
The high level of reverse imports has much to do with the deep commitment of 
electronics firms to distribution channels. Electronics firms have organised keiretsu 
retail shops into their distribution outlets.* 11 Electronics producers have sustained 
keiretsu retailers, which are small-sized family owned firms, by offering financial 
assistance and information. Keiretsu retailers have enabled electronics producers to 
control retail prices and maintain stable market shares. Electronics distribution keiretsu 
is more open than car distribution keiretsu because retail shops deal in products of a 
number of electronics producers (Niihanda and Mishima 1991, p.98). The growth of 
large-scale retail stores after the late 1970s also reduced the status of kerietsu retailers in 
sales of electronics products. The share of sales by keiretsu retailers declined 
significantly from 69 per cent in 1975 to 32 per cent in 1990.12 Furthermore, a 
protracted recession in sales of consumer electronic products in the 1990s forced major
10 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 8 May 1992; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 December 1994.
11 Matsushita has the largest number of retail outlets, some 23,000 shops. Toshiba, Hitachi, Sanyo, 
Mitsubishi Electric, and Sharp have 10,000, 8,600, 6,000, 4,500, and 4,000 shops respectively 
(Shukan Toyo Keizai, 23 April 1994, p.114).
12 Keidanren Geppo, February 1992, p.65.
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electronics firms to revise the keiretsu system.13 The maintenance of keiretsu retail 
shops now imposes a burden on major electronics firms. Hence, reverse imports have 
not been facilitated by the keiretsu distribution system alone.14 A critical point is that 
the influence of electronics producers extends to large-scale retail stores. In the past, the 
large-scale retail stores expanded their business by challenging the retail price controls 
set by electronics producers. However, they have gradually fostered interdependent 
relationships with electronics producers. Electronics producers have equity in leading 
retail stores.15 In addition, some executives of leading stores formerly worked at major 
electronics firms (Nikkei Ryütsü Shimbun ed. 1993, pp.87-88).16 The overall influence 
on distribution channels by electronics producers has facilitated reverse imports and 
OEM supply from overseas.
Secondly, the negative effects of imports have been weakened by the efforts of 
Japanese electronics firms to promote an international division of labour. As explained 
before, Japanese electronics firms transfer the production of low value-added goods to 
overseas plants and retain domestic production bases of high value-added products. This 
division of products lessens the possibility of a direct clash between imported and 
domestic products. Furthermore, since Japanese electronics producers retain multiple 
product lines, they can easily shift their businesses from declining to more profitable 
products. In recent years, they put more emphasis on high-value industrial electronic 
products represented by office automation products such as personal computers, word 
processors, work stations, and electronic parts and components. Not only do these
13 For instance, Matsushita reorgansied its keiretsu shops into the MAST (Market Oriented Ace Shop 
Team) system in April 1992. This system sought to support selected shops with active sales 
promotion (Keizaikai, 14 April 1992, pp.32-35). Other electronics firms are also trying to 
restructure their distribution keiretsu channels.
14 It is also incorrect to argue that the distribution keiretsu system is a major factor impeding market 
access of foreign products in the electronics industry. It needs to focus on regulatory controls 
which limit outlets and increase distribution costs (Drysdale 1995, p.278).
15 For instance, Besuto Denki, the leading large-scale retail store, is owned by Matsushita, Toshiba, 
Hitachi Sales, Mitsubishi Electric and Sharp, while that of Daiichi Corp., the second largest store, 
is owned by Matsushita, Toshiba and Hitachi (Nikkei Ryütsü Shimbun ed. 1993, p.87).
16 A close relationship between electronics producers and large-scale retail stores has been revealed 
in the control of retail prices by electronics producers. In March 1992, for instance, the Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) investigated the sales subsidiaries of Matsushita, Sony, Toshiba, and Hitachi 
on the suspicion that these companies had pressured retail stores to accept predeterminded retail 
prices for audio-vidual products (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 March 1992). In February 1993, the 
FTC issued a retraction order to the four companies (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 11 February 1993).
129
products have a high possibility of future growth but they are suitable for differentiating 
imported products. Japanese electronics producers have successfully adjusted their 
businesses from consumer electronic products to industrial electronic products and 
electronic components.
To summarise, rising foreign competition has not promoted a protectionist 
response from the Japanese electronics industry. The industry has enjoyed huge trade 
surpluses and the rise in imports has occurred as intra-industry trade. In addition, 
Japanese multinationals in the electronics industry have not only carried out intra-firm 
trade but have also successfully adjusted their business from declining to newly 
emerging sub-sectors as part of their own internal strategies. There is a limited 
possibility that they will suffer from rising imports. Accordingly, they can maintain a 
policy stance on open trade when there is a sharp rise in imports.
MARKET OPENING ACTIVITIES 
Cooperation programs for market access expansion
The Japanese government has been keen to promote market access for foreign goods 
since the mid 1980s, and has implemented various policies for this objective. How did 
the electronics industry react to these policies? If major electronics firms had shifted 
their stance in favour of an open domestic market, it follows that they should have 
taken action to expand the access of foreign products to Japan. These firms announced 
international cooperation programs to expand market access in 1989. Matsushita is an 
example. Matsushita named 1989 as the first year for mitigating trade friction, and 
company President Akio Tanii ordered an examination of the trade balance of the 
group. There were neither statistics nor business plans relating to the imports of the 
Matsushita group until 1988. Matsushita drew up an action program for international 
cooperation in July 1989. The program consisted of three pillars: to double the value of 
imports by 1993, to freeze the increase in exports by 1993, and to increase the share of 
overseas production in total overseas sales from 25 per cent in 1988 to 50 per cent by 
1993. In order to achieve these objectives, Matsushita established a promotion office for 
international cooperation in October 1989, under the direct control of the president. 
Matsushita strove to raise imported components and equipment to 10 per cent of total
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consumption as well as to import 10 per cent of the products manufactured in its 
overseas plants.
In December 1991, Matsushita drew up another action program for international 
cooperation. In the previous program, Matsushita had intended to import goods to the 
value of 420 billion yen by 1993. However, the company’s imports totalled 440 billion 
yen in 1991, achieving the objective two years earlier than targeted. The new program 
included plans to import 600 billion yen worth of imports by 1993. The program also 
aimed to improve local content by promoting technology transfer through overseas 
production technology centres.17
Toshiba also drew up an action program called the Globalisation Action Project in 
November 1989. The program aimed to double its 1988 import value to 200 billion yen 
by 1992, and to freeze the increase in exports. The value of local production would also 
be boosted from 300 billion yen in 1988 to 500 billion yen in 1993.18 Hitachi also 
implemented an international cooperation program. This was drawn up in December 
1989, and aimed to promote international business with balanced imports and exports. 
The program aimed to double the value of the 1988 imports by 1992 and to triple it by 
1994. In 1994, the value of imports would reach 410 billion yen, improving the trade 
balance by 130 billion yen. Hitachi established a committee on the improvement in the 
import-export balance in August 1990 and the division on overseas activities promotion 
in December 1990, whose aim was to promote the program.19
Motivations for the programs
Why did Japanese electronics firms announce international cooperation programs in 
1989? Did these programs stem from the shift in firms’ preferences for the opening of 
the domestic market? International cooperation programs were often regarded as a 
reluctant and formal response to MITI’s guidance to import more foreign products. In 
reality, MITI committed the electronics industry to expand imports. In June 1989, MITI 
held an import promotion meeting. The Minister encouraged executives from 162
17
18 
19
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 11 December 1991. 
Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 18 September 1990. 
Tsusan Janaru, October 1991, p.18.
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companies to boost finished product imports by 30 per cent in 1989.20 MITI also 
organised special meetings with the heads of industrial associations in the electronics 
industry. In May 1989, the Minister met the executives of five electronic-related 
industrial associations, and proposed that the industry should strive to cooperate in the 
promotion of imports.21 The Minister held a further meeting in July 1989 with the 
heads of four industrial associations in the electronics industry. He requested that they 
make vigorous efforts to expand imports.22
Although MITI’s guidance certainly encouraged electronics firms to take action to 
expand market access for foreign products, it was not the only factor. MITI’s 
encouragement to expand imports did not start in 1989. MITI had held import 
expansion meetings since 1985 requesting major companies to undertake measures to 
expand imports. In addition, some electronics firms formulated corporate strategies on 
the basis of international cooperation programs. For example, Matsushita invested 100 
billion yen in Asia between 1989 and 1991. This investment aimed at introducing the 
newest high-technology equipment in local plants. In order to achieve its international 
cooperation program, Matsushita tried to make plants in Asia export bases for Japan.23 
This indicates that the programs were set up in line with overall corporate strategies. It 
is necessary therefore to take a closer look at why corporate strategies changed and 
whether the changes were relevant to shifts in the stance of major electronics producers 
on market access issues.
In the second half of the 1980s, the Japanese electronics industry gradually 
reduced its dependence on exports. The ratio of exports to total production in the 
electronics industry decreased from 51.9 per cent in 1985 to 45.5 per cent in 1990. 
However, Japanese electronics producers rapidly expanded their international 
operations after the mid 1980s. Matsushita is typical in this respect. Matsushita was 
heavily dependent on exports. In 1988, its exports were valued at 1,700 billion yen, 
while its imports were 220 billion yen. The 1,480 billion yen trade imbalance accounted
20 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 June 1989.
21 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 11 May 1989.
22 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 July 1989.
23 Nikkei Bijinesu, 13 August 1990, pp. 14-15.
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for one sixth of Japan’s total trade surplus.24 Matsushita has steadily expanded 
multinational operations and pursued a globalisation strategy since 1961 when it 
established a joint venture in Thailand. Matsushita accelerated its international 
operations in the late 1980s. Matsushita had 69 manufacturing subsidiaries all over the 
world in 1988, 20 per cent of which were built between 1987 and 1988.25 As a result, 
overseas production increased rapidly from US$3.45 billion in 1987 to US$4.46 billion 
1988 and US$5.43 billion in 1989, while the ratio of local production in total overseas 
sales climbed from 25 per cent in 1988 to 30 per cent in 1989.26
In addition to extending its multinational operations, Matsushita changed its 
internal organisation to pursue a more effective globalisation strategy. In April 1988, 
Matsushita merged with Matsushita Electric Trade, which primarily developed the 
overseas strategies of the Matsushita group. This merger aimed to establish an 
integrated system of manufacturing and marketing in overseas markets as well as to 
speed up decision making on globalisation strategies. In addition, a regional 
headquarters system was introduced in the late 1980s. The headquarters in America, 
and Europe and Africa were established in October 1988, while the Asian headquarters 
was established in Singapore in April 1989. Matsushita formulated guidelines for 
overseas activities in 1989. These guidelines, which included a framework for 
promoting contributions to the local community and the recruitment of local employees 
to managerial positions, aimed to foster the corporate image that Matsushita was a 
localised company.27
As Japanese electronics firms have intensified their multinational operations and 
have been required to make more commitments to local markets, they have changed 
their competition patterns. A typical pattern of competition among Japanese firms was 
side-by-side competition. Japanese firms tended to imitate successful products or 
excellent production methods developed by competitors. This strategy led to the 
production of similar goods without distinctive sales points and resultant fierce price 
competition. In order to be competitive in price, Japanese firms pursued market share
24 Interview, Matsushita, Osaka, May 1994.
25 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 January 1989.
26 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 July 1989.
27 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 29 May 1989.
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because mass production was the easiest way to reduce prices. Japanese electronics 
firms repeated this competition pattern in radio cassette recorders, colour TVs, VTRs, 
and other electronic products. The market structure which ensured that there were five 
or six producers with a similar level of corporate power, intensified competition for the 
top market share.
In the semiconductor sector, memory producers have had to make enough profit 
in four to five years to pay off their immense capital and R & D expenditure as well as 
creating funds to prepare for the next generation of memories.28 Furthermore, steep 
learning curve effects — production costs decline by 30 per cent for every doubling of 
cumulative volume — are seen in the semiconductor field.29 As a consequence, a 
fundamental strategy of Japanese semiconductor producers has been directed towards 
increasing market share rather than maximising profitability. In order to expand market 
share, Japanese semiconductor producers pursued a ‘forward pricing strategy’ — 
offering products at low prices when they are introduced so as to stimulate demand, 
even if producers are unable to make profits at these prices. They could take this 
strategy because they were vertically integrated producers engaging in a wide variety of 
businesses. The losses in the semiconductor sector were compensated for by profits in 
other sectors.
Japanese electronics firms regarded exports and multinational production as an 
extension of domestic economic activities. Consequently, they transferred the pattern of 
excessive competition from the domestic to overseas markets, which caused friction 
with local firms and governments. For instance, the US colour TV market was severely 
disrupted by the aggressive advance of Japanese electronics makers in the 1970s. After 
the 1974-75 recession, Japanese electronics firms created an avalanche of exports of TV 
receivers, shown in a 153 per cent rise in exports in a single year (1976). Several US 
firms incapable of meeting this aggressive competition were acquired by Japanese 
electronics firms. Consequently, while in 1977 direct imports from Japan were 14 per 
cent of US colour TV consumption, the actual aggregate market share of Japanese
28 Tokyo Business Today, April 1991, p.51.
29 Although yield rates were often less than 25 per cent when new devices were introduced, the rates 
would climb to 90 per cent as the devices matured. Companies tend to manufacture high volume 
products in order to raise yield rates (Yoffie 1988, p.84).
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firms, including American and third-country subsidiaries was estimated to be 44.2 per 
cent (Yamamura and Vandenberg 1986, pp.25 8-59).30 Now, no US companies 
manufacture audio visual goods such as CD players, VTRs and stereos.
In the semiconductor field, Japanese firms have concentrated their efforts on 
DRAM, and have made massive capital and R & D investments since the late 1970s.31 
They gradually increased their world market share in this area from 70 per cent of 64K 
DRAM at the end of 1981 to 90 per cent in 256K DRAM at the end of 1986. The US 
share for all memory products in the world fell from 75 per cent in 1980 to just over 25 
per cent in 1986, while the Japanese share rose from 25 per cent to 65 per cent in the 
same period (Prestowitz 1988, p.45). This process of establishing market dominance 
was attended by fierce price competition during 1981-82 and 1984-85. During both 
these periods, Japanese semiconductor producers undertook a massive build-up of 
production capacity, with an over-supply that the world market could not absorb 
(Howell, Bartlett, and Davis 1992, p.104).32 Excess production capacity led to a 
downward price spiral.33 Whereas the imported price of Japanese 64K DRAM fell 
from US$3.53 in September 1984 to US$0.82 one year later, that of Japanese 256K 
DRAM fell from an index of 100 to 7 in the same period (Howell et al. 1988, p.86). As 
a consequence, most US merchant producers ceased production of DRAM.34 While 11 
US merchant firms had been producing DRAM at the 16K level in 1980, by 1986, only
30 In this process, the Japanese TV makers seemed to coordinate their export plans by notifying each 
other of their intended quantity of shipments and prices, and allocating US customers among 
themselves. The coordination was implemented through the Japan Machinery Exporters 
Association and the Television Export Council attended by top executives of TV exporters. 
(Yamamura and Vandenberg 1986, p.259).
31 The ratio of capital investment to total sales by twelve Japanese semiconductor producers 
surpassed 20 percent between 1979 and 1985 (EIAJ 1994a, p.132).
32 In the second period, Japanese chip producers drastically increased capital spending. Capital 
investment by twelve Japanese semiconductor producers was 763 billion yen in 1984, 42 per cent 
of total sales, and 478 billion yen in 1985, 35 per cent of total sales, in spite of a worldwide 
semiconductor recession in these years (EIAJ 1994a, p.132).
33 As evidence that Japanese semiconductor producers conducted aggressive price competition, the
memorandum that Hitachi sent to its distributors of EPROM in February 1985 is put forward. This 
memorandum said: Win with the 10 per cent rule. . . .Find AMD and Intel sockets. Quote 10 per 
cent below their price___ If they requote, go 10 per cent again.. .  .Don’t quit till you win.
34 Merchant producers are companies that manufacture and sell semiconductors to other firms for 
installation in their products. They are distinguished from captive makers that use all their 
semiconductors for in-house consumption.
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two US firms, Texas Instruments and Micron Technology, remained in the market at 
the 256K level (Howell, Bartlett, and Davis 1992, p.105).
Internationally oriented electronics firms like Matsushita recognised that to be a 
true insider in each local market, they had to refrain from the excessive pursuit of 
market share which was accompanied by fierce price competition and a resultant market 
disruption. Enhanced multinational operations have induced some Japanese electronics 
firms to view the world as one big market, to integrate their home market into one 
global entity, and to expand the global market by promoting cooperation with their 
foreign competitors. Multinational operations have also raised the sensitivity of major 
electronics firms to foreign criticism of huge trade imbalances.35 Not only did the 
electronics industry share a large portion of the trade surplus, but its surplus expanded 
from US$34.8 billion in 1987 to US$41.1 billion in 1988, and to US$41.5 billion in 
1989, in spite of Japan’s overall trade imbalances being rectified in this period (Namura 
1991, p.76). The electronics firms that strengthened dependence on overseas markets 
increasingly appreciated the crisis over trade imbalances. For example, Matsushita’s 
international cooperation program sprang from a belief that conventional macro-level 
adjustment measures alone could not resolve trade friction, and that trade imbalance 
would become a critical issue if each company did not tackle it seriously.36 Moreover, 
some internationally oriented firms feared that foreign criticism of the Japanese style of 
competition and the closed home market might lead to some form of restraint on their 
operations. They recognised the need for individual firms to make efforts to revise the 
Japanese market system by promoting access of foreign products in order that they 
would be accepted into the international community.
In addition to the internationalisation of corporate activities, there was another 
stimulus to changing the preferences of Japanese electronics firms in favour of an open 
domestic market: the appreciation of the yen after 1985. The doubling of the yen’s 
value between 1985 and 1988 undermined the international competitiveness of Japanese 
electronics products by raising their prices. In order to lessen the effects of the yen 
revaluation, electronics firms accelerated FDI, and increased the procurement of
35 Japan’s trade surplus was US$96.4 billion in 1987, US$95.0 billion in 1988, and US$76.9 billion 
1989.
36 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 July 1989.
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overseas components and materials. This deepened involvement in international 
production, and reinforced the interest of major electronics firms in market access for 
imported products.
The change in stance is shown by the statements of senior executives of leading 
electronics companies. For instance, Masahiko Hirata, a vice-president of Matsushita, 
stressed the significance of cooperation with foreign partners as follows: ‘a big 
company like Matsushita needs to promote cooperation in international society by 
imposing a burden on itself. It is not sufficient to get profits through production and 
sales. As a company grows, it is necessary to assume a corporate responsibility in line 
with this growth’.37
This thinking reflects the stance of the Japanese electronics industry as a whole. 
The industry acknowledged more responsibility for promoting mutual understanding 
with its foreign counterparts. For instance, a recent EIAJ report on the Japanese 
semiconductor sector maintains that:
In order to resolve trade issues, continuous communication and mutual understanding 
between industries are indispensable. The basis for coping with trade issues is that the 
industries have explicit prospects and policies, and seek to play a plus sum game with 
their foreign counterparts through mutual understanding. Anyway, it is almost impossible 
to find an effective solution if we cling only to the free competition rule and continue to 
maintain general principles with a myopic perspective (EIAJ 1994b, p.l 10).
Some business leaders are more concerned with the criticism of the Japanese 
market mechanism and advocate compatibility of Japanese customs and institutions 
with international norms. Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony, initiated the controversy in 
early 1992, suggesting a revision of Japanese management style. Morita, believing that 
the Japanese competition rule which stresses the expansion of market share was 
different from that in western nations, suggested reviewing Japanese practices such as a 
low proportion of value added going to employee compensation, a low level of stock 
dividends, and unequal relationships with vendors (Morita 1992). He maintained that 
companies should adopt pricing methods which took into account appropriate margins 
on each product. Morita also outlined his views in the article Rethinking the Global 
Free-Market Trade, where he argued that compared with the European Community and
37 Zaikai, 26 June 1990, p.55.
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the United States, which have transcended national boundaries and opened up their 
markets, Japan’s efforts to open its market have been slow and piecemeal — the result 
of direct foreign pressure. He proposed that Japan transform its traditional systems by 
eliminating excessive regulation and licensing (Morita 1993).
To summarise, the Japanese electronics industry has taken action to promote 
market access for foreign products. This action was promoted partly by the rapid 
appreciation of the yen. However, enhanced multinational operations had made major 
electronics firms vulnerable to foreign criticism of the closed Japanese market and 
excessive competition. In order to ensure sound overseas operations, electronics firms 
announced and implemented programs to promote market access for foreign products as 
well as cooperation with foreign firms.
Other action towards market opening
Japanese electronics producers had an effect on market opening policy in the 1990s. 
MITI announced the Business Global Partnership (BGP) Project in November 1991. 
This project consisted of three pillars: the expansion of imports, the expansion of local 
content by Japanese affiliates, and the promotion of industrial alliances. The uniqueness 
of this project lay in the establishment of joint ventures and technical tie-ups in addition 
to conventional import promotion plans. This program was formally set up in response 
to the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, and was announced in the 
second report of SII in July 1992.38 However, the content of the program was affected 
by preferences of the private sector. MITI’s request to rectify trade imbalances 
intensified in the 1990s. For example, MITI requested major firms in July 1991 to set 
up action programs to expand manufactured imports by 10 per cent in 1991 and 
1992.39 Some companies resisted this request, noting that import expansion alone could 
not resolve trade friction, and suggesting that the solutions to trade friction need to be 
considered from a broader viewpoint.40 MITI accepted this view and added the 
promotion of industrial alliances as a pillar of the BGP Project.
38
39
40
Interview, Industrial Policy Bureau, MITI, Tokyo, May 1994. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10 July 1991.
Interview, Matsushita, Osaka, May 1994.
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THE US-JAP AN SEMICONDUCTOR ARRANGEMENT
The US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement is one of the most important trade accords 
concluded between the United States and Japan. Not only were both governments 
involved in arduous negotiations before its conclusion and in the process of its 
implementation, but the accord is regarded as a model of the re suits-oriented trade 
approach that came to be favoured by the US government. It is useful to examine how 
the stance of Japanese electronics firms on the market access issue in semiconductors 
has changed, and what effects this has had on the implementation of the accord.
Background to the arrangement
The semiconductor dispute between Japan and the United States started in the early 
1980s.41 It escalated in 1985 when the US Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), 
several semiconductor producers and the US government resorted to a set of legal 
petitions.42 SIA filed a Section 301 petition of the 1974 Trade Act in June 1985 against 
unfair Japanese trading practices such as market targeting by the Japanese government 
and barriers to semiconductor sales in the Japanese market.43 Around a week after the 
Section 301 petition by SIA, Micron Technology charged seven Japanese chip 
producers with the dumping of 64K DRAM. Then, Intel, Advanced Micro Devices and 
National Semiconductor filed a suit in late September claiming that eight Japanese 
makers were dumping EPROM. In December 1985, the US Department of Commerce 
itself initiated an anti-dumping case in 256K DRAM and 1M DRAM. Finally, the US 
International Trade Commission initiated a Section 337 investigation in March 1986, 
responding to a petition from Texas Instruments which alleged infringement of patents 
on semiconductors by eight Japanese chip producers and one Korean firm. In response 
to these complaints from the US semiconductor industry and government, Japanese 
officials began negotiations with their US counterparts on 28 August 1985. The two
41 For the Japan-US semiconductor dispute before 1985, see Prestowitz (1988, pp.46-55).
42 SIA was founded in 1977 by five merchant semiconductor producers —  Advanced Micro Devices, 
Fairchild, Intel, Motorola and National Semiconductor —  with an eye to strengthening members’ 
interests as well as to coping with the Japanese challenge. By 1985, the association had increased 
its membership to 48, including IBM with combined revenues of more than US$100 billion 
(Yoffie 1988, p.86).
43 Section 301 empowers the US President to decide which countries carry out unfair trade practices 
and to take appropriate action against them.
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governments convened talks over the assurance of market shares by the Japanese 
government, the measures which the Japanese government might take concerning third- 
country dumping — dumping in the countries other than Japan and the United States — 
and the submission of proprietary manufacturing data by Japanese electronics firms to 
the US Department of Commerce.
The Japanese and US governments reached a five-year agreement on 31 July 
1986. The accord consisted of two parts. The first part described measures to boost the 
sales of foreign semiconductors in the Japanese market.44 In a confidential side letter 
accompanying the formal agreement, ‘the Japanese said that they understood, 
welcomed, and would make efforts to assist the U.S. companies in reaching their goals 
of a 20-percent market share within five years’ (Prestowitz 1988, p.65). The second part 
was concerned with the suspension of dumping. The US Department of Commerce 
would, on the basis of cost information provided by Japanese manufacturers, set fair 
market values (FMVs) for EPROMs and DRAMs of 256K and above manufactured by 
each producer. The Japanese government agreed to monitor costs and export prices, 
including export prices in third countries. On the condition that the accord would come 
into force, Japanese electronics firms signed agreements with the US Department of 
Commerce which suspended the dumping investigations on EPROMs and DRAMs.
In June 1991, the Japanese and US governments agreed to renew the 
Semiconductor Arrangement. The new agreement stipulated a more than 20 per cent 
share for foreign semiconductors in Japan by the end of 1992, and incorporated a 
common method for calculating the share.
Industry reaction to the arrangement
MITI started measures to stop selling chips below production cost just after the 
Semiconductor Arrangement came into force (Table 5.6). Some electronics firms were
44 The first part included four items: the Japanese government would encourage its semiconductor 
users to purchase more foreign semiconductors, while the US government would encourage its 
semiconductor manufacturers to strengthen their marketing efforts; the governments of both 
countries agreed that the expected improvement in access should be gradual and steady during the 
coming five years; the Japanese government would establish an organisation for helping foreign 
producers increase sales in Japan, evaluating product quality, and promoting long-term 
relationships between Japanese and US firms; and the governments of both countries would 
exercise voluntary control to prevent excessive production capacity.
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not willing to cooperate with MITI. MITI requested a 20 per cent production cut of 
256K DRAM in autumn 1986. Although major semiconductor producers such as 
Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric accepted MITI’s guidance, NEC did not 
comply (Uchihashi 1994, p.67). After warning of sanctions in January 1987, MITI 
persuaded the leading electronics companies to abide by a 20 per cent production cut. 
NEC countered with a 10 per cent cut, but eventually accepted a 20 per cent cut 
(Uchihashi 1994, p.67). In March 1987, NEC reduced the production of 256K DRAM 
from 10 to 9 million units per month.45 Moreover, several semiconductor producers 
applied for export licenses above the volume prescribed. For instance, NEC applied for 
licenses to export 20 million units in January 1987, although NEC’s monthly 
production volume was 8.5 million units. The volume was reduced to 6 million units 
under MITI’s guidance.46 In spite of MITI’s efforts, the US government approved a 
punitive sanction against Japan for alleged non-compliance. On 17 April, the Reagan 
administration imposed US$300 million in punitive tariffs on Japanese exports of 
portable computers, selected power hand tools, and some colour TV sets — the first 
penalties against Japan since the Second World War.
Some data collected by EIAJ indicate a lukewarm response from the electronics 
industry regarding market access in 1986 and 1987. The number of companies which 
established special internal sections for expanding market access increased by 19 
inl988, while the figure was 5 in 1986 and 11 in 1987.47 The number of seminars 
sponsored by semiconductor users doubled between 1986 and 1987, and grew fivefold 
by 1988 48 Furthermore, the average number of foreign semiconductor suppliers that 
each Japanese user dealt with increased slightly from 20.6 in 1986 to 24.9 in 1987, but 
jumped to 34.1 in 1988.49 The Japanese electronics industry contended that it had made
45 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 March 1987.
46 Asahi Shimbun, 21 April 1987.
47 UCOMNews, 20 June 1993, p.8.
48 UCOM News, 26 January 1993, p.8.
49 UCOM News, 26 January 1993, p.8.
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Table 5.6 MITI’s Commitments to the Semiconductor Arrangement
12/9/86
22/9/86
11/86
1/1/87
16/2/87
4/3/87
20/3/87
23/3/87
24,25/3/87
26/4/87
25/5/87
17/4/89
9/1/92
25/5/92
19/6/92
24/8/92
10/9/92
MITI requested major semiconductor makers and users in writing to eschew 
dumping exports of semiconductors and to promote the purchase of foreign 
semiconductors.
A semiconductor monitoring office was established in Mi l l.
MITI requested major semiconductor producers to ensure that export prices to 
third countries should coincide with FMVs to the United States.
The threshold value at which firms did not necessitate export licensing was 
lowered from 1 million yen to 50,000 yen.
M m  announced a 10 per cent downward forecast for the January-March 
quarter, and encouraged semiconductor producers to reduce their production.
The International Semiconductor Cooperation Centre (INSEC) was established. 
The Minister convened an emergency meeting, and requested the presidents or 
vice-presidents of ten major electronics makers to continue reducing 256K 
DRAM production, to stop third-country dumping, and to promote the purchase 
of foreign chips.
M m  released a guideline post for the Aprii-June quarter which represented a 
20 per cent cut in production volume from the previous quarter.
M m  requested 43 semiconductor users to increase the purchase of foreign 
semiconductors.
Mi l l requested that the private sector observe minimum export prices on 
five types of semiconductors.
The Minister directly asked the presidents of ten major semiconductor firms to 
expand the purchase of foreign semiconductors and to cut production capacity 
so as to arrest dumping.
M m  held the first meeting on market access expansion of foreign 
semiconductors.
M m  expanded the target of request to purchase foreign semiconductors from 
60 to 226 user companies.
The Minister had a meeting with the presidents of ten top semiconductor users. 
62 semiconductor users held a breakfast meeting attended by the deputy director 
of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau.
The deputy director of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau 
organised a meeting with the executives of ten major companies.
The deputy director of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau 
organised a meeting with the executives of 62 companies.
Source: Complied from UCOM (1993) and various newspapers.
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positive efforts to implement the accord since its conclusion.50 However, judging from 
the above data, the industry’s response to implement the accord was sluggish in 1986 
and 1987.
The dumping issue was almost resolved in 1988 through monitoring by MITI, 
production cuts by electronics firms, and the gradual recovery in semiconductor 
demand. The market access issue remained problematic. The driving force in breaking 
the deadlock on the issue came from the private sector (Table 5.7). EIAJ and SIA 
intensively discussed the issue of market access in California in March 1988, and 
agreed on five measures to promote market access.51 The agreement was crucial both 
because it broke the previously chilly relations between the two industries and because 
it presented such effective measures to expand market access as the promotion of 
design-in and a focus on the consumer electronics and automobile sectors.52
In May 1988, EIAJ organised the Users Committee of Foreign Semiconductors 
(UCOM) composed of some 60 members which accounted for three quarters of Japan’s 
total semiconductor consumption. The establishment of UCOM had significant 
implications. Even if top executives understood the necessity for expanding the 
purchase of foreign semiconductors, this aim would not be realised unless purchasing 
divisions changed their perceptions of foreign products and service quality (Pugel 1987, 
p.209). The establishment of UCOM implied that users’ divisions recognised the 
necessity for implementing concrete actions for expanding the market access of foreign 
semiconductors.53
50 For example, see EIAJ (1987, p .l).
51 These are as follows: promoting long-term relationships between producers and users; increasing 
the design-in of foreign products; increasing Japanese purchases of existing foreign products; 
broadening the base of users and suppliers engaged in market access efforts; and accelerating the 
commencement of foreign participation in the consumer electronics and automobile sectors (SIA 
1990, pp.7-8).
52 The design-in in semiconductors is defined as ‘a process by which certain semiconductors are 
newly designed or redesigned (custom/ semi-custom semiconductors), or end products themselves 
are newly designed or redesigned with the use of specific semiconductors in mind from the design 
stage of developing these end products’ (EIAJ 1993a, p.29).
53 UCOM has carried out various activities such as purchasing promotion seminars, design-in 
seminars, and dispatch of overseas trade missions. The missions were sent eight times and 
gathered a cumulative total of 283 foreign suppliers by 1993.
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Table 5.7 EIAJ’s Commitments to Expanding Market Access for Foreign 
Semiconductors
3/1988
5/1988
9/1988
6/1989
12/1989
6/1991
10/1991
6/1992
6/1992
EIAJ and SIA discussed the issue of market access to Japan in California.
EIAJ organised the Users Committee of Foreign Semiconductors (UCOM). 
EIAJ announced an Action Plan that aimed to improve market access 
opportunities for foreign semiconductor producers.
EIAJ proposed SIA establish a task force on consumer electronics, to 
participate in joint development of semiconductors for high-definition TVs, and 
to hold a joint round table on chips for automobiles.
EIAJ made constructive proposals to SLA to assist foreign semiconductor access 
to Japan.
EIAJ and SIA established a joint steering committee in order to conduct 
preliminary and follow up investigations concerning ELAJ-SIA joint 
activities.
UCOM distributed to SIA a list of contact persons in charge of design-in 
projects at 62 Japanese user companies.
EIAJ proposed SLA submit lists of planned chip purchases by ten major 
Japanese users.
UCOM established a branch in California.
Source: Compiled from various newspapers and EIAJ internal documents.
In June 1989, EIAJ proposed to SIA that they establish a task force on consumer 
electronics, participate in the joint development of semiconductors for high-definition 
TVs, and then hold a joint round table on chips for automobiles.54 EIAJ also made 
constructive proposals to SIA in December 1989 that Japanese electronics firms assist 
foreign semiconductor access to Japan, by providing information as to the products 
Japanese users require. Sales of foreign chips through Japanese firms’ distribution 
channels, and collaborative development of new products and technology were also 
proposed. After the renewed Semiconductor Arrangeament came into force on 1 August 
1991, activities for expanding foreign semiconductor sales intensified. EIAJ proposed 
in June 1992 to SIA that it submit lists of planned chip purchases by ten major Japanese 
users. In the same month, UCOM established a branch in California in order to offer 
Japanese users’ information to small and medium-sized suppliers who did not have
54 The consumer electronics task force examined the market conditions of consumer electronics and 
recommended an action plan suggesting the promotion of design-in and cooperation of US and 
Japanese semiconductor suppliers.
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direct access to the Japanese market as well as to introduce the technology and products 
of these firms to Japanese users.
These commitments yielded willing efforts of electronics firms and assisted in 
achieving a substantial improvement in the market share of foreign semiconductors.55 
Although there was only a moderate increase in the share of foreign semiconductors up 
to the first half of 1992, the share climbed sharply in the fourth quarter of 1992, 
exceeding the 20 per cent target (Table 5.8).
Table 5.8 Market Shares of Foreign Semiconductors in Japan, 1986-94 (per cent)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
FI 8.7 10.2 10.6 12.9 13.2 14.4 20.2 20.7 23.7
F2 11.1 12.4 13.2 16.3 19.0 16.1 22.5 22.1 24.7
Note: All figures are those at the fourth quarter. Between 1986 and 1990, FI is based on data
collected by World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS), while F2 is based on survey data 
collected by MITI. After 1991, FI and F2 mean Formula 1 and Formula 2 defined in the 1991 
New Semiconductor Arrangement.
Sources: EIAJ’s internal documents.
Stance of electronics firms on market access before 1988
What influence did the stance of electronics firms have on the implementation of the 
Semiconductor Arrangement? The sanctions in April 1987 were the result of the alleged 
non-compliance of the Japanese government and firms. SIA attributed the cause of the 
non-compliance to ‘Japanese government and industry perceptions that limited efforts 
to increase market access would be sufficient to appease American concerns’ (SIA 
1990, p.2). Indeed, in part, MITI made the mistake of not taking US intentions seriously 
(Prestowitz 1988, p.67). Yet, MITI undertook measures immediately after the accord 
came into force. A more crucial cause of non-compliance lay in the response of 
Japanese electronics firms in 1986 and 1987.
55 According to survey data by UCOM, the number of semiconductor users that established special 
internal sections for market access expansion increased from 8 in 1986 to 61 in 1992 (UCOM 
News, 20 June 1993, p.8). In addition, the number of seminars on purchasing promotion of foreign 
devices or the exchange of technical information held by semiconductor suppliers doubled 
between 1986 and 1992, whereas those by semiconductor users grew by ten-fold in the same 
period. In 1992, 84 per cent of seminars were sponsored by semiconductor users (UCOM 1993, 
p.7).
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The unwillingness of Japanese electronics firms to implement the arrangement in 
1986 and 1987 stemmed partly from their perception of market structures in the 
Japanese semiconductor sector. Reflecting vertically integrated corporate structures, 
major chip producers are major users in Japan. Eight out of the ten largest users are 
among the ten top producers, and only two users do not produce semiconductors. 
Accordingly, room for foreign chip producers to penetrate the Japanese market was 
limited. In addition, the Japanese semiconductor market depends heavily on consumer 
electronics demand. Consumer products accounted for 43 per cent of total 
semiconductor demand in Japan in 1986, compared with 7 per cent in the United States. 
In contrast, semiconductor use in the government and military sectors accounted for 21 
per cent of total use in the United States while there was no such comparable end use in 
Japan (EIAJ 1988, p.24). Most US suppliers had little manufacturing expertise in and 
production varieties for consumer use.56 These features of the Japanese semiconductor 
market made it almost impossible to raise the market share of foreign devices in a short 
time.57
As far as the internal organisation of electronics firms is concerned, foreign 
semiconductors are purchased by the procurement divisions rather than the 
semiconductor divisions. In vertically integrated electronics firms, the independence of 
each division is stronger than is usually recognised. The procurement divisions regarded 
themselves as victims of the semiconductor divisions because they were forced to take 
action for expanding access of foreign devices as a result of the arrangement which was 
triggered by dumping problems caused by the semiconductor divisions. They were 
therefore not inclined to be fully cooperative in purchasing foreign semiconductors.58
56 A report on consumer task force activities issued in February 1990, shows that six major US 
suppliers, on average, produced 6 per cent of existing chips meeting the need of five major 
Japanese consumer electronics makers (A report of EIAJ/SIA consumer task force activities).
57 These characteristics lead to a difference in product category between Japanese demand and US 
supply. Foreign share is the highest in bipolar digital devices, a very small share of the Japanese 
chip market, while it is meagre in discrete devices which constitute a considerable segment of the 
total Japanese market. In 1990, foreign share of bipolar digital devices was 29 per cent but the 
share was 5 per cent of the total Japanese chip market. In contrast, only 5 per cent of discrete 
devices, which accounted for 22 per cent of the Japanese market, were supplied by foreign firms, 
and the share was decreasing. Without discrete devices, the foreign market share would rise by 5 
per cent (EIAJ 1994c, p.2-4).
58 Interview, EIAJ, Tokyo, September 1995. The semiconductor divisions, which had long 
accumulated operating losses, were regarded as a ‘burden’ in the electronics firms.
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The procurement divisions of electronics firms had cultivated a tight relationship with 
parts suppliers. Electronics producers, which manufacture a large portion of parts in- 
house, are less dependent on parts suppliers than auto producers (Takeuchi 1994, 
p.88).59 In addition, unlike auto producers, electronics producers procure parts 
belonging to ‘marketed goods’ (shihanhin), such as semiconductors, condensers, and 
resistors.60 A survey shows that in the TV production at an electronics company, 20 per 
cent of the parts belong to this category (Wu 1991, p.70). However, there is a close 
relationship between parts suppliers and assembly makers in the electronics industry. 
Electronics makers encourage suppliers to organise supplier associations.61 The makers 
negotiate with parts suppliers over various trade conditions through the supplier 
associations (Chen 1994, p.83). Moreover, the electronics makers and subcontracting 
parts suppliers jointly undertake activities for quality improvement and cost 
reduction.62 Accordingly, electronics producers have traded with selected parts makers 
for a relatively long period (Hiramoto 1994, p.305). The procurement divisions that 
cultivated tight linkages with domestic firms were one of the most domestically 
oriented divisions.63 It took considerable time to change their procurement patterns.
The unwillingness of Japanese electronics firms to implement the arrangement 
also stemmed from a political factor. Japanese electronics firms were dissatisfied with 
the process as well as with the result of the negotiations over the accord. MITI officials
59 The average share of in-house parts production for auto producers is 30 per cent. The share of in- 
house parts production for electronics producers varies by company and by production item. A 
study shows that in TV production at Matsushita, 60 per cent of the parts are manufactured in two 
parts companies in the Matsushita group (Chen 1994, p.70).
60 ‘Marketed goods’ are those ‘which are offered to the public irrespective of the will of the core 
[manufacturer] firm and are therefore purchasable by merely selecting from the catalog’ 
(Asanuma 1989b, p .ll) . This makes a contrast with ‘ordered goods’ (gaichuhin), which are 
supplied accordingly to specification provided by the core firm.
61 For example, in the case of the TV division of Matsushita, 36 subcontracting parts suppliers that 
provide custom products such as cabinets and transformers organise 7V kyoei-kai. Twelve 
independent makers such as NEC, Mitsubishi Electric which offer ordered goods also organise 
meka-kai. Matsushita organises a trade meeting with the members of TV kyoei-kai each month, 
and with the members of meka-kai every six months (Chen 1994, pp.77-80).
62 For example, consumer electronics companies operate an ‘approval system for non-inspection’. 
The suppliers which obtain this qualification are exempt from inspection of their parts. It is 
common for electronics producers and parts suppliers to implement value analysis (VA, activities 
for cost reduction after entering mass production) and value engineering (VE, activities for 
reducing costs before starting mass production) in order to reduce production costs (Wu 1991, 
pp.71-72).
63 Interview, UCOM, Tokyo, September 1995.
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sought to resolve the dumping issues which were of concern to the semiconductor 
producers together with the Section 301 file. MITI hoped to limit the electronics 
industry’s influence in the negotiations.64 The negotiations were carried out secretly, 
and MITI officials did not consult sufficiently with electronics companies during the 
negotiations.65 For instance, a general framework for agreement was reached in talks 
between Michio Watanabe, Minister of MITI, and US Trade Representative Clayton 
Yeutter on 29 May 1986.66 Before the talks, MITI had no prior consultations with the 
electronics industry.67 MITI officials expected electronics firms to accept the result of 
the negotiations. In fact, however, the firms were dissatisfied with the agreement 
reached at the talks.68
After the Watanabe-Yeutter talks, MITI sought to persuade the US government to 
withdraw the anti-dumping petitions. However, the US government requested both that 
the Japanese electronics firms submit proprietary manufacturing data to prove that they 
were not exporting at cheap prices and that the Japanese government monitor export 
prices to third countries. Furthermore, the US government demanded government 
insurance for market access and eventually the side letter was submitted.69 The
64 For instance, although there were interactions between SIA and EIAJ, shown in the submission of 
the rebuttal papers, EIAJ was discouraged by MITI from reacting against SIA after MITI decided 
to negotiate with the US government (Fujiwara 1988, p.130).
65 Purejidento, May 1988, p.189.
66 Several critical points were agreed on at the talks: firstly, the 11 major semiconductor firms would 
raise the purchase rate of US semiconductors; secondly, the Japanese government would 
encourage other semiconductor users and industries to increase the share of US semiconductors; 
thirdly, a price monitoring system under which semiconductor producers would report prices 
would be introduced in order to prevent exports of cheap semiconductors to the US market (The 
Washington Post, 29 May 1986; Electronic News, No. 1604, 2 June 1986). Watanabe allegedly 
recognised that the US government expected to increase its market share in Japan to 20 per cent 
within five years. The side letter on market access seemed to be based on this talk (Shimura 1993, 
p.287).
67 Nikkei Bijinesu, 36 March 1990, p.19.
68 Tomio Matsumura, a managing director of NEC asserted that ‘it is natural for semiconductor users 
to prefer cheap, high quality products under a reliable supply system. To expect them to ignore 
these preferences is an unreasonable demand’ (Asahi Shimbun, 3 June 1986). Semiconductor 
producers also criticised the price monitoring system, arguing that it is difficult to control 
semiconductor prices because not only do prices fluctuate with supply and demand but production 
costs fall sharply due to technological innovation and a rise in yield rates (Asahi Shimbun, 3 June 
1986).
69 In addition to the side letter, the two governments allegedly exchanged confidential chairman’s 
notes in which the Japanese government suggested controlling sales prices in third countries 
(.Purejidento, May 1988, p. 191; Fujiwara 1988, p. 134).
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substantial agreement on 30 June 1986 included requests which were unacceptable to 
the Japanese electronics industry such as third country monitoring and provision of 
proprietary data to the US government. After the agreement was reached, MITI spent 
two months trying to persuade the electronics firms to accept the agreement.70 Japanese 
electronics firms reportedly preferred to accept anti-dumping duties rather than agree to 
the provisions required in the agreement.71
As Japanese electronics firms were insufficiently consulted during negotiations, 
and were also dissatisfied with the provisions of the accord, they had little incentive to 
cooperate in implementation of the arrangement (Satö 1991, p.128; Krauss 1933, 
p.287). Prestowitz (1988, p.66) says that although MITI had promised in November 
1986 that the US market share would rise to 10 per cent by March 1987, it had 
difficulty in obtaining cooperation from electronics firms.
The dissatisfaction of the electronics firms with the arrangement escalated when 
the Reagan administration announced retaliation against alleged Japanese non- 
compliance. The Japanese electronics industry and firms criticised the sanction.72 On 
the dumping issue, the Japanese electronics industry disagreed with the US 
interpretation of the cost based fair value for third country exports as being equal to the 
FMVs set by the US Department of Commerce (EIAJ 1987, p.16). In addition, the side 
letter made the situation more complicated. The managers of Japanese electronics firms 
did not understand why the US government and semiconductor industry took such an 
extreme position. The top executives of major firms were allegedly shown the side 
letter, but they considered it as merely a personal memorandum from a MITI official.73
70 Nikkei Bijinesu, 26 March 1990, p.21.
71 The Washington Post, 29 July 1986.
72 For example, Soichi Saba, President of EIAJ, criticised the urgency of the US government to 
obtain a substantial result, contending that ‘it is premature and even irrational to attempt an 
assessment of the impact of the agreement and our efforts to comply with it only 6 months after 
concluding the agreement’ (Electronic News, No. 1649, 6 April 1987). Atsuyoshi Ouchi, Vice- 
Chairman of NEC, also argued that ‘we have made efforts to provide more services than the 
arrangement anticipated such as production cuts and the establishment of INSEC. We expected 
gratitude from the US, but instead we got the criticism of non-compliance. The US action is like
returning evil for good’ (Öuchi 1987, p.98).
73 Nikkei Bijinesu, 26 March 1990, p.21. Even the MITI official who was directly involved in the 
submission of the side letter considered it merely an acknowledgement of the US side’s desire 
(Krauss 1993, p.298).
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The views of the Japanese electronics industry did not coincide with US 
perceptions of the arrangement. The US government and semiconductor industry 
believed that there had been little or no improvement in market access for four years.74 
In addition, in late January 1987, the US government gave MITI 30 days to stop third 
country dumping and 60 days to improve market access, otherwise the United States 
would have to retaliate.75 As far as the application of FMVs to third country exports 
was concerned, the US government asserted that not only would FMVs become a 
yardstick for third country exports but it would be sufficient to substantiate dumping 
because semiconductors were exported at the half price of FMVs.76 The US 
government also believed that the side letter was the core of the arrangement because it 
was proof of the intention to implement the arrangement.77 Thus, the Japanese 
electronics industry underestimated the strength of US dissatisfaction. What is 
important here is that Japanese electronics firms had little incentive to implement the 
accord during 1987 owing to their dissatisfaction with US sanctions and the side letter 
to the Semiconductor Arrangement.
Stance of electronics firms on market access after 1988
Japanese electronics firms undertook cooperative actions to implement the accord after 
1988. Several interpretations to account for this change have been advanced. The first 
interpretation stresses the success of the Semiconductor Arrangement. The positive 
actions of electronics firms on market access expansion are related to the dumping 
issues. Major Japanese electronics firms benefited from the arrangement because they 
avoided the image problems as well as dumping duties as a result of the suspension of
74 Purejidento, May 1988, pp. 187-88. In the early 1980s, the Japanese and US governments sought 
to resolve the trade disputes over semiconductors by governmental agreements. Both governments 
reached the first agreement in November 1982. It was designed to seek to ensure equivalent 
opportunities for US firms in Japan to those enjoyed by Japanese firms in the US market 
(Prestowitz 1988, p.52). The second agreement, concluded in November 1983, contained a 
commitment by the Japanese government to promote US access to the Japanese market as well as 
the establishment of the data collection system to prevent dumping by Japanese firms. The second 
accord worked for a while, but Japanese electronics firms introduced low-priced DRAMs and 
EPROMs, and the US share in the Japanese market began to decline in 1984 when market 
conditions changed.
75 Wall Street Journal, 30 January 1987; Electronic News, N o.1640,2 February 1987.
76 Purejidento, August 1987, p.81.
77 Purejidento, May 1988, p.189.
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dumping suits under the arrangement. These benefits made up for the disadvantages of 
concessions on market access.78 The electronics firms also gained huge profits from the 
semiconductor business as a result of the arrangement. As explained above, MITI 
encouraged semiconductor producers to cut production capacity in order to observe the 
arrangement. The production cut as well as price monitoring helped to raise chip 
prices.79 The major electronics firms refrained from criticising the arrangement and 
became more cooperative in market access. Others maintain that continuous US 
pressure triggered cooperative actions from the Japanese electronics industry in 1989 
and 1990 (Tyson 1992; Tyson and Yoffie 1993). Tyson (1992, p.136) asserts that SLA’s 
commitment to list semiconductors as a primary practice under Super 301 of the 1988 
Omnibus Trade Act led to a sharp increase in the market share of foreign 
semiconductors.
The second interpretation is that MITI’s guidance led electronics firms to expand 
the market access of foreign suppliers. As explained above, MITI worked assiduously 
to expand the access of foreign semiconductors. In addition to official measures, there 
were a number of examples wherein MITI played a critical role in encouraging 
electronics firms to implement market access activities. Although UCOM was 
established as an affiliated organisation of ELAJ, a manager of the Industrial Electronics 
Division of MITI persuaded major semiconductor users to join the organisation. After 
he gained agreement from 56 firms, EIAJ assumed the Secretariat of UCOM.80 When 
EIAJ suggested constructive proposals to SIA in December 1989, it sought to publish 
the content of the proposals in a US newspaper. This plan was aborted because MITI 
recommended against publishing the semiconductor access issue in the United States.81 
Furthermore, Hitachi abandoned advertisement of its development of 4M DRAM at 
MITI’s recommendation in summer 1989.82 This was in spite of the fact that Hitachi 
had already printed advertising posters. Advertising was important for Hitachi which
78 Interview, Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, MITI, Tokyo, February 1994.
79 After the production cut, the price of 256K DRAM began an unprecedented increase. The price 
increased from US$2.25 in the first quarter of 1987 to US$3.5 in the fourth quarter of 1988 (Tyson 
1992, p. 115).
80 Interview, UCOM, Tokyo, September 1995.
81 Nikkei Bijinesu, 26 March 1990, p. 13.
82 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 August 1989.
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lagged behind Toshiba in the development of 1M DRAM. MITI hoped to avoid 
stimulating the US semiconductor industry which was behind its Japanese counterpart 
in DRAM development.
These factors helped to explain the actions of Japanese electronics firms which 
were the leading semiconductor producers. Although the overall share of foreign 
semiconductors reached 20 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1992, the leading 
semiconductor producers attained the goal earlier (Table 5.9). While NEC and 
Mitsubishi Electric attained 20 per cent by 1988, Hitachi, Toshiba and Fujitsu reached 
20 per cent in 1990.
Table 5.9 Shares of Foreign Semiconductors in Major Electronics Firms, 1986-91 
(per cent)
Company 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991
NEC 20.5 20.8 21 22 24
Toshiba 12 16.3 18.5 20 20.8
Hitachi 8 15 17 20 -
Fujitsu 8 15 18 20 -
Mitsubishi Elect 20 20 20 21 22
Oki Electric 21 22.5 23 23 -
Matsushita - 9.5 13 - 20
Sony 4.2 7-8 13-14 - 20
Sources: Nikkei Bijinesu (26 March 1990, p.14), Nihon Keizai Shimbun (26 March 1989; 12 April 
1990).
The Semiconductor Arrangement was a critical factor in inducing the major 
semiconductor producers to commit themselves seriously to expanding market access. 
General managers of major electronics firms admitted that the arrangement functioned 
as a catalyst in encouraging them to undertake market opening activities.83 However, 
any interpretation of developments that focuses exclusively on the effects of the accord 
alone is simplistic. The semiconductor sector alone did not expand market access in 
Japan in the late 1980s. A sharp expansion in imports was seen in various electrical and 
electronics products. US producers alone did not increase semiconductor sales in Japan. 
In the 1990s, exports of Korean semiconductors grew more rapidly than those of the
83 Interview, Toshiba, Tokyo, February 1994.
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United States, while the US share of total imports of integrated circuits fell from 70 per 
cent in 1990 to 50 per cent in 1995 (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10 Imports of Integrated Circuits, 1990-95 (billion yen; per cent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995*
United States 265,630 280,084 250,137 286,263 331,338 196,362
(70.8) (68.8) (64.5) (60.9) (53.5) (50.2)
Europe 36,788 31,717 26,995 26,807 27,014 14,029
(9.8) (7.8) (7.0) (5.7) (4.4) (3.6)
South Korea 32,658 40,594 43,435 80,678 155,901 108,800
(8.7) (10.0) (11.2) (17.2) (25.2) (27.8)
Taiwan 15,124 19,642 14,836 19,084 28,051 17,966
(4.0) (4.8) (3.8) (4.1) (4.5) (4.6)
Others 25,224 36,167 52,316 56,894 76,961 53,692
(6.7) (8.6) (13.5) (12.1) (12.4) (13.7)
Total 375,424 407,204 387,719 469,726 619,265 390,849
Note: The figures in parenthesis are the percentage share in the total imports. * from January to June.
Source: EIAJ, Internal document.
SIA’s persistent pressure for market access played an important role but not the 
crucial role. SIA wielded political pressure effectively, but its members, big 
semiconductor producers in particular, preferred cooperative relations with Japanese 
semiconductor users to political pressure.84 The Japanese users have acknowledged this 
stance. When SIA requested the US Trade Representative to list semiconductors as a 
primary practice under Super 301, UCOM, which continued cooperative programs with 
SIA for expanding the sales of US semiconductors in Japan, asked SIA its reasons for 
the request. The answer from SIA was that there was little possibility that the US 
government would list semiconductors, but it was desirable that semiconductors should 
remain on the agenda.85 In addition, although governmental negotiations over
84 There are several episodes which reveal this stance. When the continuation of the sanction 
became an issue at the renewal of the arrangement, the US semiconductor industry was passive. 
At the hearing of the US Senate, for instance, Jerry Junkins, President and Chairman of Texas 
Instruments, expressed the stance of the US semiconductor industry as follows: ‘Now, we, the SIA 
and the CSPP [Computer Systems Policy Project], do not advocate a punitive approach toward 
Japan. Instead, we believe the positive efforts toward compliance that the Japanese have 
undertaken in the last 2 1/2 years should be encouraged to continue’ (US Senate 1991, p.10).
85 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 6 April 1991.
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semiconductors have always been intense, business level meetings have been 
constructive and cooperative.86
The semiconductor sector was originally fostered under MITI’s encouragement 
and protection. MITI protected the domestic semiconductor market from foreign firms 
by initially rejecting applications for wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries to 
establish in Japan, and by controlling approval of all patent, technical assistance and 
licensing agreements (Tyson 1992, p.93). MITI actively encouraged Japanese 
electronics firms to develop the semiconductor sector through various public projects.87 
As a consequence, the semiconductor divisions of Japanese electronics firms maintained 
closer relations with MITI than other divisions, such as consumer electronics, using 
formal and informal communication channels. Business leaders in the semiconductor 
sector and MITI officials exchanged information, some of which touched on sensitive 
issues.88 Business leaders willingly divulged proprietary corporate information to MITI 
officials because they believed that it would not be leaked (Okimoto 1984, p. 101). This 
did not mean that the semiconductor producers always accepted MITI’s guidance. 
Electronics firms criticised MITI’s concessions in the negotiation of the Semiconductor 
Arrangement, and NEC rejected MITI’s recommendation to cut production capacity 
until relations with the United States entered a critical phase.
To understand how the industry changed its stance on market access, attention 
needs to be paid to the actions of consumer electronics producers represented by 
Matsushita and Sony. They are not leading semiconductor producers, but they are the 
leading semiconductor users.89 Compared with other electronics giants, they had 
difficulty in expanding the purchase of foreign semiconductors because of their high
86 Interview, UCOM, Tokyo, September 1995.
87 More than 60 projects including electron-beam exposure and large-scale integration production 
equipment, discrete devices, and low-power, high-performance semiconductors received public 
support between 1971 and 1977 (Tyson 1992, p.95). In addition, the Japanese government 
sponsored the joint research association for VLSI operating from 1976 to 1979. This association 
generated more than 1,000 patents, and laid the foundation of future development in the 
semiconductor and computer sectors (Anchordoguy 1989, pp.137-45).
88 MITI and executives of major semiconductor firms have unofficial meetings periodically. EIAJ 
organises the semiconductor executive division, which comprises ten major semiconductor 
producers, and its hade committee functions as a communication body with MITI (Fujiwara 1988, 
p.129; Nikkei Bijinesu, 26 March 1990, p.7).
89 In 1992, Matsushita and Sony were the fifth and ninth largest Japanese semiconductor producers, 
but the primary and fourth biggest semiconductor users (EIAJ 1993a, pp.75-76).
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demand for devices used for consumer electronic products.90 Most US suppliers had 
little experience in manufacturing chips for consumer products and their production 
varieties were limited. The proportion of foreign semiconductors Matsushita and Sony 
used was below 10 per cent in 1988 when that of other major electronics firms was 15 
per cent or more (Table 5.9). However, they made serious efforts to boost their 
purchase of foreign devices. Matsushita organised joint exhibitions for foreign suppliers 
after 1989, and sent missions for semiconductor procurement. The leading consumer 
electronics maker also quadrupled the number of design-ins from 40 to 200 between 
1986 and 1990.91 Matsushita steadily elevated the share of foreign semiconductors 
from 9.5 per cent in 1988 to 13.0 per cent in 1989 to 20 per cent in July 1991. The 
foreign share of total chip purchases in Sony also increased sharply from 4.2 per cent in 
1986 to 13-14 per cent in 1989 to 20 per cent in April 1991, and the value of foreign 
semiconductors purchased grew tenfold between 1986 and 1990.92
The internationalisation of corporate activity provides an explanation for the 
stance taken by the major electronics firms, especially Sony and Matsushita. The trend 
was towards multinational production in the semiconductor sector in the late 1980s. 
Major electronics firms opened DRAM fabrication plants in the United States between 
1989 and 1991.93 The major electronics firms have promoted further
internationalisation, and they became more cooperative in promoting the access of 
foreign semiconductors to the Japanese market. Rising internationalisation increased the 
vulnerability of Japanese electronics firms towards reactions from foreign governments 
and firms. The semiconductor sector was all the more sensitive to foreign reactions 
because it had experienced retaliation from the US government in April 1987. Although 
they criticised the retaliation vocally, and semiconductors were not included in the
90 The ratio of semiconductors used in the consumer electronics fields was 55 per cent in Matsushita 
and 75 per cent in Sony in 1993.
91 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 July 1991.
92 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 June 1991.
93 While NEC started DRAM production in 1984, eight other Japanese producers —  Fujitsu, Hitachi, 
Matsushita, Mitsubishi Electric, NMB, Oki Electric, Sony, and Toshiba —  began production 
between 1989 and 1991 (Dohlman 1993, Table D15).
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sanctions list, the US response increased the vulnerability of Japanese electronics 
firms.94
Matsushita and Sony were the two major electronics firms that first began 
multinational productions, and developed them to maturity. Sony established a TV 
manufacturing plant in the United Kingdom in May 1968, and in the United States in 
August 1972. Matsushita was behind Sony in moving to developed countries, but it 
established a TV plant in Thailand in 1961. The two companies steadily expanded 
multinational production. In 1992, the ratio of foreign employees was 55 per cent in 
Sony and 75 per cent in Matsushita. The overseas production ratio in 1993 was 36 per 
cent in Sony and 39 per cent in Matsushita.95 These two companies also experienced 
trade friction in the 1970s when the US government introduced the orderly marketing 
agreement (OMA) in 1977 over Japanese exports of colour TVs. They were relatively 
more sensitive to foreign reactions than other electronics companies. The positive 
actions of Matsushita and Sony can be explained in this context.96
Technical features of semiconductors are also relevant to the expansion of the 
market access of foreign suppliers. Electronics firms manufacture core semiconductors 
for applied products in-house because these devices determine the features and 
competitiveness of applied products. At the same time, they purchase supplementary 
semiconductors from other semiconductor makers. Most semiconductors originally 
belonged to the ‘marketed goods’ category, which other large semiconductor producers 
sold directly to the market. The supply of semiconductors was not undertaken under 
subcontracting keiretsu relationships. The relationship between electronics makers and 
semiconductor suppliers has become closer as design-in has become popular in 
semiconductor development. It is less intimate than conventional subcontracting
94 Interview, UCOM, Tokyo, September 1995.
95 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 7 June 1994.
96 In the case of Matsushita, there was another factor which encouraged the company to tackle 
market access issues. While Akio Tanii, President of Matsushita, assumed the chairmanship of 
EIAJ between 1989 and 1990, Hiroshi Mizuno, an executive director of Matsushita, served as the 
head of UCOM from June 1989 to June 1990. As the chairman company of EIAJ and UCOM, 
Matsushita made serious efforts to expand market access (Interview, Matsushita, Osaka, May 
1994). UCOM established the consumer electronic task force in June 1989, and the joint 
committee on high-defmition TVs in November 1989. EIAJ also made constructive proposals 
regarding US semiconductor access to Japan in December 1989. Matsushita took the initiative in 
these activities.
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keiretsu relations, however. In addition, foreign semiconductor producers have 
enhanced their advantage, as the Japanese electronics industry has experienced changes 
in market structure. The spread of CD players and high-definition TVs raised the 
demand for digital chips in which US suppliers have an advantage. US semiconductor 
producers excel in application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) or custom chips 
represented by gate array and standard cell, which require small scale, tailored 
production to meet specific user requirements rather than mass production. 
Furthermore, the rising importance of differentiation in product function, which is a key 
measure to enhance the competitiveness of final products, increased the demand for 
foreign devices. Since Japanese makers tend to manufacture similar types of products, 
differentiation is all the more crucial for them. The nature and degree of differentiation 
depends on the function and quality of chips used in products. Japanese consumer 
electronics makers look for a wide variety of chips for this purpose, and require 
suppliers to produce chips only for specific uses. Foreign suppliers are more suitable for 
differentiation than Japanese suppliers in semiconductor supply because they are not 
competitors in the consumer electronics sector.97
The evolution of electronics firms’ position on market opening is revealed in the 
statements of company executives. Akio Tanii, President of Matsushita, explained the 
decision to pursue a 20 per cent target as follows: ‘it is useless to quibble about the 20 
per cent target. We should behave so that Japan will not become an orphan in the 
world’.98 Sony also acknowledged responsibility for expanding the purchase of foreign 
semiconductors. Masayoshi Miyazaki, a general manager of Sony, points out:
The Semiconductor Arrangement was concluded following the trigger of dumping by 
major semiconductor producers in the US market. Therefore, it might be possible to 
argue that Japanese firms other than major producers named in the dumping cases were, 
so to speak, victims with respect to market access. However, as an enterprise in a country 
with huge trade surpluses, we must make efforts to reduce them through the purchase of 
foreign goods.99
Market access to the Japanese semiconductor market has also been promoted by 
corporate alliances, especially in the 1990s. It is often argued that Japanese
97
98
99
Interview, Sony, Tokyo, March 1994. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 April 1990. 
Interview, Sony, Tokyo, March 1994.
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semiconductor firms formed alliances with US producers in order to alleviate the 
semiconductor friction (Kuwata 1990, p.91). Indeed, this motivation can explain the 
formation of alliances between Japanese users and foreign suppliers in the marketing 
and service area. The fact that in 1992, Japanese electronics firms forged alliances with 
National Semiconductor, Advanced Micro Devices, and Micron Technology, the 
hardliners of SIA is explicable in this context as well.
This factor does not explain the whole motivation of Japanese electronics firms in 
forging international alliances, however. Alliances have often been agreed after 
deliberate consideration as a major corporate strategy. For instance, the alliance 
between Toshiba and Motorola was the result of cautious and deliberate calculation by 
Motorola, which had previously had two joint ventures with Japanese companies. 
Negotiations took more than a year and continued against a background of a severe 
industry slump and during the negotiations over the Semiconductor Arrangement 
(National Research Council 1992, p.94). In addition, Japanese electronics firms forged 
alliances with Korean firms. If alliances were directed to calm down the trade dispute 
alone, Japanese electronics firms would not have forged alliances with Korean firms 
with which they did not have severe trade friction. More significantly, Japanese 
electronics makers have deepened their commitment to the alliances. In the late 1980s, 
alliances regarding joint R & D and joint manufacturing were rare. However, these have 
substantially increased in the 1990s (Table 5.11). Individual firms have also developed 
their relations typically shown in the alliance between Hitachi and Texas 
Instruments.100 If Japanese electronics firms forged alliances with US firms with an 
eye to mitigating the semiconductor friction alone, they did not have to develop the 
alliances. In reality, most alliances stem from the strategic perception that Japanese 
firms derive benefits from them (Enomoto 1991, p.60). The semiconductor dispute 
functioned only as one factor conducive to alliance formation.
100 Their first alliance was the collaborative development of 16M DRAM in December 1988. The two 
companies have evolved this partnership in various forms. They agreed to cooperate in the 
development of 64M DRAM in November 1991 and 256M DRAM in January 1993. In addition, 
the targeted product also expanded from DRAM to SRAM. Texas Instruments gave Hitachi a 
license to design SRAM, whereas Hitachi offered the know-how of SRAM production to Texas
Instilments (Higashi and Ökawa 1993, p.94). Furthermore, they agreed in August 1994 to set up a 
joint venture to manufacture 16M and 64M DRAM in the United States.
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Table 5.11 Number of Alliances between Japanese and Foreign Semiconductor 
Firms, 1985-94
Year Sales
cooperation
Exchange
information
Joint
R& D
Production
cooperation
Joint
venture
Total
1985 - 1 - - 1 2
1986 - - 1 1 - 2
1987 - 1 - - - 1
1988 1 - 2 - 1 4
1989 1 - - 2 - 3
1990 1 2 1 4 2 10
1991 - - 8 1 - 9
1992 3 1 12 4 - 20
1993 4 1 11 14 2 32
1994 - 6 10 10 1 27
Source: EIAJ (1995, p.2-8).
Corporate alliances have played a critical role in improving the access of foreign 
semiconductors to the Japanese market in various ways. Firstly, various forms of 
alliances have directly contributed to improving market access. Marketing and sales 
alliances with an eye to expanding the sales of foreign semiconductors in Japan 
naturally led to an increase in semiconductor sales.101 Manufacturing alliances such as 
OEM and second sourcing agreements also facilitated market access. These alliances 
encouraged a division of labour in product categories, and ensured a certain volume of 
foreign semiconductors.102
101 There are several examples of this type between Japanese and US firms. Micron Technology and 
Sanyo concluded a sales agency agreement in October 1989. Sanyo made Japanese catalogues and 
technical documents of devices of Micron to sell them in Japan through its own distribution 
channels. Matsushita and Intel concluded a sales agreement in February 1990 (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 6 February 1990). Not only does Matsushita use Intel’s EPROM in its group but it also 
offers them for other users such as game makers under the Intel brand. Intel would expand its 
sales in Japan by utilising Matsushita’s powerful distribution network.
102 A typical example of this type is the Hitachi-Gold Star alliance in July 1989, the first Japanese 
and Korean alliance in the semiconductor sector. Hitachi offered 1M DRAM production 
technology to Gold Star, and procured it under OEM contracts (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 July 
1989). Not only did this alliance enable Hitachi to concentrate its management resources on the 
development of next generation devices, but it allowed Gold Star to enter the Japanese market. 
Mitsubishi Electric and Texas Instruments also concluded alliances for exchanging DRAM in 
December 1989. Mitsubishi provides Texas Instruments with 1M DRAM, while Texas 
Instruments offers 64K DRAM to Mitsubishi (Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 13 December 1989). Both 
companies sell the received products under their own brand name.
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Secondly, the alliances in joint development and joint manufacturing have 
facilitated design-in. Design-in has functioned as a key factor facilitating market access 
of foreign suppliers. The design-in of application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) is 
particularly important for US suppliers who hope to enter Japan’s huge consumer 
electronics market (Tyson and Yoffie 1993, p.54). As the number of design-ins has 
increased, market access for foreign devices has improved.103 Alliances in joint 
manufacturing and joint development enable partners to exchange information as to 
production methods and commitment to quality, which constitute the basis in 
undertaking design-in. For instance, Motorola learned ‘soft technology’ such as the 
importance of training operatives on equipment to be used through joint manufacturing 
with Toshiba.104
Thirdly, corporate alliances have contributed to changing the stance of major 
electronics firms on market access. This is shown typically in Toshiba’s case. Toshiba 
has spearheaded the industry thrust for corporate alliances. Toshiba has had substantial 
experience in alliances seen in its 80-year-alliance with General Electric and it has 
developed 24 partnerships and joint ventures in numerous fields.105 Toshiba has 
learned the political as well as the economic merit of alliances. Toshiba Machine, a 
subsidiary of Toshiba, provoked a Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) breach incident in 1987.106 Robert Galvin, Chairman of Motorola, 
did not criticise Toshiba for this incident, even though he had been known as a 
hardliner towards Japan. On the contrary, he made efforts to explain Toshiba’s stance to 
the members of the US Congress, when Congress indulged in ‘Toshiba bashing’.107 It 
was deemed that the alliance with Toshiba in the semiconductor field motivated him to
103 The number of design-ins increased seven times or at an annual rate of 32 per cent between 1986 
and 1993 (EIAJ 1995, p.4-1).
104 Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 March 1990, p.74.
105 Purejidento, November 1993, pp.288-291.
106 The company exported four numerically controlled machine tools to the Soviet Union in violation 
of a degree of the COCOM. These machines are said to be capable of cutting submarine propeller 
blades, which makes submarines quieter and more difficult to detect.
107 He recalled the then situation as follows: ‘We were convinced that the parent company [Toshiba] 
had nothing to do with the incident that the subsidiary provoked. I, at once, told my friends in 
Toshiba that we would not change our attitude and behaviour towards Toshiba at all. This was as 
if we reconfirmed friendly relationships when a member of a friend’s family caused trouble’ 
(Otani 1989, p.44).
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take those positions. Toshiba appreciated the political importance of corporate alliances 
through this incident.108
Through such experience, Toshiba has become more positive about expanding 
market access through alliances. Not only did Motorola resume the DRAM business but 
it also increased sales in Japan due to the alliance with Toshiba. Toshiba and Motorola 
established a sales company, Nippon Motorola Microelectronics in October 1989 in 
order to sell Motorola’s products to Toshiba’s group members.109 Toshiba also made 
serious efforts to sell General Electric’s home electrical appliances after the two 
companies concluded alliances in the home electrical appliance business in April 
1991.110
CONCLUSION
The electronics case appears to support the argument that firms with extensive 
multinational operations and corporate alliances have preferences in favour of an open 
home market.
In the electronics industry, rising imports in electronic products have not led to a 
demand for import restrictions. In addition to the huge trade surplus in the electronics 
industry, a rise in intra-industry trade has reduced the industry’s incentive to restrain the 
increase in imports. Furthermore, imports were largely carried out by Japanese 
multinational electronics firms as reverse imports. Reverse imports took place on the 
basis of the division of manufacturing products, that is, high value-added electronic 
products in Japan and standardised consumer electronic products in overseas plants. 
Major electronics firms were restructuring away from an import-competing consumer 
electronics sector to industrial electronics and electronic components sectors. There was 
little possibility that imports would jeopardise the interests of multinational electronics 
firms. The Japanese electronics firms, which have been intensively engaged in intra- 
firm trade and have successfully adjusted their business, could maintain an open trade 
stance.
108 Nikkei Bijinesu, 16 December 1991, p.18.
109 Motorola’s sales of semiconductors in Japan increased from US$113 million in 1986 when the 
alliance was agreed and to US$497 million in 1991 (National Research Council 1992, p.96).
110 Nikkei Bijinesu, 16 December 1991, p.17.
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Enhanced international activities also affected electronics firms’ stance on market 
access activities. In 1989, major electronics firms drew up international cooperation 
programs designed to expand market access of foreign products to Japan. These 
programs were designed to mitigate the effects of the yen appreciation after 1985 by 
using cheaper foreign products. At the same time, they stemmed from changes in 
corporate strategies and trade policy stance. In the past, the five or six producers had 
indulged in intense competition to boost market share, sometimes forcing local 
producers out of the market. They paid little attention to the criticism by foreign 
governments and firms of the closed Japanese market. However, as they strengthened 
multinational operations, they began to revise competition strategies, to pay more 
attention to cooperation with their competitors and to the harmonisation of Japanese 
institutions and customs with international norms. This change in stance encouraged 
major electronics firms to draw up international cooperation programs.
The US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement illustrated the effects of the change in 
firms’ stance on the market access issue. The arrangement failed to produce substantial 
outcomes during its first two years. This was a result of the lukewarm response from 
the private sector. Some electronics firms did not accept MITI’s guidance on production 
cuts. The commitment of the industry to market access was also slow. This inert 
response sprang from the perception that a swift increase of foreign semiconductors 
would be difficult in the Japanese semiconductor market because of high demand for 
devices used for consumer electronic products for which US suppliers had little 
manufacturing expertise and few production varieties. An additional political factor was 
that the industry had not been clearly involved in the negotiations by MITI, and the 
final accord included clauses which it considered unreasonable.
The electronics industry became more cooperative in promoting market access in 
1988. While EIAJ launched various programs to aim at removing impediments to 
access of foreign semiconductors, individual firms undertook activities such as a 
dispatch of procurement missions, seminars and exhibitions of foreign devices. This 
change has been interpreted as resulting from a variety of factors such as benefits from 
the Semiconductor Arrangement, effects of SIA’s pressure, and MITI’s persistence. 
However, the changed approach of major electronics firms on market access for foreign 
products was a critical factor, especially that of consumer electronics producers. These
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firms were not leading semiconductor producers, which had caused the dumping 
problems in the US market and had gained huge profits under the arrangement. 
Consumer electronics producers also had difficulty in expanding their use of foreign 
semiconductors owing to their high demand for consumer product devices. However, 
they made serious efforts to elevate the share of foreign semiconductors used in Japan. 
As they expanded their multinational operations, they became more and more sensitive 
to foreign criticism of Japanese corporate behaviour and the closed nature of the 
Japanese market. Their motivation was to discourage the US government from taking 
retaliatory action, and to promote cooperation with foreign firms.
Corporate alliances have played a crucial role in improving market access. Some 
of the alliances incorporated direct measures to promote market access, providing an 
environment where mutual understanding and communication would develop more 
deeply. The parties to alliances deepened their understanding of market conditions, 
production methods, and the kinds of semiconductors partners need. Corporate alliances 
led to a changed stance of some Japanese electronics firms on market access. They 
promoted market access in order to maintain stable relationships with alliance partners. 
The change in private firms’ strategies was, thus, a vital factor ensuring success in 
expanding market access to the Japanese semiconductor market.
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6  Trade Policy Preferences in the Japanese Textile 
Industry
The automobile and electronics industries have advanced international operations. This 
chapter approaches the central issue of this study, the relation between the 
internationalisation of corporate activity and firms’ trade policy preferences from a 
different viewpoint; that is, how internationally oriented firms react to protectionist 
tendencies in an import competing industry.
The Japanese textile industry, which had been the leading industry in terms of 
production output and exports until the 1950s, gradually lost international 
competitiveness in the labour intensive sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. The industry 
suffered first from a dramatic decline in international market share and then from a rise 
in imports from Asian neighbours.1 In order to circumvent a sharp rise in imports, 
some textile producer associations resorted to anti-dumping and countervailing suits, 
while major textile industrial associations called on the government to invoke the Multi- 
Fibre Arrangement (MFA), the protectionist agreement in international textile trade.
There are many different kinds of firms in the textile industry, reflecting a 
vertically layered structure. While the weaving, knitting, dyeing and garment 
manufacturing sectors consist of a number of small and medium-sized firms, the fibre 
making and spinning sectors are dominated by big companies owing to their capital- 
intensive character.2 The degree of internationalisation is also diverse. The small and 
medium-sized firms in the weaving and knitting sectors have developed few 
international operations. In contrast, spinning and synthetic fibre companies started 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while the apparel 
makers have actively expanded international operations since the mid 1980s. The aim 
here is to confirm whether the internationalisation of corporate activity has functioned 
as a critical factor in determining trade policy attitudes, in particular whether it has 
mitigated the demand for import restrictions in the industry.
The share of imports in total domestic demand jumped from 16.3 per cent in 1980 to 50.8 per cent 
in 1993.
The number of employees per establishment was 221.3 in the synthetic fibre making sector and 
71.7 in the spinning sector in 1991. The figures in weaving, knitting and garment manufacturing 
sectors were 4.5, 10.8 and 12.3, respectively (Seni Nenkan, 1995, p.66).
The next section looks at the features of the textile industry as well as examining 
the internationalisation of the industry. The second section outlines the rise in textile 
imports and government policies in response to this trend. The third section describes 
two reactions by textile producers to rising imports: anti-dumping and countervailing 
suits, and the demand for introducing the MFA. The fourth section examines the stance 
of various industrial associations towards import restrictions. Then, it highlights the 
policy stance of large textile producers and examines why they took the stance that they 
did.
INDUSTRIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INTERNATIONALISATION 
Industrial characteristics
Management resources, a company’s perspective on markets, and decisions by 
executives are among the factors which influence the formation of corporate 
preferences. The characteristics of industries to which firms belong also influence the 
formation of corporate preferences. The Japanese textile industry has several particular 
industrial characteristics. Firstly, the textile industry is multi-layered consisting of fibre 
production, primary processing, and secondary processing.3 Fibre production involves 
the manufacturing of two kinds of fibres — staple and filament — from raw fibre 
materials. The main synthetic fibres today are nylon, polyester and acrylic. The primary 
processing operations include spinning, twisting, weaving, knitting, dyeing and 
finishing. Intermediate products produced in primary processing are transformed into 
final goods in secondary processing operations, including such activities as garment 
manufacturing and the production of soft furnishing and other textile goods (Yoshihara 
1978, p.94). These three sets of manufacturing operations are normally called upstream, 
midstream and downstream stages.4
Textiles usually include primary processing and secondary processing, and fibre production is 
excluded from textiles proper. However, the discussion in this chapter includes fibre production in 
textile activities because preferences and activities of major synthetic fibre companies have a 
great influence on the textile industry as a whole.
The current discussion includes the spinning sector in the upstream stage due to similarities 
between fibre production and spinning as a capital intensive industry as well as the role of both 
major spinning and synthetic fibre producers as yam suppliers.
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Market competition in the textile industry is intensive from the upstream to 
midstream and then to the downstream stages (Yoshihara 1978, p.94). The fibre 
production stage is oligopolistic because large capital investments are necessary to 
attain the optimum scale of production, and the level of technology and expenditure for 
research and development (R & D) is high. The spinning sector is less oligopolistic than 
fibre making but exhibits a relatively high degree of company concentration. Market 
structure in the midstream stage — weaving, dyeing and finishing, and knitting — is far 
more competitive than that in the spinning sector. Lastly, there are numerous garment 
manufacturers in the downstream stage, which is more competitive. Thus, the industrial 
structure of the textile industry is exactly the opposite of the automobile and electronics 
industries, which become oligopolistic as manufacturing proceeds downstream and 
approaches the final product stage (Hirai 1991, p.52).
The multi-layered relationship between firms in the textile industry leads to a 
dualistic structure. The industry consists of a dozen big companies that specialise in 
synthetic fibre making and spinning, and a large number of small and medium-sized 
firms that engage in weaving, knitting, dyeing, and garment manufacturing. The 
majority of small and medium-sized firms subcontract with upstream firms or local 
trading companies that supply yam, sell products and often offer financial assistance.
The second feature of the textile industry lies in its role in the national and local 
economies. The textile industry was the leading industry from the Meiji era to the 1950s 
in Japan.5 Although its status has declined since the 1960s in terms of production and 
exports, the industry still accounts for a considerable share in all manufacturing 
establishments and employment. In 1992, for example, the industry employed 1.22 
million people in 121,410 establishments in the manufacturing section, accounting for 
10.1 per cent of the total Japanese manufacturing labour force, and 17.4 per cent of total 
manufacturing establishments.6 In addition, textile manufacturing companies are 
concentrated in specific textile districts (sanehi). There are 127 textile sanchi including 
36 handling silk and rayon fibre weaving and 30 handling cotton and staple fibre 
weaving (Hirai 1991, pp.56-57). In these districts, the industry creates employment and
5 Even in 1950, the industry accounted for 19.1 per cent of manufacturing output and 37.3 per cent 
of manufacturing exports (Seni Nenkan, 1981, p.105).
6 Seni Nenkan, 1995, p.65.
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sustains the local economy. In 1992, for instance, the share of textiles in the total 
manufacturing labour force was more than 20 per cent in 12 prefectures.7
Industrial associations
Policy stances are often formed on a sectoral basis, and are expressed by industrial 
associations in each sector. Because of its vertical multi-layered structure, the textile 
industry has numerous industrial associations (Table 6.1).8 In the upstream sector, the 
Japan Chemical Fibres Association (JCFA) and the Japan Spinners’ Association (JSA) 
are the two major associations. JCFA, established in August 1948, comprises 60 large 
companies that engage in man-made fibre production, yarn spinning, raw material 
manufacturing and allied processes. The association is dominated by the so-called seven 
major synthetic fibre companies.9 As major cotton spinners have expanded their 
business into man-made fibre production and processing, they have become members of 
JCFA. Toyobo and Kanebo, which began operations in the spinning sector, are now 
included in major synthetic fibre companies. JSA, originally founded as the Spinners’ 
Federation in 1882, is the association of large natural and man-made fibre spinning 
companies. JSA consisted of 41 members in 1995 including nine major spinning 
companies, but small and medium-sized spinners are not members.10 These two 
associations, reflecting the corporate power of the members, are the most influential in 
the textile industry.
The weaving sector has two major associations. One is the Japan Cotton and 
Staple Fibre Weavers’ Association (JCSFWA), which represents spun-yam weavers 
(cotton and synthetic spun fabrics). JCSFWA consists of 56 affiliated associations at the 
district level, mainly located on the Pacific coast of Japan. The other is the Japan Silk 
and Rayon Fibre Weavers’ Association (JSRFWA), which represents filament fabric 
weavers (silk, artificial silk, and synthetic filament fabrics). JSRFWA comprises 27
' MITI, Kogyo tokeihyo [Census of Manufacturers] 1993.
In 1994, there were 204 national associations relevant to the textile industry (Seni Nenkan, 1995, 
pp.16-17).
These are Toray Industries, Teijin, Asahi Chemical Industry, Kuraray, Unitika, Mitsubishi Rayon, 
and Toho Rayon.
10 The nine major spinning companies are Toyobo, Kanebo, Fuji Spinning, Daiwabo, Nisshinbo 
Industries, Omikenshi, Nitto Boseki, Kurabo Industries, and Shikibo.
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affiliated associations on the district level, mainly concentrating on the Sea of Japan 
coast. Both associations consist of small companies, and more than 99 per cent of the 
members belong to small and medium-sized firms.11 The Japan Knitting Industry 
Association (JKIA) and the Japan Towel Manufacturers’ Association (JTMA) are the 
two other major associations in the midstream sector. JKIA was formed in 1974 in the 
knitting sector which covers some 14,500 firms. Some 92 per cent of these firms are 
small firms with less than 30 employees. JTMA, founded in 1962, incorporates some 
700 members which are concentrated in the Osaka and Ehime prefectures. More than 95 
per cent of its members are small and medium scale firms which operate less than 50 
looms.
Table 6.1 Major Industrial Associations in the Textile Industry
Association Stage Sector Firm size
JCFA upstream fibre making big
JSA upstream spinning big
JCSFWA midstream weaving small
JSRFWA midstream weaving small
JKIA midstream knitting small
JTMA midstream towel making small
JAIC downstream apparel mixed
JTIA importing mixed
Source: Compiled from industry sources.
In the apparel sector, six major apparel associations formed the Japan Apparel 
Industry Council (JAIC) in 1982. JAIC consists of some 220 members, most of which 
are apparel wholesalers. In the textile import business, the Japan Textiles Importers 
Association (JTIA) was founded in 1972 as a combination of the Japan Importers 
Association of Textile Products and the Japan Importers Association of Wool Products. 
The association comprises some 170 members including the major general trading 
companies and textile-specific trading companies.
Lastly, textile circles have a peak federation, the Japan Textile Industry 
Federation (JTIF). The Federation was established in January 1970 during the US-Japan
11 The small and medium-sized firms are either corporate enterprises with capital funds of less than 
100 million yen or with less than 300 employees, or individual enterprises with less than 300 
employees.
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textile negotiations as a counterweight to the American textile coalition led by the 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute (Friman 1990, p.74). JTIF incorporates 20 
prefectural subdivisions as well as 35 associations ranging from the upstream to 
downstream stages of the industry.
Internationalisation before 1985
In examining how firms’ stance on trade policy has evolved as textile firms have 
promoted international operations, one needs to spell out how the Japanese textile 
industry has become more deeply involved in multinational operations. The textile 
industry was the first Japanese manufacturing industry to make inroads into overseas 
markets and then into overseas production. Big spinning producers initiated 
multinational operations by investing in Latin America in the 1950s, followed by major 
synthetic fibre producers which had actively transferred production bases to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong in the late 1960s and to South Korea, Singapore and Thailand in the 1970s. 
Annual outward investment in textiles was US$163 million in 1972 and US$326 
million in 1973, which accounted for 31 per cent and 22 per cent of the total Japanese 
manufacturing investment, respectively (Table 6.2). The two synthetic fibre makers, 
Toray Industries and Teijin, were the most active in multinational operations. By the 
end of 1973, Teijin was involved in 18 overseas manufacturing operations in nine 
countries, whereas Toray was engaged in 35 offshore manufacturing operations in 15 
countries (Tsurumi 1976, p.89). Even in 1974, the capacity of the overseas affiliates for 
these companies was 30 per cent of domestic capacity (Yoshihara 1978, p. 106). Most 
overseas operations took the form of joint ventures with local companies and Japanese 
trading companies in order to diversify capital and market risk.
Motivations for FDI during this stage had domestic and international origins. 
Owing to a labour shortage and a resultant rise in wages, textile producers suffered 
from an increase in production costs. They sought to restore international 
competitiveness by making inroads into countries with cheap labour costs. As an 
external factor, the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries adopted policies to attract foreign capital
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Table 6.2 Foreign Direct Investment by Japanese Textile Producers by 
Destination, 1965-93 (US$ million)
Year North
America
South
America
Asia Europe Other Total
1965 - 2 3 - 1 6
1966 3 3 2 - 3 11
1967 - 5 11 - 1 17
1968 - 2 13 - - 15
1969 - 5 25 - 4 34
1970 3 6 37 - 3 49
1971 1 11 53 - - 65
1972 3 23 132 - 5 163
1973 28 93 191 4 10 326
1974 10 36 118 8 3 175
1975 4 17 71 4 2 98
1976 29 27 47 6 3 112
1977 27 34 83 13 1 158
1978 37 27 35 73 - 172
1979 22 15 34 17 1 89
1980 14 12 50 12 3 91
1981 26 10 43 13 - 91
1982 10 12 40 5 - 67
1983 11 17 132 14 - 174
1984 15 16 39 15 - 85
1985 1 11 8 8 - 28
1986 22 2 21 17 1 63
1987 132 9 28 35 3 206
1988 96 11 149 59 2 317
1989 158 1 189 185 - 533
1990 107 12 298 376 2 796
1991 233 9 217 156 - 616
1992 66 23 227 108 4 428
1993 37 - 300 161 - 498
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Kokusai kinyukyoku nenpo [Annual Report of International Finance 
Bureau], various issues.
in the mid 1960s. For instance, South Korea enacted the Foreign Capital Promotion 
Law in 1966, while Singapore introduced the Economic Expansion Encouragement 
Law in 1967 (Horaguchi 1992, p.172). This is one reason why some 70 per cent of 
investment was directed towards Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, 
export restraints by the US government, which started in the late 1950s and led to the 
US-Japan Textile Arrangement in 1971, encouraged Japanese textile manufacturers to
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promote offshore production. The tariff exemption system under the Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences introduced by European countries in 1971 also provided 
developing countries other than Japan with an advantage in achieving access to the 
markets of industrialised countries (Yamazawa 1980, p.451: Toyne et al. 1984, p.155). 
However, overseas investment in textiles experienced a downward trend until the mid 
1980s owing to a protracted recession in the industry caused by the two oil shocks.
Internationalisation after 1985
The textile industry, like other manufacturing industries, enjoyed a surge in its 
international operations after the mid 1980s. The main actors in this phase were the 
apparel, not the textile companies. The international operations of Japanese apparel 
makers at first took the form of technology alliances and outward processing 
agreements. Outward processing agreements under which local subcontractors 
manufactured standard clothing according to the specifications of Japanese firms in 
design pattern and quality were especially prominent. The number of export approvals 
for outward processing in China, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong increased 
sharply from 709 in 1985 to 9,605 in 1991 (Table 6.3). One study estimates that some 
80 per cent of imports in clothing from the NIEs between 1983 and 1987 were imports 
associated with outward processing agreement (Mukaiyama 1989, p.27).
Table 6.3 Number of Export Approvals for Outward Processing in Textiles, 1985- 
92
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992*
China 472 489 728 1,241 2,012 3,814 8,636 7,436
South Korea 201 219 246 350 401 426 483 326
Taiwan 26 25 31 38 35 45 73 44
Hong Kong 10 13 34 44 58 144 413 253
Others - - - - - 324 747 460
Total 709 746 1,039 1,673 2,506 4,753 10,352 8,519
Note: Data on others before 1989 are unavailable.* From January to June.
Source: MITI (1994c, p.203).
FDI, especially in the form of joint ventures, has expanded rapidly since 1987. It 
is difficult to obtain official data on FDI in the apparel sector proper because data on
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FDI issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) treat the textile industry as one industrial 
category. But other survey data indicate a remarkable rise in FDI by apparel makers 
since the late 1980s. Table 6.4 illustrates the number of joint ventures in textiles 
reported by MITI. The apparel sector accounted for 29.2 per cent, 63 out of 216 before 
1987. After 1988, 80.1 per cent, 181 of the total 226 joint ventures were related to the 
apparel sector. The advance into China by Japanese apparel makers in the 1990s is 
particularly noteworthy. According to a survey by the Japan Export Clothing 
Manufacturers Association, 476 apparel-related plants were established between 1981 
and the first half of 1994. They were set up mainly in the 1990s: 19.3 per cent in 1992, 
22.5 per cent in 1993, and 14.9 per cent in the first half of 1994.12 The main objective 
of apparel makers in making inroads into China was to cope with the labour shortage in 
Japan, and to utilise cheap labour. After the Japanese economy plunged into a 
protracted business slump in the 1990s, apparel makers responded to consumer 
preferences for low-priced clothing by accelerating the transfer of production bases for 
standardised garments to low labour cost countries.
Table 6.4 Number of Joint Ventures in Textiles
Fibre, Spinning Weaving, Dyeing Apparel Total
1987* 1988-92 1987* 1988-92 1987* 1988-92 1987* 1988-92
China 2 4 1 7 13 108 16 119
NIES 8 1 16 5 21 17 45 23
ASEAN 35 5 47 11 14 43 96 59
US, EC 7 3 6 7 9 12 22 22
Latin America 18 1 13 1 6 1 37 3
Total 70 14 83 31 63 181 216 226
Note: * Up to 1987.
Source: MITI (1994c, p.176).
Active international operations by Japanese apparel makers led to an increase in 
imports of finished products into the Japanese market. Originally, Japanese apparel 
makers decided to advance into East Asian countries with an eye to bringing the 
products manufactured there back to Japan. Not only was the demand in local markets
12 The Japan Export Clothing Manufacturers Association, JECMA Bulletin 93, December 1994, 
p.24.
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weak but exports to major developed countries were also blocked by quotas. A survey 
by MITI shows a high propensity for Japanese apparel makers to import their offshore 
output to Japan. In 1992, 23 out of 42 affiliates in clothing apparel and 16 out of 28 
affiliates in knit apparel exported 100 per cent of their garments produced overseas to 
Japan (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Shares of Exports to Japan by Overseas Affiliates of Japanese Textile 
Firms, 1992
0 1-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 100% Total
Spinning 17 5 3 - 1 1 27
Dyeing 8 2 2 1 - - 13
Clothing apparel 3 1 2 6 7 23 42
Knit apparel 2 2 1 6 1 16 28
Note: The figures are the number of affiliates which export each product to Japan by each
percentage.
Source: MITI (1994c, p.211).
RISING IMPORTS IN TEXTILES AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES
As with other labour intensive industries, the Japanese textile industry, particularly its 
labour intensive sectors, has steadily lost competitiveness internationally, and suffered 
from a rise in imports from developing countries (Park and Anderson 1992). While the 
proportion of textiles in all manufacturing output halved between 1970 and 1992 from 
8.9 per cent to 4.2 per cent, the proportion of textiles in total exports decreased from 
12.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent in the same period.13 The importance of the Japanese 
textile industry in international trade declined sharply as well. The ratio of Japanese 
exports of textiles and clothing in international trade decreased from 15 per cent in 
1955 to 8 per cent in 1975 and then to 3 per cent in 1988 (Park and Anderson 1992, 
P-23).
The scarcity of domestic labour — particularly young factory workers — and a 
rise in wages deprived the Japanese textile industry of its international competitive 
edge. This led to falling competitiveness in low-quality standardised textile products.
13 Seni Nenkan, 1981, p.105; 1995, p.65.
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Furthermore, owing to several yen appreciations after the early 1970s, imported 
products gained price competitiveness in the Japanese market. Internationally, East 
Asian countries emerged as powerful production centres for textile goods. These 
economies positioned their textile industries as significant export industries, and 
promoted them with active investment. Not only have they rapidly augmented 
production capacity but they have also caught up with Japan in terms of technology and 
productivity by introducing the newest technology and machinery (Uryü 1990, p.5). 
Furthermore, because of tighter import restrictions of the MFA, developing countries 
shifted their exports from other industrialised countries to Japan (Cline 1987, pp.136- 
37). In the 1990s, consumer preferences for inexpensive clothing and emergence of 
discount retailings, such as roadside shops, have accelerated import penetration in the 
Japanese market.
Textile imports have grown sharply, especially since the 1980s. The share of 
imports in total domestic demand increased from 16.3 per cent in 1980 to 27.8 per cent 
in 1986, and to 50.8 per cent in 1993 (Table 6.6). Japan became a net importer of 
textiles in 1987. In 1993, the share of imported products in total domestic consumption 
was 42.6 per cent of cotton yarn, 49.2 per cent of cotton fabric and 69.6 per cent of 
knitted outerwear. Although import penetration is seen in every segment, the rise in the 
clothing sector is particularly striking. The import value of finished textile products 
grew significantly from US$3.54 billion in 1985 to US$14.2 billion in 1993, making for 
a cumulative growth of 400 per cent within this period. In 1993, the clothing sector 
accounted for 76 per cent of total textile imports.14
The sharp rise in imports had serious effects on the textile industry. The number 
of establishments decreased from 146,286 in 1970 to 121,410 in 1992, and some 24,900 
establishments withdrew from production. Employment also fell from 1.75 million in 
1970 to 1.22 million in 1992 (Table 6.7).
The Japanese government has treated textile problems — including rising imports 
— as an industrial problem rather than a trade issue, encouraging the restructuring and 
rationalisation of the industry instead of resorting to import restriction measures.
14 Seni Nenkan, 1995, p.86.
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Table 6.6 Import Shares in Textile Products, 1986-93 (per cent)
Product 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Yarn
Cotton 26.1 28.9 30.3 31.5 31.1 37.1 36.5 42.6
Silk 34.0 34.3 39.2 41.7 37.6 47.5 41.6 50.4
Wool 4.0 5.4 8.1 5.8 6.6 11.8 9.3 6.1
Synthetic 3.5 5.0 6.1 6.6 7.7 8.0 8.4 7.8
Fabric
Cotton 24.9 28.8 31.3 34.2 31.4 36.6 39.0 49.2
Silk 18.7 19.3 20.0 21.5 22.7 22.9 23.4 26.8
Wool 4.7 5.9 8.1 9.1 7.9 6.4 6.7 6.6
Synthetic 15.3 8.0 4.7 11.7 7.8 9.1 11.6 7.8
Finished textiles 
Woven outerwear 28.6 33.2 40.8 46.9 47.3 51.2 59.1 64.8
Woven underwear 31.5 36.3 42.0 51.0 51.1 49.5 58.8 63.4
Knitted outerwear 34.8 46.3 53.6 55.2 53.7 57.7 64.3 69.6
Knitted sweater 49.0 54.8 65.9 69.4 66.9 72.4 77.4 81.3
Knitted underwear 25.5 36.3 46.6 50.1 47.5 50.8 55.7 55.4
All textiles 27.8 32.8 36.7 38.7 37.4 41.4 45.0 50.8
Note: The figures are the proportion of imports in total domestic demand.
Source: MITI (1995, p.246).
Table 6.7 Establishments, Employees, Value of Shipments, and Value Added in 
the Textile Industry, 1970-92
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992
Establishments 146,286 157,381 147,467 142,167 130,063 127,044 121,410
(22.4) (21.4) (20.1) (19.0) (17.8) (17.6) (17.4)
Employees 1,750 1,589 1,391 1,334 1,271 1,263 1,218
(‘000) (15.0) (14.1) (12.7) (11.6) (10.8) (10.6) (10.1)
Value of shipments 6,127 9,404 12,878 13,340 13,953 14,404 13,967
(billion yen) (8.9) (7.4) (5.7) (5.0) (4.3) (4.2) (4.2)
Value added 2,329 3,335 4,663 5,333 6,080 5,956 5,902
(billion yen) (9.5) (7.9) (6.5) (5.8) (5.0) (4.7) (4.9)
Note: The figures are for all textiles, clothing and man-made fibres. The figures in parentheses
represent the percentage share in the total manufacturing industry in Japan
Sources: Seni Nenkan, 1981, p.105; 1993, p.65; 1995, p.65.
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Structural adjustment in textiles has been implemented by adopting a succession of 
temporary laws, which aimed to provide incentives to reduce excess labour and capital 
equipment, to modernise small plants, and to move into higher value products.15 The 
1956 Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment (Old Textile Law, 
1956-63) introduced a program to regulate spinning and weaving capacity through 
purchases of surplus equipment and established a registration system for spindles and 
looms under which the use of non-registered equipment was prohibited. The 1964 Law 
on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment and Related Equipment (New 
Textile Law, 1964-66) adopted a scrap-and-build program in which two machines were 
scrapped in exchange for the installation of one new machine. The government has 
continued policies to purchase and scrap excess capacity by adopting additional laws.16
Under these industry-specific measures and general programs for small and 
medium scale firms, the government provided 52.5 billion yen in subsidies between 
1956 and 1974, of which 3.6 billion yen was used for the direct purchase of excess 
equipment and the rest was awarded in return for losses under the voluntary restraint on 
textile exports to the United States (Yamazawa 1980, p.454). The government offered 
329.9 billion yen in low-interest, long-term loans to promote the disposal of excess 
machinery, the modernisation of productive capacity, and the grouping of units of 
production.17 As a consequence of these measures, 205,000 looms for cotton and staple 
fibres, 121,000 looms for silk and rayon, and 5 million spindles were scrapped between 
1956 and 1981 (Yamazawa 1988, p.400).
The Japanese government, by adopting the successive adjustment laws, has 
avoided protecting the textile industry from outside competition through the use of 
trade restrictions. Although Japan has been one of the developed country participants in 
the MFA, it has not imposed MFA restrictions on imports (Whalley 1992, p.77). 
Exceptional import restrictions are the bilateral restraint agreements on raw silk and silk
15 For a description of structural adjustment policies in the Japanese textile industry, see Ike (1980) 
and Yamawaki (1992, pp.94-105).
16 These laws are the Law on Temporary Measures for the Structural Improvement of Specified 
Textile Industry (1967-73), the Temporary Special Measures for the Textile Industry (1971-73), 
the Law on Temporary Measures for the Structural Improvement of Textile Industry (1974- 
present), and the Law on Temporary Measures for the Adjustment of Industry Structure (1987- 
present).
17 Seni Nenlcan, 1975, p. 111.
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fabrics from China and South Korea, and voluntary export restraints (VERs) which 
were agreed as a result of anti-dumping actions in December 1982 and October 1988.18
RESPONSE OF TEXTILE PRODUCERS TO RISING IMPORTS
Textile producer associations have taken several measures to curb steep rises in imports. 
One measure is the convening of periodic consultations with foreign exporters. JSA has 
organised meetings with its Korean and Pakistani counterparts, and JCSFWA has had 
consultations with its Chinese counterparts every year since 1977. However, this appeal 
to foreign suppliers at the private level has not worked well in maintaining orderly 
exports. In more direct responses, some of the textile producer associations have 
resorted to adopting anti-dumping and countervailing suits. Major textile producer 
associations have also demanded that the Japanese government put the MFA into action.
Anti-dumping and countervailing suits
The primary strategy of textile producers to curb steep import rises has been directed 
towards persuading the government to invoke the MFA. But they have recognised that 
this initiative depends on government not industry action, and that it takes time. 
Alternatively, several textile producer associations have resorted to anti-dumping and 
countervailing charges for restraining imports.19 There have been seven anti-dumping 
and countervailing cases filed by Japanese industry until now, four of which were 
lodged by textile producers (Table 6.8).20
The first anti-dumping and countervailing files in Japan were petitioned in 1982. 
In early December of 1982, JSA notified MITI of its intention to petition MOF to 
institute an anti-dumping suit against South Korea and a countervailing duty suit against 
Pakistan. Although MITI refused to engage in bilateral discussions to restrain imports 
with either South Korea or Pakistan, the association filed the suits with MOF on 27
18 For restraints on raw silk imports, see Zhao (1993 chap.2, 3).
19 When a dumping file is petitioned, MITI and MOF decide whether to start a dumping 
investigation within two months. Then, within one year of the investigation, both ministries 
decide whether dumping duties should be imposed or not.
20 The number of anti-dumping suits in Japan is very small compared with other developed 
countries. For instance, between 1980 and 1987, there were 263 anti-dumping actions in the 
European Community, 11 of which were related to the textile industry (Hamilton 1992, p.137).
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December.21 The association asserted that massive imports of cheap cotton yam from 
the two countries had caused serious damage to domestic cotton spinners.22 The 
imports of cotton yam from the two countries during January to October 1982 totalled 
486,786 bales, 70 per cent more than over the same period in the previous year, and 
some 30 per cent of Japan’s total production during the same period.23 In March 1983, 
Korean spinners announced that they would accept VERs on cotton yam exports to 
Japan set at an annual maximum of 270,000 bales for three years. The government 
decided in February 1983 to investigate charges that cotton yam exports from Pakistan 
had been subsidised by the government. In August 1983, the Pakistani government 
agreed to withdraw export subsidies. In light of the responses from both countries, JSA 
dropped the case against South Korea in April 1983 and the case against Pakistan in 
February 1984 after the completion of Pakistani loans to cotton producers in January 
(Friman 1990, p.135).
Table 6.8 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Suits in Japan
Date Actor Country Targeted item Result
Anti-dumping suits
27 Dec. 1982 JSA South Korea Cotton yam VER, withdrawal
6 Mar. 1984 JFA Norway, France Ferrosilicon Withdrawal
manganese
21 Oct. 1988 JKIA South Korea Knit sweater VER, withdrawal
8 Oct 1991 JFA China, Norway, Ferrosilicon Dumping duties on
South Africa manganese Chinese imports
20 Dec. 1993 JSA Pakistan Cotton yam Dumping duties
Countervailing suits
27 Dec. 1982 JSA Pakistan Cotton yam Withdrawal
6 Mar. 1984 JFA Brazil Ferrosilicon Withdrawal
manganese
Note: JFA denotes the Japan Ferroalloy Association.
Source: Kasen Geppo (March 1994, p.12).
The second anti-dumping file in the textile industry was petitioned against Korean 
knitted sweaters in 1988. JKIA announced on 30 May 1988 that it would lodge a
21
22
23
Textile Asia, February 1983, p.81.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 December 1982. 
Textile Asia, January 1983, pp.63-64.
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complaint with MOF against Korean knitted sweaters. Imports of Korean sweaters 
increased 41.8 per cent in 1986, 25.9 per cent in 1987 and 77.2 per cent during January 
to July 1988.24 However, MITI was anxious about a deterioration in relations with 
South Korea, and persuaded the association to postpone the filing. On 24 June, the 
Korean government announced that it would adopt a monitoring measure for price and 
volume of exports in July.25 The measure had almost no effect. The export volume of 
Korean knitted sweaters in July was 14 million units, 29 per cent up from the previous 
year and 0.68 million units up from the previous month.26 Eventually, the association 
filed an anti-dumping suit with MOF on October 21 1988, arguing that the export prices 
of Korean knitted sweaters were 30 per cent lower than normal market prices.
The major textile industrial associations supported the anti-dumping action. JTIF 
was a substantial co-organiser of the file. The dumping suit imposed huge costs and 
consumed an enormous amount of time because it required the investigation of Japanese 
products, Korean imported products and products sold in the Korean market. JTIF 
supported JKIA by collecting data and providing financial and personnel assistance.27 
JTIF also sent a mission to South Korea to investigate the implementation of the 
monitoring measures in August 198 8.28 It was reported that the suit by JKIA went 
ahead because of informal negotiations with the LDP, MOF and MITI by Kagayaki 
Miyazaki, Chairman of JTIF.29 JCFA also supported the JKIA’s suit. Susumu 
Okamoto, Chairman of JCFA, said that the dumping suit by JKIA was a natural 
reaction, and he expected that MOF and relevant ministries would respond to the anti­
dumping action properly and promptly.30 JCFA assisted JKIA by offering financial and 
personnel support. The Japan Federation of Textile Workers’ Unions (Zensen Domex), 
and its supporting party, the Democratic Socialist Party also openly supported the suit.
24 Asahi Shimbun, 21 October 1988.
25 Asahi Shimbun, 24 June 1988.
26 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 September 1988.
27 Interview, JTIF, Tokyo, March 1994.
28 Asahi Shimbun, 20 August 1988.
29 Miyazaki maintained that ‘this anti-dumping would be a model case for other industries which 
have similar trade issues. The redress of unfair trade is a responsibility of industrial associations’ 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 22 October 1988).
30 Senken Shimbun, 22 October 1988.
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MITI was reluctant to commence the investigation of dumping because it 
favoured a negotiated settlement.31 The LDP Special Committee on Textile Measures 
received an explanation from MITI about the dumping, and Kabun Muto, Chairman of 
the Committee, visited South Korea in late December to coordinate relations between 
the governments and industries of both countries.32 After five days of negotiations 
between the Japanese and Korean industries, South Korea announced VERs on 2 
February 1989, which limited the annual growth rate to less than 1 per cent for the next 
three years under a price monitoring system. JKIA withdrew the petition in March 
1989.
The third anti-dumping suit by the textile industry was lodged in December 1993. 
In January 1992, JSA commenced a dumping investigation against cotton yam imports 
from Pakistan. At that time, however, JSA abandoned the petition because the Pakistani 
government introduced a minimum export price system on cotton yarn exports.33 In 
mid 1993, low-priced exports of 20-count cotton yam from Pakistan became a serious 
issue again. On 20 December 1993, JSA filed an anti-dumping suit against Pakistani 
20-count cotton yam. According to JSA, imports of cotton yam from Pakistan 
accounted for some 80 per cent of sales in the Japanese market, and the price of 20- 
count cotton yarn imported from Pakistan was 20 per cent lower than domestic prices in 
Pakistan.34 MOF and MITI decided in February 1994 to commence a dumping 
investigation. After two extensions of the investigation, MOF and MITI decided in 
August 1995 to impose dumping margins ranging from 2.1 per cent to 9.9 per cent.35 
This was the second case in which dumping duties were imposed in Japan.36
31 For example, Eiichi Tamori, a MITI advisor, expressed the view that in the resolution of knitted 
sweater dumping, it was desirable that the relevant industrial associations should pursue the matter 
independently in order to prevent the politicisation of the issue in South Korea {Seni Nenkan, 
1989, p.56).
32 Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1989.
33 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 10 June 1993.
34 The Nikkei Weekly, 27 December 1993.
35 Senken Shimbun, 2 August 1995.
36 The first duties were imposed on the imports of ferrosilicon manganese from China in February 
1993.
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Demand for the introduction of the MFA
Textiles and apparel have been ‘the most systematically and comprehensively protected 
sectors in the world’ (Cline 1987, p.145). The United States and other developed 
countries sought to restrain imports from Japan and other East Asian countries through 
VERs between Japan and the United States in 1956, the Short Term Arrangement in 
1961, and the Long Term Arrangement (LTA) in 1962.37 After the LTA was renewed 
in 1967 and 1970 through 1973, the MFA was concluded in January 1974.38 The MFA, 
which covered woollen goods and man-made fibres in addition to cotton products under 
the previous accords, stipulates two import quota measures. The signatory countries are 
qualified to take unilateral restraints when serious damage or actual threat is provoked 
by imports (Article 3), or to conclude bilateral agreements with exporting countries 
when there are real risks of market disruption (Article 4). The MFA aims to safeguard 
the textile industries of developed countries against a rise in imports from developing 
countries as an exception to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 19.
Although the MFA had regulated the international textile trade for twenty years, 
liberalisation of the textile trade became an issue in the GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In the new arrangement ratified in April 1994, it was agreed that the MFA 
would be phased out by integrating it into the general GATT rules in three stages over a 
ten year period. The new arrangement divides the transition period into three stages — 
the first stage for three years, the second for four years, and the third for three years — 
and at the beginning of each stage 16 per cent, 17 per cent, and 18 per cent of the total 
textile trade will be changed into the general rules. During the transition phase, any 
country is entitled to introduce a transitional safeguard (TSG).39
37 The LTA allowed an importing country to limit international trade in cotton textiles which would 
‘cause or threaten to cause disruption in the market of the importing country’. It allowed bilateral 
consultations and import increases of 5 per cent a year in the absence of agreements.
38 The MFA was renewed in 1978, 1982 and 1986. The MFA IV, which expanded coverage to 
textiles made of vegetable fibres, blends of vegetable fibres and blends containing silk, was 
extended twice in 1991 for one year and five months and in 1993 for one year.
39 In the process of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations over textiles, the Japanese government 
sought to play a bridging role between the developed and developing countries by presenting a 
proposal in February 1990. The major textile associations did not object to the government’s 
intention to phase out the MFA. Not only did they fmd it highly improbable that the Japanese 
government would actually introduce the MFA in the meantime but regarded the MFA as a source 
of the growth of imports in Japan due to quotas under the MFA in other developed countries. For
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Japan is one of the exceptional countries which have not set quotas on textile 
imports based on the MFA. The introduction of the MFA (later TSG) has been 
persistently called for by textile circles. JCSFWA has requested the government to 
introduce the MFA against imports of cotton fabric from China almost every year since 
1975.40 JSA has also called on the government to introduce the MFA since the mid 
1970s. JTIF set up a committee on import issues in May 1973, and persistently 
advocated the application of MFA provisions in import restrictions (Yamazawa 1988, 
p.415).
Textile producer associations intensified their demand for restricting imports 
under the provisions of the MFA after they experienced a sharp rise in imports in 1984, 
and Japan posted its first deficit in the textile trade in 1987.41 In March 1985, JTIF 
decided to persuade relevant government agencies to apply the MFA quota restrictions 
on imported products.42 JSA, JKIA, and JCSFWA also intensified pressure on the 
government to introduce the MFA. In November 1986, Chairman of JSA stated that it 
would ask relevant ministries to apply the MFA for maintaining orderly imports of 
cotton yam. In April and June 1987, JKIA called on MITI to safeguard its interests by 
introducing the MFA against textile imports. On 21 January 1988, JTIF passed a 
resolution to use anti-dumping suits against unfair imports and to demand that the 
government impose restrictions on textile imports under the MFA quota.43 In May 
1988, JCFA expressed its intention to ask the government to put the MFA into action.44
These producer associations lobbied the LDP as well. Textile producers have long 
maintained strong ties with the LDP because owners of small-sized textile factories in 
sanchi often simultaneously engage in agriculture, which constitutes LDP’s traditional 
constituency (Ike 1980, p.538). The LDP organised the Special Committee on Textile 
Measures at the foundation of the party. The Committee, which mainly comprises Diet
interactions between the Japanese government and textile circles over the Japanese proposal on 
the GATT textile negotiations, see Öyane (1992).
40 Interview, JCSFWA, Tokyo, February 1994.
41 In 1984, imports of cotton yam climbed by 58 per cent, while imports of knitted products 
increased by 50 per cent.
42 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 March 1985.
43 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 January 1988.
44 Textile Asia, July 1988, p.70.
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members from the prefectures of sanchi, played a critical role in relief funding (Ötake 
1979, p.136). The Committee has also showed an interest in textile trade issues. On 30 
August 1979, the Committee passed a resolution to demand effective measures to cope 
with a surge of textile imports and to call for the abolition of the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences. On 4 June 1985, the Committee passed a resolution requiring the 
government to invoke the MFA. The resolution was a result of the earnest lobbying 
activities by executives from textile circles to the LDP.45
In spite of persistent demands from textile circles, MITI has maintained a cautious 
stance in applying the MFA quota restraints to textile imports. It is said that the 
Consumer Goods Industries Bureau, one of the sec tor-specific vertical bureaus, has 
become more sympathetic to textile circles. The bureau, which has jurisdiction over the 
textile industry, understands the plight of the industry.46 However, horizontal bureaus 
such as the International Trade Policy Bureau and the International Trade 
Administration Bureau, which consider the issue of the introduction of the MFA from a 
broader perspective, have remained sceptical about its introduction. They fear that 
adoption of a protectionist measure like the MFA would provoke international criticism 
that Japan’s action runs counter to its commitment to import more and reduce its huge 
trade surplus. They are also concerned that the introduction of the MFA would threaten 
the relationship with Japan’s trade partners in textiles, especially China and South 
Korea.47 Furthermore, MITI has preferred selective support based on industrial 
adjustment policies to uniform protection by import restrictions which cover all firms, 
including inefficient ones. The Japanese government has regarded the MFA as a last 
resort after various industrial policies have failed to yield expected results.
Although the pace was slow, textile circles gradually extracted concessions on 
import restrictions from the government after the late 1980s. The change in the
45 Senken Shimbun, 5 June 1985.
46 In the deliberation process at the subcommittee on trade issues from 1993 to 1994, the Consumer 
Goods Industries Bureau persuaded other bureaus to understand the introduction of the MFA by 
stressing the necessity for ensuring administrative transparency (Senken Shimbun, 18 May 1994). 
Yukio Doi, after retiring from the post of Director of the Consumer Goods Industries Bureau, 
published an article entitled ‘Defending the Textile Industry’ in which he stressed the significance 
of the industry, and referred to MITI’s policy to refrain from introducing the MFA as unfair to the 
industry (Doi 1995).
47 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 January 1988; Textile Asia, July 1988, p.70.
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government stance reflects the content of the textile industry reports.48 The 1988 report 
was cautious about the possibility that import restrictions would be imposed under 
MFA provisions, regarding MFA restrictions as the final resort in specific products for 
a limited period. However, it recommended that ‘appropriate measures such as anti­
dumping and countervailing duties based on the GATT rules should be introduced, 
when a sharp increase in imports was caused by unfair trade practices’.49 In addition, 
the report suggested that the investigation subcommittee under the Textile Industry 
Council conduct periodic investigations on import surges and make recommendations 
on necessary measures.
The revised textile report released in December 1993 included more flexible 
provisions for introducing the MFA. This report explicitly spelt out that the MFA was 
an internationally accepted rule and that its introduction was an international right. The 
report then stated that it would be desirable to adopt measures to mitigate the adverse 
effects of a rapid increase in imports on planned structural improvement, business 
conversion and industrial adjustment. More importantly, the report proposed that the 
government should consider detailed conditions for putting the MFA into action at a 
subcommittee on trade issues under the Textile Industry Council.
The Textile Industry Council had set up a subcommittee on trade issues in July 
1993 in order to discuss trade issues in textiles. According to one of the 
recommendations of the textile report in December 1993, the subcommittee started to 
conduct surveys on the implementation of the MFA in other countries and to discuss 
detailed conditions for the introduction of the MFA in Japan. In the process of 
deliberation, the subcommittee organised hearings with nine relevant industrial 
associations.50 The subcommittee submitted a recommendation in May 1994, outlining 
the conditions that would be prudent for introducing the MFA. They included political
48 MITI publishes the textile industry report entitled Toshin: Kongo no seni sangyo oyobi sono 
sesaku no arikata [Report on the future of the textile industry and its policy measures] every five 
years. The reports are deliberated and drawn up in the joint advisory committee of the Textile 
Committee of the Industrial Structure Council and the Textile Industry Council. Recent reports 
were issued in 1983, 1988, and 1993.
49 Toshin: Kongo no seni sangyo oyobi sono sesaku no arikata [Report on the future of the textile 
industry and its policy measures], November 1988.
50 These associations are JCFA, JSA, JCSFWA, JSRFWA, JKIA, JTMA, JAIC, JTIA, and the Japan 
Chain Stores Association.
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conditions such as the effects on foreign countries and consumers. They also covered 
the following aspects of market conditions: shares of imported products; ratio of import 
growth; and changes in the volume of production as well as in the number of 
manufacturing establishments. The recommendation also suggested that the period of 
introduction should be within three years under the strict selection of targeted products, 
and quotas should be increased at least 6 per cent over the preceding year. Although 
strict conditions were attached, the decision to introduce the MFA was broadly accepted 
as essential by textile circles.51 Based on this recommendation, MITI published 
guidelines for the procedure of textile safeguards in December 1994.52
Changes to the government stance in favour of import restrictions were a result of 
persistent commitments by textile circles through members of the Textile Committee of 
the Industrial Structure Council and the Textile Industry Council, and also a result of 
direct demands on the government. Both councils include quite a few representatives 
from textile industrial associations. For example, when the 1988 report was drawn up, 
20 out of 44 members of the Textile Industry Council and 5 out of 13 members of the 
Textile Committee of the Industrial Structure Council were representatives from 
industrial associations which belonged to JTIF. In the case of the 1994 report, 15 out of 
42 members of the Textile Industry Council and 3 out of 11 members of the Textile 
Committee of the Industrial Structure Council were from industrial associations which 
joined JTIF.
The change in the 1988 report reflected the opinions of these members. For 
example, Susumu Okamoto, Chairman of JCFA and a member of the Textile Industry 
Council, explicitly spelt out in May 1988 that he strove to reflect opinions of the 
industry on the report. Saburo Takizawa, Chairman of JSA and another member of the 
Textile Industry Council, expressed his dissatisfaction with import policies in the
51 For instance, Reiichi Yumikura, Chairman of JCFA, commented that the recommendation was 
epoch-making because it set the basis on which import restraints could be triggered (Nikkei 
Sangyo Shimbun, 18 May 1994).
52 The guidelines stipulate that MITI decides whether to commence investigations within two 
months after receiving a request from textile associations. MITI then judges whether to set in 
place negotiations with the export countries within one year after starting the investigation. In 
February 1995, JSA requested the introduction of transitional safeguards against imports of 40- 
count cotton yam, and JSA and JCSFWA against imports of poplin and broadcloth. MITI decided 
to start investigations in April 1995.
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report, demanding stricter measures.53 The actions by textile circles in the deliberation 
of the 1993 report were more salient. The Trade Policy Division of the Consumer 
Goods Industries Bureau drew up a preliminary draft of the interim report in April 
1993. This draft was sceptical about the introduction of the MFA, pointing out that its 
introduction would produce ‘unfavourable side effects’ such as damage to the interests 
of domestic consumers and users, and the survival of inefficient manufacturers in the 
industry, and regarded the introduction of the MFA as a measure that the government 
had to take in spite of these unfavourable side effects.54 The draft did not suggest 
establishing an organisation to discuss the issue of the MFA, either. The draft adopted 
the basic stance of the previous report without any significant change.55 When the draft 
was published, major producer associations were disappointed with it, and pressured the 
government to revise it. JCFA submitted a paper on 11 May which called on the 
government to recommend in the interim report that the MFA should be introduced 
when import surges caused market disruption, and an organisation to discuss concrete 
conditions for introducing the MFA should be established.56 JTIF confirmed on 21 
May that unless the demands from the industry were accepted, deliberation on the 
report should be held over to the final report, and not released as part of the interim 
report.57 The interim report announced on 8 June 1993 deleted the phrase 
‘unfavourable side effects’ as too negative to the introduction of the MFA. The report 
also suggested establishing a special subcommittee to discuss the conditions for 
introducing the MFA. The industry also succeeded in sending a representative to this six- 
member subcommittee.
TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES OF INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND 
FIRMS
Textile circles have filed three anti-dumping suits and one countervailing suit and have 
gradually extracted concessions from the government over the introduction of the MFA.
53 Seni Nenkan, 1989, p.56.
54 Kasen Geppo, December 1993, p.49.
55 Interview, JTIA, Tokyo, September 1995.
56 Kasen Geppo, June 1993, pp.60-61.
57 Senken Shimbun, 22 May 1993.
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To test the argument that as firms have intensified their multinational operations, they 
have opposed the introduction of protectionist measures, we need to examine the 
preferences and actions of internationally oriented textile producers towards these 
moves within textile circles.
Trade policy preferences of industrial associations
Not only are the stances of the numerous industrial associations in the textile industry 
towards import restrictions diverse, but some industrial associations have displayed 
inconsistent views as users of intermediate products and as producers of competing 
products of imported goods. Manufacturing associations such as JCSFWA, JKIA and 
JSRFWA explicitly support the introduction of the MFA. These associations are 
composed of small and medium-sized firms whose international operations are minimal. 
They support the introduction of the MFA on the products they manufacture, but they 
do not oppose the introduction of the MFA on imports of yams, although they are users 
of yarns.
Towel manufacturers are in a unique position. Since they were suffering from 
rising imports of towel products, they demanded the introduction of the MFA on towel 
imports. At the same time, as users, they were heavily dependent on imported cotton 
yarns. Eighty per cent of their input came from overseas, with 15 per cent directly 
supplied to weaving houses and only 5 per cent supplied to the market by domestic yarn 
spinners. Only one domestic company produced 20-count cotton yarn against which 
JSA filed an anti-dumping suit in December 1993.58 Therefore, JTMA was cautious 
about imposing import restrictions on cotton yams. When JSA filed the anti-dumping 
suit in December 1993, JTMA opposed this action. One week after the suit, JTMA sent 
a letter to JSA in which it called for the establishment of a stable supply system for 
cotton yarn.59 JTMA also asked the textile federation to persuade the spinning 
association to withdraw the suit, hinting at the possibility that it might secede from the 
federation.60
58
59
60
Interview, JTMA, Tokyo, September 1995. 
Interview, JTMA, Tokyo, September 1995. 
Interview, JTIF, Tokyo, September 1995.
187
JAIC also adopts an ambiguous stance on import restrictions. Apparel makers, 
which have developed their business with few regulations and little support from the 
government, prefer to operate without regulation of their activities including 
international trade (JAIC 1993, p.4). A more substantial reason why apparel makers are 
reluctant to introduce import restrictive measures lies in their international operations. 
The bulk of imported clothing is products manufactured by joint venture plants or local 
manufacturers under outward processing agreements with Japanese apparel makers. The 
introduction of import restraint measures in the Japanese market will impede their own 
exports and disrupt their overseas business. This is the reason why there is little or no 
move to restrain imports in the clothing sector, although the rise in imports in this 
sector is the most conspicuous. At the same time, apparel makers are users of domestic 
fabrics, and have cultivated linkages with the upstream and midstream manufacturers. 
They are concerned that the spinning and weaving sectors may lose planning and 
development capabilities due to rising imports. Accordingly, JAIC appreciates the need 
for import restrictions on cotton yams and fabrics as a measure to sustain structural 
adjustment.
JTIA has been the most explicit opponent of import restrictions, and has 
occasionally taken action to oppose moves that would restrain imports. When the LDP’s 
Special Committee on Textile Measures passed its resolution in June 1985, JTIA sent a 
letter to 42 members of the Committee asking them to oppose the introduction of the 
MFA.61 JTLA’s opposing stance on import restrictions was also shown when JKIA filed 
an anti-dumping suit against Korean knitted sweaters in October 1988. JKIA and the 
Knit Products Committee of JTIA organised meetings where they discussed measures to 
restore ordered imports of knit products. However, JKIA decided on the suit without 
prior consultation in the middle of ongoing negotiations.62 Some members of the 
Committee hinted at the possibility that JTIA would secede from JTIF.63 Furthermore, 
when the subcommittee under the Textile Industry Council held hearings with major 
textile associations on the introduction of the MFA, JTIA was opposed to the 
introduction of the MFA. JTIF, which hoped to demand the introduction of the MFA as
61 Interview, JTIA, Tokyo, September 1995.
62 Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1988.
63 Interview, JTIA, Tokyo, September 1995.
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the collective will of the industry, asked JTIA to refrain from objecting to the 
introduction of the MFA.64 However, JTIA submitted a hearing paper opposing its 
introduction raising such problems as: the importance of free trade principles; 
preservation of consumers’ interests; anxiety that import restraints might spread to other 
items and countries; and the role of Japan in contributing to economic development in 
Asia (JTIA 1993, p.7).
Trade policy preferences of large textile producers
What stance, then, did JCFA and JSA, which are the associations of large textile firms, 
take on import restrictions? As already mentioned, JSA itself filed anti-dumping and 
countervailing suits in 1983 and an anti-dumping suit in 1993. Although JCFA did not 
lodged a suit, neither did it object to anti-dumping suits. JCFA assisted JKIA with 
finance and personnel when JKIA filed an anti-dumping suit in 1988. In September 
1988, JCFA conducted a dumping investigation of Korean acrylic filament by 
organising a special working group to investigate import routes.65
JCFA and JSA adopted a position of supporting the introduction of the MFA. 
JCFA has publicly advocated the introduction of the MFA since 1979, and has spelled 
out its stance on this issue on various occasions.66 In March 1988, for instance, Ryohei 
Suzuki, vice-chairman of JCFA, stressed the necessity of macro-level measures like the 
introduction of the MFA in order to minimise economic and social costs attended by 
international structural adjustment in the textile industry.67 Susumu Okamoto, 
Chairman of JCFA, also stated in May 1988 that Japan must limit its textile imports if 
the domestic industry were to survive.68 JSA has demanded since the mid 1970s that 
the government put the MFA into practice.
For what reasons, then, have JCFA and JSA demanded the introduction of the 
MFA? As noted before, the subcommittee under the Textile Industry Council held 
hearings with nine industrial associations in order to assess their opinions about the
64 Interview, JTIA, Tokyo, September 1995.
65 Asahi Shimbun, 10 September 1988.
66 Interview, JCFA, Tokyo, February 1994.
67 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 March 1988.
68 Textile Asia, July 1988, p.70.
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introduction of the MFA. According to JCFA’s hearing paper, the introduction of the 
MFA would have five benefits (JCFA 1993, pp.10-12):
(1) maintenance and strength of production technology and a capability to develop 
products.
(2) a swift and appropriate response to distorted supply pressure.
(3) a breathing space for strengthening linkages with the midstream sector.
(4) a lead time for structural adjustment.
(5) a breathing space for gaining outcomes from prior investment
JSA maintained that the MFA would provide the preconditions for promoting the 
transfer to other lines of business by adjusting its speed of the transfer and minimising 
friction accompanying it, and for ensuring the effects of investments for upgrading 
business. The association also asserted that the introduction of the MFA would not yield 
negative effects on the development of the textile industry for their Asian neighbours 
and users because it would admit a certain increase in imports. Nor would this impact 
on consumers because the level of imports of cotton yams and fabrics had already been 
high (JSA 1993, pp. 14-22).
It is difficult to know the stance of individual firms on import restrictions because 
it is very rare for them to reveal their views on specific policies. However, several 
textile producers showed support for the introduction of the MFA. For example, a 
general manager of Toray asserted that Toray had openly provided support for the 
introduction of the MFA.69 Teijin and Kanebo also maintained that their views towards 
the MFA were in line with those of their industrial association.70
To summarise, domestically oriented industrial associations composed of small 
and medium-sized firms have aggressively maintained the demand for import 
restrictions. In contrast, the associations which have some form of international linkages 
such as imports of intermediate inputs, overseas production, or imports of products give 
reluctant support to or oppose imports restrictions (Table 6.9). Given the fact that these 
associations include those composed of small and medium-sized firms, international
69 Interview, Toray, Tokyo, April 1994.
70 Interview, Teijin, Tokyo, September 1995; Interview, Kanebo, Tokyo, September 1995.
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linkages are a critical factor in formulating policy preferences of firms and sectors. 
What is of interest is that JCFA and JSA supported moves to implement protectionist 
measures, although they comprise large companies that have international operations. 
While JSA initiated the anti-dumping suits, JCFA positively supported the anti­
dumping files by other industrial associations. Both associations have supported the 
move to invoke the MFA. We have to consider why large textile producers and their 
industrial associations have adopted a policy stance supportive of protectionist measures.
Table 6.9 Policy Stance of Major Industrial Associations on Import Restrictions
Association Sector Firm size International
linkages
Stance on import 
restrictions
JCFA fibre making big FDI support
JSA spinning big FDI support
JCSFWA weaving small minimal support
JSRFWA weaving small minimal support
JKIA knitting small minimal support
JTMA towel making small yam importers ambiguous
JAIC apparel mixed FDI ambiguous
JTIA importing mixed importers oppose
POLICY PREFERENCES OF LARGE TEXTILE PRODUCERS
Internationalisation of corporate activities and policy preferences
The preference of large textile producers for protectionist measures had various origins. 
First of all, it is necessary to examine their preferences in terms of international 
activities. Recall that the textile industry was the first among the Japanese 
manufacturing sectors to transfer production bases overseas, and its leading companies 
are regarded as being involved in a vast array of international operations through direct 
investment and international subcontracting (Dicken 1992, p.258). However, the 
overseas operations of Japanese textile producers have not necessarily been successful. 
One illustration of unsuccessful overseas operations is withdrawal from overseas 
markets. Horaguchi (1992) compiles the number of firms which withdrew from Asia. In 
the textile industry, 222 affiliated firms withdrew between 1973 and 1986, accounting 
for 52.2 per cent of total firms that advanced into Asia in the same period (Table 6.10).
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This figure was extremely high compared with other sectors. The withdrawal from 
overseas operations was prominent at the individual firm level. For example, Teijin 
retreated from five overseas affiliates in the 1970s, and an additional 15 in the early 
1980s.71 Kanebo also withdrew from seven overseas affiliates in the 1970s and four in 
the 1980s.72 As a consequence, the level of overseas operation in the textile industry 
remained almost unchanged through the 1980s, although it was relatively high in the 
late 1970s.73
Table 6.10 Number of Withdrawals of Japanese Affiliates in Asia
Sector A B 100B/A
Food 393 75 19.1
Textiles 425 222 52.2
Wood and pulp 236 55 23.3
Chemicals 588 107 18.2
Metals, non-ferrous metals 446 148 33.2
General machinery 532 81 15.2
Electrical machinery 826 153 18.5
Transport machinery 252 36 14.3
Other manufacturing 865 221 25.5
Manufacturing total 4,563 1,098 24.1
Note: A denotes the number of inroads firms. B denotes the number of withdrawn firms. The
numbers are accumulated figures between 1973 and 1986.
Source: Horaguchi (1992, p.159).
The high level of withdrawal from overseas operations in the 1970s and the early 
1980s stemmed from factors relevant to the host countries as well as in the domestic 
market. In South Korea and Taiwan, local partners of joint ventures sought to expand 
business aggressively, and local governments supported this strategy. The Japanese 
partners, who were not keen on overseas business expansion, hesitated over new capital 
commitments and often retreated from the joint ventures.74 In ASEAN countries, 
overall economic conditions were depressed until the mid 1980s, and most subsidiaries
71 Interview, Teijin, Tokyo, September 1995.
72 Interview, Kanebo, Tokyo, September 1995.
73 For instance, the ratio of overseas production in textiles in the 1980s was similar to or lower than 
the ratio in 1980.
74 Interview, JCFA, Tokyo, February 1994.
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of Japanese textile firms incurred losses. For example, between 1974 and 1983, Toray’s 
businesses in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia suffered operating losses except for the 
three years from 1978 to 1980.75 The intensification of import restraints in advanced 
countries also led to a deterioration of profitability for Japanese affiliates in East Asia.
On the domestic front, Japanese parent companies were confronted with severe 
management problems in the 1970s and the early 1980s. The recession caused by the 
first oil shock in 1973 resulted in a protracted business slump in the textile industry. 
The first oil shock led to a sharp increase in prices of raw fibre materials. This increase, 
coupled with a rise in labour and fuel costs, contributed to rising production costs. In 
addition, the second oil shock in 1979 led to a sluggish demand for textiles. 
Accordingly, major textile firms were forced to implement drastic adjustment 
programs. Between 1973 and 1978, the number of employees in the seven major 
synthetic fibre companies fell from 93,000 to 53,000, while those in the nine major 
spinning companies fell from 99,000 to 56,000 (Okamoto 1988, p.79). Between 1970 
and 1980, the number of textile workers decreased by approximately 359,000, 20.5 per 
cent of the total employed in the industry.76 Efforts to retrench business by scrapping 
production facilities and laying off excess workers included curtailment in overseas 
operations. Major textile firms retreated from most of their overseas production bases. 
Teijin has retained only two plants in Thailand and one plant in Indonesia, while 
Kanebo has one plant in Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia. Toray alone maintained a 
large number of overseas production bases, six manufacturing plants in Indonesia, five 
in Malaysia, four in Thailand and one in South Korea.
A sharp yen appreciation after 1985 exacerbated the recession in the textile 
industry. The synthetic fibre sector, in particular, was hit hardest because the sector 
exported half of its domestic production. The synthetic fibre makers initiated a 
production cut in polyester filament in July 1986, but the price of polyester filament in 
late 1987 dropped to two-thirds of the price when the cutback started.77 Major textile 
firms were forced to undertake restructuring programs, mainly the dismissal and 
transfer of a redundant workforce. In the case of Teijin, for example, the total
75 Interview, Toray, Tokyo, March 1994.
76 Seni Nenkan, 1981, p .105; 1993, p.65.
77 Japan Economic Almanac, 1988, p. 163.
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workforce was reduced from some 10,000 in 1985 to some 7,000 in 1988.78 Between 
1986 and 1989, the export ratio in total textile production decreased from 33 per cent to 
24 per cent.
The synthetic fibre sector recovered from the recession as a consequence of the 
singosen boom starting in 1989.79 Shingosen products, mainly used as materials for 
women’s clothing, contributed to the expansion of the domestic market for synthetic 
fibres. During this period, synthetic fibre makers made investments to expand 
production capacity. But Toray’s investment was directed to overseas plants, and the 
company coped with the increase in demand by purchasing yarn at the market.80
The build-up of overseas production bases by textile companies resumed in 1992. 
Major synthetic fibre companies have built joint ventures mainly in China. Kanebo, the 
most active investor in China, established two joint ventures in 1992, another two in 
1993, and six in 1994. Teijin regards 1995 as the first year of globalisation, and seeks to 
develop its overseas operations.81 Toray also established a Trade Business Division in 
January 1995 whose objectives are to promote global operations as well as to deal with 
the import business.82 The advance into China aims to supply yams and fabrics to local 
apparel plants which suffer from losses of delivery time as well as from the cost of 
transport and tariffs. In addition, some companies have moved to build up integrated 
production systems from yam production to the weaving and dyeing processes.
In brief, the curtailment in overseas operations during the 1970s and the early 
1980s had a substantial effect on corporate attitudes in the textile sector. Toray alone 
has been able to maintain an integrated international production system from fibre 
production to spinning, weaving, and dyeing, and to divide its business between Japan
78 Interview, Teijin, Tokyo, September 1995.
79 Shingosen is referred to as ‘new polyester’ which covers a whole group of products made by 
complex, high-tech processing of polyester filaments {Japan Economic Almanac 1991, p. 151).
80 Keizaikai, 29 March 1994, p.29. This strategy had a crucal outcome in 1993 when the demand for 
yam shrank. While synthtic fibre makers agreed with the production cut, Toray alone did not 
abide by the cut on the grounds that the company did not increase its production capacity during 
the expansion period (Nikkei Bijinesu, 20 February 1995, p.27). Toray could cope with the 
reduced demand by decreasing the yam purchased at the market and by exporting excess yam to 
its mid-stream plants in Southeast Asia.
81 Senken Shimbun, 22 February 1995.
82 Senken Shimbun, 27 February 1995.
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and South East Asia. Toray feels little need for the introduction of the MFA on its own 
account, although it considers that application of the MFA is necessary for the textile 
industry as a whole.83 In contrast, other textile producers which have not developed 
effective overseas operations have little or no interest in resisting protectionist 
measures.
The other factor that has induced textile firms to favour import restrictions is the 
direction of exports from the affiliates of Japanese textile firms in East Asia. Affiliates 
long avoided exporting to the Japanese market. According to MITI survey data, the 
ratio of exports to Japan by textile affiliates in Asia was 4.0 per cent in 1980 and 14.2 
per cent in 1992 (Table 6.11). A 10 percentage point rise in this ratio indicates that 
Japanese textile firms were to re-direct exporting to Japan. However, the figure in 1980 
was extremely low given that the textile industry was relatively advanced in terms of 
foreign operations at that time. The industry accounted for 13 per cent of cumulative 
manufacturing investments between 1951 and 1980, and the 4.0 per cent overseas 
production ratio in textiles in 1980 was higher than the manufacturing average, at 2.9 
per cent.84 Even in the 1990s, the ratio was relatively low considering that standardised 
textile products from Asian countries are very competitive in price and the import 
volume of textile products doubled between 1986 and 1992. This peculiarity becomes 
clear if the textile sector is compared with the electronics sector where reverse imports 
in consumer electronic goods have been growing rapidly since the late 1980s.
The low ratio of textile exports to Japan is partly accounted for by the tendency of 
Japanese textile producers to restrain reverse imports. This propensity was first shaped 
by administrative guidance. When Japanese textile producers decided to make inroads 
into overseas markets in the early 1970s, they were encouraged by MITI not to reimport 
the products manufactured there to Japan. In some cases, firms were required to submit 
sworn documents that they would not reimport textile products to Japan.85 There was 
no such guidance in the 1980s, but Japanese textile producers seem to have maintained 
a propensity against importing. For instance, Toray manufactures synthetic staple and
83 Interview, Toray, Tokyo, March 1994.
84 The accumulated value of FDI between 1951 and 1980 was US$1,637 billion in textiles out of 
US$12,573 billion in total manufacturing.
85 Interview, Toray, Tokyo, March 1994.
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filament in ASEAN countries and exports these products to various countries, but not to 
Japan until recently. Toray explained why it did not import cheap textile products from 
Asian plants as follows: ‘If Toray imports such products to the Japanese market, it 
would lead to serious damage to the Japanese textile industry. We have to consider the 
balance of the whole economy, not the interests of consumers alone’ (Ishizawa 1992, 
pp. 169-70).
Table 6.11 Shares of Exports to Japan by Japanese Affiliates in Asia, 1980-92 
(per cent)
Sector 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
Food 30.2 13.4 31.6 16.1 26.5
Textiles 4.0 5.3 10.3 14.9 14.2
Wood and pulp 30.8 39.1 25.5 35.9 47.2
Chemicals 8.9 9.3 3.8 10.3 4.9
Iron and steel 10.1 7.5 5.2 4.2 2.1
Non-ferrous metals 2.6 0.4 31.8 12.1 21.4
General machinery 5.5 15.2 31.4 18.2 23.6
Electrical machinery 16.2 21.0 22.2 26.9 27.2
Transport machinery 1.9 5.5 5.3 1.6 1.7
Precision machinery 9.1 30.5 21.9 22.2 51.8
Petro and coal - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others 6.0 7.9 7.7 12.1 9.4
Manufacturing total 9.8 10.8 15.8 15.8 15.8
Sources: MITI, Kaigai toshi tokei soran [Statistical Report on Foreign Investment], N o.l - No.5.
Thus, major synthetic fibre companies long avoided importing products 
manufactured in overseas markets. In the mid 1990s, this changed. In September 1994, 
Katsunosuke Maeda, President of Toray, created a stir in the industry by proclaiming 
that Toray would import polyester products from its overseas plants. In January 1995, 
Toray established the Trade Business Division whose major task was to import fibre 
and fabric manufactured in plants in South East Asia. The aim of reverse imports was to 
maintain the market share which was being lost to South Korean and Taiwanese 
makers.86 Toyobo also decided to start reverse imports from its joint venture plant in
86 Although Japanese synthetic fibre makers dominate differentiated polyester markets, commodity 
polyester markets have been penetrated by South Korean and Taiwanese products. In 1993, 
imported polyester reached 71 per cent, 67 per cent, and 40 per cent of the domestic demand for 
ladies’ trousers, sweaters, and blouses, respectively (Shukan Daiyamondo, 26 November 1994, 
p. 13).
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Thailand. The company commenced production of polyester knit fabrics in April 1995, 
and plans to export all products to Japan.87 In spite of this trend, major textile 
producers have not changed their stance on import restrictions. Other factors have also 
influenced the policy preferences of large textile producers.
Industrial structure and policy preferences
The structure of the textile industry influences the attitudes of large textile producers 
towards protection. The dual structure of the textile industry — a few big companies 
and a great number of small and medium scale firms — is a widespread phenomenon in 
Japanese industry. In textiles, however, small-sized firms dominate the industry in 
terms of employment and establishments. More than 60 per cent in textile firms have 
between one and three employees, 20 per cent higher than the manufacturing average 
(Table 6.12). In terms of total employees, the share of these small-sized firms was 
roughly three times as large as that of the manufacturing average. These small-sized 
firms are family factories operated by three workers, the owner, his wife and another 
family member. Owing to their small corporate size, small firms had scant management 
resources to diversify their business or to relocate their operations offshore. They could 
only make adjustments to reduce excess capacity and to modernise machines and 
equipment Large textile producers have assumed a leadership role in an industry with a 
majority of small-sized firms.88 They have tended to resist measures which would 
undermine the interests of the majority of firms in the industry.
Big textile firms in the upstream stage also need to maintain close relations with 
firms in the mid- and downstream stages. The synthetic fibre and spinning firms and 
weaving houses have been linked by service fee contracts since the 1950s. Under these 
contracts, yarn makers or trading houses supply yams to weaving houses, which return 
the woven textiles to them in exchange for service fees based on the amount of woven 
textiles they produce (Itoh and Urata 1994, p.20). In the 1950s, weaving service fee 
contracts between major spinning companies and weaving houses expanded. Weaving 
production under service fee contracts enabled spinning manufacturers to ensure a
87 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 April 1995.
88 The past four chairmen of JTIF came from large spinning and synthetic fibre produers such as 
Toyobo, Asahi Chemical, and Teijin.
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stable market for yarn as well as to avoid risk arising from uncertainties about 
fluctuations in the price of raw materials and yarn and in the exchange rate (Fujii 1971, 
pp. 113-14).
Table 6.12 Shares of Establishments with Less Than Four Employees, 1993 (per 
cent)
Sector Establishments Employees Value added
Food 30.8 3.7 1.3
Textiles 61.1 15.3 6.9
Apparel 39.6 7.2 5.1
Wood 39.2 9.7 5.0
Chemicals 10.5 0.3 0.2
Petro and coal 11.3 1.0 0.4
Iron and steel 21.5 1.1 0.4
Non-ferrous metals 30.2 2.2 0.9
Metals 42.2 8.2 3.6
General machinery 41.1 5.3 2.5
Electrical machinery 21.4 1.1 0.5
Transport machinery 31.8 1.6 0.5
Precision machinery 38.0 3.7 1.7
Others 55.4 14.3 5.7
Manufacturing total 40.6 5.2 1.8
Sources: MITI, Kogyo tokeihyo: Sangyohen [Census of Manufacturers: Report by Industries], 1993.
Service fee contracts have been prevalent in the synthetic fibre sector as well. 
Synthetic fibre makers produce two kinds of fibres: staple and filament. While most of 
staple is provided to spinning makers, filament is supplied to weaving houses. When 
synthetic fibre makers succeeded in mass production of nylon and polyester in the 
1950s, it was critical to ensure a stable market for these products. The fibre makers 
could select one of two options in ensuring a sales market. One was to integrate the 
weaving and dyeing process into their own operations. The other was to negotiate 
service fee contracts with weaving and dyeing houses. Since textile products are highly 
susceptible to movements in business cycles, and a division of labour between yarn 
producers and weavers had developed in the Japanese textile industry, synthetic fibre 
makers selected the latter method (Uekusa and Nanbu 1973, pp. 198-202). The synthetic 
fibre makers actively invited weaving houses to enter their group in the late 1950s and
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the early 1960s.89 Accordingly, the percentage of service fee contracts in the total 
synthetic fibre weaving production continued at more than 60 per cent (Table 6.13).
Table 6.13 Shares of Service Fee Contracts in Woven Products, 1965-93 (per 
cent)
Product 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993
Cotton 42 44 48 45 49 50 48
Wool 49 63 71 76 77 72 72
Synthetic Fibre 64 61 63 65 67 66 65
Textile Total 50 54 58 58 60 60 60
Note: The figures are the share of productions under service fee contracts in total production.
Source: MITI, Seni tokei nenpo, [Annual Report on Textile Statistics], each year.
As uncertainties in the market reduced, service fee contracts directly agreed with 
yarn makers declined, while those with local trading houses increased. However, yam 
makers which invited major local trading houses into their group, assumed substantial 
responsibility for production development and risk (PFC 1990, p. 116). The presence of 
excellent weaving houses is crucial for yarn makers. Synthetic fibre makers have 
introduced new materials to the market. The quick transformation of new materials into 
new products has much to do with technical skills of weaving houses in dealing with 
new materials (Itoh and Urata 1994, p.21). The yam makers retain a portion of yams 
for their own brand products as ‘maker chop’ products. The technical skills of weaving 
houses are particularly important for maintaining the competitiveness of ‘maker chop’ 
products. For example, it is often said that singosen was produced as a consequence of 
the R & D efforts of synthetic fibre companies. However, a key factor in the 
development of singosen lay in the vertical planning and production systems which 
supported technology and cooperative relations in the process of yam plying, weaving, 
dyeing and finishing.90 Singosen would not have emerged without the existence of the 
excellent weaving production teams and their cooperation. It is said that Japanese
89 Synthetic fibre makers often refer to relevant weaving houses as ‘production teams’. In the case of 
Toray, the first production team was organised in September 1959, and the number of the teams 
increased to 337 by April 1964 (Toray 1977, pp.l 16-18).
90 Kasen Geppo, February 1992, p.71.
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differentiated fibre products are ten years in advance of those from South Korea and 
Taiwan. This is because the Japanese fibre industry retains excellent weaving houses.91
The synthetic fibre companies understand the importance of the weaving houses, 
as shown by the fact that Toray regards the production teams as its internal plants.92 
They have actively supported weaving houses to increase their technology level and 
develop new products.93 At the same time, they sought to avoid policies that lower the 
competitiveness of the production teams. It is said that Toray decided to start imports 
from its overseas plants after it confirmed that its production teams could shift from 
standardised to differentiated production lines.94
In addition to the links to the midstream stage through service fee contracts, 
synthetic fibre and spinning firms have promoted forward vertical integration for 
several reasons. Firstly, the profit margin is higher in the downstream sector. In the case 
of men’s suits, for instance, the value of the raw material is doubled in the yam 
manufacture stage, increases five times in the fabric production stage, 25 times in the 
wholesale stage, and 75 times in the retail stage (Itoh 1994, p.16). Large textile firms 
have not only established divisions or subsidiaries to produce woven goods, apparel and 
made-up goods, but also promoted tie-ups with manufacturers of apparel and made-up 
goods. The second factor promoting forward vertical integration is the existence of a 
large uniform and quasi-uniform market in Japan (Itoh 1994, p.17). The large demand 
for school uniforms and company uniforms enable large spinning producers to enjoy 
economies of scale. The weaving divisions of large spinning producers have their own 
finishing facilities, and coordinate the weaving and finishing processes for such large 
volume products.
Recent pressure from rising imports has forced the Japanese textile industry to set 
up systematic production linkages among firms. Owing to production cost 
disadvantage, it is almost impossible for domestic manufacturers of standard textile
91 Shukan Daiyamondo, 26 November 1994, p. 13.
92 Senken Shimbun, 10 May 1994.
93 According to Itoh and Urata (1994, pp.43-44), weaving houses in the Fukui and Ishikawa 
prefectures regarded support from synthetic fibre makers or trading companies as the most useful 
sources for improving technical skills and developing new products.
94 Shukan Daiyamondo, 26 November 1994, p. 13.
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products to compete with imported goods on price. They therefore seek to differentiate 
their goods in non-price areas. The development of differentiated products requires 
systematic linkages among the vertical stages, namely, the combination of skills and 
information in fibre production, spinning, weaving, dyeing, and apparel making enables 
textile makers to produce differentiated products.95 Furthermore, as a measure to 
enhance efficiency, the industry sought to establish a quick response system.96 
Successful implementation of the quick response system requires collaboration between 
the up-, mid- and downstream sectors. Intense and systematic relationships among 
various subsectors make large textile producers less willing to adopt a policy stance 
which contradicts the interests of the majority in the industry.
Import pressure and policy preferences
The third factor pushing large textile producers to favour protectionist measures is that 
they faced a serious threat from rising imports in their core sector. Some big textile 
producers have diversified their business activities to new fields such as 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.97 As a result, the share of non-textiles in total sales 
among nine major synthetic fibre companies increased sharply from 6.8 per cent in 
1964 to 57.8 per cent in 1994 (Sakura Research Institute 1995, p.4). However, the 
majority of these firms are still dependent on the textile areas for obtaining a stable 
corporate revenue. Toray, which is regarded as having successfully diversified its 
business, gained 43.2 per cent of total sales from textiles in 1993, while 24.4 per cent 
were from plastics and chemicals and 20.8 per cent from housing and engineering. 
Teijin gained 59.9 per cent from textiles, 16.9 per cent from plastics and chemicals and
95 The necessity for promoting systematic linkages was explicitly shown in the 1988 textile report. 
The report suggested establishing ‘linkage production units’ which meant linkages among many 
firms for mutual supplementation of information collection, product planning, and response to the 
demand for many kinds of textile products in small quantities.
96 The quick response system seeks to deliver products with a shorter turnaround time by using 
information networks. This system, developed in the United States in the 1980s, not only reduces 
the loss of the stock but also speeds up the flow of information about the market. The Japanese 
textile industry organised the Council for Promoting Quick Response in September 1994 with the 
participation o f 203 groups from upstream to downstream stages (,Senken Shimbun, 27 September 
1994).
97 While Asahi Chemical and Kanebo have become the leading companies in housing and cosmetics, 
respectively, Toray and Teijin are major international manufacturers of base films for magnetic 
tape (.Japan Economic Almanac 1990, p.171).
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7.8 per cent from pharmaceticals and medical products in 1993. As capital-intensive 
industries, synthetic fibre and spinning companies have to maintain a certain 
manufacturing level of standard products. Stable production of standard goods enables 
firms to maintain employment and profits, and stable profits from standard product 
sales support R & D expenditure on high value-added products or the diversification to 
related business fields. It is also difficult to differentiate standard products and high 
value-added ones in technology development. Technology which generates high value- 
added products is created in the mass production process of standard products.98
Since the mid 1980s, Japanese textile producers have been apprehensive about the 
rapid increase in the production capacity of their Asian neighbours. Japanese production 
capacity in synthetic fibres has been surpassed by Asian countries. Production capacity 
of polyester staple was exceeded by Taiwan before 1985 and by South Korea and China 
in 1991, and production in polyester filament was surpassed by China before 1985 and 
by South Korea and Taiwan in 1990 (JCFA 1993, p.l). Among the four major synthetic 
fibres, Japanese synthetic fibre makers maintain an advantage in acrylic alone. The 
rapid build-up of production capacity in these countries is likely to be transformed into 
export pressure on the Japanese market. Japan, which has no quota under the MFA and 
is geographically close to Asian countries, will be a target for their exports.
Market conditions in the spinning sector are more acute. Owing to a decline in 
international competitiveness, the Japanese spinning sector has been obliged to reduce 
its operations. The number of firms fell from 84 in 1980 to 42 in 1994, and the number 
of plants fell from 168 to 88 in the same period (Table 6.14). The increase in 
production capacity in Asian countries is prominent in the spinning sector as well. 
Between 1985 and 1991, the number of spindles increased by 81.7 per cent in China, 
95.7 per cent in Pakistan and 86.7 per cent in Indonesia, while that of looms increased 
by 44.1 per cent in China and 50.0 per cent in Indonesia during the same period (JSA 
1993, p.3). The recent build-up in production capacity has contributed to a rise in 
imports to the Japanese market. Thus, a rapid build-up in production capacity in Asian 
countries is a critical factor encouraging large textile producers to take a stance similar 
to that of small and medium-sized firms.
98 Interview, Toray, Tokyo, March 1994.
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Table 6.14 Major Industrial Indicators in the Japanese Spinning Sector, 1970-94
1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Firms 103 84 71 53 52 50 45 42
Plants 208 168 148 122 120 110 99 88
Spindles (TOO) 9,439 8,668 7,828 6,515 6,285 5,861 5,001 4,330
Employees (‘000) 122 60 48 35 33 27 19 16
Note: The figures are concerned with firms which belong to JS A.
Sources: JSA (1993, p. 13) and interview (JSA, Tokyo, September 1995).
CONCLUSION
The Japanese textile industry, like that in other developed countries, has suffered from 
rising import pressure from developing countries since the 1980s. In order to cope with 
import pressure, textile circles have intensified their demand for import restrictions. 
Four out of seven anti-dumping and countervailing petitions in Japanese industry were 
lodged by the textile industry. The demand by the textile industry for invoking the 
MFA intensified over time. How did the internationalisation of corporate activity affect 
firms’ policy preferences towards rising import pressure? Did internationally oriented 
firms resist the demand for protectionst measures due to their international ties?
The answers to these questions are ambiguous. Several industrial associations 
were reluctant to support protectionist policies because of their international linkages. 
JAIC would not accept import restrictions at the downstream stage, although it accepted 
import restrictions at the up- and midstream stages. This was because the Japanese 
apparel makers had developed local production in East Asian countries, and they were 
also heavily involved in imports from production bases there to Japan. JTMA demanded 
restrictions on imports of towel products, yet the association opposed them on cotton 
yarn because its members were heavily dependent on imported cotton yam as an input 
for production. JTIA has been a vocal opponent of import restrictions. It resisted the 
move to introduce the MFA, on the one hand, and opposed an anti-dumping suit, on the 
other hand. It has adopted an anti-protectionist stance because its members were 
importers. Thus, the policy stance of these industrial associations gives credence to the 
argument that firms with international ties prefer an open trade policy.
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The textile industry also included cases where industrial associations adopted a 
protectionist stance in spite of their international linkages. This was the stance of JCFA 
and JSA, the two major producer associations in the industry. Although they comprised 
big synthetic fibre and spinning companies with international linkages, they stood in 
line with JKIA, JCSFWA, and JSRFWA, the associations of domestically oriented 
small firms. The degree of internationalisation had a great bearing on their attitudes. 
The spinning and synthetic fibre makers became the first investors in overseas markets 
in Japanese industry in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. However, their multinational 
operations did not develop, and there were successive withdrawals in the 1970s and the 
early 1980s. They also restrained imports from their overseas plants to Japan until 
recently in order to avoid unfavourable effects on domestic producers. Accordingly, 
they had little interest in resisting the demand for protectionist measures. Their stance 
favouring protectionst policies was also shaped by domestic linkages and the industrial 
structure in textiles. The synthetic fibre and spinning firms that belong to JCFA and 
JSA have maintained service fee contracts with small and medium-sized weaving 
houses since the 1950s. They have also enhanced their interest in downward stage 
operations by promoting forward integration. Furthermore, rising import pressure urged 
the Japanese textile industry to strengthen systematic linkages among up-, mid- and 
downstream stages in order to enhance non-price competitiveness and to produce 
differentiated products. Thus, large textile firms maintain extensive domestic linkages, 
motivating them to incline towards a protectionist stance. The large textile firms, the 
most powerful actors in the industry, have regarded themselves as the leaders of the 
industry whose majority are small-sized firms. They are reluctant to push for measures 
which conflict with the interests of the majority in the industry.
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7 Keidanren’s Stance on Trade and Investment 
Policies
Keidanren is the leading institution through which Japanese big business influences 
policy making, and multinational corporations are its major members. Keidanren’s 
stance and activities on various trade policies reflect the policy preferences of 
multinational corporations. This chapter approaches the relations between 
internationalisation of corporate activities and its influence on pro-liberal corporate 
preferences by examining Keidanren’s stance on trade and related policy issues.
Several policy issues are examined to elucidate Keidanren’s stance on trade 
policy. The first set of issues concerns deregulation and inward investment in Japan. 
Deregulation became a primary policy objective of Keidanren in the 1990s. 
Deregulation directly aimed to relax and eliminate government regulations on private 
business activities, and also had a great bearing on improving market access by foreign 
firms to Japan. Japan’s regulated economic system fostered the image of a closed 
Japanese market. More business opportunities and the enhanced domestic demand 
created by deregulation led to better market access for foreign goods and firms and, 
more controversially, a reduction in Japan’s trade surplus. Keidanren promoted 
deregulation through the submission of recommendations, negotiations with bureaucrats 
and politicians and cooperation with the Economic Reform Council, which was 
established with an eye to providing a blueprint for Japan’s structural reform. 
Keidanren also published policy papers aimed at encouraging the government to offer a 
better environment for inward investment.
The second set of issues that this chapter focuses on in order to examine 
Keidanren’s stance on trade policy is farm products trade and agricultural policy. 
Keidanren raised its voice in favour of the liberalisation of agricultural imports after it 
established the Committee on Agricultural Policy in 1980. Keidanren’s stance on farm 
products trade evolved as Japanese manufacturing industries strengthened export 
dependence, and criticism of Japan’s trade surplus became serious after the late 1970s. 
This chapter examines the reasons why Keidanren demanded liberalisation of 
agricultural imports, and what influence Keidanren’s actions had on farm products trade 
and agricultural policy.
Keidanren was also committed to improving standards and certification systems 
in the early 1980s, as foreign firms and governments intensified their criticism of such 
Japanese trade-related administrative systems as non-tariff barriers. Not only did 
Keidanren release a number of recommendations for reform of the standards and 
certification systems, but it supported positively the activities of the Second Provisional 
Commission on Administrative Reform (Daini Rincho) which aimed to promote 
rationalisation of administrative operations.
Before examining Keidanren’s activities on these policy issues in detail, the first 
part of the chapter highlights organisational changes within Keidanren which had their 
origins in rising internationalisation, in an attempt to investigate the changing influence 
of internationally oriented firms and sectors within Keidanren.
EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONALISATION ON KEIDANREN’S INTERNAL 
ORGANISATION
The central issue is whether Keidanren intensified its commitment to liberalisation of 
the Japanese market as Japanese firms strengthened their international operations. In 
order to clarify causal relationships between the internationalisation of corporate 
activities and Keidanren’s commitment to an open domestic market, it is necessary to 
explore whether internationally oriented firms and sectors enhanced their status within 
Keidanren. There are three indicators of the rising influence of internationally oriented 
sectors and firms within Keidanren. The first is the composition of member companies. 
The number of corporate members of Keidanren has gradually increased from less than 
800 in 1975 to 970 in 1994 (Table 7.1).1 The composition of membership by sector 
reveals several features. One is the expansion of members in the services sector. 
Membership in the services sector increased significantly from 43 to 93 between 1975 
and 1994. Membership in the commerce sector also expanded in the early 1980s as a 
result of the participation of large retail stores. Within the manufacturing sector,
Although no special qualifications to become a corporate member of Keidanren are written into 
the articles of association, Keidanren’s member companies are members of industrial associations 
composed of big companies, or one of the major members of industrial associations which include 
medium and small-sized firms (Honjo 1993, p. 196).
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membership in the electrical machinery sector increased from 40 in 1975 to 68 in 1994, 
reflecting the strong growth of the sector.
Table 7.1 Number of Corporate Members in Keidanren by Sector, 1975-94
Sector 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Fishery 8 5 5 5 5
Mining 22 22 21 20 18
Construction 45 45 50 62 70
Food 31 31 34 36 34
Textiles 37 34 35 37 39
Wood and pulp 24 23 24 22 20
Chemicals 74 75 81 91 92
Oil and coal 14 15 16 15 15
Rubbers 12 12 11 10 10
Ceramics and cement 22 21 21 22 21
Iron and steel 29 28 28 27 26
Non-ferrous metals 15 16 14 15 17
General machinery 41 41 44 45 47
Electrical machinery 40 39 56 64 68
Transport machinery 29 29 32 32 35
Precision machinery 19 17 20 24 25
Commerce 54 67 76 78 81
Finance 179 186 178 186 184
Real estate 10 11 12 16 19
Transportation 37 36 37 45 46
Services 43 49 68 80 93
Others 2 2 3 5 6
Total 787 804 866 937 971
Sources: Compiled from Keidanren Kaiin Meibo, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1994.
The second indicator is the affiliation of Keidanren’s executive personnel of 
Keidanren (Table 7.2). The executive personnel is decided with consideration to shifts 
in the structure of Japanese industry, coordination among financial keiretsu groupings 
and so on. Keidanren increased the number of vice-chairmen from seven or eight in the 
1970s to 12 in the mid 1980s. This was partly because Keidanren accepted new 
members from firms in the services sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, a considerable 
number of posts was allocated to leaders from the heavy and chemical industries. 
However, Keidanren accepted leaders from newly emerging industries such as the
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automobile and consumer electronics sectors to the executive posts, although the pace 
of change in representation was not as rapid as the change in the structure of Japanese 
industry. In May 1986, a second vice-chairman’s post was allocated to the electronics 
industry and a third in May 1994. The automobile sector also obtained two posts from 
May 1984 to May 1986 and after May 1992. In contrast, the iron and steel sector, which 
dominated the chairman’s post from May 1980 to December 1990, gained neither the 
post of chairman nor that of vice-chairman in the change of leadership of May 1994.
Table 7.2 Posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of Keidanren by Sector
Sector 5/1968 5/1974 5/1980 5/1986 12/1990 5/1994
Mining - 1 - - - -
Food - - - - 1 1
Textiles - 1 - - - -
Chemicals 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iron and steel 1 1 2 2 1 -
General machinery - - - - 1 -
Electronics - - 1 2 2 3
Transport equipment 2 1 1 1 1 -
Automobile - 1 1 1 1 2
Trading 1 - - 1 1 1
Distribution - - - - 1 1
Banking 1 1 1 2 1 2
Securities - - - - 1 -
Insurance - - - - - 1
Oil and coal - - 1 1 - -
Transport - 1 1 - - -
Electric power - - 1 1 1 1
Keidanren’s Secre. 2 - 1 1 - -
Total 8 8 11 13 13 13
Note: Figures in bold include the post of chairman.
Source: Honjo (1993, pp.355-67); Asahi Shimbun (28 May 1994).
The shift of executive posts from the heavy and chemical to the automobile and 
electronics sectors is also reflected in the post of chairman. Akio Morita, Chairman of 
Sony, a representative consumer electronics company, was expected to be the eighth 
chairman of Keidanren. The seventh chairman, Gaishi Hiraiwa, considered Morita as 
the most suitable candidate because he was well known internationally and was
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expected to lead Japanese business from an international viewpoint. Monta’s illness 
prevented his succeeding Hiraiwa. Instead, Shoichiro Toyoda, Chairman of Toyota, was 
selected as the head of Keidanren. The shift in Keidanren’s executive personnel from 
the heavy and chemical to internationally oriented automobile and electronics industries 
implies that these internationally oriented sectors have an enhanced influence within 
Keidanren.
The shift in influence by sector is also reflected in the chairmanship of the policy 
committees. The number of policy committees increased from 30 in 1980 to 42 in 1995. 
In 1980, leaders from three sectors — iron and steel, trading and banking — chaired 
almost half the committees.2 In 1995, the internationally oriented sectors became more 
important. Four policy committees were chaired by leaders from the automobile sector, 
while five committees were chaired by those from the electronics sector.
A third indicator is ranking in terms of membership fees. Although membership 
fees are confidential, Mainichi Shimbun published the ranking in 1992 (Table 7.3). The 
membership fees are calculated on the basis of a firm’s total assets and ordinary profits. 
The top three companies are those that assumed the chairmanship after 1980. These 
firms are followed by Nissan and several major electronics companies. The companies 
that pay high fees assume executive posts of Keidanren, and play a leadership role.3 In 
1995, all the top ten companies except Kansai Electric Power and Sony assumed a post 
of chairman, vice-chairmen, or chairman, vice-chairmen of the Board of Councillors.
The influence of the internationalisation of corporate activity is seen in 
Keidanren’s internal organisation. Not only did the number of policy committees 
increase between 1980 and 1995, the composition of policy committees also reflects the 
rising internationalisation of corporate activity and the Japanese economy (Table 7.4). 
Several policy committees dealing with external issues affecting Japanese corporations 
have been established in recent years. The Committee on Foreign-Affiliated 
Corporations was established in 1986. This Committee helps foreign-affiliated firms
Of 30 policy committees, three were chaired by leaders from iron and steel, four by trading, and 
six by banking.
The main organs of Keidanren are the Board of Councillors, the Board of Governors, the 
Executive Council and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman Meeting.
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conduct business smoothly in Japan. In 1992, the Committee on Kyosei was set up.4 
This Committee aims to reform the corporate behaviour of Japanese firms as well as to 
examine the compatibility of Japanese institutions and conditions for competition with 
those in foreign countries. The establishment of the Committee is an indication of the 
shift in philosophy among Japanese big business from the pursuit of corporate growth 
to a broader concept including cooperation with society and foreign companies.
Table 7.3 Ranking of Membership Fees in Keidanren, 1992
Company Industrial
Sector
Membership 
Fee (million yen)
Toyota Motor Automobile 32.8
Tokyo Electric Power Electric power 31.4
Nippon Steel Steel 31.0
Nissan Motor Automobile 28.3
Hitachi Electronics 27.3
Toshiba Electronics 27.3
Matsushita Electric Ind. Electronics 26.4
Kansai Electric Power Electric power 23.8
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. Transport equipment 23.1
Sony Electronics 21.0
Source: Mainichi Shimbun (2 March 1994).
The number of bilateral relations committees has sharply increased from six in 
1980 to 19 in 1995. These committees deal with bilateral relations with Japan’s major 
trading partners and promote private diplomacy. The increase in the number of the 
committees reflects an elevation of Keidanren’s concern with trade relations with 
foreign countries.
KEIDANREN’S STANCE ON INWARD INVESTMENT AND DEREGULATION
Keidanren focused on inward investment policies and issued recommendations aiming 
to facilitate investment in Japan in the 1990s. Investment policy has a great bearing on
Kyosei is referred to as ‘symbiosis’ or ‘living together’ in English but its main idea is ‘mutually 
beneficial co-existence’. Kyosei became a central issue after Keidanren espoused a commitment to 
the concept in its Basic Guidelines for the 1990s in 1991 (Keidanren Review, No.137, October 
1992, pp.4-6).
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Table 7.4 Policy Committees in Keidanren, 1995
Committee on Basic Strategy 
Committee on Corporate Ethics*
Committee on Government Reform 
Committee on Public Affairs 
Committee on Business and Politics*
Ad-Hoc Committee on Nurturing Creative Human Resources*
Committee on Taxation
Committee on Economic Research
Committee on Fiscal and Monetary Policies
Committee on International Finance
Committee on Economic Structure*
Committee on International Taxation*
Committee on Statistics 
Committee on Industrial Affairs 
Committee on New Business*
Committee on Competition Policy*
Committee on Environment and Safety
Committee on Information and Telecommunication Policy
Committee on Energy and Resources
Committee on Quality of Life and Consumer Affairs*
Committee on Distribution 
Committee on Transportation 
Committee on Land Policy*
Committee on Housing and Urban Development 
Committee on Concentration Problems in Tokyo*
Committee on Agricultural Policy
Committee on Industrial Technology
Committee on Oceanic Resources
Committee on Life Science
Committee on Corporate Finance
Committee on Economic Legislation
Committee on Corporate Management and Disclosure
Committee on Foreign Relations
Committee on Foreign Trade
Committee on Economic Cooperation
BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Committee to OECD) Japan 
Committee on Trade in Services*
Committee on International Industrial Cooperation*
Committee on Foreign-Affiliated Corporations*
Committee on Kyosei-Economic Symbiosis*
Committee on Corporate Philanthropy*
Committee on Promotion of Inter-Cultural Understanding* 
Committee on Commodity Prices**
Committee on Coal Policy**
Committee on Atlantic Institute**
Note: * denotes the committees established between 1980 and 1995. ** denotes committees
abolished between 1980 and 1995.
Sources: Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, 1980; Keidanren Annual Report, 1995.
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trade flows and trade policy. An investment imbalance may impede the rectification of 
trade imbalances. Foreign-affiliated firms maintain a high level of imports.5 An 
increased presence of foreign firms in Japan may lead to a reduction in Japan’s trade 
surplus. Whichever the case, the huge investment imbalance has contributed to 
intensifying the foreign perception that the Japanese market is closed. The other issue 
that Keidanren took in the 1990s was the promotion of deregulation (kisei kanwa).6 
Deregulation has become a critical issue in opening the Japanese market. A regulated 
social and economic system heightens the perception of Japan as a closed society 
lacking transparency. Deregulation would also lead to the creation of new business 
opportunities and stimulate domestic demand. These factors contribute to better market 
access and the rectification of Japan’s trade surplus.
Activities for promoting inward investment
In spite of the removal of formal restrictions on foreign investment, the rise in inward 
investment in Japan has been slow.7 While outward investment from Japan has rapidly 
expanded since the mid 1980s, inward investment has remained at a low level. At the 
end of 1992, the ratio of outward to inward investment was 1.16 in the United States,
According to MITI (1994b, p.6) survey data, while foreign-affiliated firms imported goods worth 
4.72 trillion yen in 1992, accounting for 16 per cent of Japan’s total imports, they exported 
products from Japan worth 1.84 trillion yen, 4.3 per cent of Japan’s total exports. They ran trade 
deficits of 2.88 trillion yen.
There were 508 regulatory laws and 10,945 government authorisations or licenses at the end of 
March 1994 in Japan (Management and Coordination Agency 1995, pp. 14-20). As much as 40 per 
cent of Japan’s gross national product (GNP) is produced by industries under some form of 
government regulation. There are two kinds of regulation. One is economic regulation which 
imposes restrictions on new entrants, prices and fares and controls on service and investment from 
a viewpoint of supply-demand adjustments. The other is social regulation which aims to ensure 
health, security and environmental protection (Etö 1994, p.8). Isao Nakauchi, a vice-chairman of 
Keidanren as well as Chairman of Daiei, a representative retailing company, explains the burden 
of excess regulations as follows: ‘Seventeen laws, 45 administrative requirements, 200 pages of 
application documents — this is what it takes to open one sales outlet. All this costs the 
distribution industry sales as much as 50 billion yen a year’ (The Nikkei Weekly, 30 August 1993). 
The liberalisation of capital investment in Japan was implemented mainly in the period from 1967 
to 1971 through a four stage liberalisation program. In 1980, while the Foreign Investment Law 
was abolished, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was modified, changing the 
basis of the foreign investment system from approval to prior notification, and allowing foreign 
investors to acquire full ownerships of existing firms. Now Japan has no restrictions on foreign 
investment except reservations under the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, oil, mining, and leather and leather products, and sectors related 
to national security (MITI 1994a, p.204).
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1.24 in the United Kingdom and 2.25 in Germany, while the ratio was 15.99 in Japan 
(OECD 1994, p. 15). According to MITI (1994b, pp.4-15) survey data, in 1992 foreign- 
affiliated firms accounted for 1.1 per cent of total sales and 0.5 per cent of total 
employees in Japan. These figures are extremely low compared with other advanced 
countries.8
Keidanren expressed increasing concern about the lack of inward foreign 
investment in Japan in the 1990s. In order to identify impediments to foreign 
investment and to dismantle specific regulatory barriers to it, Keidanren took several 
initiatives. Keidanren set up an Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Direct Investment in 
Japan in June 1992 under the Committee on International Industrial Cooperation and 
the Committee on Foreign-Affiliated Corporations. The Committee collected views on 
Japan’s investment climate and suggested measures to improve it.9 The result was 
summed up in a report titled Improvement of the Investment Climate and Promotion of 
Foreign Direct Investment into Japan. The report, issued on 27 October 1992, 
recommended nine detailed measures to facilitate the entry of foreign firms. The report 
suggested some preferential incentives to entice foreign investment. The first measure 
related to taxation, cuts in corporate tax rates, the expansion of tax credits for 
investment and accelerated depreciation rates. The second measure was a boost to the 
ceiling of low-rate financing that the Japan Development Bank provided for foreign 
companies. The report required that the ceiling should be raised from 40 per cent of 
required funds up to 70 per cent. The report also proposed the revision of problematic
The share of foreign owned firms in total sales was 10 per cent in the United States and 18 per 
cent or higher in the United Kingdom, France and Germany in 1986 (Graham and Krugman 1991, 
p.33). Limited inward investment in Japan results from several home market factors. Firstly, fierce 
corporate competition and high land and labour costs have discouraged foreign investors to 
advance into Japan (MITI 1994a, p.205). Secondly, such Japanese business and social practices as 
close long-term business relations and the difficulty of finding quality labour in the face of the 
life-time employment system have made it difficult for foreign investors in Japan. Thirdly, the 
incompatibility of many Japanese standards, regulations and inspection practices as well as the 
lack of transparency and administrative guidance have placed foreign firms at a disadvantage vis- 
a-vis local firms (Mason 1995, p. 138).
The Committee held hearings from the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, the European 
Business Community, and relevant embassies in order to collect opinions with respect to Japan’s 
investment climate. Then it received explanations from representatives of related government 
agencies about the conditions of Japan’s investment climate. Parallel to these activities, the 
Committee conducted a questionnaire survey of the members of the Committee on Foreign- 
Affiliated Corporations about Japan’s investment climate (Gekkan Keidanren, December 1992, 
p.23).
213
aspects of two private institutions: keiretsu groupings and industrial associations. The 
report pointed out that vertical keiretsu groupings, in spite of enhancing efficiency, 
make entry to intiai-keiretsu dealings more difficult than that to general markets, while 
industrial associations create less transparent relations with relevant ministries and limit 
competition when they complement administration and implement some government 
functions.
A bold suggestion in the report was the liberalisation of Japan’s legal system. The 
Diet passed the Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by 
Foreign Lawyers in May 1986, admitting foreign lawyers to practice in Japan at the 
beginning of April 1987. However, the Law imposed various restrictions on the 
activities of foreign lawyers. The report, based on the recognition that legal business 
cannot be exempted from the liberalisation of trade in services, demanded the lifting of 
the regulations on the formation of partnerships with Japanese lawyers, the hiring of 
Japanese lawyers by foreign attorneys, the use of the name of the law firm to which 
they belong, and a five-year experience requirement of foreign lawyers.10
In 1993, Keidanren took a further step to boost foreign direct investment in Japan. 
Keidanren organised a Subcommittee for Improving the Climate for Foreign-Affiliated 
Firms under the Committee on Foreign-Affiliated Corporations. The Subcommittee, 
after exchanging opinions with the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and the 
European Business Community, produced a report in December 1993, entitled 
Improvement of the Climate for Foreign-Affiliated Corporations and the Reform of the 
Japanese Economy. The report suggested 23 ways to improve access by foreign 
companies. A crucial recommendation was relaxation of the ban on holding 
companies.* 11 The report proposed this on the grounds that there was little possibility 
that holding companies impede fair and free market competition, but that the ban 
hampered direct foreign investment in Japan by foreign firms. Revision of the
10 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) criticised the report as lacking 
consideration of the Japanese legal system and the Japanese system for lawyers, established to 
protect people’s basic rights (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 October 1992).
11 The establishment of companies that have the sole purpose of controlling another company is 
prohibited in Japan under Article 9 of the Antimonopoly Law. This ban resulted from the bitter 
lesson that the pre-war Japanese economy had been dominated by a handful of zaibatsu 
(conglomerates), which were allegedly a factor that led Japan into World War II.
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regulations on discounts and prizes was also suggested in the report. The maximum 
values of discounts and prizes, some of which were fixed over thirty years ago, did not 
reflect the rise in commodity prices and changes in firms’ sales activities. Foreign 
firms, which had a limited name value in the Japanese market, saw revision of these 
regulations as valuable because discounts and prizes were an important incentive for 
expanding sales. Other issues in the report were the improvement in information on 
government procurement, and transparency and simplification of administrative 
operations, as well as strengthening of organisation and authority of the Office of Trade 
and Investment Ombudsman (OTO).12
The third report on inward investment, entitled Emergency Request for Expanding 
Inward Investment, Promoting Imports, and Deregulating Import-Related 
Administration, was announced in March 1994. The report, based on previous 
recommendations as well as a questionnaire survey in October 1993, suggested 
deregulation aimed at expanding inward investment in Japan and promoting imports to 
Japan. Keidanren suggested eight measures to promote inward investment: deregulation 
of laws restraining inward investment in Japan; a cut in corporate tax rates; expansion 
of the ceiling of low-rate financing; reduction of land prices; revision of the public 
pension system; deregulation of construction permission processes; lifting the ban on 
holding companies; and deregulation of the conditions on issuing bonds.
Keidanren issued a fourth report, entitled The Promotion of Foreign Direct 
Investment and Imports to Japan in June 1995. The report examined the response of the 
government to 23 requests that Keidanren made in December 1993, and called on the 
government to consider further improvements. In addition, the report contained requests 
for rapid expansion of the import promotion zone, and extension of employment 
reference activities to private companies.
12 OTO was established in January 1982 as a consequence of a recommendation in 1981 by the 
Japan-US Economic Relations Advisory Group (the so-called Wisemen’s Group). Its primary 
objective is to deal promptly and efficiently with complaints from foreign businesses with respect 
to access to the Japanese market. For the details of OTO, see Komine (1986, pp. 135-43) and Boeki 
Nenkan (1989, pp. 150-55).
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Activities for promoting deregulation
Deregulation has been one of Keidanren’s major policy agendas since the early 1980s 
when the Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Daini Rincho) 
focused on it as one factor in administrative reform.13 Keidanren’s action in promoting 
deregulation in the 1990s has been even more comprehensive and decisive. Keidanren 
encouraged the government to implement deregulation by negotiating with the 
ministries and agencies involved and with ruling parties, and by critiquing government 
deregulation programs.
The Japanese government took up the cause of deregulation, especially after the 
Hosokawa Cabinet emerged under the banner of ‘reform’ in August 1993. The 
government announced an emergency economic package on 16 September 1993 which 
encompassed deregulation in 94 areas. Prior to this announcement, Keidanren identified 
its priorities for deregulation items. In March 1993, Keidanren released a position paper 
entitled Evaluation of Progress in Deregulation and Related Requests, and explained 
this at a session of the Third Provisional Council for Administrative Reform. 
Government ministries and agencies laid out initial deregulation plans by the end of 
August 1993, but the 60 items in these plans did not include core issues because the 
bureaucrats took a wait-and-see stance watching to see what others would sacrifice. 
Keidanren attempted to prevent ministries from omitting core areas from 
deregulation.14 On 2 September 1993, the heads of the five business federations met 
with Koshiro Ishida, Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency, 
and requested that the government promote deregulation. At that time, Keidanren 
submitted a paper Emergency Requests Concerning Deregulation and Other Measures. 
In this paper, Keidanren called on the government to examine deregulation of 30 
priority items across seven fields.
On 21 January 1994, an Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters, chaired 
by the Prime Minister, was set up. One month later, the government adopted a Cabinet 
Decision that would deregulate 250 items in the short term, and deregulate an additional 
531 items to facilitate the coordination and streamlining of various procedures, such as
13 A detailed explanation of Rincho will be provided later.
14 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 August 1993.
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the submission of notifications and reports in the long term. The Decision suggested 
drawing up a five-year action plan for deregulation by the end of the 1994 fiscal year.
The government recognised that selection of specific fields and in-depth 
deliberation on these fields would be an effective way of promoting deregulation. For 
this purpose, working groups were set up under the aegis of the Headquarters in March 
1994, charged with considering deregulation in three areas: housing and land; 
information and communications; and import promotion, and improvement in market 
access and distribution systems.15 The deliberations at the working groups led to a 
Cabinet Decision on 5 July 1994. Under this Decision, 279 items were listed for 
deregulation in those three fields and in finance, securities and insurance markets. The 
Decision also determined seven principles for promoting deregulation in the five-year 
action plan.
Before the Cabinet Decision was announced, Keidanren submitted proposals on 
13 May 1994 entitled A Proposal for a Decisive Deregulation to Realise Political, 
Administrative and Economic Reform. The proposals, which contained a deregulation 
list of 196 items relating to seven fields, suggested three principles for promoting 
deregulation: firstly, a zero-based principle which meant that all regulations should be 
abolished and re-created on the basis of current needs; secondly, a sunset principle 
which would require automatic review or elimination within a certain time frame (five 
years at maximum) when the government enacts new rules or regulations; and thirdly, a 
due-process principle which requires public hearings where affected parties would 
outline their views when new regulatory legislation is introduced in the Diet.16
On 31 March 1995, the government announced the five-year program 
deregulating 1,091 items. Keidanren had earlier made public its views on this in A 
Proposal for a Deregulation Promotion Plan for Japan on 17 November 1994. It 
recommended comprehensive deregulation, including 456 items across 19 areas. It also 
suggested that the five-year deregulation program aim to cut economic regulations by 
half within five years.17
15 Nikkei Bijinesu, 12 September 1994, p. 117.
16 Keidanren Shuho, No.2213, 23 May 1994, pp.2-5.
17 Keidanren Review, No. 148, February 1995, pp.4-7.
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Keidanren also promoted deregulation through cooperation with the Economic 
Reform Research Council (the so-called Hiraiwa group), whose chairmanship was 
assumed by Gaishi Hiraiwa, Chairman of Keidanren. The 15-member council began its 
work on 16 September 1993 as a private advisory body to Prime Minister Hosokawa, 
following an example of the Maekawa panel in 1986. Its aim was to furnish a blueprint 
for structural reform policies of the Japanese economy from a mid and long-term 
perspective. The panel submitted an interim report on 8 November 1993. The report 
stressed the need for a wholesale review of government regulations, stating that 
economic regulations should be abolished in principle and social regulations on safety, 
health and the environment should be kept to a minimum, based on the principle of 
individual responsibility, with separate lists showing nearly 500 examples of regulations 
that could be eliminated or revised. The report also noted that a five-year plan for 
promoting deregulation should be enacted, and a powerful third party organisation 
should be established in order to examine the deregulation plan, monitor the progress of 
deregulation, and issue recommendations to promote the efforts. Keidanren actively 
supported the panel. Two officials were appointed as full-time officials for the panel. In 
addition, Keidanren was prepared to write a draft of the report that the panel would 
publish.18
The demand for deregulation that would curtail the mandate of bureaucrats and 
lead to a change in existing power structures has faced severe resistance from ministries 
and agencies. A typical example is the attitude of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
towards the elimination and reduction of tariffs on agricultural products and textiles. 
When Keidanren asked MOF to put tariffs in the five-year deregulation program, MOF 
asserted that tariffs were not regulations, and the items regarding tariffs were not listed 
on the scheme.19 Frequently, when an issue was relevant to several ministries, each 
ministry asserted that this was relevant to other ministries, and eventually no ministry 
took responsibility.20 In the deliberations of the working groups under the 
Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters, resistance from bureaucrats was 
powerful. Isao Nakauchi, a vice-chairman of Keidanren, joined the working group as a
18
19
20
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 October 1993. 
Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995. 
Gekkan Keidanren, June 1994, p.17.
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Headquarters specialist. He recalls that ‘even if detailed suggestions were set up at the 
Headquarters, these were eventually overturned by opinions of former bureaucrat 
members. It was quite out of the question that representatives from the private sector be 
allowed to participate in the final meeting’.21
Strong resistance to deregulation was apparent in the deliberations of the 
Economic Reform Research Council. In mid October 1993, the secretariat of the 
Council establihsed in the Secretariat of the Cabinet drew up a draft of the interim 
report. The draft was not only unclear and without detailed expression but it lacked a 
guarantee for implementation. In addition, regulations in banking, securities, and 
insurance, which were under the jurisdiction of MOF, were not included in the draft. 
This was allegedly because the director of the secretariat came from MOF.22 The 
members from the private sector suggested rewriting the draft. Hence, concrete 
examples of regulations regarding electricity, gas, and international air fares were spelt 
out in the interim report. The report also referred to the creation of an independent 
agency to monitor a program of deregulation, although a specific legal designation for 
the agency was not named. In addition, intensive debate occurred over the independent 
agency in the draft subcommittee.23 The members were split over the authority of the 
agency, and requested the opinion of Chairman Hiraiwa. In spite of Hiraiwa’s support 
for giving more authority to the agency, his opinion was not adopted because of strong
objections from former bureaucrat members (Nakatani and Öta, 1994, pp. 147-48).
The promotion of deregulation has been espoused generally by the business 
community. But there are important differences between Keidanren and Nissho, the 
latter representing the interests of small business. Keidanren has argued for the abolition 
of economic regulations in principle. Nissho has adopted a more cautious attitude to 
regulatory reform. In December 1994, for instance, Nissho expressed the fear that the 
abolition of economic regulations might provoke excessive competition among firms, 
and eventually lead to market dominance by big companies with large capital and 
human resources.
21 Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 17 June 1994.
22 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 20 October 1993.
23 The panel set up a subcommittee composed of four members —  two former bureaucrats, one 
business leader and one scholar —  in order to draw up the draft of the report.
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The deregulation issue which divides Keidanren and Nissho most sharply is the 
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law.24 Keidanren has demanded the amendment of the Law 
including its incremental abolition.25 Keidanren considers that reform of the Law will 
improve efficiency in the distribution system and create new business and job 
opportunities. In addition, reform is expected to increase imports of finished products 
by facilitating the business of large-scale stores which tend to import more than small- 
scale retailers.
Nissho’s position is ambiguous. Originally Nissho was expected to coordinate 
interests between local small retailers and large-scale retailers.26 However, Nissho has 
promoted the interests of small and medium-sized retailers. Not only are half of the 
Nissho’s management funds derived from local small and medium-sized retailers but 
also senior officials in certain local chambers of commerce and industry have been local 
retailers (Terada 1994, p. 18). In addition, the Councils for Coordinating Commercial 
Activities played a role in coordinating interest in local areas until they disbanded in 
January 1992. Secretariats of the Councils set up in the local chambers of commerce 
and industry contributed the authority of chambers of commerce and industry, and 
maintained their influence on retail stores (Kusano 1992, p.240). The abolition of the 
Councils as a part of deregulation of the Law reduced the authority of chambers of 
commerce and industry. Hence, reform of the Law, insofar as it threatened the 
management of small and medium-sized local retailers and undermined Nissho’s
24 The Law came into force in March 1974. Its aim is to promote the proper development of retail 
business and to insure business opportunities for small and medium-sized retailers by regulating 
the retail activities of large-scale stores in the area concerned with care for protecting consumer 
interests. The Law has been amended many times. The amendment in May 1979, February 1982, 
and February 1984 aimed to strengthen the regulation on large-scale stores. The amendments in 
the 1990s —  in May 1990, January 1992, and May 1994 —  aimed to make it easier for large 
retailers to own a larger number of outlets and to strengthen their businesses.
25 Keidanren recommended deregulation in the distribution sector in February 1988, March 1990, 
December 1993, and September 1995. In its recommendations, it demanded that the Law should 
be amended to expand business opportunities of large retail stores. In the recommendations that 
referred to deregulation as a whole, Keidanren has also raised the amendment of the Law as a 
primary interest.
26 Reflecting this character of Nissho, the Large-Scale Retail Store Council has an executive director 
of Nissho as one of its seven members (Kusano 1992, p.240).
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authority, cannot be accepted by Nissho. Nissho has sought to prevent abolition of the 
Law and further reform of the Law.27
Results of activities
Keidanren’s attempts to promote inward foreign investment have led to changes in 
government policies.28 In the second and third reports, Keidanren requested the lifting 
of the ban on holding companies. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) had refused the 
lifting. For instance, it lodged its opposition with an Administrative Reform Promotion 
Headquarters and the tax reform panel of the coalition government in June 1994.29 
However, opposition to the regulation has been gradually fostered.30 The lifting of the 
ban on holding companies was excluded in the preliminary report of the five-year 
deregulation program. In the final program announced on 31 March 1995, however, the 
FTC agreed to exchange opinions with the private sector and investigate the subject 
over the next three years.31
The functions of OTO were strengthened in February 1994. Under the revised 
system, the Prime Minister is the head of the Office of OTO, and the rank of member 
officials of the Office was raised from vice-ministers to ministers. In addition, the OTO 
advisory council was transformed into a Market Access Ombudsman Council. The
27 In April 1990, Chairman of Nissho, Rokuro Ishikawa, displayed his dissatisfaction with the 
amendment of the Law, stating that the Law’s amendment and abolition would lead to a rush of 
large-scale stores, creating great uncertainty and disorder among small retailers (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 6 April 1990). When the abolition of the Councils for Coordination Commercial 
Activities was decided, Nissho suggested establishing the Councils for Commercial Issues, which 
had the substantially same function of the Councils for Coordination Commercial Activities 
(Kusano 1992, p.240).
28 For the details of overall government policies for promoting inward investment, see MITI 
(1995b).
29 In a position paper, the FTC raised three reasons for the ban on holding companies: firstly, 
holding companies become a means to control business, leading to the impeding of free and fair 
competition; secondly, removal of the ban would strengthen Japanese keiretsu groupings which 
would stimulate criticism from foreign countries; and thirdly, corporate restructuring is possible 
within the framework of the existing antitrust statutes (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 7 June 1994).
30 Keizai Doyukai released a report in October 1992, urging the government to abolish the ban on 
holding companies in order to bring Japan’s corporate system into alignment with Western 
countries (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 October 1992). The advisory panel to Director of MITI’s 
Industrial Policy Bureau also announced a report in February 1995. The report maintained that the 
ban on holding companies had lost rationality, and concrete deliberation to lift this should be set 
forth (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 February 1995).
31 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 March 1995.
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Council, composed of members selected directly by the Prime Minister, can initiate 
recommendations even when the Office of OTO does not ask it to do so.32
There have also been changes in the regulations on discounts and prizes. The FTC 
was reluctant to revise the regulations on discounts and prizes on the grounds that the 
costs of discounts and prizes would be transferred to sale prices. However, the 
government incorporated revision of the regulations on discounts and prizes in the 
external economic reform plan announced in March 1994.33
Keidanren’s commitment to deregulation has led the debate and pushed policy 
development. The five-year deregulation program announced in March 1995 was the 
first action program for deregulation. This action program was partially a result of 
Keidanren’s persistence. In March 1988, Keidanren’s Committee on Administrative 
Reform compiled a position paper entitled Proposals for Deregulation. In this paper, 
Keidanren sought a government action program with a defined time table for 
deregulation.34 The need for drawing up an action program was repeated in a position 
paper entitled Basic Stance on Administrative Reform for the 21st Century, released in 
February 1993. Keidanren’s demands were incorporated in the Cabinet Decision in 
February 1994, and led to the five-year deregulation program in March 1995.
In the process of drawing up the five-year deregulation program, the Deliberation 
Committee on Deregulation, composed of the representatives from business circles and 
academia, reflected the interests of the private sector on the final program. This 
committee was set up as a consequence of successful pressure from Keidanren. The 
government, at first, had no intention of setting up an organisation including 
representatives from the private sector. Keidanren approached politicians of Shinto 
Sakigake, emphasising the difference between the Hosokawa and Murayama Cabinet. 
The Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters under the Hosokawa Cabinet was
32 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 February; 25 February 1994.
33 In March 1995, the FTC announced that it would ease the regulations on discounts and prizes. The 
maximum value of discounts to all buyers was set at 10 per cent of the regular price of a product 
or up to a maximum of 50,000 yen. The new regulations left the 10 per cent rule but lifted the 
50,000 yen ceiling. The FTC also agreed to increase the maximum of 50,000 yen of prizes to 
selected customers, and to raise the maximum allowed value of prizes awarded to winners from a 
pool of entrants from 1 million to some 10 million yen (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 29 March 1995).
34 Keidanren Geppo, May 1988, p.9.
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originally expected to include representatives from the private sector. However, strong 
resistance from bureaucrats prevented this. Instead, working groups under the 
Headquarters accepted the private sector representatives. Keidanren persuaded Sakigake 
politicians, arguing that even working groups were not set up at the deliberation of 
deregulation at the Murayama Cabinet. Strong support from Sakigake saw the 
deliberation committee set up.35 This committee had a big impact on the five-year 
action program. One hundred and twenty nine of the 172 items that the committee 
raised were accepted in the five-year action program.36 The committee’s programs 
contained Keidanren’s major demands. Furthermore, Keidanren’s commitment 
contributed to a strengthening of the five-year deregulation program. The preliminary 
plans of the program contained many items which had no time schedule for 
implementation. On 20 March 1995, Shoichiro Toyoda, Chairman of Keidanren, asked 
Prime Minister Murayama and major cabinet members directly to specify the date for 
implementation. By 31 March, the implementation schedule was specified in all 
plans.37
Government deregulation policies included many of the issues taken up by 
Keidanren. The emergency economic package the government announced on 16 
September 1993 included 21 out of the 30 items on Keidanren’s agenda.38 Sixty 
deregulation proposals that the government announced as the initial plans at the end of 
August 1993 covered only seven out of 30 items that Keidanren raised.39 Keidanren 
actively lobbied ministries to incorporate more items. As a result, an additional 14 items 
were included in the final package. In the Cabinet Decision on deregulation in June 
1994, 98 out of 196 requests by Keidanren were completely incorporated and an 
additional 14 items were partially accepted.40 In the case of the five-year deregulation 
program issued in March 1995, 428 items across 15 fields out of the 456 items across
35 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
36 Gekkan Keidanren, June 1995, p.31.
37 Gekkan Keidanren, June 1995, p.31.
38 Keidanren Review, No. 142, October 1993, p.6.
39 Asahi Shimbun, 2 September 1993.
40 Asahi Shimbun, 9 August 1994.
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19 fields that Keidanren requested became the target. Out of 428 items, 130 items were 
completely realised, and an additional 79 items were partially realised.41
Although Keidanren has succeeded in having its demands incorporated into 
government policieas for deregulation, some qualifications are necessary to assess 
Keidanren’s capability and influence. Firstly, there are many deregulation measures 
which have been implemented with little or no involvement of Keidanren. A notable 
example is the amendment of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law in May 1990. This 
amendment was largely a result of US pressure during the Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) talks (Terada 1994). Secondly, Keidanren’s commitment to deregulation 
is often supported by political initiatives. Keidanren’s officials make prior consultation 
with relevant ministries and agencies. If they think that some items are possible to 
deregulate logically through this consultation, they commit politicians to supporting 
their deregulation.42 Politicians have played a critical role in realising Keidanren’s 
requests. For instance, a critical reason why Keidanren’s requests were largely accepted 
in the emergency economic package in September 1993 was that Masayoshi Takemura, 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Hosokawa Cabinet, encouraged ministries to 
consider Keidanren’s requests positively.43 Thirdly, Keidanren has experienced 
resistance to deregulation in the debate within Keidanren. Keidanren includes a wide 
range of companies and industries among its members, and its opinions tend to be the 
so-called soron sansei kakuron hantai [endorse the general principle but reject specific 
measures for implementation] because of difficulty in coordinating interests among 
members. Deregulation is not an exception to this general tendency. Industries that 
enjoy vested interests under existing regulations are likely to exert veto power to oppose 
measures to curtail the interests. The most notable example is the petroleum sector. The 
Natural Resource and Energy Agency put forward a plan in June 1994 to abolish the 
Special Temporary Law for Import of Specific Petroleum Products which regulated
41 Gekkan Keidanren, June 1995, p.31.
42 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
43 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 October 1993; Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995. In the 
Hata Cabinet, Hiroshi Kumagai, Cheif Cabinet Secretary, was the key politician who promoted 
deregulation, while Koichi Kato, Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council 
(PARC), played a similar role in the Murayama Cabinet (Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 
1995).
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imports of petroleum products. Shoichiro Toyoda, Chairman of Keidanren, expressed 
his support for the reform, but he met strong resistance from the Petroleum Association 
of Japan.44 In addition, when Keidanren drew up recommendations for deregulation in 
May 1994, proposals on the petroleum sector were omitted from the text due to strong 
opposition from that sector.45 Another example is liberalisation of the retail price of 
cigarettes. In spite of the appreciation of the yen, retail prices of cigarettes did not fall 
because of price regulation. When Keidanren sought to nominate cigarettes for 
deregulation, the tobacco industry strongly opposed it.46
Keidanren’s motivations
Why has Keidanren become so active in promoting inward investment and deregulation 
in the 1990s? Keidanren’s advocacy of the promotion of inward investment derives 
largely from the management of international trade friction and the internationalisation 
of corporate activity. A primary concern is that the huge Japanese foreign investment 
imbalance would foster a protectionist climate in foreign countries. The 1992 
recommendation referred to this concern, observing that ‘if investment friction is added 
to the current trade friction, a protectionist trend will be further fueled’.47 In addition, 
the advanced multinationalisation of Japanese corporations provides the background of 
Keidanren’s commitment to promoting inward investment. Japanese corporations have 
made big inroads into foreign countries and made efforts to be accepted in local 
markets. However, acceptance in foreign countries requires reciprocal acceptance of 
foreign firms in Japan.
The demand for deregulation has more complicated origins. Firstly, Keidanren 
advocated deregulation in order to promote change in the Japanese economic system 
away from a bureaucratic, centralised system to a private sector led decentralised
44 The Nikkei Weekly, 20 June 1994.
45 Although Kozo Uchida, a managing director of Keidanren met with Yasuoki Takeuchi, President 
of the Petroleum Association of Japan, many times in order to discuss this issue, Uchida could not 
persuade Takeuchi to put the regulations regarding the petroleum sector on the deregulation list 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 November 1994).
46 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
47 Keidanren Review, Special Issue, 1993, p.2.
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system based on individual responsibility. This objective was spelt out explicitly in the 
position paper issued in November 1994:
Japan is now undergoing a period of radical reform. The era o f the government-controlled 
socioeconomic system, the dynamo that has driven Japan’s economic growth since the 
Meiji Period, is coming to a close. If we are to chart a new course o f growth for the 21st 
century —  and create a new society that fulfills its responsibilities to both the 
international community and its citizens —  we must create a new social and economic 
system. The days for maternal protection are over. We must create this new, deregulated 
society now —  one that is based on freedom o f choice and supported by the principle of 
individual responsibility.48
Secondly, Keidanren sees deregulation as important in raising international 
competitiveness in the non-manufacturing sector. The Japanese economy is a mixture of 
export-oriented manufacturing industries and domestically oriented mainly non­
manufacturing industries. While the former have enhanced their competitiveness, the 
latter — transportation, telecommunications, distribution, construction, financing, and 
insurance — have long been protected by regulations. The regulations have dissuaded 
new entry and competition and left the industries less productive and less 
competitive.49 The slow restructuring in non-manufacturing industries has created a 
high cost economic structure, invited low level imports and a high yen, and eventually 
imposed additional costs on manufacturing industries. Keidanren’s demand for 
deregulation is an effort to alleviate the burden that is imposed on the manufacturing 
sector by the uncompetitive non-manufacturing sector. Although the Japanese economy 
grew with the expansion of the manufacturing sector until 1980s, a rise in 
competitiveness in the whole of industry is indispensable in the 1990s (Takenaka and 
Miyoshi 1995, p.38). Reflecting Keidanren’s concern about the non-manufacturing 
sector, it raised telecommunications, transportation, distribution as the primary fields 
for deregulation in its recommendations in September 1993, May 1994, and November 
1994.
Thirdly, Keidanren considers administrative reform and deregulation as 
indispensable for resolving trade friction. Deregulation is expected to promote imports
48 Keidanren Review, No. 148, February 1995, p.4.
49 For example, labour productivity in the manufacturing sector grew 5.8 per cent annually between 
1985 and 1992, while that in the non-manufacturing sector increased 3.0 per cent in the same 
period (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 September 1993).
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and investment in Japan, to narrow the gap between prices in Japan and abroad, and to 
rectify Japan’s trade surplus. More importantly, deregulation aims to promote the 
compatibility of Japan’s economic system with international norms. In Japan, 40 per 
cent of gross national product (GNP) is produced by industries under government 
regulation. This ratio is extremely high compared with those in other industrial 
countries (6.6 per cent in the United States). As Japanese industry has been 
internationalised, it is important for Japan to compete under the same international 
competitive conditions. Deregulation is indispensable for creating equal and fair 
conditions for competition.50
In brief, Keidanren has intensified its commitment to promoting inward 
investment and deregulation in the 1990s. Through the promotion of deregulation, 
Keidanren has aimed to change Japan from a bureaucracy-led economic system to a 
private sector led system, as well as to enhance the competitiveness of regulated sectors. 
Equally important in promoting inward investment and deregulation is Keidanren’s 
interest in preventing further trade friction and facilitating Japanese firms’ multinational 
operations through the creation of a more open Japanese market. Keidanren’s 
commitment to opening the Japanese market in the 1990s has involved an extension of 
its focus from trade policy itself to investment policy and the regulatory system as these 
factors significantly affect the closed nature of the Japanese economic system.
KEIDANREN’S STANCE ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POLICY
Japan has long maintained a protectionist policy in the agricultural sector. The 
government has used quantitative import quotas, tariffs and state trading in order to 
protect domestic agriculture. Keidanren is a major advocate of the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade.51 It has made many recommendations for promoting the 
liberalisation of farm product imports and the reform of administrative regulations on 
agriculture (Table 7.5).
50 Gaiko Foramu, June 1992, pp.14-15.
51 The other players who stand in line with Keidanren are such ministries as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, MITI, the Economic Planning Agency and the media. For the stance of major players over 
agricultural liberalisation, see George (1990).
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Table 7.5 Keidanren’s Recommendations Regarding Agricultural Trade and 
Policy
Date Tide
Feb. 1981 
Jan. 1982 
Sep. 1983 
Jun. 1985 
Dec. 1986 
Jan. 1987 
May. 1988 
Nov. 1988 
May. 1991 
Mar. 1992 
May. 1994
Problems of Agricultural Policy from the Food Industry Viewpoint
How Agriculture and Agricultural Policy Should Be Developed
The Food Industry in an Internationally Open Economic Society
A View on Food Security
White Paper on the Food Industry
Rice Deregulation: A Multistage Approach
1987 White Paper on the Food Industry
A View on Raw Materials in the Food Industry and Agricultural Policy
Third White Paper on the Food Industry
Japan’s Agricultural Policy: Facing the 21st Century
Demand for Deregulation on Agriculture and the Food Industry
Source: Compiled from Keidanren’s internal documents.
Stance on agriculture before 1985
Keidanren’s stance on agricultural policy and agricultural trade has evolved over time. 
Keidanren was, by and large, tolerant of agricultural protection before the mid 1970s 
for several reasons. Firstly, Keidanren shared the popular view of the need to secure 
sufficient food supplies. Keidanren, as well as the agricultural groups, acknowledged a 
national security reason for ensuring a basic food supply (George and Saxon 1986, 
p.102). Furthermore, in the era of high economic growth, Japan had a limited capacity 
to purchase foreign food because of a shortage of foreign currency.52 Secondly, big 
business recognised the importance of rural areas in support for the conservative 
administration. Agricultural groups constituted the main electoral support for the 
conservative party. Business circles represented by Keidanren recognised the continuity 
of the conservative administration provided a stable basis for business activities. 
Accordingly, Keidanren did not advocate policies that would weaken the agricultural 
group.
Keidanren changed its fundamental stance on agricultural trade policy in the 
1980s. It intensified demands for liberalisation of farm products trade after it
52 Interview, Zenchu, Tokyo, September 1995.
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established the Committee on Agricultural Policy in January 1980. This Committee 
comprised the presidents of meat processors, beer producers, flour-milling firms, 
beverage producers and so on. The Committee’s report, Problems of Agricultural 
Policy from the Food Industry Viewpoint, released in February 1981, was based on the 
perception that expensive domestic agricultural raw materials robbed Japanese food 
processors of international competitiveness. It suggested that restrictions on imports of 
agricultural raw materials should be lifted to enable the Japanese food industry to 
procure them at international prices. It also proposed that the government should, 
instead of restricting imports, introduce deficiency payments in a major reform of 
domestic agricultural policy. The report in January 1982 suggested that the market 
mechanism should be introduced into the agricultural sector in order to alleviate the 
financial burden of Japanese agriculture as well as to strengthen its competitiveness. 
More significantly, it proposed the expansion of farm scale, improvement of 
agricultural infrastructure, the strengthening of research and development aimed at cost 
reductions, and the creation of new agricultural technologies. The report in September 
1983 explained how the Japanese food industry was losing competitiveness against 
foreign suppliers due to its inability to import raw materials freely. The report proposed 
swift liberalisation of raw materials imports through a market opening timetable for 
import quotas on farm products, and revision of the price support systems for 
agricultural and livestock items.
Several international and domestic factors encouraged Keidanren to change its 
stance on agricultural trade liberalisation in the 1980s. The expansion of Japan’s trade 
surplus with its major trading partners, especially the United States, from the second 
half of the 1970s was one factor. The US government demanded liberalisation of 
Japan’s beef and citrus market from autumn 1977, and this demand intensified in the 
final negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tokyo 
Round in 1978-79. The United States strengthened its pressure on agricultural 
liberalisation in late 1981, facing the impending expiry of the agricultural trade 
agreements between Japan and the United States reached in the Tokyo Round (George 
and Saxon 1986, p. 106). Threats by US politicians and officials of retaliatory 
protectionism against Japanese manufacturing exports caused a sense of crisis in 
Keidanren which had export-oriented industries and firms as its major members
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(George and Saxon 1986, p.106). Accordingly, Keidanren shifted gradually to an anti- 
protectionist stance on agricultural trade.
Keidanren’s liberal stance on agricultural trade also derived from several 
domestic factors. Firstly, Keidanren considered that the liberalisation of farm products 
trade was indispensable to restore the profitability and competitiveness of the Japanese 
food industry.53 Owing to the high cost of domestic agricultural raw materials, 
Japanese food processors were disadvantaged in competition against foreign rivals who 
had access to cheaper raw materials.54 Japanese food processors, who dominated the 
Food Industry Policy Division under the Committee on Agricultural Policy, sought to 
reflect their interests in Keidanren’s approach. Their interests were incorporated into 
policy pronouncements in February 1981 and September 1983, protesting the need to 
pay high prices for domestic agricultural products and demanding easier access to 
inexpensive imported raw materials.
Secondly, Keidanren regarded reform of agricultural policy as indispensable to 
fiscal reform (George and Saxon 1986, p.106). Agriculture related spending constituted 
a large portion of the national budget. In 1970, the budget for agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries accounted for 11.5 per cent of the general account, 42 per cent of which was 
used for subsidies and 48 per cent was carried over to the special account for food 
control. In 1980, the share of the agricultural-related budget in the general account was 
reduced to 8.4 per cent, but subsidies accounted for 65 per cent. In this year, the 
subsidisation of rice amounted to US$5.2 billion, while that of other crops amounted to 
US$1.4 billion (Balassa 1986, p.758). Keidanren attacked excessive subsidies to 
farmers and deficits in the special account for food control as major causes of the 
national deficit and of the rise in corporate tax rates.
53 The food industry produced 24 trillion yen of the total value of goods with 1.14 million employees 
in 1981, compared with 12 trillion yen with 5.34 million in agriculture. The industry was the third 
largest manufacturing sector in Japan, with 10.7 per cent of the total value of produced goods.
54 The high price of domestic agricultural materials is pointed out in several Keidanren’s reports. For 
instance, one report states that *[d]omestically produced rice costs 3.2 times more than imported 
rice. Likewise, industrial users pay 3.8 times more for domestic wheat, 3.8 times more for 
soybeans, and 2.5 times more for butter. . . .  The result is that raw material costs add up to 64.4% 
of the total value of the food processing industry’s annual production’ (KKC Brief, No. 11, 
September 1983). The White Paper on the Food Industry issued in December 1986 also stated that 
one kilogram of sugar costs 58 yen in Melbourne, 118 yen in New York, 90 yen in London and 
198 yen in Tokyo, while one kilogram of skim milk costs 138, 287, 254, 545 yen, respectively.
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Stance on agriculture after 1985
The recommendations of Keidanren in the early 1980s tended to be general, but 
increasingly, they contained detailed proposals criticising agricultural policy including 
that on rice. In a report of June 1985, the Committee of Agricultural Policy criticised 
the time-honoured national food security tenet as narrowly focusing on improvement in 
self-sufficiency rates, and recommended an emphasis instead on improvement in self- 
sufficiency capacity. The report suggested that Japan should unload its food stockpiles 
when the opportunity arose, that people should change their eating habits and that the 
production of food that generates higher calories such as grains and potatoes should 
increase.
In September 1985, Keidanren set up a Rice Problem Subcommittee under the 
Committee on Agricultural Policy comprising experts from rice related companies. The 
Subcommittee drew up a report on rice deregulation in January 1987.55 The report was 
a landmark because this was the first proposal in which a business federation referred to 
reform of the food control system regulating all aspects of Japan’s rice market.56 The 
report recommended that the food control system should be lifted within five years in 
two phases.57 The report also suggested revision of rice import controls, arguing that 
rice imports for industrial processing should be deregulated, and hinted at the 
possibility of opening up rice imports when supplies fell below market intervention 
requirements or special varieties of rice that meet diversifying demand were required.
The demand for liberalisation of rice imports by Keidanren grew louder in the 
1990s. Keidanren released a report, Third White Paper on the Food Industry, in May 
1991. The report pointed out that the price gap between domestic and imported food
55 In order to draw up the report, the Subcommittee held 16 seminars which involved hearings from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), local governments, and other 
interested organisations, as well as observation tours to obtain first-hand information (Keidanren 
Review, No. 103, February 1987, p.2).
56 The Japan Times, 28 January 1987.
57 In the first phase, the ratio of rice the government buys from the farmers to the total harvest 
should be reduced from 60 per cent to 30 per cent, and in the second phase, the volume of 
government rice should be reduced to a level sufficient for adjusting supply and demand and 
maintaining stockpiles. The second phase also aimed to remove farm cooperative rice, which is 
distributed independently by agricultural cooperatives (nolcyo), from government control, and to 
promote rational price formation guided by transactions on the rice market (KKC Brief, No.41, 
March 1987).
231
materials remained large in the food processing industry, and suggested that the market 
mechanism needed to come into play on Japan’s rice market. At Keidanren’s general 
meeting on 24 May 1991, a resolution calling on the government to open the rice 
market partially and take the lead in reaching a successful conclusion at the GATT 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was adopted.58 Keidanren was the 
first business federation to adopt a resolution demanding liberalisation of rice 
imports.59 In its paper Demand for Deregulation on Agriculture and the Food Industry 
in May 1994, Keidanren suggested drastic deregulation of rice production and retailing. 
The paper proposed selective rice acreage reduction. It also suggested diversifying sales 
channels for rice in order to lessen the price gap.
Keidanren’s demand for liberalisation of agricultural trade has intensified since 
the mid 1980s. Not only did Keidanren demand open farm products trade, providing 
detailed proposals on farm products trade and agricultural policy, but it also called for 
the liberalisation of the rice market after the late 1980s. Such changes can be explained 
by the internationalisation of Japanese manufacturing corporate activities. The demand 
from Japan’s trade partners for opening the Japanese market escalated in the second half 
of the 1980s as Japan’s trade surpluses grew rapidly. The Uruguay Round, which had 
begun in September 1986, became the critical agenda in maintaining the free trade 
system. In the negotiations, Japan’s restriction on rice imports became a major issue. 
These factors motivated the intensification of Keidanren’s opposition to agricultural 
protection.
The necessity to open Japan’s agricultural market to maintain the international 
trade system was articulated vigorously by senior executives of Keidanren. At the 
annual meeting when Keidanren adopted the resolution calling for the partial rice 
liberalisation in May 1991, Gaishi Hiraiwa, Chairman of Keidanren, stated that ‘it’s 
important for Japan to take the initiative in bringing the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to a successful
58 Keidanren organised a top level meeting with the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
(Zenchu) on 10 May, two weeks earlier than Keidanren’s resolution. Senior executives of 
Keidanren suggested that liberalisation of the rice market should be promoted with policies to 
mitigate effects attended by its opening (Honjo 1993, pp.300-301).
59 The Japan Times, 28 May 1991.
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conclusion. For that purpose, the rice issue could become Tokyo’s trump card, and 
Japan’s decision (to open its market to rice imports) will have no small impact 
internationally’.60 In November 1991, Toshikuni Yahiro, a vice-chairman of 
Keidanren, also stressed the need for rice liberalisation from an international point of 
view:
The issue of food security, which the government and agricultural organizations have 
clung to as a way of justifying the ban on foreign rice, is selfish. It ignores the benefits 
that Japan has enjoyed over the past century by exploiting the world’s free markets. . . . 
Japan has a duty to contribute to the preservation of international free trade, for which the 
success of the Uruguay Round is crucial. The opening of the rice market is symbolic 
from this perspective.61
The internationally oriented firms in the manufacturing sector have not directly 
been involved in the drawing up of Keidanren’s recommendations on agricultural 
issues. This is because the agricultural group has always considered farmers to be 
victims of trade disputes which had been caused by export-oriented firms and 
industries.62 If export-oriented firms had advocated the liberalisation of agricultural 
products too actively, it would exacerbate the antagonistic feeling against them. 
However, their influence seems to have become critical in Keidanren’s stance on 
agricultural trade, as shown by the fact that motivations demanding liberalisation of 
agricultural trade have expanded from a measure to maintain international 
competitiveness of the food industry in the early 1980s to the broader objective of 
sustaining the free trade system in the late 1980s. The driving force behind Keidanren’s
60 Mainichi Daily News, 26 May 1991.
61 The Nikkei Weekly, 16 November 1991.
62 For example, when tariff reductions on agricultural products were determined in the Action 
Program in 1985, Chairman of Zenchu commented that although the government explained the 
reductions as a response to foreign requests, the agricultural sector was sacrificed to a massive 
volume of exports of manufacturing products (Asahi Shimbun, 26 June 1985). In addition, 
Zenchu's position paper, Gatto uruguai raundo nogyo kosho ni kansuru nogyo seisansha no 
shucho [The assertion of farmers regarding the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations on 
agriculture], released in February 1991, states that ‘excess exports of Japan’s manufacturing 
products have rapidly expanded under the GATT free trade system causing trade friction with 
importing countries. Closed markets other than agriculture are also criticised by Japan’s trading 
partners, as shown by the Japan-US Structural Impediments Initiative talks. Japan is required to 
revise its industrial and trade policies by the international community, yet there is an argument to 
put an excess burden of international responsibility on the agricultural sector in order to delay 
substantial solutions for these issues. This argument lacks justice, making agriculture a scapegoat’ 
(Zenchu 1991, p.5).
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advocacy of agricultural trade liberalisation was the deepening of its commitment to the 
multilateral trade system.63
Opposition to Keidanren’s activities
In the process of demanding liberalisation of farm product imports and removal of 
excess protection for agriculture, Keidanren was confronted with strong opposition 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and agricultural 
groups represented by the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu).64 
MAFF intervened in the process of drafting the report of September 1983. In June 
1982, the Food Industry Policy Division under Keidanren’s Committee on Agricultural 
Policy organised a special deliberation group composed of general managers of food 
processing companies. The preliminary draft drawn up one year later strongly criticised 
agricultural policy on import quotas and the system of a virtual monopoly on beef 
imports and distribution by the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation. MAFF 
called on the members of the deliberation group to revise parts of this report. The 
announcement of the report was delayed for three months, and the passages criticising 
agricultural policy were revised.65 Zenchu also criticised the report on the grounds that 
its implementation would strengthen dependence on imported raw materials, that its 
timing was inappropriate because the Japan-US talks on trade in beef and oranges were 
about to be held, and that US President Reagan was to visit Japan soon.66
In March 1984, the Hokkaido Farmers’ Federation with a membership of 78,000 
passed a resolution to boycott the products of Daiei, the largest supermarket, 
Ajinomoto, a leading food maker, and Sony. Daiei and Sony were targeted on the 
grounds that the senior executives of the companies publicly criticised the excessive 
protection given to Japanese agriculture.67 Ajinomoto was included in the boycott 
because Bunzo Watanabe, an advisor to Ajinomoto, led the move for import
63 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
64 Zenchu encompasses some 4,300 nokyo representing 4.4 million farmers and approximately 12 per 
cent of all households (Higashi and Lauter 1990, p. 162).
65 Asahi Shimbun, 21 September 1983.
66 Asahi Shimbun, 21 September 1983.
67 The Japan Economic Journal, 29 May 1984.
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liberalisation of agricultural products as the chairman of Keidanren’s Committee on 
Agricultural Policy. Watanabe eventually resigned the post, and the president of 
Ajinomoto offered a formal apology, stating that Keidanren’s recommendations lacked 
sensitivity towards Japanese agriculture.68 Although a new chairman of the Committee 
on Agricultural Policy was selected soon, this incident influenced the activities of the 
Committee. The Committee held a meeting in October 1984 to discuss the direction of 
its activities, and decided to investigate rice issues, food security, and the improvement 
in the environment for the food processing industry taking into consideration the role of 
agriculture in the Japanese economy and the special character of agriculture. At the 
same time, the Agricultural Policy Affairs Division (nosei bukai) and the Food Industry 
Division {shokuhin kogyo bukai) were abolished, and the Special Committee on 
Agricultural Policy Affairs (nosei senmon iinkai) and the Special Committee on Food 
Industry Policy {shokuhin kogyo seisaku senmon iinkai) were set up.69
Strong opposition from MAFF and agricultural groups was seen in the 1990s. In 
July 1991, Zenchu and two other farmers’ associations organised the ‘Emergency 
National Rally for the Protection of Rice’. More than 50,000 farmers from all over 
Japan gathered in Tokyo to protest against any liberalisation of the rice market. 
Following the rally, 200 farmers stormed Keidanren’s headquarters building to protest 
the resolution that Keidanren adopted in May demanding partial liberalisation of the 
rice market.70 In 1994, MAFF called President of Yamatane Corp., a rice distribution 
company, and dissuaded him from criticising the government’s food policies. Seizo 
Yamazaki, Chairman of the company, was the head of the Agricultural Policy Affairs 
Division of Keidanren’s Committee on Agricultural Policy, and criticised that the 
government’s food control system as impeding a stable food supply.71
The intervention from MAFF in Keidanren’s activities and opposition from the 
agricultural group indicate that they regard Keidanren’s activities as important and
68 Another two firms took a similar approach, and the Federation reached reconciliation with 
Ajinomoto and Daiei in May and with Sony in July.
69 Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, 1984, p.37. The two Special Committees were transformed into the 
Special Divisions in 1985.
70 The Japan Times, 2 July 1991.
71 The Daily Yomiuri, 7 June 1994.
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influential. In addition, as shown by the resignation of Watanabe, Keidanren’s advocacy 
of reform in agricultural policy and trade was accompanied by serious risk.
Influence on agricultural trade and policy
What influences have Keidanren’s activities had on policy outcomes in respect of 
agricultural issues? The liberalisation of agricultural trade has proceeded under strong 
pressure from foreign suppliers, especially the United States. The tariff reduction and 
removal of quotas on various agricultural products including beef, oranges, and citrus 
juice over the period for 1978 and 1988 were implemented in response to US pressure. 
In December 1993, the Japanese government agreed to convert all remaining 
agricultural import restrictions to tariffs, and to establish minimum access for rice. The 
deals over these issues were settled primarily in bilateral negotiations with the United 
States. Foreign pressure was, thus, a vital factor promoting liberalisation of agricultural 
trade. Keidanren was a prominent domestic actor in promoting the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade, but others were also important. For instance, the Policy Innovation 
Forum, a group of academic scholars, played a crucial role in publishing the costs of 
Japan’s agricultural protection when the Uruguay Round broke down.72
Some argue that Keidanren failed to get its way on agricultural policy owing to 
strong resistance from MAFF, agricultural interest groups and LDP’s norin zoku.73 
Some Keidanren officials admit that Keidanren’s influence on agricultural trade may 
have been limited.74 The limits to Keidanren’s influence on agricultural trade were 
threefold.
Firstly, agricultural issues were politically very sensitive. Many LDP politicians 
relied on rural support in gerrymandered election districts. Because of the dependence 
on the agricultural bloc, a number of LDP politicians had strong interests in agricultural
72 The Forum published a paper in January 1992, entitled ‘Towards the Success of the GATT 
Uruguay Round’. This paper emphasised the possibility that the United States and the European 
Community would move towards the formation of exclusive economic blocs if the Uruguay 
Round broke down. It also argued that if the rice issue shifted to bilateral Japan-US negotiations 
as a result of the breakdown of the Uruguay Round, the amount of imports Japan would be 
compelled to agree to would exceed the minimum access amount required under the GATT 
negotiations.
73 Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1992, p.47.
74 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
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issues.75 Vital decisions affecting agricultural policy depended on internal politics 
within the LDP as well as the LDP’s overall power in the Diet. This is evident in the 
changes in the policy stance of the LDP on agriculture in line with the results of 
national elections. In the 1980s, the LDP was in a position to adopt bold policies on 
agriculture when it gained an overwhelming majority in the Diet. The voice of 
agricultural reform was raised after the general election in July 1986 in which the LDP 
captured the biggest victory since its foundation in 1955, gaining 304 seats, 54 more 
than before the election. The Nakasone Cabinet drew confidence from this result in 
undertaking agricultural reform.76 The policy stance of the LDP on agricultural issues 
changed dramatically in mid 1989, after a devastating defeat in the Upper House 
election on 23 July 1989, which led to its loss of a sole majority for the first time since 
the party’s foundation.77 One of the most serious causes of this setback was the 
dissatisfaction of farmers with the liberalisation of imports of oranges and beef in June 
1988 and the ambivalent attitude of the LDP on the rice issue. After the election, the 
LDP was obliged to adopt policies that appeased the agricultural group.78 The LDP 
secured a clear majority in the Lower House election on 18 February 1990. After that, 
senior LDP politicians began to express the view that some form of rice liberalisation 
was inevitable 79
75 In 1985, for example, the Division on Agriculture and Forestry with 149 members was the largest 
among 17 LDP’s PARC divisions, while the Comprehensive Farm Policy Committee with 216 
members was the biggest committee in PARC (Satö and Matsuzaki 1986, pp.256-59).
76 In August 1986, Kazuo Tamaki, Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency, 
ordered the implementation of administrative inspections on business practices of nokyo (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 14 September 1986). The Agency implemented the investigation on 124 nokyo, 
and submitted its final report in June 1988. In September 1986, Tamaki also suggested purchasing 
American rice by using the official development assistance budget, and sending it to developing 
countries as official assistance products (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 September 1986).
77 In a nationwide poll for the 126 seats of the 252 member Upper House, the LDP won 36 — down 
from 69 — while the Japan Socialist Party gained 46 — up from 22.
78 The LDP decided to maintain 830,000 hectares of rice planting limits, although the original plan 
of MAFF was to expand these limits by 100,000 hectares. The LDP’s decision had a high 
probability of leading to an excess supply of rice (Asahi Shimbun, 11 November 1989). The 
subsidies on acreage cutbacks also increased to 180 billion yen. MOF’s intention to reduce the 
subsidies was rejected owing to strong pressure from the LDP which was keen to regain support 
from the agricultural bloc (Asahi Shimbun, 16 November 1989).
79 In July 1990, Toshio Yamaguchi, Chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee for Economic 
Coordination, contended that the acceptance of 5 per cent of rice imports in total domestic 
demand would be inevitable (Asahi Shimbun, 14 July 1990). In 1991, quite a few senior leaders of 
the LDP followed Yamaguchi. Takeo Nishioka, Chairman of LDP’s Executive Council, Shin
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The opening up of the rice market has been a national issue. A questionnaire 
survey by Asahi Shimbun in May 1990 revealed that 21 per cent of respondents 
supported liberalisation of the rice market and 17 per cent were in favour of gradual 
liberalisation. At the same time, 30 per cent of respondents supported the ban on rice 
imports and 27 per cent admitted minimum imports.80 The major opposition parties as 
well as the LDP have been opposed to the liberalisation of the rice market. The Diet 
three times passed resolutions opposing the opening of the rice market.81
The political sensitivity of agricultural issues made Keidanren sensitive to 
political factors in calling for the liberalisation of farm products trade. After the LDP 
experienced its historical setback in the Upper House election in July 1989, Keidanren 
suspended its advocacy of agricultural liberalisation until the party had obtained a 
secure majority in the Lower House election in February 1990. Between the two 
elections, Keidanren issued no reports on agricultural liberalisation.82
Secondly, Keidanren’s influence on the LDP in respect of agricultural issues was 
limited. The agricultural group and big business were the two wheels of the cart 
supporting the LDP administration. Agriculture contributed votes, while business 
provided money. Although the relative influence of these two sources of support for the 
LDP shifted over time and according to the issues, it was natural for the LDP to pay 
more attention to the interests of the agricultural group than to big business on 
agricultural issues. Furthermore, Keidanren’s influence on the LDP in respect of 
agricultural issues was also limited in terms of access. Keidanren has maintained tight 
linkages with party bosses and top-ranking officials. Initiatives on agricultural policies
Kanemaru, the former vice president of the LDP, and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu admitted that 
a partial lifting of the import ban on foreign rice was inevitable (Mainichi Daily News, 26 May 
1991; The Nikkei Weekly, 8 June 1991).
80 Asahi Shimbun, 4 June 1990.
81 The Diet passed resolutions against rice market liberalisation in April 1980, July 1984, and 
September 1988.
82 In July 1990, Keidanren resumed its campaign on agricultural liberalisation by sending a letter 
which called on the government to reduce or eliminate regulations imposed on agricultural 
imports (The Daily Yomiuri, 2 July 1990).
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are controlled by norin zoku. Norin zoku have often succeeded in achieving their 
objectives in spite of the opposition of party leaders.83
Thirdly, Keidanren was not a directly interested party in the area of agricultural 
issues. Basic policies on agriculture have been determined by MAFF, the agricultural 
group and LDP’s norin zoku. Even the food processing industry, which is often referred 
to as the second wheel of the cart, along with agriculture, for ensuring a stable food 
supply, has seldom been involved in decisions on agriculture. Moreover, MAFF’s Food 
Distribution Bureau, which has jurisdiction over the industry, has little power in the 
Ministry.84
Given the character of Keidanren’s interest in agricultural matters, it is not 
surprising that its influence was limited. This does not mean that Keidanren’s 
representation had no effect. One Zenchu official asserted that Keidanren’s views had a 
critical influence on agricultural policies because not only did the government pay 
attention but the mass media also gave prominence to Keidanren.85 A Keidanren 
executive also argued that Keidanren’s representation had a body-blow effect on 
agricultural policy.86 Keidanren became a harbinger challenging some of the tenets of 
agricultural policy, and spearheaded campaigns for the agricultural policy reform. In 
June 1985, Keidanren proposed a paper which suggested a suspension on the long- 
honoured tenet to improve the self-sufficiency rate. This was a bold challenge to the 
agricultural groups, and forced Zenchu to publish a view rebuking it one week later. 
Keidanren was the first business federation to take a hard look at the food control 
system.87 Other associations published views on the food control system after
83 For example, norin zoku successfully dropped the reduction of quotas on agricultural products 
from the list of the Action Program in July 1985, in spite of the earnest desire of the Nakasone 
Cabinet. In the case of the decision on producer rice price in 1986, even the leaders of norin zoku 
were unable to resist pressure from the rice Diet members and junior Diet members. Although the 
government intended to lower the producer rice price, and the bosses of norin zoku agreed to this, 
the rice Diet members and junior Diet members, who were subject to various pressures from the 
agricultural group, led the LDP to agree to leave the price at the previous year’s level (Inoguchi 
and Iwai 1987, pp.246-52).
84 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
85 Interview, Zenchu, Tokyo, September 1995.
86 Interview, Keidanren, Tokyo, September 1995.
87 Tashiro (1989, p.10), examining the arguments surrounding reform of the food control system, 
concluded that ‘all the turning points for the argument on the food control system were suggested
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Keidanren’s recommendations. Keizai Doyukai published a report, Objectives and 
Policies for Rice Reform, in October 1988. The Committee on the Food Control 
System, an advisory panel to Zenchu, produced a report titled Future Directions of Rice 
Distribution and Control. Keidanren’s resolution calling for the partial liberalisation of 
the rice market on 24 May 1991 had a big impact on business and political circles. It led 
the heads of other business federations to express similar views. Osamu Uno, Chairman 
of Kankeiren (the Kansai Economic Federation) and Takeshi Nagano, Chairman of 
Nikkeiren, called for the early liberalisation of the rice market on 27 May and 29 May 
1991, respectively.88 Keidanren’s resolution also helped sustain the trend to 
liberalisation among LDP politicians with this explicit support from the business world.
More importantly, Keidanren’s position papers often influenced policy guidelines 
on agriculture. In parallel with other business federations and academic scholars, 
Keidanren affected the policy guidelines, especially those promulgated by the 
Agricultural Policy Advisory Council.89 The Council, an advisory panel to the Prime 
Minister, issues reports on future agricultural policy every five years.90 The 1980 
report, Basic Stance on Agricultural Policy in the 1980s, paid attention to the food 
industry, spelling out that agriculture and the food industry are two wheels of the cart 
for ensuring a stable food supply. It also referred to the price gap between domestic and 
imported raw materials, and suggested structural, production, and price policies aimed 
at rectifying the gap. This sensitivity was a consequence of Keidanren’s interim report 
of the recommendation of February 1981. The report drew attention to the crisis facing 
the food industry because of domestic agricultural policy, and suggested that 
agricultural import policy, which was complicated and lacked consistency across 
products, should be standardised and liberalised.
by zaikai through the Provisional Council for Administrative Reform and the recommendations of 
the peak business federations’.
88 Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 1991.
89 The Agricultural Policy Advisory Council, established in June 1961, is the most important panel 
which determines the future course of agricultural policy.
90 These are Promotion of the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy (1970), Expansion of the 
Comprehensive Food Policy (1975), Basic Stance on Agricultural Policy in the 1980s (1980), 
Basic Stance on Agricultural Policy for the 21st Century (1986), and Direction for Agricultural 
Policy in a New International Climate (1994).
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The eye-catcher on the 1986 report Basic Stance on Agricultural Policy for the 
21st Century was its emphasis on ‘agriculture as an industry’. It argued that agricultural 
policy should aim to establish the independence of agriculture as an industry by way of 
productivity improvements based on cost performance. This was the stance in 
Keidanren’s recommendation of January 1982 which took the view that agriculture was 
an essential industry in which farmers could be independent and self-sustaining without 
massive government intervention.
In August 1994, the Council issued a report, Direction for Agricultural Policy in a 
New International Climate. This report was particularly important because it provided a 
perspective on post-Uruguay Round agricultural policy. The report proposed that a new 
legal framework was needed to replace the Staple Food Control Law, which had 
governed production, distribution and prices of rice since 1942. It also recommended 
that rice growers decide how much to produce at their own discretion, and that punitive 
measures on farmers who do not abide by government-set production schemes should 
be abolished. In terms of the regulations regarding distribution, it stressed the need to 
introduce market mechanisms, promoting the entry of new rice wholesaling and 
retailing businesses in place of the system dominated by agricultural cooperatives. 
Keidanren’s advocacy of reform of the food control system went back to its 
recommendations on rice deregulation in January 1987. In the recommendation of May 
1994, Keidanren suggested the introduction of a selective rice planting system in which 
rice growers could decide whether they accept rice planting limits or not. The Council’s 
report largely incorporated the views of Keidanren’s recommendations.
In summary, Keidanren’s capability to affect directly the decisions on changing 
the basic of agricultural policy was limited. The agricultural issues are too politically 
sensitive, and detailed policies have been worked out among MAFF, the LDP, and the 
agricultural groups. However, Keidanren spearheaded the campaign for agricultural 
reform and liberalisation of agricultural trade, and Keidanren’s views have played a 
catalytic role in transforming agricultural policy.
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KEIDANREN’S STANCE ON THE IMPROVEMENT IN STANDARDS AND 
CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS
One policy area in which Keidanren actively committed itself to changing government 
policies with considerable success in the 1980s was improvement in standards and 
certification systems.91 In the 1970s and 1980s, the complicated standards and 
certification systems in Japan were regarded by foreign firms and governments as a 
symbol of the closed Japanese market, and successive trade disputes between Japan and 
its trade partners occurred over the application of standards and certification systems.92 
Keidanren expressed concern about foreign criticism of the systems, and actively 
committed the government to revising them.
The 1983 Gotoda Decision
The first substantial and comprehensive improvement in standards and certification 
systems was implemented in 1983. On 13 January 1983, the government held a cabinet 
meeting on economic measures, and announced a third package of external economic 
measures.93 This package included the reduction of tariffs on 86 items, the relaxation
91 The standards and certification systems mean the administrative system imposing regulations on 
goods and services with an eye to protecting consumers, ensuring the people’s health and security, 
and unifying industrial standards. The content of the systems is different country by country 
according to social and economic conditions. However, if the systems consider domestic 
conditions alone, these impede the entry of foreign products to the domestic market (Kawano 
1991, p.50). For overall discussions on trade friction regarding the standards and certification 
systems in Japan, see Anezaki and Noguchi (1983), and Negishi (1986).
92 Examples are high-cube containers, metal baseball bats, and tulip bulbs. The issue of high-cube 
containers will be discussed later. Metal ball bats were classified as ‘specified products’ subject to 
the S-mark system under the Consumer Product Safety Law. This classification, aiming to prevent 
injury to consumers, required foreign suppliers to submit each individual bat for inspection. The 
US government, which had complained about this system since May 1980, filed it to the GATT in 
September 1982 as a violation of the Standards Code. MTTI removed the special classification in 
January 1983. As far as tulip bulbs are concerned, Japan adopted cultivation in isolation as a 
quarantine system for imported tulip bulbs, which caused problems such as an inability of 
exporters to ship bulbs as finally packaged products through normal sales routes to wholesalers 
and retailers, and increased costs due to the expense of cultivation in isolation. The Netherlands, 
the major exporter of tulip bulbs, requested that the Japanese government revise the system on the 
grounds that cultivation in isolation was an outmoded quarantine method which caused healthy 
bulbs to become infected with viruses (KKC Brief, No.35, September 1986).
93 The first package of the liberalisation program, which was announced in December 1981, 
included the two-year advanced implementation of tariff reductions agreed on in the Tokyo 
Round, and the second package in May 1982 attained the elimination and reduction of tariff rates 
on 215 items and the elimination of import quotas on four farm products.
242
of import quotas on six farm products, the promotion of imports, and an improvement 
in standards and certification systems. A Liaison and Coordination Headquarters on 
Standards and Certification Systems was set up to discuss and promote the 
improvement in standards and certification systems. The Headquarters — comprising 
vice-ministers of relevant ministries — collected opinions from relevant organisations, 
and discussed detailed measures for improving standards and certification systems.94 
On 26 March, the Headquarters announced the so-called Gotoda Decision.95 According 
to the principle of domestic and external non-discrimination in the process of 
certification, the government decided to amend 17 laws regarding MITI, MAFF, the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Labour. 
The omnibus package amending these laws was adopted on 18 May 1983, and came 
into force in August 1983.
Keidanren was at the forefront of the movement to revise standards and 
certification systems in 1983 through collecting detailed examples, publishing them in 
recommendations and negotiating with the responsible government agencies and the 
LDP. On April 27 1982, Keidanren’s Committee on Foreign Trade made public a 
statement, entitled For Better External Economic Relations with Our Trading Partners. 
In addition to further tariff reductions and liberalisation of 27 remaining quota items, 
the statement demanded drastic simplification of complicated approval systems, 
including export and import inspection procedures.
In autumn 1982, the Committee on Foreign Trade collected approximately 1,000 
complaints on trade-related regulatory issues, mainly from foreign firms. Then, a panel 
of experts on trade procedures was set up under the Committee, along with three 
specialised subcommittees. The panel groups discussed 300 detailed trade-related 
complaints at the meetings where some 250 specialists in total gathered 12 times.96
94 For example, the US government sent requests regarding standards and certification systems to the 
Headquarters on 26 February, and the European Community took the same action on 10 March 
('Toki no horei, No. 1193, 13 October 1983, p.7).
95 This decision contained five principles for revision: the legal and institutional preservation of 
domestic and external non-discrimination in the process of certification; the maintenance of 
transparency in standards and regulations; the promotion of standards and certification systems 
compatible with international norms; the further acceptance of foreign inspection data; and the 
simplification and speeding-up of certification procedures.
96 Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, 1982, pp.70-71.
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Based on intensive discussions over the improvement in trade regulatory procedures, 
Keidanren adopted a position paper entitled A New Look at Trade-Related Regulatory 
Administration on 21 December 1982, and submitted it to the Nakasone Cabinet and the 
LDP. This paper requested that ‘various regulatory agencies be abolished except where 
they are indispensable from the standpoint of national policy and for securing the safety 
of citizens’, and suggested that the current trade-related regulatory systems should be 
internationalised by accepting foreign standards and by abandoning double inspection 
and testing.97 This recommendation also included detailed examples for improving 
licensing, approval and other trade regulatory systems.
Keidanren obtained a response from concerned ministries on every item it raised 
in its recommendation of December 1982, and recognised that many of the problems 
regarding trade regulatory administration sprang from the way that laws and ordinances 
were administrated, but there were cases where improvement was difficult without 
amendment of the legislation itself.98 Accordingly, Keidanren decided to establish 
another subcommittee consisting of experts on trade-related laws and ordinances. Four 
research groups were also organised under the panel of experts to study the Customs 
Law, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, the Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Law and the Food Sanitation Law.99 In order to accumulate more cases and examples 
and to explore the irrational aspects of existing systems, Keidanren conducted another 
questionnaire survey among its members in February 1983, and compiled a list of 
complaints from foreign governments and organisations.100
Based on these various surveys and discussions in the subcommittee and in the 
research groups, the Committee on Foreign Trade drew up a statement entitled 
Reforming Trade-Related Regulations and Improving Their Application. Keidanren 
submitted this to the government and the LDP on 22 March 1983, and explained this at 
the OTO advisory council the next day.101 The statement included 207 detailed
97 KKC Brief No.3, January 1983.
98 Keidanren Jigyo Hohoku, 1982, pp.71-72.
99 KKC Brief No.35, September 1986.
100 KKC Brief No.35, September 1986.
101 Keidanren Geppo, May 1983, pp.55-56.
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examples for revision concerning 43 laws and ordinances ranging from the revision of 
the custom system to the promotion of transparency in administrative procedures.
In addition to direct commitments to concerned ministries and agencies, 
Keidanren cooperated with the LDP’s Special Committee for International Economic 
Measures chaired by Masumi Esaki. The Committee, established in December 1981 as a 
direct organisation of the President of the LDP, was a substantial body to promote 
market opening measures including the improvement in import administrative 
procedures in the early 1980s.102 Keidanren supported the initiatives of the Committee. 
It is said that the data the Committee used in revising standards and certification 
systems were largely based on the questionnaire survey of Keidanren (Funabashi 1987, 
p.57). Keidanren also maintained close communication with the Committee by 
exchanging views over revising standards and certification systems. For example, when 
Keidanren drew up its position paper in December 1982, it had an opportunity to 
explain major examples for improving trade-related regulatory administration before 
the Committee. Esaki requested that the relevant agencies discuss the response to the 
issues Keidanren raised.103
The Action Program in 1985
The improvement in standards and certification systems became a major issue in the 
Action Program of July 1985.104 Following a meeting in Los Angeles in January 1985 
between Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and US President Ronald Reagan, the 
Japanese government decided to formulate further market liberalisation measures as 
well as to launch market-oriented sector-specific (MOSS) negotiations in 
pharmaceutical and medical devices, telecommunications, electronics, and forestry 
products. On 9 April 1985, the government received a report from the Advisory
102 The Committee initiated and coordinated the decisions both of the first package of liberalisation 
program in December 1981, and of the second package in May 1982. The establishment of OTO 
in January 1982 was also realised with a strong commitment of the Committee (Gekkan Jiyu 
Minshu, March 1982, pp.39-40). In respect of import procedures, the Committee called on the 
government in February 1982 to improve import procedures on 67 of 99 items of which foreign 
countries complained (Funabashi 1987, p.39). In the revision of standards and certification 
systems in May 1983, the Committee supervised the actions of ministries towards improving 
certification and import procedure systems.
103 Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, 1982, p.71.
104 For the background and effects of the Action Program, see Higashi and Lauter (1990, chap.3).
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Committee for External Economic Issues chaired by Saburo Okita. The report 
advocated six sets of measures for easing trade friction including an action program to 
improve market access, economic expansion centred on the domestic demand, and the 
expansion of economic cooperation. On the same day, the government announced a 
seventh package of external economic measures, and decided to draft the framework for 
the Action Program by July. The Government-Ruling Parties Joint Headquarters for the 
Promotion of External Economic Measures headed by the Prime Minister himself was 
established on 19 April.
On 30 July, the government issued an Outline of the Action Program for 
Improved Market Access. This addressed opening the market in six areas: tariffs; import 
restrictions; standards, certification, and import procedures; government procurement; 
capital and financial markets; and service imports. The Program included the reduction 
and elimination of tariffs on 1,853 items, 1,790 of which were cut by 20 per cent. In the 
area of government procurement, 16 government-related organisations were added to 
the scope and coverage of the GATT agreement on government procurement. In respect 
of the improvement in standards and certification systems, 88 items covered by 31 laws 
were expected to be amended. Although the overall assessment of the effectiveness of 
the Program was rather low, the improvement in standards, certification, and import 
procedures received a relatively favourable assessment.
In the deliberation on the Action Program of July 1985, Keidanren initiated the 
move towards the improvement in import standards, certification systems and 
inspection procedures. Keidanren was not satisfied with the amendment of 16 laws in 
May 1983. There was still foreign discontent with Japan’s system of trade regulation. In 
addition, economic relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated as the US 
trade deficit with Japan climbed from US$19 billion in 1983 to over US$33 billion in 
1984.
Keidanren submitted a proposal entitled Smoothing the Way for Imports on 4 
February 1985. It recommended that the administration make a deliberate commitment 
to reassess and reform both its policy objectives and the means used to give effect to 
them, responding to the growth of the national economy, advances in science and
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technology, and changes in lifestyles.105 This paper included 44 detailed proposals for 
the revision of 18 laws. Keidanren focused particularly on the Food Sanitation Law and 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law because many grievances about non-tariff barriers 
related to food and drugs. The Committee on Foreign Trade had conducted another 
questionnaire survey in May 1984 dealing with food and drugs, and had extensive talks 
with the relevant ministries.106 The results of this survey were incorporated into the 
recommendations. Twenty-one out of 44 cases taken up in the recommendations were 
relevant to the Food Sanitation Law and the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. Keidanren 
pushed for the improvements through negotiations with ministries and agencies 
responsible on a case-by-case basis and through the commitments to the Cabinet Special 
Assignment Office, and the LDP’s Committee for International Economic Measures.
In February 1985, Keidanren made public another position paper entitled Toward 
Rebuilding and Strengthening the Free Trade System. This paper advocated the need to 
open up the Japanese market from a broader standpoint. It called for immediate action 
on the reduction and elimination of tariffs on wood products, alcoholic beverages, 
boneless chicken and so on, and reform of trade-related regulatory procedures, as well 
as such long-term issues as the promotion of a new multilateral trade negotiation round, 
and elimination of restraints outside the GATT framework.
In addition to the submission of the position papers, senior executives of 
Keidanren called directly on the government and the LDP to promote market 
liberalisation. On 21 March, senior executives of Keidanren asked the LDP’s top- 
ranking officials to promote the reduction of tariffs on boneless chicken and 
plywood.107 On 8 April, Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman of Keidanren, had a meeting 
with executive officials of MAFF including the Minister, and suggested reducing the 
tariffs on boneless chicken and plywood.108
105 KKC Brief, No.26, February 1985.
106 KKC Brief, No.35, September 1986.
107 Asahi Shimbun, 21 March 1985.
108 Asahi Shimbun, 8 April 1985.
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Results of activities
The requests in Keidanren’s statements concerning the improvement in standards and 
certification systems were widely incorporated into government policies. Particularly 
important in the Gotoda Decision in March 1983 was the acceptance of foreign 
inspection data. Several Japanese laws did not admit acceptance of foreign inspection 
data on the grounds that it might cause security and health problems. Keidanren called 
on the government to accept foreign standards and foreign inspection data in the 
statement of December 1982 and of March 1983 with the objective of promoting the 
compatibility of the domestic legal system with international norms. In the statement of 
March 1983, amendment of a dozen laws relating foreign inspection data was 
advocated. The Gotoda Decision suggested accepting foreign inspection data with 
respect to 17 laws including the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, the High-Pressure Gas 
Control Law, the Agricultural Chemicals Control Law. Eleven out of 17 laws were 
taken up in Keidanren’s proposals in March 1983.
The other important revision in the Gotoda Decision and the omnibus package in 
May 1983 concerned the Road Vehicles Law. Keidanren called on the Ministry of 
Transport to revise 13 items of this Law including the acceptance of inspection data 
conducted by recognised foreign automakers as well as the amendment of safety 
regulations. The package incorporated most of Keidanren’s requests, including that for 
an improvement in type designation procedures and handling procedures for motor 
vehicles imported in small batches, as well as the revision of safety regulations for 
headlights, turn signals, rear reflectors, headrests, and rear bumpers.
In the Action Program of July 1985, Keidanren failed to realise its objectives for 
market opening in some areas. For instance, the reduction in tariffs on plywood was 
excluded from the Program due to strong resistance from MAFF and norin zoku. 
However, in the areas of improvement in the standards and certification systems, many 
items for which Keidanren had requested revision were included in the Program. The 
Program incorporated Keidanren’s 27 requests concerning seven laws, including ten 
and nine items with respect to the Food Sanitation Law and the Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Law respectively.109 An important case was the permission for passage of high-cube
109 KKC Brief, No.35, September 1986.
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containers within Japan. The Japanese government prohibited the domestic use of high- 
cube containers on the grounds that the Japanese highway system was structurally 
unable to handle such loads and their use would cause safety problems. The importers 
had to change high-cube containers widely used in the Pacific line to the domestic ones. 
However, the passage of high-cube containers for exports was allowed on the grounds 
that these were inseparable freight, and this double-standard treatment had been 
criticised as unfair. In responding to foreign criticism, Keidanren had maintained since 
spring 1983 that the issue could be resolved even under present conditions by using 
permits to transport the containers at specific times along specific routes.110 Keidanren 
also called for the revision of the Load Law and the Load Traffic Law in the position 
papers of March 1983 and February 1985.
Keidanren’s motivations
Why did Keidanren so actively commit itself to improving standards and certification 
systems? Keidanren’s motivations had much to do with the establishment of the Second 
Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Daini Rincho). Rincho started with 
nine members and 21 special members on 16 March 1981. Keidanren and other 
business federations provided both foundation of Rincho and momentum of its 
activities. A clue to Keidanren’s interest in administrative reform was the new seven 
year economic and social plan announced in August 1979. This plan spelt out the need 
to correct fiscal deficits by tax increases. Keidanren, anxious to avoid tax increases, 
demanded administrative and fiscal reform. In September 1979, Keidanren released a 
position paper entitled Opinions on the Future Tax System. This paper opposed tax 
increases and urged the government to develop detailed plans for fiscal reconstruction. 
Two months later, Keidanren released another position paper, Hope for Decisive 
Implementation of Administrative and Financial Reform, which contained detailed 
measures for administrative and financial reform (Heiwa Keizai Kenkyü Kaigi 1982, 
pp.85-86). Furthermore, Keidanren repeatedly required the LDP and MOF to refrain 
from introducing policies leading to tax increases. These initiatives led to the 
establishment of Rincho.
no KKC Brief No.21, July 1984.
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Leading zaikai supported the activities of the commission. Keidanren dispatched 
Toshio Doko, who had just finished a six-year term as Chairman of Keidanren, as the 
head of Rincho. Three out of nine members of the commission were selected from 
business circles. In addition, when the commission was established, the chairmen of the 
five business federations — Keidanren, Keizai Doyukai, Nikkeiren, Nissho and 
Kankeiren (the Kansai Economic Federation) — organised the Five Member 
Committee for Promoting Administrative Reform. However, the common front on 
administrative reform by zaikai lasted only for one year because differences among the 
major business federations — especially between Keidanren and Nissho — began to 
emerge. Nissho, whose members are small and medium-sized firms, favoured the 
expansion of public expenditure, as the Japanese economy plunged into recession. In 
July 1982, Shigeo Nagano, Chairman of Nissho, backed away from the line advocated 
by Rincho calling on the government to stimulate the economy by expanding public 
expenditure.111 This was incompatible with Keidanren’s stance favouring cuts in public 
expenditure. Nagano confronted Keidanren, proclaiming that he would organise a 
political association composed of small and medium-sized firms.112 Thus, although the 
common front by zaikai lasted only for a short time, Keidanren remained as a pivotal 
supporter of Rincho.
Rincho had two objectives. One was to resolve the fiscal bind by simplification 
and rationalisation of administrative operations. Business circles, which had 
successfully overcome the problems of the two oil shocks by restructuring and 
rationalisation efforts, expected bureaucrats to make similar efforts by cutting excess 
intervention in private activities as well as by rationalising administrative operations 
(Maki 1982, p.65). The improvement in standards and certification systems promoted 
administrative reform in trade-related areas.
The other objective of Rincho was to resolve problems resulting from 
internationalisation of the Japanese economy (Doi, Hayakawa and Yamaguchi 1985, 
p.206). Japanese manufacturing industries had intensified their dependence on exports 
since the late 1970s. On the one hand, rising dependence on overseas markets meant
111 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 July 1982.
112 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 July 1982.
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that big business did not have to rely so heavily on the public expenditures that Rincho 
sought to curtail (Heiwa Keizai Kenkyü Kaigi 1982 p.83). On the other hand, rising 
dependence on exports meant that Japan’s trade surpluses rose. Rincho sought to 
resolve trade friction through rationalisation of administrative operations and 
elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade.
The improvement in standards and certification systems aimed to achieve the 
second objective of Rincho through directly removing non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Around 1983, foreign governments voiced stronger criticisms of the closed Japanese 
market. The European Community proposed in March 1982 to initiate consultations 
with Japan under the provisions of GATT Article 23. The Community raised the 
complicated and exclusive import inspection, standards and certification systems as 
evidence of the closed nature of the Japanese market. Criticism against the domestic 
structure of the Japanese economy was also voiced by the US government. The US 
Trade Representative submitted a report on Japanese Barriers to US Trade and Recent 
Japanese Government Trade Initiatives to Congress in November 1982, pointing out 
that the Japanese standards and certification systems ran counter to domestic and 
external non-discrimination.113 Keidanren feared that the deterioration of relations with 
major trading partners would jeopardise the free trade system.
Tatsuzo Mizukami, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Trade made the point 
as follows:
If we ignore foreign criticisms of Japan . . . there is the serious danger that the forces of 
protectionism [will be] set loose to destroy the liberal trading system. What we must 
appreciate more than anything else is the fact that freeing our market to foreign imports is 
in our own interest in the sense that the Japanese people can have access to products of 
the best quality available in the world at the cheapest price.114
That Keidanren positively committed itself to improving the standards and 
certification systems to preserve the free trade system is also shown in various 
recommendations.115 For example, in February 1985 it urged:
113 Toki no horei, No.1193, 13 October 1983, p.6.
114 Keidanren Review, No.77 October 1982, p.4.
115 For example, see Toward Strengthening and Preserving the Free Trade System (27 September 
1983); Toward Rebuilding and Strengthening the Free Trade System (26 February 1985); and How 
Japan Can Contribute to a Healthy World Economy (25 February 1986).
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Japan must now assume a major role in rebuilding and strengthening the free-trade 
system. We must work even harder than other countries to open our domestic market 
wider still, and we should be ready to shoulder our share of the costs. At the same time, 
we must redouble our efforts to carry forward the administrative reform program and put 
a stop to excessive government intervention. And administrative policy must be made 
more transparent116
The improvement in standards and certification systems attracted only minor 
interest. This was partly because it contained a wide variety of amendments in laws and 
each amendment was very detailed, and partly because it did not necessarily lead to any 
immediate increase in imports. However, the systems of trade regulations constituted 
the major non-tariff barriers, regarded as a symbol of a closed Japanese market. 
Keidanren’s efforts improved these systems considerably, and the main target of trade 
friction shifted away from the trade regulation system to other issues after the late 
1980s.
Keidanren played a crucial role in improving the standards and certification 
systems. Not only did it identify problematic aspects of these systems in its various 
recommendations, but it also demanded their revision through direct negotiations with 
government agencies responsible for the administration and with the ruling party. 
Keidanren’s actions were spurred by the desire to promote administrative reform in 
trade-related areas. Equally important was the concern to maintain the free trade system 
on which Japanese manufacturing industry depended by showing Japan’s willingness to 
remove non-tariff barriers.
CONCLUSION
The analysis here has explored the development of Keidanren’s open trade stance, 
especially since the early 1980s. Keidanren expressed an anti-protectionist stance on 
agricultural trade and took the initiative in improving standards and certification 
systems. Significantly, Keidanren over time strengthened its open trade stance. The 
evolution of Keidanren’s policy stance can be seen in its commitment to farm products 
trade and agricultural policy liberalisation. Keidanren was not a vocal opponent of 
protectionist agricultural policy until the late 1970s. This stance changed in 1980 
through the establishment of the Committee on Agricultural Policy. Although the attack
116 KKC Brief ', No.27, March 1985.
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on agricultural trade protectionism came from the perspective of the food processing 
industry in the early 1980s, it became more comprehensive, including a demand for 
liberalisation in the rice market in the late 1980s. The evolution of Keidanren’s stance 
was also apparent in other commercial policy areas. Keidanren made serious efforts in 
the early 1980s to improve standards and certification systems, so-called border 
measures directly impeding the entry of foreign goods. Keidanren aggressively 
advocated deregulation after the late 1980s. The demand for deregulation was linked to 
the revision of the economic system that impeded better market access. Keidanren’s 
interest also took in investment policies in the 1990s as a factor affecting perceptions of 
a closed Japanese market. Keidanren called on the government to create a better 
environment for foreign investment in Japan through the removal and relaxation of 
regulations on investment-related policies, and the provision of incentives to attract 
inward investment. Keidanren’s commitment to achieving better market access 
expanded from trade policies proper to related investment policies and reform of the 
economic system that created a closed market.
Several of the factors that encouraged Keidanren to adopt an open trade stance 
were domestically based. A critical factor urging Keidanren to promote administrative 
reform through the activity of Rincho and to demand reform of the food control system 
was the need to restore sound public finance, and avoid tax increases. The demand for 
deregulation also involved commitment to the change from the bureaucracy-led, 
centralised social and economic systems to private sector led, decentralised systems. 
Central to all of these was the internationalisation of Japanese corporate activity and its 
influence on the character of Keidanren’s commitment to an open market. The 
evaporation of Keidanren’s tolerance for agricultural protectionism provides insight 
into the increased importance attached to Japanese industry’s linkages with overseas 
markets. While Japanese manufacturing industries increased their dependence on 
overseas markets through exports, Japan’s surpluses with trade partners mushroomed 
and raised the serious possibility of retaliation against Japan’s exports. Keidanren’s 
commitment to improve standards and certification systems can also be understood in 
this context. Moreover, Keidanren’s concern about the lack of foreign investment in 
Japan increased as the investment imbalance grew due to the huge expansion in the 
multinational operations of Japanese corporations. The demand for deregulation sprang
253
from the perception that Japan’s trade surplus would not decrease and Japan’s trade 
relations would remain unstable unless there was reform of a regulation-dominant 
economic system.
Keidanren’s policy influence differed case by case. In the area of agricultural 
policy, Keidanren’s influence was limited in spite of the persistence of its 
representation. Agricultural issues were politically extremely sensitive, and Keidanren 
was not a full participant in the policy process on agricultural issues. However, 
Keidanren played a role in initiating the campaign for agricultural reform and helped to 
shape the long-term agenda for reform. Keidanren has not influenced all measures for 
market liberalisation, either. There are numerous market opening measures in which 
other factors such as foreign pressure seem to be more influential. However, in the area 
of standards and certification systems and deregulation, Keidanren’s influence was 
conspicuous. Keidanren, cooperating with politicians and other business federations, 
took the lead in trying to influence policy making, and was successful in making its 
voice heard and its recommendations accepted.
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8  Conclusions
This study has looked in detail at the automobile, electronics, and textile industries, and 
at Keidanren to explore the influence of rising international corporate activity on firms’ 
policy preferences. The case studies suggest that as Japanese corporations have 
extended their multinational operations and international corporate alliances, they have 
become more interested in promoting the liberalisation of the Japanese market, except 
for some cases in the textile industry. The study also reveals several distinctive features 
of the relationship between greater international interdependence of corporate activity 
and firms’ trade policy preferences in Japan. In Japanese industry, vertical linkages 
affect the preferences of large corporations for opening up the home market. Divergent 
views among corporations within an industry is also uncommon in Japan. Moreover, 
multinational operations and corporate preferences for an open domestic market often 
develop concurrently in Japan. The preferences of the private sector influence changes 
in trade policy, and the effectiveness of commercial policy depends on the explicit or 
implicit preferences of the private sector in other cases.
The first section of this chapter examines how the central hypothesis that firms 
with extensive multinational operations and corporate alliances prefer an open domestic 
market applies to Japanese industry, and draws out the salient features of the formation 
of corporate preferences peculiar to Japan. The second section reviews how corporate 
preferences have affected Japanese policies on market liberalisation. The third section 
discusses the limitations of this study and explores future research issues.
FIRMS’ POLICY PREFERENCES
The central question of this study was ‘how has the internationalisation of corporate 
activity changed Japanese firms’ preferences on trade policy?’ The hypothesis is that as 
firms strengthen their international linkages in the form of multinational operations and 
international corporate alliances, they have more interest in the openness of the global 
market including the market at home. This corporate policy preference is expected to 
have an important influence on trade policy. Multinational corporations (MNCs) appear 
to favour open trade. MNCs gain more benefits from policies that reduce barriers to 
trade and investment flows because foreign production is often impossible without trade 
in intermediate products (Dunning 1993, p.402). Protection at home also imposes
additional costs on MNCs. MNCs fear that protection at home may promote retaliatory 
restrictions on their overseas operations and trade flows (Milner 1988, p.23). Closure of 
the home market can also put MNCs at a disadvantage vis-a-vis domestically oriented 
firms because trade barriers can impose new costs on the former with little or no effect 
on the latter (Milner 1987, p.645). Structural adjustment resulting from import pressure 
is often easier for MNCs to undertake than it is for domestically oriented firms. Not 
only do they frequently have more information about market trends and changes in 
international comparative advantage than do domestically oriented firms but they can 
shift from declining sectors to related sectors with better growth prospects.
Rising intra-firm trade is a crucial factor motivating MNCs to favour an open 
domestic market. Closure of the home market may hamper the trade of MNCs that 
export intermediate and final products from overseas subsidiaries to the home market. 
Corporate alliances are also expected to change firms’ preferences for open trade. Risk 
sharing through alliances reduces the need of firms to depend on protectionist policies 
(Cowhey and Aronson 1993, p.225). Corporate alliances also motivate firms to resist 
protectionist measures at home against their partners. Furthermore, corporate alliances 
may undermine the base for nationalistic trade and industrial policies and protectionism. 
This is because firms that forge research and development (R & D) and manufacturing 
alliances with foreign partners exchange information and technological knowledge 
including that acquired from government sponsored programs.
Japanese manufacturing industries intensified their international operations 
especially after the mid 1980s. Greater internationalisation, according to the theoretical 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2, should have made internationally oriented Japanese 
corporations interested in a more open domestic market. Testing the hypothesis that 
firms with significant international linkages prefer a liberalised home market in the 
Japanese context enriches the study of corporate preferences for anti-protectionist trade 
policy. Little work on corporate policy preferences has been done outside the United 
States. Distinctive characteristics of the Japanese political economy such as close 
relationships between business and government, the existence of powerful peak 
business federations and industrial associations, and the prevalence of long-term 
relational dealings may be thought likely to produce different outcomes from those in 
other countries, even under conditions in which internationally oriented corporations
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prefer an open domestic market. Addressing this question in the context of Japanese 
industry provides a strong test of the pro-liberal corporate preference hypothesis as well 
as insights into Japanese political economy.
The findings in this study, by and large, support the internationalisation 
hypothesis set out in Chapter 2. In the three sectoral case studies, the 
internationalisation of corporate activities has changed corporate preferences for open 
trade, with the exception of some areas in the textile industry. Multinational operations 
have been a crucial factor motivating Japanese automakers in the opening up of supplier 
keiretsu, and in expanding market access for foreign products by increasing the 
purchase of foreign auto parts and vehicles. Growing multinational operations have led 
to economic and political pressures to increase purchases from local suppliers, and 
made international procurement policies indispensable for creating efficient global 
procurement. These considerations led to the opening of supplier keiretsu relations to 
foreign parts makers. Multinational operations have also made Japanese automakers 
more sensitive to foreign criticism of the closed Japanese market. In order to dissuade 
foreign industries from demanding retaliatory restrictions on the local operations of 
Japanese automakers, and to ensure access to foreign markets, Japanese automakers 
have been keen to facilitate the access of foreign products to the Japanese market. The 
major automakers have changed their stance on free trade and market access. In the 
past, they considered that free trade was necessary to expand their market share in the 
world market. As their operations shifted from exports to local production, they were 
required to be insiders in local markets. They came to regard the expansion of market 
access of foreign products to Japan as necessary to their acceptance in foreign markets.
Growing multinational operations have also affected the stance of Japanese 
electronics producers on market access issues. As they extended their multinational 
operations, electronics producers reconsidered their pattern of aggressive competition, 
and paid more attention to cooperation with their competitors, as well as promoting the 
harmonisation of Japanese institutions and customs to international norms. These 
changes in strategy in 1989 encouraged major electronics firms to draw up international 
cooperation programs designed to expand market access for foreign products to Japan. 
The influence of multinational operations is also revealed in the stance of electronics 
firms on market access issues in the US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement. Although
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their cooperative action on market access for foreign semiconductor suppliers can be 
accounted for by the benefits from the arrangement, successful pressure by the US 
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), and persistent encouragement of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITT), changes in corporate preferences 
on market access were also of importance, especially in explaining the behaviour of 
consumer electronics producers. These producers were not major semiconductor 
producers and were highly dependent on the production of consumer electronic goods. 
As they expanded their multinational operations, they became more sensitive to foreign 
criticism of their corporate behaviour and of the closed Japanese market.
In the electronics industry, multinational operations also dampened the 
protectionist movement. Rising imports of electronic products did not encourage 
electronics firms to demand import restrictions. The industry experienced growing 
intra-industry trade as imports grew, and these continued to be a large trade surplus in 
this sector. Importing was largely carried out by Japanese multinational electronics 
firms themselves, as they implemented internal business rationalisation policies. While 
high value-added electronic goods continued to be manufactured in Japan, the 
production of standardised consumer electronic goods was increasingly transferred to 
overseas plants. These efforts diminished firms’ interest in, and need for, import 
restrictions.
In the textile industry, which faces rising import pressure, international corporate 
activity can also be expected to encourage firms to resist the temptation to press for 
import restrictions. The Japan Apparel Industry Council (JAIC) opposed import 
restrictions at the downstream stage, but supported import restrictions at the upstream 
and midstream stages. This is because apparel makers developed local production in 
East Asian countries, and were heavily involved in imports from these production bases 
to Japan. Other textile industry associations were reluctant to endorse protectionist 
policies because of their international links. The Japan Towel Manufacturers’ 
Association (JTMA), whose members were users of imported cotton yarn, opposed 
restrictions on imports of cotton yarn, despite demand for restrictions on imports of 
towel products. The Japan Textiles Importers Association (JTTA) whose members were 
engaged in the import business resisted the move to activate the Multi-Fibre
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Arrangement (MFA) and opposed an anti-dumping suit.
International corporate alliances have also contributed to the opening of the 
Japanese market. In the automobile industry, corporate alliances are a crucial factor 
promoting the opening of distribution keiretsu. Japanese automakers, through their 
distribution channels, sell vehicles that their alliance partners manufacture. In the 
electronics industry, some alliances have provided an environment in which close 
mutual understanding and communications have developed. This has contributed to the 
increased penetration of foreign semiconductors into the Japanese market. Alliances 
also motivated some electronics firms to implement market access activities more 
seriously in order to maintain stable relationships with alliance partners.
The case studies suggest that multinational operations and international corporate 
alliances have been key factors in changing the preferences of Japanese corporations in 
favour of an open domestic market. A preference for greater market liberalisation led to 
action to facilitate market access for foreign products and to resist protectionist 
measures. This is not, of course, to suggest that the internationalisation of corporate 
activity has been the only factor encouraging firms to change their stance on market 
access for foreign products. The high yen appreciation after 1985 was another crucial 
factor motivating Japanese corporations to use more imported products, as too was 
pressure from outside Japan, especially from the United States.
Japanese business has a different institutional setting from its US counterpart, 
through the representation of interests by peak business federations, especially 
Keidanren. Keidanren has intensified its demand for an open Japanese market as 
Japanese corporations have expanded their international operations. The evolution of 
Keidanren’s stance is evident in its commitment to liberalisation of trade in farm 
products. Previously Keidanren was not a vocal opponent of the protectionist 
agricultural policy. This stance changed in 1980 through the establishment of the 
Committee on Agricultural Policy. Although Keidanren’s attack on agricultural trade 
protectionism was moderate and general in the early 1980s, it became stronger and 
more comprehensive in the late 1980s, including a demand for liberalisation in the rice 
market. The evolution of Keidanren’s stance is also evident on other trade policy issues. 
In the early 1980s, Keidanren sought to improve standards and certification systems, so-
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called border measures directly impeding the entry of foreign goods. Keidanren 
intensified its advocacy of deregulation from the late 1980s, attempting to revise 
domestic systems that impeded better market access. Keidanren also directed attention 
to policies affecting inward investment in the 1990s, perceiving them as a factor 
fostering perceptions of a closed Japanese market. Keidanren’s commitment to opening 
the Japanese market extended from border measures to reform of the domestic system, 
and from trade policies proper to related investment policies.
Keidanren’s actions can be explained by several domestic factors. An important 
factor encouraging Keidanren to promote administrative reform, including 
improvement in standards and certification systems, and to demand reform of the food 
control system was its desire to restore sound public finance, and thereby avoid tax 
increases. Deregulation aimed to change a bureaucracy-led and centralised economic 
system to a private sector-led decentralised economic system. Liberalisation of 
agricultural trade was also demanded in order to strengthen international 
competitiveness in the food processing industry. However, the internationalisation of 
corporate activity is clearly an important factor motivating Keidanren to advocate 
liberalisation of the Japanese market. Keidanren strengthened its anti-protectionist 
stance on agricultural trade because the Japanese manufacturing sector increased its 
dependence on foreign markets and its involvement in overseas manufacturing, and 
Japan’s surpluses with its trading partners raised the likelihood of retaliation against 
Japan’s exports. The Japanese manufacturing sector accelerated its multinational 
operations after 1985. This led to a rise in the investment imbalance as well as to 
increased vulnerability to potential foreign retaliation. Keidanren focused on investment 
policies and deregulation in order to change the system that had created a closed 
Japanese market. Thus, Keidanren, the organisation representing the interests of 
internationally oriented big business, has also intensified its open trade stance as 
Japanese corporations have extended their international corporate activity.
The case studies here basically support the hypothesis that firms with greater 
multinational operations and international corporate alliances prefer an open domestic 
market. In the textile industry, however, there are qualifications to the argument. The 
Japan Chemical Fibres Association (JCFA) and the Japan Spinners’ Association (JSA), 
comprising big synthetic fibre and spinning companies with international links,
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demanded protectionist measures on textile imports. Their stance is partly explicable in 
terms of the main hypothesis of this study. Although their members were among the 
first overseas investors in Japanese industry in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
multinational operations did not expand and there were successive withdrawals from 
overseas investment in the 1970s and the early 1980s. They also restricted imports from 
their overseas plants to Japan to avoid unfavourable effects on domestic producers. 
Hence, they had little interest in resisting the demand for protectionist measures. The 
international linkages of these textile producers are less significant than those of 
automobile or electronics producers. In contrast to their weak international links, they 
had strong domestic links. The textile producers were linked to small and medium-sized 
firms through service fee contracts after the 1950s. They also concentrated their 
interests in downstream operations by promoting forward integration. The large textile 
firms, potentially the most powerful actors in the industry, assumed the role of leaders 
of the Japanese textile industry. The majority of firms in the industry are, however, 
small scale. Large companies tended to resist measures that undermined the interests of 
the majority in the industry. They suppressed their own interests in favour of those of 
the majority.
The exceptional case of the textile industry suggests that domestic linkages are 
also a crucial factor affecting firms’ trade policy preferences.1 Why, however, was 
there a difference in the case of the textile industry and not in the automobile and 
electronics industries? In these three industries, vertical keiretsu relations are present 
between large and small-sized firms. Large producer firms encourage small 
subcontracting firms to organise cooperative associations, and provide various 
assistance and information to their members. However, there are subtle differences in 
the business relations in each industry. In the textile industry, small-sized weaving 
houses are a significant source of the non-price competitiveness of Japanese textile 
products. Japanese textile producers have difficulty in finding weaving houses with the 
same quality overseas, and few Japanese weaving houses have been able to relocate
This finding is in line with those in previous studies that stress the influence of particular national 
characteristics on states’ policies in the sense that vertical relations influence trade policy through 
firms’ preferences in Japan (Katzenstein ed. 1978; Zysman 1983; Hart 1992).
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abroad successfully. Accordingly, large textile producers have sought to preserve the 
competitiveness of these subcontracting firms.
The automobile industry is similar to the textile industry in the sense that 
subcontracting firms are a source of competitiveness. However, major parts suppliers 
have been able to go abroad with their assembly makers or on their own, and auto 
assemblers have been compelled by economic and political pressures to find parts 
suppliers in local markets. The internationalisation of corporate activity has functioned 
to loosen the vertical relations between auto assemblers and parts suppliers. In the 
electronics industry, unlike the automobile sector, major producers manufacture 
numerous parts in-house; the ratio of in-house manufacturing is higher than in the 
automobile industry. In addition, electronics producers procure a portion of parts from 
suppliers’ catalogues in the market, not from subcontracting firms. In respect of 
semiconductors, core devices are manufactured in-house, and supplementary devices 
are supplied by other semiconductor producers, not by subcontracting firms. 
Accordingly, when electronics producers sought to purchase more foreign 
semiconductors, it was easier to switch from in-house production to procurement from 
other firms, and from domestic to foreign suppliers. In these three industries, the 
strength and form of vertical linkages diverge. The degree of internationalisation of 
subcontracting firms is also different. Vertical linkages do affect the preferences of 
large producers for opening the home market. But the detailed characteristics of 
linkages have greatly affected company preferences in different sectors.
In addition to strong domestic linkages, there are at least two other noteworthy 
features of the relationship between the internationalisation of corporate activity and its 
influence on firms’ preferences for commercial policy in Japan. The first is that 
multinational operations and corporate preferences in favour of an open domestic 
market often occur concurrently. This stems from a propensity for multinational 
operations by Japanese manufacturing firms to begin as a result of external factors 
rather than internal corporate strategies. Rising trade friction with other industrial 
countries after the late 1970s and a sharp appreciation of the yen after 1985 were crucial 
factors encouraging Japanese manufacturing firms to promote overseas operations. 
These factors simultaneously highlighted Japanese firms’ concerns about the openness 
of the home market. The preference in favour of open trade developed with
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multinational operations rather than after them. The crucial point is that the firms that 
developed multinational operations before the mid 1980s were the most active in 
opening the Japanese market. This was shown in the case of Nissan and Matsushita 
which took the initiative in drawing up international cooperation programs in 1989.
The second feature relates to the resolution of intra-industry divisions of views. 
Internal divergence of views on trade issues within an industry often prevents that 
industry from developing a unified position on trade policy. Milner (1988, p.248) 
attributes these divergent views to a difference in the degree of internationalisation, that 
is, the largest firms have tended to become internationalised, while the smaller ones 
have often remained dependent on the domestic market.
These studies of Japanese industry add to the understanding of intra-industry 
divergence of position on liberalisation in subtle ways. There are several cases where 
intra-industry divisions emerged over trade issues. The most prominent example was in 
the textile industry. The Japan Textile Industry Federation (JTIF), the peak organisation 
of the industry, called on the government to introduce the MFA as the collective will of 
the industry. Yet JTIA strongly opposed import restrictions, and this disagreement had 
the effect of weakening the demands of the textile industry for government action. 
There were also divergences at the firm level. Toray, the leading synthetic fibre 
producer, decided to begin importing textile products manufactured in its overseas 
plants. This decision broke a tacit consensus within the industry that products 
manufactured in overseas plants should not be imported into Japan. Toray did not 
accept the agreement among synthetic fibre makers to cut production capacity, either. 
Toray, which had established an integrated production system in Southeast Asia, could 
send yarn in oversupply in Japan to its overseas plants instead of cutting production in 
Japan.
Divisions among companies were evident in other sectors. In the electronics 
industry, NEC, the leading semiconductor producer, did not accept MITI’s injunction to 
cut semiconductor production. NEC’s resistance lasted for half a year and this defection 
undermined the effectiveness of MITI’s administrative guidance of the industry. 
Although there are only 11 producers in the automobile industry, the cohesion of the 
industry has not been strong. For instance, when the extension of VERs became an
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issue in 1985, the companies failed to reach a common position, and this was a crucial 
reason why the Japanese government decided on the extension of VERs. The relatively 
weak cohesion in the automobile industry is partly because Toyota, which did not have 
its headquarters in Tokyo until 1991, was less interested in maintaining cohesion in the 
industry. In the case examined here, Nissan’s international cooperation program was 
greeted cynically by other automakers in 1989.
These cases are in line with Milner’s argument that leading companies with 
intensive international linkages often take actions that contradict the interests of other 
firms in their industries. It also suggests the importance of examining individual firm’s 
preferences and behaviour.
In the cases examined here, disagreements among firms generally were not 
prevalent and cases where internal divisions made it difficult to develop a unified 
position on trade issues were rare. Industries were likely to develop a common position. 
In the textile industry, JTIA opposed import restrictions, but JTIA was not an 
association of textile producers. Textile producer associations maintained a common 
position on import restrictions. Despite its reluctance to support the introduction of the 
MFA on imports of cotton yam, JTMA demanded the introduction of the MFA on 
towel imports. Toray broke an industry consensus not to import products manufactured 
in overseas plants, but not until 1994. Toray had avoided reverse imports for twenty 
years in order to maintain industry solidarity. In the automobile industry, all the major 
automakers announced similar programs in 1989, following Nissan’s example. In the 
1992 Action Plan, all the major automakers eventually announced plans to increase the 
purchase of US-made parts and vehicles. A common front among firms was also 
evident in most instances in the electronics industry. The major electronics firms made 
concerted efforts to expand market access for foreign semiconductors. This is shown by 
the fact that some 60 members of the Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) 
joined the Users Committee of Foreign Semiconductors (UCOM) when it was founded. 
All the major electronics firms, including those that were not involved with the 
dumping problems in the US market, attained the 20 per cent market share target of 
foreign semiconductors by 1992.
Two factors explain the tendency of Japanese corporations to adopt a similar
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position on trade issues. The first factor is similarity of international operations. 
Originally, Japanese corporations tended to follow a leader’s example due to their 
strong sense of equal level competition, and an industrial structure that is not heavily 
concentrated (Encamation 1986, p.130-32). In addition, unlike US corporations which 
have engaged in international operations over a long period, Japanese corporations 
generally entered international operations recently and at the same time as a 
consequence of the appreciation of the yen and rising trade friction. In the automobile 
industry, eight out of the nine passenger car producers established production plants in 
North America in the 1980s. In the electronics industry, 186 out of 455 firms belonging 
to EIAJ as full members had overseas manufacturing facilities in 1993, and 356 out of 
924 manufacturing facilities were set up between 1985 and 1989 (EIAJ 1993b). These 
common moves into international operations reduced the possibility of intra-industry 
conflict over trade policy issues.
The second factor is the existence of powerful industrial associations. Some 
scholars argue that associations that link state and societal actors have over time played 
an increasingly important role in policy formation and policy implementation 
(Gourevitch 1986, pp.229-32). In Chapter 3, it was argued that industrial associations 
played an important role in reflecting their members’ interests in policy making in 
Japan. The findings of these case studies confirm these points. The leadership of 
industrial associations is apparent in the textile industry in which all major sub-sectors 
organise an association. These associations are bases for political activities, and their 
lobbying was a crucial factor in changing the government’s stance on import 
restrictions. EIAJ also played a crucial role in promoting market access in the 
semiconductor sector. Market access activities became prominent after EIAJ discussed 
with SIA detailed measures for expanding the sales of foreign devices in March 1988, 
and established UCOM two months later. EIAJ and UCOM took the initiative in 
promoting market access for foreign semiconductors by suggesting measures for market 
access and providing opportunities for Japanese semiconductor users and foreign 
suppliers to meet. In the automobile industry, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (JAMA) organised design-in seminars and conferences and undertook 
various public relations activities in order to promote market access. These associations 
play a key role in representing preferences of member firms on trade issues to the
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government, and initiating activities for market liberalisation. The strong leadership of 
industrial associations minimised the possibility of intra-industry divisions on trade 
issues among member firms.
THE INFLUENCE OF BUSINESS ON POLICY MAKING
In Chapter 3, earlier studies of the role of private business in shaping economic policy 
in Japan were reviewed. These studies saw Japan as a strong state and argued that the 
bureaucracy played a dominant role in shaping economic policy in Japan. Recent 
studies have stressed the role of the private sector in economic policy making. What 
insight does this study, focusing on corporate preferences in trade policy formation, 
provide into the role of business in Japanese policy making? The influence of 
Keidanren’s commitment to the opening of the Japanese market was important in the 
improvement in standards and certification systems and the promotion of deregulation. 
Keidanren identified problematic aspects of regulation systems in trade-related areas 
and in other areas of the economy, and suggested detailed measures to rectify them. 
Strong lobbying of the government and the ruling parties often led to the incorporation 
of its demands into government policies. Even in the agricultural issues, where 
Keidanren is not a primary member of the policy formation group, it played a role in 
initiating a campaign for reform of agricultural trade policy and in suggesting a long­
term strategy on reform. In the textile industry, the government softened its attitude 
towards the introduction of the MFA. The most critical factor in this case was strong 
pressure from textile circles reflected in the 1994 textile report document which 
recommended that the government should examine detailed conditions for introducing 
the MFA. These cases provide evidence of the influence of business preferences and 
commitments on changes in trade policy direction.
On market access policies, the cases in which government policies were formed or 
changed as a direct result of firms’ or industries’ commitments were rare. The Japanese 
government, especially MITT, requested firms and industries unilaterally to promote 
market access for foreign firms and products. In this sense, this study agrees with other 
studies that firms’ preferences are not the only factor accounting for trade policy 
outcomes. As Milner (1988, pp.260-62) argues, the identity and goals of policy makers 
are critical factors affecting trade policy outcomes. This does not necessarily mean that
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MITI has played a dominant role in the opening of Japanese market. M m  launched 
several policies designed to open the Japanese market and to attract foreign products 
and firms. However, policy instruments directly aimed at the private sector have been 
limited. MITT pressured firms into accepting its guidance by hinting at the possibility of 
invoking legal authority such as the regulation of exports under the Export Trade 
Control Ordinance, but these cases were exceptional.
This study suggested more subtle relationships between government and business 
over market access issues. In 1989, for example, M m  hoped to promote imports in a 
medium term time frame, yet it did not have any plausible pretext for requesting the 
private sector to do so. After Nissan announced an international cooperation program, 
M m  formally asked 50 firms to draw up similar programs. Nissan’s program gave 
substance to MITI’s intention and offered a pretext to take this issue up with industry. 
Similar relations between M m  and the private sector were seen in the Business Global 
Partnership Project that M m  announced in November 1991. The uniqueness of this 
project lay in the promotion of industrial alliances. The private sector had already been 
engaged in extensive joint ventures and technical tie-ups, and MITI’s policy followed 
these moves. Some companies asked M m  to consider import promotion not only 
directly but also through providing global industrial alliances. M m  adopted these 
views and made the promotion of industrial alliances a pillar of the project.
Market access in semiconductors was promoted effectively after EIAJ’s active 
involvement. MITI’s encouragement to promote market access was certainly an 
important factor that led the electronics industry to consider market access seriously. 
However, concrete measures such as the establishment of a task force on consumer 
electronics, the promotion of design-in and the use of distribution channels originated in 
the electronics industry. Moreover, when the relations between MITI and the electronics 
industry were difficult, M m  failed to attain its policy objective. The unstable 
relationship between MITI and the electronics industry was a vital factor inviting US 
sanctions. These examples suggest that although the Japanese government seemed to 
lead the private sector to expand market access forcefully, the effectiveness of such 
initiatives often depended on the explicit or implicit preferences of the private sector.
Through the 1980s, the Japanese government announced a series of market
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liberalisation measures, but these measures were regarded as ‘too little, too late’, far 
below the expectations of foreign governments. If these inadequate measures are 
explained by focusing on government action alone, the cause of the limited outcome is 
simply negligence by the Japanese government. If the preferences of private business 
are taken into account, this result stems from private actors’ inadequate recognition of 
the necessity for expanding market access.
As the study reveals, MITI seeks to intervene in the activities of private business 
such as investment plans, advertising, and import expansion programs. However, 
intervention does not necessarily mean influence. Internationally competitive firms 
have sufficient resources to formulate and pursue their own corporate strategies. Even if 
firms take action that the government encourages, this does not necessarily mean that 
they do so by abiding by the government’s guidance. Their actions may spring from 
their own preferences or from a desire for cohesion within the industry. By the early 
1980s, MITI’s influence on industry had gradually declined as Japanese industry 
enhanced its international competitiveness and accumulated corporate power. When the 
internationalisation of corporate activities grew rapidly in the 1980s, Japanese 
corporations became embroiled in political problems. This was because they tended to 
pursue market share single-mindedly, paying little attention to the political effects of 
their behaviour. MITI gradually regained some influence on internationally competitive 
sectors by intervening to seek solutions to trade friction caused by firms in areas where 
MITI’s involvement had in the past been limited.2 The study suggests that 
internationally oriented firms are more likely to formulate corporate strategies taking 
into consideration political as well as economic factors. If this tendency is strengthened, 
MITI’s influence on internationally competitive sectors is likely to decline once again.
ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The study revealed that firms with extensive international linkages preferred an open 
domestic market in internationally competitive sectors. Yet the study is not free from 
the inherent limitations of case studies, in particular the problem of uniqueness. The 
study does not show that all Japanese MNCs take a position supporting market
2 Nikkei Bijinesu, 26 March 1990, p.16.
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liberalisation in Japan. Large textile producers adopted a protectionist stance, and this 
evidence suggests the need to undertake studies of firms’ trade policy preference in 
other sunset industries. Another issue for further research is the reaction of private 
actors to deregulation. The study sheds light on the influence of firms’ preferences on 
deregulation through the activities of Keidanren. Examination of different stances 
between and within industries on deregulation will contribute to a clearer understanding 
of corporate interests in market liberalisation.
The research also has implications for broader international comparative research. 
The Japanese evidence confirms the main conclusions of work on the United States and 
France but also suggests subtle differences from the US and French cases, mainly 
because of close links in Japan among domestic firms, the existence of powerful 
industrial associations, and the difference in institutional setting. The study highlights 
the value of conducting research on countries with different industrial characteristics 
and different institutional settings. Further research can also be done on the influence of 
international corporate alliances on government policy. The study suggests that 
corporate alliances in the electronics and automobile industries contributed to the 
change in corporate preferences towards more open trade. Research on other industries 
and other countries on this issue may strengthen confidence in this conclusion.
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Appendix
Interview List
Mr. Noboru Arai,
Toshiba Corporation
February 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Tom Arai, April 1994, Tokyo
Electric Industries Association of Japan
Mr. Noboru Araya, February 1994, Tokyo
Japan Cotton and Staple Fibres Weavers Association
Mr. Hiroshi Bessho, March 1994, Tokyo
Tray Industries Inc.
Mr. Toshiyuki Endo, March 1994, Tokyo
Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations)
Mr. Kazuo Fujimoto, April 1994, Tokyo
International Semiconductor Cooperation Center
Mr. Shinichiro Fukushima, May 1994, Tokyo
Automobile Division, Machinery and Information 
Industries Bureau, MTTI
Mr. Akira Gyobu, March 1994, Tokyo
Japan Auto Parts Industries Association
Mr. Junichi Haba, September 1995, Tokyo
Japan Towel Manufacturer’ Association
Mr. Tamotsu Harada, September 1995, Tokyo
Electric Industries Association of Japan
Mr. Sadayoshi Hino, September 1995, Tokyo
Japan Spinners’ Association
Mr. Atsushi Horigome, June 1994, Tokyo
Tokyo Nissan Motor Sales Company
Mr. Shigeru Iizaka, September 1995, Tokyo
Zenchu (The Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives)
Mr. Hiroshi Kam, March 1994, Tokyo
Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives)
Mr. Yasuhisa Kawagishi, March 1994, Tokyo
Japan Automobile Dealers Association
Mr. Akira Kawaguchi, September 1995, Tokyo
Office for the Promotion of Administrative Reform, Keidanren
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Mr. Takashi Kikuoka,
Yokohama Toyopet Company
June 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Hidefumi Kobayashi,
The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
March 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Kazunori Koga,
Japan Chemical Fibres Association
February 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Kunihiko Komatsu,
NEC Corporation
April 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Tsuneo Komura,
The Japan Textiles Importers Association
September 1995, Tokyo
Mr. Motoo Masaki,
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
June 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Tetsuya Matsuura, September 1995, Tokyo
Trade Division, Consumer Goods Industries Bureau, MITI
Mr. Tadahiro Mizutani, 
Kanebo Ltd.
September 1995, Tokyo
Mr. Ryoji Mita,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
May 1994, Osaka
Mr. Masayoshi Miyazaki, 
Sony Corporation
March 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Motoo Moriya,
Japan Knitting Industry Association
March 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Kabun Muto,
Member of House of Representatives
September 1995, Tokyo
Mr. Osamu Nagata,
Chrysler Japan Sales Ltd.
May 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Kenkichi Nakajima,
Nippon Motorola Ltd.
April 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Torn Nakayama,
Industrial Electronics Division, Machinery and 
Information Industries Bureau, MITI
February 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Katsunori Nemoto, 
Keidanren
September 1995, Tokyo
Mr. Hiroshi Niwano,
International Business Affairs Division, Industrial 
Policy Bureau, MITT
May 1994, Tokyo
Mr. Kazuo Nukazawa, 
Keidanren
September 1995, Tokyo
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Mr. Michio Okawa,
Tray Industries Inc.
Mr. Shinichiro Omori, 
Hitachi Ltd.
Mr. Shingo Oogi, 
Teijin Ltd.
Mr. Kunihisa Ono,
Users Committee of Foreign Semiconductors
Mr. Kuniyoshi Sawada,
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association
Mr. Fumio Shinozuka,
Japan Textile Federation
Mr. Katsuyuki Suginohara,
Toyota Motor Co. Ltd.
Mr. Kaoru Sumikama,
Nissan Motor Co. Ltd.
Mr. Hitoshi Suzuki,
Calsonic Corporation
Mr. Toshio Takada,
ZEXEL Corporation
Mr. Toshikazu Tanida,
Communications Industry Association of Japan
Mr. Kunio Tomita,
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
Mr. Katsuhiro Yamanaka,
The Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association
Mr. Kenichiro Yokowo, 
Keidanren
Mr. Hideki Yoshida,
Texas Instruments Japan Limited
Mr. Yasuhiro Wad a,
Honda Motor Co. Ltd.
Mr. Naoyuki Watanabe,
Imports Division, International Trade Administration 
Bureau, Mi l l
April 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
September 1995, Tokyo 
September 1995, Tokyo 
March 1994, Tokyo 
March 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
May 1994, Tokyo 
June 1994, Tokyo 
March 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
February 1994, Tokyo 
June 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo 
April 1994, Tokyo
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